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Preface and Summary
Since the early 19th century, the world experienced an accelerating process of an integration
of the national economies that is generally called globalization.1 Driven by the occurring
technological and political progress, in particular the revolution of the transportation tech-
nology (railways, steamships and airplanes) and subsequently the information and commu-
nication technology (ICT; telephone and computer) as well as the liberalization, costs of
transporting goods as well as barriers to trade, invest and travel declined and thus cross-
border flows of goods (international trade), capital (international investment) as well as,
to a smaller extent, people (international migration) surged.2 Recently, the world is eco-
nomically (as well as politically and socially) by far more intertwined than ever before and
any attempt of a deeper understanding of this process has to focus on its main economic
drivers, inevitably leading to the following questions: How do the economic actors decide
and behave in such an environment? Why do they decide and behave as they do? What
are the (micro- and macro-)economic consequences of their actions?
This thesis contains five chapters that deal with firms in the globalized world. All of these
self-contained essays are motivated and guided by the attempt to learn (more) about these
smallest organizational units in the economy that aim at profitably producing and selling
products3 to the market in which they are located in (domestic market), but especially to
markets across their own national border (foreign markets) whose serving generates addi-
tional problems as well as options for the firms. The analyses that are conducted in these
essays concentrate on the globally active firms’ decisions and behaviors, their correspond-
ing determinants (factors) as well as implications. Chapter 1 theoretically studies the firm
choice of how to serve foreign markets by choosing either exporting domestically manufac-
tured goods or setting up a production facility abroad through foreign direct investment
(FDI).
1For the discussion of the start of globalization and its determination in the early 19th century: See
O’Rourke and Williamson (2002, 2004).
2For a comprehensive survey of the history of international trade and the non-monotone development
of trade, i.e. the existence of phases of de-globalization due to political regresses (wars): See Findlay and
O’Rourke (2009). Recently, Federico and Tena-Junguito (2017) revise the common temporal localization
of the two waves of globalization.
3Based on the fundamental definition of economic organizations by Milgrom and Roberts (1992): “Eco-
nomic organizations are created entities within and through which people interact to reach individual and
collective economic goals. The economic system consists of a network of people and organizations, [...].”
(p. 19).
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The following essays all address a special type of firms, called multi-product firms, which
are characterized by the fact that they produce and sell more than a single product. An
encouragement, justification and requirement to (theoretically) concentrate on them when
being interested in globally active firms and a detailed picture of their characteristics and
behavior that binds the theory are provided by Chapter 2, that surveys a comprehensive
body of empirical studies on multi-product firms in international trade. After a short in-
troduction to the already existing theory of multi-product firms in international trade as
a reference and starting point (Chapter 3), Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 theoretically study
multi-product firms. The former takes a look into multi-product firms that both produce
with a flexible manufacturing technology and are endowed with a resource, called organi-
zational capital, in a limited amount and investigates those firms’ behavior in international
trade. The latter analyzes the export behavior of multi-product firms in a world in which
countries differ in their per capita income and preferences are non-homothetic.
Chapter 1 - “Export versus FDI: Non-monotone Sorting under Quadratic Preferences”:
Monopolistic competition models with constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) consumer
preferences do not replicate substantial empirical facts and in this way provide an incentive
to look for an alternative theoretical assumption on consumption. By applying quadratic
instead of CES preferences in a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms,
this chapter investigates the robustness of the conventional sorting of cross-border active
firms that is derived by Helpman et al. (2004), and thereby detects a significant change at
the upper end of the productivity range: While (sufficiently) productive firms export and
even more productive ones engage in foreign direct investment (FDI), the most productive
firms do not undertake FDI, but export again. This non-monotone sorting is consistent
with the meta-analysis by Mra´zova´ and Neary (forthcoming) and both direct and indirect
empirical support for it can be found.
Chapter 2 - “Multi-product Firms in International Trade - A Survey and Evaluation of
Empirical Studies”: Motivated by the intensive treatment of multi-product firms in the
more recent empirical literature of international trade, which is based on the progressive
availability of micro data sets, this chapter asks for the actual state of knowledge about
this type of firms in international trade. It tries to generate a comprehensive answer by
surveying and evaluating a large body of empirical studies that employ micro data sets both
for developed and developing countries. Thereby, it turns out that several robust findings
or stylized facts can be derived, even so definitions about firms and products vary across
the studies: Multi-product firms (i) are national and especially international prominent,
less prevalent but important, (ii) are singular economic units with premia in terms of their
nature and performance, (iii) produce and export at different margins, (iv) are asymmetric
within themselves (“superstar products”), (v) do not produce all their exports, (vi) are
relatively diversified in production and export, (vii) compete on both a cost and quality
vbasis, (viii) are less prone to firm exit in the process of “creative destruction”, (ix) start
exporting at a small scale and scope and increase them over time, (x) frequently and to
a large extent change their product portfolio (“product switching”) and (xi) undertake
adjustments in response to exogenous shocks. These derived empirical regularities bind
both the existing and upcoming theoretical modeling of multi-product firms.
Chapter 3 - “Introduction to the Theory of Multi-product Firms in International Trade”:
As a reference and starting point for the following chapters, this chapter introduces to the
theory of multi-product firms in international trade, its evolution in the general theory of
international trade and structurally presents its main contributions.
Chapter 4 - “Multi-product Firms with Flexible Manufacturing and Organizational Cap-
ital in International Trade”: Based on the traditional resource-based theory of firms, this
chapter develops a theory of multi-product firms with both dis-economies of scope and
asymmetric products in international trade. Firms with some flexible manufacturing tech-
nology in production are endowed with some production cost-reducing resource, called
organizational capital, which is (in the short run) for each firm limited in volume and for
which firms have to decide over its allocation across the product mix. In (sufficiently)
heterogeneous industries, multi-product firms with more organizational capital as well as
more productive multi-product firms have a larger product scope. Opening up to inter-
national trade, firms adjust their allocation of organizational capital, their intensive and
extensive margin in response to changes in the cost parameters of trade, whereas a trade
liberalization induces multi-product firms to increase their product scope. Under a (stan-
dard) functional specification for the production costs, large-scope firms respond less to
trade shocks. Using firm-level data on production factors and performance, this chapter
provides empirical evidence in support of some of the basic predictions of the theory and
organizational capital in general is shown to be a relevant factor in the production process
of firms.
Chapter 5 - “Multi-product Exporters in a World with Heterogeneous Countries and Non-
homothetic Preferences”: With the increasing availability of disaggregate data, three facts
about both countries and firms robustly appear in the empirical literature of international
trade: Firstly, countries with a higher per capita income import more product varieties from
other countries. Secondly, imports and exports are concentrated among a relatively small
number of firms, so that firms in form of “export superstars” exist and represent the “gran-
ular” components of the set of internationally active players. And thirdly, multi-product
firms are prevalent and dominant in international trade. In light of these observations, this
chapter analyzes the export product scope of multi-product firms across countries that
substantially differ in terms of their per capita income, which is so far largely ignored by
the literature of international trade. In a non-standard model with non-homothetic pref-
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erences and imperfect competition, multi-product firms export more varieties to countries
with a higher per capita income, thereby dealing with both cannibalization and income
effects.
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Chapter 1
Export versus FDI: Non-monotone
Sorting under Quadratic Preferences
1.1 Introduction
As part of their business strategies, firms decide on the sales markets for their products. In
times of globalization, they particularly face the question of whether to serve the market
in a foreign country and, in the case of international engagement, how to serve the destina-
tion market abroad. Each firm has the choice between two alternative modes of operation:
Either it exports its domestically manufactured goods, thereby becoming an exporter, or
it undertakes foreign direct investment (FDI)1 to establish production facilities in the des-
tination country, becoming a multinational enterprise (MNE).2,3 Internationally engaged
enterprises, sometimes called internationalized firms (IFs), are different from those that
limit their activity to the domestic market: Exporters and MNEs are unique in charac-
teristics and superior in performance parameters - the group of these enterprises consists
of larger, more productive and higher value added firms that pay higher wages, use more
0I would like to thank my supervisors, Hale Utar and Gerald Willmann, as well as Emily Blanchard and
the participants of a Trade Workshop in Leuven, the 18th Workshop “Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehun-
gen” in Go¨ttingen, the 15th Annual GEP Postgraduate Conference in Nottingham, the 17th Annual
Conference of the European Trade Study Group (ETSG) in Helsinki and the Aarhus-Kiel Workshop 2016
in Sønderborg for helpful comments and suggestions.
1Throughout this chapter, the term FDI is used as a synonym for horizontal FDI, i.e. the replication of
production and sales structures in a foreign country with the aim to serve its market (see for an illustrating
model: Markusen (1984)), in contrast to vertical FDI, i.e. the fragmentation of production processes in
the form of the relocation of stages abroad with the aim to generate benefits in serving the home market
(see for an illustrating model: Helpman (1984)).
2This chapter abstracts from a firm-level combination of these choices by assuming a cost structure for
which firms do not have any incentive to serve a foreign market via both exports and affiliates. Beyond
any bilateral country setting, a hybrid form of the two modes of international operation of firms is given
by the export-platform FDI. For its theoretical treatment, see Motta and Norman (1996), Yeaple (2003),
Grossman et al. (2006) and Ekholm et al. (2007) and its empirical treatment, see Hanson et al. (2005) and
Baltagi et al. (2007); for firms simultaneously choosing both operation modes, each for a different market,
see Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2012).
3See Caves (2007), p. 1: A multinational enterprise is defined as “[a firm] that controls and manages
production establishments - plants - located in at least two countries”.
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capital per worker and employ more skilled workers relative to domestic firms.4 Among
these outstanding IFs, each firm’s profit-maximizing decision about the operation mode, so
either to become an exporter or a MNE, reflects its solution to the underlying proximity-
concentration trade-off in a world with both trade barriers and economies of scale:5 While
exporting allows the local concentration of production, and in this way enables the ex-
ploitation of economies of scale, FDI implies production close to the sales market and
hence saves on transportation costs.
Analyzing the choices that are made by heterogeneous, i.e. productivity varying, firms
regarding their preferred mode of operation in a country abroad, Helpman et al. (2004)
establish a sorting of firm activities and operation modes that is denoted in the literature
as conventional sorting : The least productive firms exit the domestic economy, firms with a
low productivity restrict their activity to the domestic market, firms with an intermediate
productivity in addition serve the foreign market via exports, and only the most productive
firms sell domestically and engage in FDI. Empirical evidence for a productivity premium
of the MNEs (relative to the exporters) and of the exporters (relative to the domestic
firms) is found in Kimura and Kiyota (2006) and Tomiura (2007) for Japan, Girma et al.
(2005) for the UK, Wagner (2006) and Arnold and Hussinger (2010) for Germany as well
as Engel and Procher (2012) for France. In Helpman et al. (2004), the conventional sorting
of firm activities and operation modes theoretically arises in a Melitz (2003)-type model
of heterogeneous firms in monopolistic competition with constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) consumer preferences, iceberg transportation costs and fixed operating costs.
In general, however, monopolistic competition models with CES preferences, pioneered
in international trade by Krugman (1980) and extended to heterogeneous firms by Melitz
(2003), do not replicate substantial empirical facts, as recently addressed by Melitz (2018)
himself.6 Firstly, by generating markups that are constant across heterogeneous firms in a
market and across markets, they are not able to reproduce the empirically robust findings
of variable markups, incomplete cost pass-through and markup responses to market-wide
4A comprehensive strand of the empirical literature of international trade documents the characteristics
uniqueness and performance premia of IFs: See e.g. for exporters Bernard and Jensen (1995), Bernard
and Wagner (1997), Bernard et al. (2007), for MNEs Doms and Jensen (1998) and Antra`s and Yeaple
(2014), and for both types of firms Mayer and Ottaviano (2008). An overview of the literature on firm
heterogeneity and firm-level globalization strategies is provided by Greenaway and Kneller (2007).
5The proximity-concentration trade-off was established in the theoretical literature of horizontal FDI
with the work by Brainard (1997) and is subsequently studied in several generalized setups: Markusen
and Venables (2000) allow for factor endowment differences across countries and therefore incorporate
country asymmetries. Helpman et al. (2004) extend the model to firm asymmetries (heterogeneity) and
more recently Ramondo et al. (2013) set it into a stochastic environment.
6The model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), with which the idea of monopolistic competition as a market
structure got formalized and customized to a broad professional audience, does not use the CES specifica-
tion of preferences, but instead includes consumers with a direct utility that is symmetric and additive in
the consumption of different goods, leading to a demand elasticity that depends on the consumption level.
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changes.7,8 Possible ways to overcome the shortcoming and in this way to generate more
flexible models with endogenous markups and incomplete cost pass-through are obtained
by either changing the market structure, while maintaining the demand structure of CES
preferences,9 or changing the demand structure, while maintaining the market structure of
monopolistic competition,10 or changing both. Secondly, while in the empirical evidence,
adjustments and reallocations are robustly reported to take place at the intensive margin,
monopolistic competition models with CES preferences only allow for the extensive margin
as their active channel.11
Addressing and remedying the shortcomings of the monopolistic competition model
of heterogeneous firms with CES preferences in its empirical consistency, Melitz (2018)
generalizes the demand setup to separable preferences and requires that these preferences
satisfy “Marshall’s Second Law of Demand”, i.e. the price elasticity of demand increases
with the price along a demand curve, or - equivalently - the derived demand curve is
log-concave in log-price,12 to generate empirically consistent model predictions.13 Any
violation of this property14 would contradict the empirical evidence on (i) the markup
variation across firms (more productive firms charge higher markups), (ii) the incomplete
pass-through of cost changes (a change to marginal cost is passed-on less than one-for-one
into prices, since the markups absorb the remaining variation), and (iii) the incomplete
pass-through variation across firms (better performing firms absorb a greater proportion of
a cost shock into their markups) as well as in particular (iv) the (pro-)competitive effects
of trade, i.e. the response of markups and induced product reallocations to increases
7The case of constant markups by assuming CES preferences is not limited to the market structure of
monopolistic competition. It also occurs in the case of Ricardian trade models with perfect competition,
as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
8For an overview of the different approaches of estimating firm markups, see De Loecker and Goldberg
(2014). And for variable markups across (heterogeneous) markets, see e.g. Campbell and Hopenhayn
(2005), Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Barron et al. (2008).
9In models of an oligopoly with firms of a non-zero measure, in which those firms internalize the effects of
their price choices on market aggregates, variable markups occur even in the case of CES preferences, as for
Bertrand competition in Bernard et al. (2003) and De Blas and Russ (2015) and for Cournot competition
in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond et al. (2015).
10See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who use quadratic preferences, Behrens and Murata (2012) who use
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, Zhelobodko et al. (2012) who use a general class of
additively separable preferences, Kichko et al. (2014) who use a general class of quasi-linear preferences,
Bertoletti et al. (2017) who use increasing elasticity of substitution preferences and Feenstra and Weinstein
(2017) who use translog preferences.
11For the details on the empirical evidence: See the Section 1.3.
12Equivalently, the price elasticity of demand falls with the quantity consumed.
13Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) argue that this is the standard behavior of demand and propose a model
specification with a variable elasticity of substitution form of demand. Krugman (1979) by himself also
makes this assumption for the demand structure in his seminal work on monopolistic competition in
international trade, before giving it up in favor of CES preferences in his subsequent contribution (Krugman
(1980)). For the property captured by Marshall’s Second Law of Demand, several other terms have been
used in the literature: Zhelobodko et al. (2012) describe the preferences as to reveal an increasing “relative
love for variety”, Bertoletti and Epifani (2014) as to represent a “decreasing elasticity of substitution” and
Mra´zova´ and Neary (2017, forthcoming) as to lead to a “subconvex” demand function.
14In some cases, a slightly stronger assumption than Marshall’s Second Law of Demand is required: The
marginal revenue (instead of the demand) becomes more inelastic as output increases.
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in market size and competition in an exporter’s destination: Markups fall and market
shares are reallocated towards the better performing products. As it is already evident,
CES preferences do not satisfy this property and all the above mentioned facts therefore
provide an incentive to look for an alternative theoretical assumption on consumption.
The present chapter takes the standard model of international trade, a monopolistic
competition model with CES preferences and heterogeneous as well as internationally active
firms a` la Melitz (2003), and adds an operation mode for these firms, i.e. undertaking FDI.
Moreover, it basically adjusts the model’s demand setup to perform the empirical facts by
applying quadratic preferences, which leads to a linear demand with variable markups and
this satisfies Marshall’s Second Law of Demand (as well as the slightly stronger assumption)
as highlighted by Melitz (2018). By doing this, the chapter investigates the robustness of
the conventional sorting that is derived by Helpman et al. (2004) and finds an alternative
type of sorting, which is consistent with the meta-analysis of firm selection effects that
is conducted by Mra´zova´ and Neary (forthcoming): While (sufficiently) productive firms
export and even more productive ones engage in FDI, the most productive firms do not
undertake FDI, but export again, thereby establishing a switch of operation modes at the
upper end of the productivity range.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: After briefly outlining the es-
sential elements of the monopolistic competition model with quadratic preferences that
is developed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the next section presents an appropriately
modified and extended version of this model in which the export versus FDI decision of
heterogeneous firms is both incorporated and analyzed. As the chapter’s main contribution
and insight, the section’s analysis derives the non-monotone sorting of firm activities and
operation modes. The section subsequently concludes with the presentation of the sorting’s
consistency with the existing theoretical contribution about the firm selection effects. In
the following section on the sorting’s empirical evidence, both direct support - in form of
evidence for a more complex and less monotone sorting than the conventional one in case of
some types of international firm activity - as well as indirect support - in form of evidence
against the CES and for the quadratic preferences - are provided. Finally, the chapter ends
with some conclusions in the last section.
1.2 Model
By incorporating the firms’ option to serve a foreign sales market through undertaking
FDI, this chapter modifies the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), as Helpman et al.
(2004) do it for the model by Melitz (2003).
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1.2.1 Closed Economy
A country is populated by L individuals (consumers, workers), each endowed with one
unit of labor. Consumers exhibit identical quadratic preferences, which are defined over a
homogeneous good (chosen as the nume´raire) and a continuum of horizontally differentiated
product varieties indexed by i ∈ Ω, as represented by the utility function
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci )
2di− 1
2
η
(∫
i∈Ω
qcidi
)2
(1.1)
with qc0 > 0 and q
c
i as the individual consumption of the nume´raire and of each variety i ∈ Ω
respectively, and α, η and γ > 0 as parameters, where γ describes the degree of product
differentiation between the varieties. Maximizing utility and subsequently aggregating over
all individuals, demand for variety i is given by
qi =
αL
γ + ηN
− L
γ
pi +
ηN
γ + ηN
L
γ
p ∀i ∈ Ω?, (1.2)
where N denotes the measure of varieties in Ω? = {i : qci > 0} ⊂ Ω, pi the price of variety
i, and p = 1
N
∫
i∈Ω? pidi the average price. For all varieties within the consumption set then
holds that
pi <
αγ
γ + ηN
+
ηN
γ + ηN
p ≡ pmax, (1.3)
and the price elasticity of demand for variety i, εi ≡ −(∂qi/∂pi)(pi/qi) = [pmax/pi − 1]−1,
depends both on the price of the variety and the price bound.
With a large number of small firms in the country, its market structure is characterized
by monopolistic competition. Each firm produces a horizontally differentiated product
variety i ∈ Ω?, using labor as the single factor of production. The unit variable costs of
a firm with the productivity level ϕ are given by c(ϕ) = w
ϕ
, where w represents the wage.
Firms draw their productivity level from a common and known distribution G(ϕ) with
support on (0,∞), after paying the sunk entry costs fE > 0 (all fixed costs measures in
labor units). Among entrants, only those firms that are able to cover their marginal costs
produce; all other firms exit the economy. Maximizing its profits, a firm with a productivity
level ϕ charges the price
p(ϕ) =
1
2
(pmax + c(ϕ)). (1.4)
The marginal firm in the economy, i.e. the firm with the lowest possible productivity level
to stay in the economy, satisfies the condition p(ϕ?E) = pmax = c(ϕ
?
E) =
w
ϕ?E
, therefore just
breaks even and so realizes zero profits. Finally, the economy-wide choke price pmax also
co-determines firm-level variables like the markup µ(ϕ), output q(ϕ), revenue r(ϕ) and
operating profits pi(ϕ):
µ(ϕ) =
1
2
(pmax − c(ϕ)) and q(ϕ) = L
2γ
(pmax − c(ϕ)), (1.5)
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r(ϕ) =
L
4γ
(p2max − c(ϕ)2) and pi(ϕ) =
L
4γ
(pmax − c(ϕ))2. (1.6)
Facing quadratic preferences and linear demand with its decreasing price elasticity, firms
with a higher productivity level charge lower prices and are able to realize higher mark-
ups, higher revenues and higher profits due to an incomplete pass-through of their cost and
quantity of sales advantage.
1.2.2 Open Economy
The world consists of two countries j and k. Their populations Lj and Lk are immobile
across countries, markets are segmented, and each consumer in countries j and k exhibits
preferences of type (1) and has a demand of type (2), with country-specific consumption
variables and a country-specific degree of product differentiation as well as cross-country
identical parameters α and η. Firms have an additional activity option in this setting:
Besides serving the domestic market, they can extend their activity to the foreign country
by either exporting domestically manufactured goods to its market or setting up a produc-
tion plant and thereby investing in its market. Assuming country j as being a firm’s home
country and thereby the location of both its headquarters and production plant, exports
of products to country k entail iceberg transportation costs (including tariffs) τ jk ≥ 1 and
in addition some fixed costs fX > 0, which are caused by the spatial separation of the
headquarters and the sales location, requiring some extra entrepreneurial effort to arrange,
coordinate and monitor sales services like marketing, distribution and logistics. Undertak-
ing FDI in country k involves as well these fixed costs fX > 0, but in addition is associated
with some further fixed costs fI > 0, which are caused by the duplication of production
facilities and the spatial separation of the headquarters and the production location, re-
quiring some extra entrepreneurial effort to communicate with the implementation unit
and to ensure the intended realization of production plans.
A firm in country j makes the decision about its activities and modes of operation
with the objective to maximize its overall profits, i.e. the sum of profits from domestic
and foreign operations. Since these are independent of each other (separable and linearly
additive), it is possible for the analysis to split up the decision-making of a firm with a
productivity level ϕ into three separate profit maximization problems: Regarding domestic
sales, denoted by qjD(ϕ), the firm solves the maximization problem
max
pj(ϕ)
pijD(ϕ) = (p
j(ϕ)− cj(ϕ))qjD(ϕ) (1.7)
with pj(ϕ) as the price of the variety produced by the firm in country j and cj(ϕ) as its unit
variable costs of production. The maximization problem regarding sales abroad, denoted
by qjkM(ϕ) with M as the mode of operation (X for export, F for FDI) from j as the source
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country to k as the destination country, is given by
max
pkM (ϕ)
pijkM(ϕ) = (p
k
M(ϕ)− c?(ϕ))qjkM(ϕ) for M ∈ {X,F}, (1.8)
where pkM(ϕ) denotes the price of the variety supplied to country k by operation mode M
and the unit variable costs of production are represented by
c?(ϕ) =
τ jkcj(ϕ) for M = Xck(ϕ) for M = F , (1.9)
with ck(ϕ) as the unit variable costs of production in country k. The firm’s optimal prices
then emerge as
qjD(ϕ) =
Lj
γj
(pj(ϕ)− cj(ϕ)) and qjkM(ϕ) =
Lk
γk
(pkM(ϕ)− c?(ϕ)) for M ∈ {X,F}, (1.10)
where the firm applies the aggregate demand in the domestic and in the foreign country
respectively, and these prices are bound by the country-specific choke prices:
p(ϕm∗E ) = p
m
max =
1
γm + ηNm
(αγm + ηNmpm) for m ∈ {j, k},
pinning down the productivity level of the marginal firm in the respective market (ϕj∗E and
ϕk∗E ).
With the price and quantity determined, the optimal (operating) profits from each of
the firm’s activities and operation modes are derived:
1. For the domestic market:
pj(ϕ) =
1
2
(pjmax+c
j(ϕ)), qjD(ϕ) =
Lj
2γj
(pjmax−cj(ϕ)) and pijD(ϕ) =
Lj
4γj
(pjmax−cj(ϕ))2
2. For the foreign market (for M ∈ {X,F}):15
pkM(ϕ) =
1
2
(pkmax+c
?(ϕ)), qjkM(ϕ) =
Lk
2γk
(pkmax−c?(ϕ)) and pijkM(ϕ) =
Lk
4γk
(pkmax−c?(ϕ))2.
Taking the assignment of the productivity levels to the firms as given (i.e. the uncertainty
of productivity draws is resolved) and thus the productivity-dependent firm-level variables
as quantitatively determined, the firm’s decision about an activity and a mode of operation
crucially depends on its productivity level. Heterogeneous firms self-select into those op-
tions that generate the highest profits among alternatives, conditional on the firm’s level of
productivity. Given the outside option of refraining, a firm only takes an option of serving
15See the Appendix A.1 for the details.
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a market into account when it is at least able to cover with its generated profits the fixed
costs associated with the activity. Levels of productivity at which the generated profits
and fixed costs equalize represent the minima required for firms to be profitably active and
are called zero-profit thresholds. In case of the domestic market with its fixed entry costs
fE > 0, firms with a productivity level below the domestic sales threshold
ϕjD =
wj
pjmax − 2
√
fEγj
Lj
(1.11)
do not produce products for the domestic consumers and decide to exit the economy.
Foreign consumers in country k however do not receive products through exports by firms
in country j with a productivity level below the export sales threshold ϕjkX and they are
not served through FDI by firms in country j with a productivity level below the FDI sales
threshold ϕjkF :
16
ϕjkX =
τ jkwj
pkmax − 2
√
fXγk
Lk
and ϕjkF =
wk
pkmax − 2
√
(fX+fI)γk
Lk
. (1.12)
For a firm being sufficiently productive for a profitable activity abroad, productivity lev-
els at which the profits generated by exporting and undertaking FDI are equal indicate
an indifference in the choice of the operation mode and are called iso-profit thresholds.
Firms with a productivity level below and above those thresholds make different choices
and passing the threshold therefore would imply some change in the decision of firms.
The analysis works out that the activities and modes of operation can be sorted for the
heterogeneous firms by the productivity thresholds, between which some option yields the
highest (non-negative) profits and thus represents the preferred and chosen choice for firms
with corresponding levels of productivity. Restrictions on the model parameters need to
be imposed in order to fix the analysis. To arrange the zero-profit thresholds in a standard
way, this chapter assumes a lower bound on the transportation costs
τ jk >
pkmax
√
Lk − 2
√
fXγk
pjmax
√
Lk − 2
√
Lk
Lj
√
fEγj
, (A1)
ensuring that ϕjD < ϕ
jk
X , which implies that all firms profitably exporting also serve the
domestic market, and an upper bound on the transportation costs
τ jk <
wk
wj
pkmax
√
Lk − 2
√
fXγk
pkmax
√
Lk − 2√(fX + fI)γk , (A2)
replicating the order of the conventional sorting by ensuring that ϕjkX < ϕ
jk
F . Assumption
16For (strictly) positive thresholds, this chapter assumes 2
√
γj
√
fE < p
j
max
√
Lj and 2
√
γk
√
fX + fI <
pkmax
√
Lk. See the Appendix A.2 for the details of derivation.
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(A1) is more (less) restrictive for higher domestic (export) fixed costs, while assumption
(A2) is less restrictive both the higher the FDI fixed costs and the higher the foreign wage
premium.17
1.2.3 Non-monotone Sorting
Computing the iso-profit thresholds by setting equal the total profits from exporting and
undertaking FDI, ΠjkM for M ∈ {X,F}, yields a quadratic equation and hence gives two
possible solutions18
ϕjk1,2 =
pkmax ±
√
(pkmax)
2 − fI4γk
Lkωjk
(−)
ωjk(+)
fI4γk
Lkωjk
(−)
, (1.13)
with 0 < ωjk(−) ≡ τ jkwj − wk < ωjk(+) ≡ τ jkwj + wk. Two distinct real solutions exist by
assuming
2
√
γk
√
fI
√√√√ωjk(+)
ωjk(−)
< pkmax
√
Lk, (A3)
which requires sufficiently low FDI fixed costs, a sufficiently low wage in the destination
country k and a sufficiently high market potential in that country, all facts creating incen-
tives to undertake horizontal foreign direct investment in the country abroad.
For the relation between the zero-profit and iso-profit thresholds and in detail the fact
that the FDI sales threshold lies below the lower productivity level for which the profits
equalize, i.e. ϕjkF < ϕ
jk
1 , this chapter consistently assumes
19
2pkmaxΨ− ωjk(+) <
4γkfI
Lkωjk(−)
Ψ2 (A4)
with Ψ ≡ wk
√
Lk
pkmax
√
Lk−2
√
γk
√
fX+fI
, for which a sufficient condition is given by an upper bound
on the transportation costs
τ jk <
wk
wj
fI
√
γk
(1− zjk)√fX + fI
1
pkmax
√
Lk − 2√(fX + fI)γk , (A4′)
with zjk ≡ wk
τ jkwj
< 1.
Under the assumptions (A1)− (A4), the following ordering of productivity thresholds
pertains (Figure 1.1):
0 < ϕjD < ϕ
jk
X < ϕ
jk
F < ϕ
jk
1 < ϕ
jk
2 . (1.14)
This sequence implies the following sorting of firm activities and modes of operation, as
17See the Appendix A.3 for the details of derivation.
18See the Appendix A.4 for the details of derivation.
19See the Appendix A.5 for the details of derivation.
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the productivity level successively increases (Figure 1.2):20 The least productive firms,
i.e. firms whose productivity level is lower than ϕjD, exit the economy, while low- to
medium-productive firms with a productivity level between ϕjD and ϕ
jk
X only serve the
domestic market and operate as domestic firms. All firms with higher productivity levels
ϕ
Π
ΠjkX
ΠjkF
ϕ
jk
X ϕ
jk
1 ϕ
jk
2
ϕ
jk
F
Figure 1.1: Export and FDI Profit Functions and Productivity Thresholds
engage additionally in the foreign market via one of the two available options, exporting or
undertaking FDI. Those firms with intermediate productivity levels, i.e. with a ϕ between
ϕjkX and ϕ
jk
1 (≡ ϕjkX,F ), export their products to the foreign market (exporters) and high-
productive ones with productivity levels between ϕjk1 and ϕ
jk
2 (≡ ϕjkF,X) serve the foreign
market by undertaking FDI, i.e. they establish production facilities in the foreign market
and become multinational enterprises. Importantly, the highest productive firms, i.e. those
with a productivity level above ϕjk2 , again decide to export their products to the foreign
market (exporters). Hence, this chapter derives a non-monotone sorting that differs from
the conventional one that is derived by Helpman et al. (2004),21 as firms at the upper end
of the productivity range decide to export instead of undertaking FDI: Up to the threshold
ϕjk2 , the conventional sorting is qualitatively replicated, but firms with a productivity level
above this threshold (top performers) revert to a mode of operation (exporting) already
chosen by firms with intermediate productivity levels, and not by the ones with adjacent
levels of productivity.
In order to get an intuition for the result, one has to remember that firms charge lower
prices, sell larger output volumes and are able to realize both higher markups and prof-
its as the productivity level increases. While lower-productivity firms decide to serve the
20For the sorting, the threshold ϕjkF is immaterial, since it does not indicate a switch in the decision of
the firms, and therefore appears in Figure 1.1 as colored in gray only for completeness.
21Deviations from the conventional sorting are theoretically also found in a general equilibrium Ricardian
model with within-country and within-sector productivity homogeneity, see ?, and in a model with firm
heterogeneity as well as cross-country factor-price and market-size heterogeneity, thereby allowing for
vertical investment motives of firms, see Head and Ries (2003).
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ϕ
0 ϕ
j
D
exit domestic ﬁrm
ϕjkX ϕ
jk
X,F ≡ ϕjk1
exporter multinational
ϕjkF,X ≡ ϕjk2
exporter
Figure 1.2: Activity and Operation Mode Choices across Firm Productivity (Non-monotone
Sorting)
foreign market via exports because of the associated low fixed costs and low total vari-
able costs due to the limited sales volumes (concentration more relevant than proximity),
higher-productivity firms would by this choice suffer from high total variable costs due to
their large sales volumes. Therefore, these firms shift to undertaking FDI, being profitable
enough to bear the associated high fixed costs while being able to save variable costs (prox-
imity more relevant than concentration), thereby maximizing overall profits. So far, up to
ϕjk2 , these solutions to the proximity-concentration trade-off give rise to the conventional
sorting.
Importantly, under quadratic preferences, the highest-productivity firms export again
instead of undertaking FDI (Figure 1.2) and thus the way, firms trade-off fixed and variable
costs, becomes more complex. The firms with the highest productivity levels charge low
prices and face a low-elasticity part of the demand curve, for which any further decrease in
prices would lead only to a small increase in sales. So the incentive for those firms to cut
variable costs through FDI, and thereby to reduce prices in exchange for high fixed costs,
vanishes. And even though for the highest-productivity firms with large sales volumes total
variable costs in case of exporting are high, the reduction in demand and operating profits
due to exporting appears to be smaller than the savings on fixed costs, and this calculation
induces those firms to choose exporting, leading to a non-monotone sorting.
Technically, the result arises because of the relative convexity of the export profit func-
tion (Figure 1.1). As pointed out by Cargo (1965) in its general form, a necessary and
sufficient condition for this property is given by
Π′′X
Π′X
≥ Π
′′
F
Π′F
,
with Π′′M as the second derivative and Π
′
M as the first derivative of the total profit function
for the operation mode M ∈ {X,F}. By inserting the respective expressions and sim-
plifying the inequality, the condition reduces to τ jkwj ≥ wk or equivalently to ωjk(−) ≥ 0,
which is fulfilled in the present analysis22. For the special case of symmetric countries with
identical wages, it is apparent that in both settings, the absence of transportation costs
(τ jk = 1) and the existence of iceberg transportation costs (τ jk > 1), the export profit
function is relative convex and thereby the non-monotone sorting of internationally active
firms exists.
The conducted analysis and its result are consistent with Mra´zova´ and Neary (forth-
22See the Appendix A.6 for the details of derivation. Graphically, for the sets of wage allocations for
which the relative convexity is (not) fulfilled: See the Figure A.1.
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coming), who study in a general setting with different demand and supply assumptions
a firm’s choice between different modes of operation, whose result depends on the firm
heterogeneity in productivity. In this way, firms (self-)select into a single option of a firm
activity and operation mode and the aggregate firm behavior that is worked out by the
meta-analysis is called selection effects. Importantly, the meta-analysis is thereby applica-
ble to the choice between exporting and undertaking FDI, the relevant case for this chapter,
and applies the concept of the modularity of the firm’s objective function, i.e. the (max-
imum operating) profit function pi(t, c) with t as the transportation costs or tariffs and c
as the marginal production costs. This concept turns out to be the distinguishing feature
of the firms’ selection effects. A profit function reveals the property of super-modularity
in its arguments if pi(t1, c1) − pi(t2, c1) ≥ pi(t1, c2) − pi(t2, c2) for all t1 ≥ t2, c1 ≥ c2.
In this case, more productive firms benefit more in terms of profits from a reduction in
transportation costs, which seems to be a plausible relation, given that firms with larger
amounts of goods internationally shipped take a larger advantage of cost reductions and
those firms might probably be the more productive ones. Applying religious associations,
the pattern of profit changes across firms in case of super-modularity reflect the “Matthew
effect”: To those who have, more shall be given. The super-modularity of the profit func-
tion however ultimately implies as a sufficient condition the conventional sorting for the
firms’ (self-)selection among the options of being exporters and multinational firms: More
productive firms choose to serve the destination abroad through affiliates by undertaking
FDI, while less productive firms export their domestically manufactured goods to the for-
eign market. Consequently, the intended determination of the selection effects reduces to
the task of identifying the modularity of the firms’ profit function, whereas any violation
of the super-modularity, which is called sub-modularity, does not by itself imply reversed
selection effects.
The identification of the modularity is straightforward, if the profit function is contin-
uous and differentiable: Given such a continuous and differentiable profit function, super-
modularity is equivalent to a non-negative cross-derivative with respect to its arguments:
pitc ≥ 0 for all (t, c). Any multiplicative specification of the cost parameters in the profit
function allows for explicit demand conditions that can be derived for the super-modularity
of the profit function. With both ε ≡ −(p/x)(∂x/∂p) = −p/xp′ as the price elasticity of
demand which represents a measure of its slope, and ρ ≡ −xp′′/p′ as a measure of its
curvature, a demand function is called super-convex at a point if log p is convex in log x
at that point23 and the super-convexity is equivalent to the properties that the demand
function is more convex than a CES demand function with the same elasticity as well as
its elasticity is increasing in sales, i.e. εx is positive. Any violation of the super-convexity
is called sub-convexity, especially the case where ε is decreasing in x, and is sometimes
23The form of the representation of the demand function is irrelevant in terms of that property: The
super-convexity of the inverse demand function, d
2 log p
d(log x)2
= 1ε
(
ρ− ε+1ε
) ≥ 0, is equivalent to the super-
convexity of the direct demand function, d
2 log x
d(log p)2
= ε2
(
ρ− ε+1ε
) ≥ 0.
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referred to as “Marshall’s Second Law of Demand”, as Marshall (1930) characterizes it as
the benchmark for demand. Melitz (2018) points to its theoretical absoluteness to replicate
substantial empirical facts.24 As pointed out by Mra´zova´ and Neary (forthcoming), the
super-convexity of the demand function and the super-modularity of the profit function
are then directly related by the following finding: A profit function pi(t, c) is super-modular
in both its arguments (t, c) at all levels of output if the demand function is weakly super-
convex, i.e. if the elasticity of demand is non-decreasing in sales (εx ≥ 0). Most notably for
the analysis of the present chapter, Mra´zova´ and Neary (forthcoming) derive modularity
conditions: The super-modularity of the profit function pi(t, c) in both its arguments (t, c)
is equivalent to either of the following conditions that are equivalent among themselves:
The elasticity of output with respect to marginal cost is greater than one in absolute value;
the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to output is less than one in absolute value;
or the sum of the elasticity ε and the convexity ρ of the demand function is greater than
three.
Let us now relate the insights of Mra´zova´ and Neary (forthcoming)’s meta-analysis to
the present chapter’s case: For a linear demand function, which is implied by (any specifi-
cation of) quadratic preferences and which is as sub-convex, the meta-analysis reveals that
the profit function switches with decreasing costs from super-modularity to sub-modularity,
given that the curvature of the demand function is zero (ρ = 0) and its elasticity mono-
tonically decreases with output/sales (εx < 0). Therefore, the conventional sorting gets
established for the lower-performance firms, while it is reversed for the higher-performance
ones, which contrasts the case of CES preferences with a weakly super-convex demand
function, a super-modular profit function and hence the conventional sorting for all out-
put/sales levels. Firms with low costs and high output levels however face a part of the
demand function with a relatively low elasticity, i.e. the elasticity is less than three, and
deal with a sub-modular profit function that indicates - if at all - a weaker Matthew effect.
It provides insufficient incentives for the highest-performance firms to avoid additional vari-
able costs by engaging in the activity with higher fixed costs, which leads them to choose
exporting instead of undertaking FDI for serving the foreign market, and overall results in
the derived non-monotone sorting.
1.3 Empirical Support
The non-monotone sorting that is derived in this chapter obtains empirical support both (i)
directly from empirical evidence on a less monotone and more complex sorting compared to
the conventional one, and (ii) indirectly from the empirical inconsistency of the assumptions
under which the conventional sorting is derived, as well as the empirical consistency of its
own assumptions.
24For the details: See the Section 1.1.
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Let us first consider the direct empirical support for the non-monotone sorting. For
some types of international firm activity, in particular investment and services trade, de-
viations from the structure and quantitative levels that are predicted by Helpman et al.
(2004) occur, and a sorting that is less monotone and more complex compared to the con-
ventional one can be directly observed in several cases. And this provides support for the
present chapter’s non-monotone sorting. Analyzing firm-level data for U.S. multinational
enterprises, Yeaple (2009) points out that the sales of a U.S. firm’s affiliates are indeed in-
creasing in the parent firm’s productivity as measured by the parent firm’s U.S. sales, but
this takes place at a rate which is lower than that predicted by the model. In addition, the
standard model of the proximity-concentration trade-off with heterogeneous firms misses
an element that is able to explain why the unit cost of serving foreign markets appears
to rise in distance. And finally, the comparison of the actual and predicted engagement
of firms yields that the large firms appear to invest in too few countries while the small
firms invest in too many foreign locations. In all countries, more U.S. multinational activ-
ity is predicted than actually observed and in particular relatively less attractive countries
experience much less multinational activity due to the underinvestment than would be pre-
dicted by the model.25 Spearot (2012) studies the investment choices between greenfield
investment and acquisition (“brownfield investment”) of North-American industrial firms,
primarily classified in the agricultural, commodity and manufacturing industries, between
1980 and 2004. He finds that those in a middle range of productivity engage in the largest
amount of investment, both for greenfield investment and acquisition.
In addition, in case of services trade,26 a robust finding in the literature suggests some
sorting which is reversed compared to the conventional one: While more productive firms
are engaged in exports, less productive suppliers of services undertake FDI. Bhattacharya
et al. (2012) observe this fact in the Indian software industry between 2000 and 2008. It
is also confirmed in a study by Foster-McGregor et al. (2014) for nineteen sub-Saharan
African countries, based on a survey that is conducted in 2010-2011 and analyses 1,437
domestically owned services firms. Verifying the finding for a highly developed country,
which likewise represents an important player in the service exports worldwide, Wagner
(2014) provides the empirical evidence that those with FDI are less productive than firms
that export for large German firms with at least 100 employees and an annual sum of
turnover and other operating income equal or higher than e250,000 in business services
trade. All these studies reveal for certain firm activities in selected countries deviations
from the conventional sorting and point instead to a sorting that is more complex and less
monotone, in line with this chapter’s result of the non-monotone sorting.
Let us now turn to the indirect empirical support for the non-monotone sorting. Con-
trary to the constant-markups implication of the assumption of monopolistic competition
25Yeaple (2009) by himself offers a way to bring the theory more into line with the empirical facts:
Allowing for variable markups, as it is the case with quadratic preferences.
26For a literature overview of services trade and policy, see Francois and Hoekman (2010).
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and CES preferences, an extensive empirical literature documents variable markups across
firms and an incomplete pass-through that varies across firms, which represents an indica-
tion of markups that vary across firms. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) detect significant
differences in markups between exporting and non-exporting firms for Slovenian data, with
robustly higher markups for exporters. Additionally, they provide empirical evidence at
the dynamic level that firm markups increase when firms enter export markets. Examining
firms’ markup adjustments to exchange rate shocks in Belgium, Amiti et al. (2014) doc-
ument an incomplete pass-through of exchange rates on prices at the aggregate level and
a variation in the pass-through across firms:27 Small exporters with zero import intensity
and small market shares exhibit a nearly complete pass-through of exchange rates, while
large exporters with a high import intensity and large market shares show an exchange rate
pass-through of 55%, both the marginal cost and markup channels contributing roughly
equally to the cross-sectional variation and overall leading to a low aggregate exchange
rate pass-through of 62% due to an import intensity and export market shares distribution
that is heavily skewed towards the largest exporters.
Based on direct evidence on markups in Pakistan, made possible by data collection in
form of producer surveys, Atkin et al. (2015) find for soccer-ball manufacturers a greater
markup dispersion than costs dispersion, at least in proportional terms, and a positive cor-
relation of both costs and markups with firm size. Furthermore, the elasticity of markups
with respect to firm size is significantly larger than the elasticity of costs and larger firms
charge higher markups both because a larger share of higher-quality ball types, which carry
higher markups, is produced and because those firms charge higher markups for a given
type of ball. Marketing efforts thereby seem to contribute to the higher markups: The cor-
relation between markups and measures of whether a firm attends an annual international
sports goods trade fair and sells to richer countries is higher than the correlation between
markups and measures of technical efficiency.
Bellone et al. (2016) investigate firm markups in the French manufacturing industry and
show that these markups are higher with firm productivity and lower with the intensity
of local competition as well as the degree of import penetration. Once again, markups
are found to be positively related to the export participation of firms. In addition, the
characteristics of the export destination seem to play a role: The exporters’ markups are
higher for countries with a higher average wealth and for countries on average further
away from the exporters’ location. Explicitly accounting for multi-product firms in times
of a comprehensive trade liberalization in India, De Loecker et al. (2016) observe not
only variable markups across firms, with higher markups for firms with larger outputs and
higher accounting profits, but even within firms: For products further away from the firms’
27A vast strand of literature exists on the exchange rate pass-through, thereby documenting a hetero-
geneity in the degree of pass-through incompleteness across firms and across products within firms: See
Berman et al. (2012) in terms of firm size and productivity for France, Chatterjee et al. (2013) for Brazil
and Li et al. (2015) in terms of firm productivity and other dimensions (i.a. intensity of imported inputs)
for China.
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core competency variety, they have higher marginal costs and realize lower markups. In
the course of the trade liberalization with both reductions in input and output tariffs,
associated changes in marginal costs are not perfectly accompanied by changes in prices,
indicating variable markups and incomplete pass-through of costs to prices at the firm
level: While the average output and input tariffs decline by a substantial amount of 62
and 24 percentage points, respectively, marginal costs experience a decline on average by
31 percent due primarily to input tariff liberalization while prices fall on average by 18
percent. The difference in the response of marginal costs and prices reflects adjustments
in the markups: On average, markups increase by 13 percent, even so the output tariff
reductions have some pro-competitive effects by putting downward pressure on markups,
with substantially more pronounced effects on products with initially high markups. Firms
with larger increases in average markups apparently face a less restrictive surrounding and
are found to be more likely to introduce new products, being able to cover the costs
associated with their development. Especially for those firms with high initial markups,
the trade reform’s pro-competitive effect caused by output tariff reductions also restricts
the firms’ ability to raise the markups even further.28
With US data on household purchases, Hottman et al. (2016) structurally estimate a
model of heterogeneous multi-product firms and thereby analyze the firm composition and
heterogeneity of sectors, finding substantial differences in both size and markups across
firms. A typical sector consists of a few large firms that occupy substantial market shares
and simultaneously a competitive fringe of firms with only trivial market shares. Their price
behavior can be approximated by the monopolistic competition benchmark of constant
markups, while the very largest firms realize substantially higher markups. Moreover, the
variation in markups turns out to be greater under quantity than under price competition.
Quantitatively, in a typical sector, the largest firm with a market share of above 20%
is able to implement a markup that is 24% higher than that of the median firm under
price competition and almost twice as large as that of the median firm under quantity
competition. However, the markup differentials quite rapidly cut back for the second- and
third-largest firms, indicating that only a few firms can make use of their market power.
Amiti et al. (forthcoming) study firms’ price setting reactions in response to cost shocks
for Belgian data and find strong evidence for an incomplete cost pass-through and strategic
complementarities: While the typical firm adjusts its price with an elasticity of 0.65 to 0.70
in response to its own cost shocks, its response to the price changes of its competitors takes
place with an elasticity of 0.35 to 0.40. These average reactions however conceal a lot of
heterogeneity across firms, in the way that small firms exhibit no strategic complemen-
tarities and have a complete pass-through of own cost shocks, whereas large firms react
28A large empirical literature on the relationship between trade liberalization and firm markups exists.
The depressing effects of import (output) tariff cuts on markups (pro-competitive effects) are thereby
considered in a number of empirical case studies, see e.g. Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey, Harrison (1994)
for the Ivory Coast and Brandt et al. (2017) for China (with the enhancing effects of input tariff cuts on
markups).
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strongly to competitors in their price setting and charge variable markups, accounting for
large shares of sales and thereby shaping the average patterns.
While the assumptions of the present chapter’s analysis are consistent with the above
empirical evidence (in contrast to those of the model that yields the conventional sorting),
whether the empirically documented variability of markups across firms has a relevant nor-
mative implication in case of trade is the subject of an active discussion in the theoretical
literature of international trade. Theoretically, monopolistic competition models with het-
erogeneous firms in international trade provide in general three types of gains from trade:
Besides the gains from the access to new import varieties of differentiated products (variety
expansion effect), they propose the self-selection of more efficient firms into exporting and
the market exit of less efficient firms, overall leading to gains due to the rise of the average
productivity (firm selection effect), as well as the reduction in markups charged by firms
due to the import competition and gains due to the lower consumer prices (pro-competitive
effect). By the application of CES preferences as the demand structure of the models, the
third source of gains is by construction closed down and thereby a priori excluded from
any welfare evaluation. However, Arkolakis et al. (2019) show that even in the case of
non-CES preferences and so the case of allowing for variable markups, the pro-competitive
effect does not lead to gains from trade, questioning the normative relevance of variable
markups.29 Replying to the study, Feenstra (2018) points to the sensitivity of the result
with respect to the assumed unbounded Pareto distribution of productivity and demon-
strates that the pro-competitive effect regains a role in the normative considerations in
the case of a bounded, i.e. truncated from above, Pareto productivity distribution.30 In a
structural estimation with a monopolistic competition and translog preferences model spec-
ification, Feenstra and Weinstein (2017) ascertain that the pro-competitive effect, together
with the variety expansion effect, which gets also restored by the distribution adjustment,
leads to cumulative welfare gains to the United States of 0.85% of total GDP over 1992-
2005 and Feenstra (2018) then draws the conclusion that both effects thereby account for
about 75% of the increase in U.S. welfare over this period resulting from the expansion in
trade, while the residual firm selection effect contributes in an upper bound the remaining
25%.31,32
An additional shortcoming in the empirical consistency of monopolistic competition
models with CES preferences is that they do not capture reallocations of firms at the
intensive margin due to variations across sales markets and changes within a sales market.
29When preferences are non-homothetic, total gains are reduced by the pro-competitive effect.
30In his study, Feenstra (2018) applies a quadratic mean of order r (QMOR) expenditure function.
31Translog preferences represent a special case of the QMOR expenditure function with a parameter
restriction. Feenstra (2018) obtains a similar result (0.93%) for the welfare gains of the two effects for the
same country and period, an explicit quantitative assessment of an upper-bound of the firm selection effect
and a small adjustment/extension in the estimation approach, thereby being able to draw qualitatively
and quantitatively equivalent conclusions for both studies.
32For a normative analysis of a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and either
quadratic preferences or a general system of demand: See Nocco et al. (2014, 2017) and Dhingra and
Morrow (2017, forthcoming).
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Mayer et al. (2014) document for French multi-product exporters reallocations of their
products’ market shares (product mix) across destinations: They skew their export sales
towards their better performing products in markets where they face tougher competition,
i.e. in bigger markets (measured by destination’s GDP in a given year) and in markets
with more competing firms (measured by the geography of the destination in a given year).
In a follow-up study, Mayer et al. (2016) take a look at the within-exporter adjustments
of the mix of products sold in a particular destination over time and find that firms skew
their sales towards their better performing products in response to a positive demand
shock in the export destination. As repercussions of the induced reallocations, multi-
product firm productivity increases following the demand shock, with an elasticity of the
labor productivity between 5% and 11%, and the productivity in the French manufacturing
sector between 1995-2005 increases on average by 1.2% per year due to the growth in world
trade.
To summarize the empirical support for the non-monotone sorting, one can find both
direct evidence from case studies indicating a less monotone and more complex sorting
compared to the conventional one, and indirect evidence from the empirical inconsistency
of the assumptions of the conventional sorting and the empirical consistency of the as-
sumptions of the non-monotone sorting. Especially, the robust empirical fact of variable
markups across firms can not be captured by the demand assumptions of the conventional
sorting, but the demand assumptions of the non-monotone sorting.
1.4 Conclusion
Monopolistic competition models with CES consumer preferences do not replicate substan-
tial empirical facts and thereby provide an incentive to look for an alternative theoretical
assumption on consumption. This chapter now applies quadratic instead of CES prefer-
ences in a monopolistic competition model of international trade with heterogeneous firms,
being consistent with “Marshall’s Second Law of Demand” and the empirical evidence, and
thereby investigates in a setting of a firms’ choice between exporting and undertaking FDI
the robustness of the conventional sorting of cross-border active firms that is derived by
Helpman et al. (2004). At the upper end of the productivity range, this chapter detects a
significant change: While (sufficiently) productive firms export and even more productive
ones engage in FDI, the most productive firms do not undertake FDI, but export again.
The non-monotone sorting that this chapter derives is consistent with the meta-analysis of
firms’ selection effects by Mra´zova´ and Neary (forthcoming). In addition, both direct and
indirect empirical support in its favor are found in form of the empirical evidence on a less
monotone and more complex sorting compared to the conventional one in the investment
and services trade as well as the empirical inconsistency of the assumptions under which the
conventional sorting is derived and the empirical consistency of the non-monotone sorting’s
own assumptions.
Appendix A
A.1 Profit Functions
The (operating) profits that are generated by export sales are given by
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Lk
4γk
(
pkmax − τ jk
wj
ϕ
)2
.
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The (operating) profits that are generated by FDI sales are given by
pijkF (ϕ) =
Lk
4γk
(
pkmax −
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ϕ
)2
.
A positive derivative of the FDI profit function with respect to ϕ requires
∂pijkF (ϕ)
∂ϕ
= 2
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(
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ϕ
)(
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)
!
> 0
⇔ pkmax >
wk
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k
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.
A positive second derivative of the FDI profit function with respect to ϕ requires
∂2pijkF (ϕ)
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k
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)
= w
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(strictly) concave for ϕ ∈
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.
With τ jkwj > wk and 1.5wk > τ jkwj > wk, the following cases of the curvature of the
profit functions are given:
(i) for ϕ ∈
(
τ jkwj
pkmax
, 1.5 w
k
pkmax
)
: the export profit function is convex, the FDI profit function
is convex,
(ii) for ϕ ∈
(
1.5 w
k
pkmax
, 1.5 τ
jkwj
pkmax
)
: the export profit function is convex, the FDI profit
function is concave,
(iii) for ϕ ∈
(
1.5 τ
jkwj
pkmax
,∞
)
: the export profit function is concave, the FDI profit function
is concave.
A.2. ZERO-PROFIT THRESHOLDS 21
A.2 Zero-profit Thresholds
The domestic sales threshold derives as
Lj
4γj
(
pjmax −
wj
ϕ
)2
= fE,
pjmax −
wj
ϕ
=
√
4γj
Lj
fE
and
ϕjD =
wj
pjmax − 2
√
fEγj
Lj
. (A.1)
The export sales threshold derives as
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The FDI sales threshold derives as
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A.3 Ordering - Part I
In order to ensure that
ϕjD < ϕ
jk
X
holds, the following assumption on the transport costs has to be established:
wj
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√
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Lj
<
τ jkwj
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√
fXγk
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In order to ensure that
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A.4 Iso-profit Thresholds
The iso-profit thresholds derive as
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A.5. ORDERING - PART II 23
4γk
Lk
fIϕ
2 − 2pkmaxωjk(−)ϕ+ ωjk(−)ωjk(+) = 0,
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For the existence of two distinct real solutions, the following assumption has to be estab-
lished:
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A.5 Ordering - Part II
In order to ensure that
ϕjkF < ϕ
jk
1
holds, the following assumption on the transport costs has to be established:
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A sufficient condition for the assumption (A.7) exists:
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A.6 Relative Convexity
The concept of relative convexity is defined by Cargo (1965) (Theorem 2): Let I(a, b)
denote the set of all continuous, strictly increasing functions on the interval [a, b]. Suppose
that ζ, χ ∈ I(a, b) and that ζ ′′/ζ ′ and χ′′/χ′ are defined throughout (a, b). Then χ is convex
with respect to ζ (relative convexity) if and only if
χ
′′
(t)
χ′(t)
≥ ζ
′′
(t)
ζ ′(t)
,
whenever a < t < b.
While the convexity of a (continuous and differentiable) function on an interval describes
the relationship between the function and a linear model of the function (reference) based
on the function value and its first derivative, the relative convexity of a (continuous and
differentiable) function on an interval characterizes the relationship between the function
and a model of a (reference) function based on the function values and their first derivatives.
The ratio of the first and second derivative of the export profit function is given by
pi
′′
X
pi
′
X
=
(
τ jk w
j
ϕ2
)2
+
(
pkmax − τ jk w
j
ϕ
)(
−2τ jk wj
ϕ3
)
(
pkmax − τ jk wjϕ
)
τ jk w
j
ϕ2
,
pi
′′
X
pi
′
X
=
τ jk w
j
ϕ2
+
(
pkmax − τ jk w
j
ϕ
)(
− 2
ϕ
)
pkmax − τ jk wjϕ
,
pi
′′
X
pi
′
X
= τ jk
wj
ϕ2
(
ϕ
pkmaxϕ− τ jkwj
)
− 2
ϕ
,
and
pi
′′
X
pi
′
X
=
τ jkwj
ϕ (pkmaxϕ− τ jkwj)
− 2
ϕ
.
26 APPENDIX A.
The ratio of the first and second derivative of the FDI profit function is given by:
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The condition for the relative convexity of the export profit function derives as
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Figure A.1: Wage Allocations and Relative Convexity: Sets of Wage Allocations for which
the Relative Convexity is (not) Fulfilled (Given that τ jk > 1, i.e. Existence of Transporta-
tion Costs)
Chapter 2
Multi-product Firms in International
Trade - A Survey and Evaluation of
Empirical Studies
2.1 Introduction
With the progressive availability of (disaggregated) micro, i.e. product- and firm-product-
level, data sets, products and in particular multi-product firms attracted more and more
attention in the empirical literature during the last decade, leading to a meanwhile intensive
treatment and a large body of research output.1 In an early as well as seminal study on
the products that are purchased by a representative sample of households in 23 cities in
the United States, Broda and Weinstein (2010) examine the turnover of products mainly
in the grocery, drugstore and mass-merchandise sectors for the year 1994 and the period
1999-2003. They document high dynamics in the product market: In a four-year period,
there is four times more entry and exit in the product market data than that found in
the establishment and labor market data, since most of the product turnover takes place
within existing firms: At four-year frequencies, 82% of product creation and 87% of product
destruction happens within existing manufacturers.2 The firms consequently have a multi-
product nature: A typical firm sells eight different products in two different brand modules.3
However, the distribution of products per firm is highly skewed, with a large number of
firms having only a small number of products and a relatively small number of large and
highly diversified firms that sell over 700 different products in over 35 different brands
1For an overview about a likewise large body of research output in the theory of multi-product firms
in international trade: See the Chapter 3.
2Product creation and destruction represent the weighted analogues of the entry and exit rates. The
value in consumption is thereby used as the weight. Hence, creation (destruction) measures the share in
total expenditure in period t (s) on those goods that were consumed in period t (s) but were not available
in period s (t).
3Products are identified by the Universal Product Codes (UPCs), which are also denoted as ”bar codes”
and represent the lowest level of aggregation. They are aggregated to brand modules, which in turn are
ordered into product groups.
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and 18 different product groups, thereby being responsible for over 60% of the sales (in
the forth quarter of 2003).4 In this way, the average firm sells about 40 different products
under about four different brands in about three modules, which are contained in about two
product groups. Product creation and destruction by firms do not happen independently
from the overall demand conditions, but it turns out that the net creation, i.e. creation
less destruction, is strongly pro-cyclical with the total sales growth and primarily driven
by creation rather than destruction.
The studies on multi-product firms in international trade by themselves mainly inves-
tigate the type-specific characteristics as well as the behavior of firms that simultaneously
produce multiple products and are active in trade across national borders: In addition to
the (standard) decision on the production (output) and sales amount of a product (scale:
how much to produce and sell in a market (abroad)?), those firms have to make a choice
on their supplied product portfolio, i.e. the number of products produced and sold (scope:
how many to produce and sell in a market (abroad)?) as well as its composition (space:
what to produce and sell in a market (abroad)?). In particular, with this type of firms, a
new and additional margin of adjustment to exogenous shocks in international economics,
in particular trade liberalization and exchange rate fluctuations, is introduced and can be
examined in empirical studies. Given the meanwhile extensive work already done, one
may tend to raise the question: Summarizing, what do we empirically know about multi-
product firms that binds the existing and upcoming theoretical modeling of this firm type
being progressively treated?
The contribution of this chapter now consists of surveying and evaluating a large number
of the empirical studies by taking up a novel cross-study perspective to get to know the
actual state of knowledge about multi-product firms in international trade. Despite the
methodological problem of a non-uniform definition of a product across the studies, several
robust findings or stylized facts (empirical regularities) can be derived: Multi-product firms
in international trade are not an exception, but represent and account for large shares of
economic agents and activity: They (i) are national and especially international prominent,
less prevalent but important (Section 2.2.1); a fact that justifies, encourages and also
requires the attempt to collect the knowledge about this firm type. As it turns out by
doing this, multi-product firms in international trade feature the following characteristics :
They (ii) are singular economic units and reveal premia in terms of their nature and
performance (Section 2.2.2), they (iii) produce and export at different margins (Section
2.2.3), they (iv) are asymmetric within themselves (“superstar products”, Section 2.2.4),
4A highly skewed sales (exports/imports) distribution across firms is frequently documented in the
literature: See Bernard et al. (2007) for the U.S., Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) for European countries,
Freund and Pierola (2015) for a set of developing countries and Hottman et al. (2016) for the U.S. The
phenomenon of the existence of a few large firms (“superstars”) that decisively influence aggregate patterns
and outcomes is also denoted as “granularity”, with these firms as the “granular elements” (grains) of the
economy. For the macroeconomic implications of the granularity: See Gabaix (2011) and the application to
international trade: See Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012). For the comparative advantage implications
of the granularity: See Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016).
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they (v) do not produce all their exports (“carry-along trade”, Section 2.2.5), they (vi)
are relatively diversified in production and export (Section 2.2.6), they (vii) compete on
a cost and quality basis (Section 2.2.7) and they (viii) are less prone to firm exit in the
process of “creative destruction” (Section 2.2.8). Given the dynamically varying economic
environment in which they operate, multi-product firms in international trade reveal the
following behavior : They (ix) start exporting at a small scale and scope and increase them
over time (Section 2.2.9), they (x) frequently and to a large extent change their product
portfolio (“product switching”, Section 2.2.10) and they (xi) undertake adjustments in
response to exogenous shocks (Section 2.2.11).
The remainder of the chapter is then organized as follows: The next section presents the
empirical regularities on multi-product firms that are derived by surveying and evaluating
a large number of empirical studies. The last section summarizes the main findings.
2.2 Empirical Regularities
The attempt of deriving empirical regularities about multi-product firms is undertaken
by surveying and evaluating 50 empirical studies dealing with those firms in international
trade. These studies use data sets gathered both in developed and developing countries,
in American, Asian and European countries and mostly over a decade between the mid-
1990s and mid-2000s. Because of the large geographical, sectoral/industrial and temporal
coverage of the volume of the empirical studies, results out of a comparison of their find-
ings can claim some validity for multi-product firms. However, as hinted above, an obvious
limitation of this procedure must be mentioned and stressed beforehand: Products are typ-
ically defined according to categories of international classifications, which are hierarchical
and top-down structured with an increasing level of disaggregation going further down the
classification. Empirical studies in general and likewise in this survey however apply differ-
ent classifications and levels of disaggregation to fix their definition of the term product5,
which restricts a reasonable comparison of the findings across the studies, given that the
findings, their robustness and their significance in each study are sensitive to the chosen
product definition and those definitions describe significantly varying ideas of what a prod-
uct represents. Therefore, any results in this survey must be treated with some caution
and one should be aware of those methodological difficulties of a comparative evaluation
of empirical studies of multi-product firms.
An overview about the evaluated empirical studies, their samples, unit of observation,
industrial coverage and product definition used is given by Table B.1, Table B.2, Table
B.3, Table B.4 and Table B.5 in the Appendix B.2.
5An overview about the commonly used product classifications and their levels of disaggregation is
provided by the Appendix B.1.
30 CHAPTER 2. MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS - SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Empirical Study Share of Firmsa Share of Outputb
Average Number
of Productsc
Aw and Lee (2009)
(Taiwanese data (1992-1999))
9% 40% 2.09†
Liu (2010)
(U.S. data (1984-1996))
23% 57% 2.8
Elliott and Virakul (2010)
(Thai data (2001-2004))
43% 57% -
Bernard et al. (2010)
(U.S. data (1997))
39% 87% 3.5
Goldberg et al. (2010b)
(Indian data (2003))
47% 80% 3.06
Navarro (2012)
(Chilean data (1996-2003))
52% 56% 3.9
So¨derbom and Weng (2012)
(Chinese data (2004/2008))
47% 50% 2.76
Bernard and Okubo (2015)
(Japanese data (2006))
39% 77% 2.8
Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016)
(Turkish data (2009))
44% 68% 3.9
Boehm et al. (2016)
(Indian data (2000-2008))
39% 71% 2.81
Caselli et al. (2017)
(Mexican data (1994-2007))
58% 67% 2.86
Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)
(Ethiopian data (1996-2007))
34% 42% -
Dhyne et al. (2017)
(Belgian data (1997-2007))
- 74%†† -
Notes: a: share of multi-product firms in all country-wide active firms, b: share of multi-product firms’ output in country-wide output,
c: average number of products produced by multi-product firms, †: weighted average across the four main industries in the Taiwanese
electronics sector and ††: at the 2-digit PRODCOM level: 22% (firms producing 3+ products: 5% → firms specialize by typically
producing goods within the same 2-digit category.
Table 2.1: Prevalence and Importance of Multi-product Firms in (National) Economies
2.2.1 Prevalence and Importance
Regularity 1 Multi-product firms are national and especially international prominent,
less numerically, i.e. prevalent, but quantitatively, i.e. important.
Multi-product firms are national and especially international prominent, less numerically,
i.e. prevalent, but quantitatively, i.e. important (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). While these
firms represent only a minority or slight majority (Navarro (2012), 52%; Caselli et al.
(2017), 58%) of firms in a country, their output dominates national accounts. With the ex-
ception of the studies by Aw and Lee (2009), Liu (2010) and Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)
using relatively aggregated firm-product-level data ((comparable to) 4- or 5-digit SIC cat-
egories as products) and reporting a lower prevalence (Liu (2010)) as well as importance
(Aw and Lee (2009) and Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)) of multi-product firms, the studies
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document that between 39% and 47% of the firms in a country produce more than one
product; in detail, they produce on average between three and four products (2.76-3.9).6
Regarding output, one can split the country-level studies into three groups: The first group
reports a national output share of multi-product firms of 56% or 57% (with So¨derbom and
Weng (2012) representing an outlier at the bottom limit), the second one demonstrates a
greater relevance of multi-product firms by documenting an output share of about 69%,
while the third group gives evidence of an again greater quantitative dominance of multi-
product firms, as the studies of this group reveal that multi-product firms are responsible
for about 79% of the national output (with Bernard et al. (2010) representing an outlier
at the upper limit and Dhyne et al. (2017) representing a study between the second and
third group).
Looking at international transactions, the prominence of multi-product firms, numeri-
cally and quantitatively, is even enhanced: They build the majority of exporting firms in
a country (only the studies by Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Elliott and Virakul (2010)
and Chatterjee et al. (2013) with shares slightly below 50%) and account for almost all of
the national export values (only the studies by Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Elliott and
Virakul (2010), Navarro (2012) and Chatterjee et al. (2013) with shares below 90%).
As a consequence, these facts about the national and international prevalence and
importance of multi-product firms justify, encourage and likewise require by themselves an
intensive theoretical analysis as well as an empirical examination of multi-product firms in
international trade.
2.2.2 Singular Economic Units - Premia of Multi-product Firms
Regularity 2 Multi-product firms are different in terms of premia of characteristics and
performance, in particular size, productivity and export propensity, compared to single-
product firms.
Multi-product firms are larger (Aw and Lee (2009) (in terms of product sales and employ-
ment), Adalet (2009) (in terms of sales, value added, value of exports and employment),
Bernard et al. (2010) (in terms of shipments and employment), Goldberg et al. (2010b)
(in terms of output), Elliott and Virakul (2010) (in terms of employment), Liu (2010) (in
terms of sales, assets, profits and employment), Navarro (2012) (in terms of output and
employment), So¨derbom and Weng (2012) (in terms of output, employment and capital),
Bernard et al. (2014) (in terms of value added and employment), Bernard and Okubo
(2015) (in terms of output and employment), Lopresti (2016) (in terms of sales and em-
ployment), Choi and Hahn (2017) (in terms of shipments), Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)
(in terms of sales and employment)), more productive7 (Aw and Lee (2009) (TFP), Adalet
6One exception is Aw and Lee (2009): They report a lower average number of products (2.09).
7Exceptions are given by Liu (2010), who reports a lower profit margin as well as a significantly lower
return on asset and sales per employee for multi-product firms and attributes the under-performance to
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Empirical Study Share of Exporting Firmsd Share of Export Valuee
Bernard et al. (2007)
(U.S. data (2000))
58% 99%
Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)
(French data (2003))
65% 98%
Iacovone and Javorcik (2008)
(Mexican data (2003))
43% 63%
Adalet (2009)
(New Zealand data (1996-2007))
72% 99%
Bernard et al. (2009)
(U.S. data (2000))
62% 99%
Elliott and Virakul (2010)
(Thai data (2001-2004))
47% 52%
Navarro (2012)
(Chilean data (1996-2003))
57% 58%
Go¨rg et al. (2012)
(Hungarian data (2003))
96% -
Chatterjee et al. (2013)†
(Brazilian data (1997-2006))
49% 78%
Amador and Opromolla (2013)
(Portuguese data (1996-2005))
61% 92%
Bernard et al. (2014)
(Belgian data (2005))
66% 98%
Damijan et al. (2014)
(Slovenian data (2008))
83% 99%
Notes: d: share of multi-product exporters in all exporting firms in a country, e: share of multi-product exporters’ value in total export
value in a country and †: share of multi-product exporters’ employment in total employment in the export sector: 65% and 86% of unit-
value observations from multi-product firms, overall average number of products exported by a firm to a given country: 5.2 (median
number of products: 2) - heterogeneity across industries.
Table 2.2: Prevalence and Importance of Exporting Multi-product Firms in Intern. Trade
(2009) (ratio of value added to employment), Bernard et al. (2010) (labor productivity and
TFP), Goldberg et al. (2010b) (TFP), Elliott and Virakul (2010) (TFP), Navarro (2012)
(TFP), So¨derbom and Weng (2012) (labor productivity and TFP), Bernard et al. (2014)
(TFP), Bernard and Okubo (2015) (labor productivity and TFP), Choi and Hahn (2017)
(TFP)) and more likely to export8 (Aw and Lee (2009), Bernard et al. (2010), Goldberg
et al. (2010b), Navarro (2012), So¨derbom and Weng (2012), Bernard and Okubo (2015),
Lopresti (2016) (activity in foreign markets), Choi and Hahn (2017) (positive correlation))
than single-product firms (within the same industry). For Taiwanese data, Aw and Lee
(2009) find that multi-product firms are older, confirmed by Choi and Hahn (2017) for Ko-
the firms’ diversification (diversification discount, Section 2.2.6), as well as Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017),
who find that multi-product firms are not more productive in terms of labor productivity.
8A restriction is given by Elliott and Virakul (2010) for Thailand, who find the ownership structure of
firms to be an important determinant of firm behavior, and, in detail, they derive a negative correlation
between the multiple product production status and foreign ownership, as well as report that only foreign-
owned multi-product firms are more likely to export. Furthermore, an exception is given by Lopresti and
Shiferaw (2017) for Ethiopia, who find that multi-product firms are not more likely to export.
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rean data and Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017) for Ethiopian data, and more capital-intensive
than single-product firms. Accordingly, Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017) detect that multi-
product firms are more likely to invest in physical capital and are more likely to undertake
large investments than single-product firms.
Inherently to (productive) firms producing more than a single product, they further
empirically derive the result that those firms more often undertake research and devel-
opment (R&D). The positive correlation between the multiple product production status
and R&D is confirmed by several following studies, namely the one of Elliott and Virakul
(2010) for Thai data, in which multi-product firms are more active in product and process
innovation, latter especially in case of domestic firms, and also by Liu (2010) and Lopresti
(2016), both reporting higher R&D expenditures of multi-product firms for U.S. data, as
well as Choi and Hahn (2017), who find for Korean data a positive correlation between the
multiple product production and innovation status.
The general discussion in the international trade literature about the productivity pre-
mium of internationally active firms and its reasons finds its extension to the empirical
literature of multi-product firms, revealing both characteristics: (disproportional) interna-
tional participation and a productivity premium. While Bernard et al. (2010) document
that single-product firms that subsequently become multi-product firms are more produc-
tive than other single-product firms and interpret this finding as a contribution to some
evidence for the selection approach, Navarro (2012) rejects that approach (in the sense
that plants that add products to their portfolio are ex-ante more productive) in favor of
the alternative one of learning.
2.2.3 Margins of Production and Export
Regularity 3 Multi-product firms produce and export at different margins.
The analysis of the margins of production and export, which becomes relevant in the case
of multi-product firms and possible with the availability of disaggregated data, can be
conducted schematically by deducing margins through aggregate data and data on other
inverse margins or analytically by employing firm- and firm-product-level data. A firm’s
output (sales) can be schematically decomposed into two margins, the product-extensive
margin, i.e. the number of products produced (sold) by the firm, and the product-intensive
margin, i.e. the product output produced (sold) by the firm. Denoting firm f ’s extensive
margin with nif and product p’s intensive margin with xifp, firm output (sales) xif is then
given by: xif = nif × xifp and describes the firm-intensive margin. To get the aggregate,
i.e. country-, sector- or industry-level output (sales) Xi, firm output (sales) xif has to be
multiplied with the firm-extensive margin, i.e. the number of firms Ni in the respective
unit i: Xi = Ni× xif (Figure 2.1).9 With the availability of disaggregated (firm- and firm-
9In their seminal paper, Hummels and Klenow (2005) analyze a country’s exports by decomposing it
into an extensive (number of goods) and intensive (volume of each good) margin. They show that larger
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country-(sector-, industry-)level output/sales Xi
number of firms Ni
firm-extensive margin
firm output/sales xif
firm-intensive margin
number of products nif
product-extensive margin
product output/sales xifp
product-intensive margin
Figure 2.1: Decomposition of Aggregate Output (Sales) in the (Firm- and Product-level)
Margins
product-level) data, the decomposition becomes possible to be conducted by empirical
studies in international trade, thereby investigating firm behavior in more detail.10
The correlation between the product-extensive and the product-intensive margin is
examined by several studies that derive in part opposite results. Iacovone and Javorcik
(2008) (in exporting), Adalet (2009) (in exporting), Goldberg et al. (2010b) (in output),
Elliott and Virakul (2010) (in exporting), Liu (2010) (in sales), Bernard et al. (2011)11
(in exporting) and Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013) (in exporting, per destination) find a
positive correlation12 in the sense that firms producing (exporting) a larger set of products
also produce (export) more of each product in their portfolio. In contrast, Elliott and
Virakul (2010) (in production) and Navarro (2012) (in sales and exporting) report for
Thai and Chilean data respectively a negative correlation13 between the product-intensive
and product-extensive margin, i.e. firms producing (exporting) a larger set of products
produce (export) less of each product in their portfolio.
Another correlation between the product-extensive margin and the firm-intensive mar-
gin exists. As documented by Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Adalet (2009), Bernard et al.
(2011), Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013) (per destination) and Bernard et al. (2014), both
margins are positively related in the way that larger exporters export more products. In
addition, Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013) (per destination) find a positive correlation between
the product-intensive margin and the firm-intensive margin for exporting, i.e. exporting
economies export more in absolute terms than smaller economies and the extensive margin accounts for
62% of these larger exports.
10In the following, the analysis do not explicitly distinguish between schematically deduced values and
analytically estimated values for the margins in the estimation results, since such a distinction do not
provide exceeding insights (exception: the estimations by Bernard et al. by construction).
11In their baseline econometric exercise, Bernard et al. (2011) use the exports of the firm’s (5th-)largest
product as a measure for the product-intensive margin; different to what is used in other studies. In
addition, they state that the exports of this top product increase more sharply with the number of products
exported than the exports of an average product; even so, they still confirm a positive correlation between
the latter and the number of exported products.
12In line with the theoretical model of multi-product firms by Bernard et al. (2011).
13In line with the theoretical models of multi-product firms by Eckel and Neary (2010) and Nocke and
Yeaple (2014), incorporating crucial within-firm cannibalization effects and dis-economies of scope.
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firms with larger exports per product are also larger in their aggregate exports.
Bernard et al. (2011) take a look at the margins of trade across countries and thereby
analyze their responsiveness to variable trade costs (proxied by distance) and the market
size of the destination country. As it is well established in the literature, exports decline
with the distance of the source country to the destination country and increase with the
destination country’s market size (proxied by GDP; Bernard et al. (2014)). The decompo-
sition however yields that this negative relationship between the export value and distance
is caused entirely by the extensive margin, i.e. the number of firm-product observations in
the destination country, while the intensive margin, i.e. the average firm-product exports
(product-intensive margin), seems not to be significantly influenced by distance (Bernard
et al. (2014)). Even so the number of firms (firm-extensive margin; Bernard et al. (2014))
and the number of products (Bernard et al. (2014)) decline with distance (combined ef-
fect of the extensive margins almost completely explains cross-country variation in export
value; Bernard et al. (2014)), the opposite is true for the density as a measure of the extent
to which each firm supplies each product (Bernard et al. (2014)): The number of firm-
product observations increases less than proportionately than the number of firms times
the number of products as market size increases, illustrating the restricted set of products
that firms are active in. In the analysis, Bernard et al. (2011) show that the number of
products per firm (product-extensive margin) and the number of firms per product also
decline with distance. Overall, the exports of a given product by a given firm and distance
are negatively related.
Arkolakis and Muendler (2013) confirm the finding that the product-extensive margin
is negatively related to distance, while they find that it is not significantly related to the
destination country’s market size; so whether the country is large or small in terms of its
market does not play a significant role for the number of products that a firm exports to
it. In contrast, Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013) derive a positive correlation between the
product-extensive margin and the destination country’s market size. This factor also pos-
itively influences the export decision, the average value exported per product by each firm
(product-intensive margin) and the total export value of each firm (firm-intensive margin).
Arkolakis and Muendler (2013) similarly identify that the product-intensive margin is sig-
nificantly positively related to the destination’s market size, but unrelated to distance.
Furthermore, the firm-extensive margin is driven by the destination’s market size; so fi-
nally, they conclude that the market size drives firm entry but not meaningfully influence
subsequent product entry decisions of firms.
In addition to looking at the market potential (market size) and a barrier for goods
delivery (trade costs) as potentially important factors of the margins of trade, Berthou and
Fontagne´ (2013) take into account the competition from the rest of the world and figure
out that both the product-intensive margin and the firm-intensive margin are negatively
correlated with it. A 10% increase in the competition from other Euro-area countries leads
to a reduction in the product-intensive margin by 5.8%.
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So far, firm-external factors of the margins of trade were investigated, but it seems
plausible to extend the consideration also to firm-internal factors. Firm characteristics
that indicate the firm’s overall performance, especially its productivity, thereby repre-
sent natural candidates for potentially important factors of the margins of trade. With
a higher productivity, firms are more likely to export products (Berthou and Fontagne´
(2013) and Masso and Vahter (2015)).14 More productive firms typically export larger
volumes of goods (firm-intensive margin), documented by Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013)
(per destination) and Bernard et al. (2014). According to the latter, a 10% increase in
total factor productivity (labor productivity) is associated with a 0.7% (7.6%) increase in
firm exports. More productive exporters are also found to be those firms that export a
larger number of products (product-extensive margin), which is reported by Bernard et al.
(2011), Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013) (per destination) and Bernard et al. (2014) (aggre-
gate and per destination), and those firms that export to a larger number of destinations,
according to Bernard et al. (2011) and Bernard et al. (2014). As Berthou and Fontagne´
(2013) (per destination) and Bernard et al. (2014) (per destination) show in addition, the
product-intensive margin positively correlates with the firm’s productivity, which implies
that more productive firms export more of each of their supplied products. In Bernard
et al. (2014), the density measure falls with productivity: More productive firms export
more products and reach more destinations but do not ship every product to every country.
The aggregate increase in firm exports associated with a higher firm productivity can be
attributed to more than a half to the intensive margin. Overall, the higher productivity at
the firm level is associated with greater exports of a given product to a given country.
2.2.4 Heterogeneity within Firms - Product Asymmetry
Regularity 4 Multi-product firms reveal a within-firm product heterogeneity and hierarchy
in the way that they sell more of some products and less of others, i.e. asymmetric products.
The sales distribution across products within firms is non-uniform but skewed and points
to the existence of core or “superstar” varieties of firms15 and a product hierarchy within
firms (Aw and Lee (2009), Adalet (2009), Goldberg et al. (2010b), Bernard et al. (2010),
Liu (2010), Bernard et al. (2011), Navarro (2012), So¨derbom and Weng (2012), Go¨rg et al.
(2012), Amador and Opromolla (2013), Chatterjee et al. (2013), Masso and Vahter (2014),
Arnarson (2016), Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016), Lopresti (2016), Boehm et al. (2016),
Caselli et al. (2017), Dhyne et al. (2017), Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)). Regarding the
14For the theoretical foundation of selection effects in models with heterogeneous firms, see the seminal
work by Melitz (2003). Miranda et al. (2012) show that the firm-extensive margin (firm exit) is mainly
determined by firm characteristics and Masso and Vahter (2015) derive a productivity premium of multi-
product or multi-market new exporters.
15For the “superstar” phenomenon (“granularity”) at the firm margin, i.e. a few large exporters account
for large shares of a country’s exports: See Bernard et al. (2007) for the U.S., Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)
for European countries, Freund and Pierola (2015) for a set of developing countries and Hottman et al.
(2016) for the U.S.
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magnitude of the distribution skewness, Adalet (2009), Liu (2010), Bernard et al. (2011)
and Navarro (2012) report that the tails of this distribution are thinner than that of the
Pareto distribution. Liu (2010) further documents that the average sales share of the
largest product is about two times larger than the average sales share of the second largest
product, while Chatterjee et al. (2013) find that on average the export value generated by
the top product is approximately three times larger than the export value generated by
the second-largest product and roughly twice as large as the export value generated by the
sum of all the products exported by the firm. For firms with ten export products, a single
product accounts on average for about 70% of export sales and the top-5 export products
are responsible for about 98% of export sales (Masso and Vahter (2014)). According to
Arnarson (2016), the top (second top) ranked export product accounts for 44% (18.3%)
of the aggregate firm trade value, while the first three products in sum are responsible for
over 73% of the aggregate firm trade value. Similarly, Lopresti (2016) reports a sales share
of the firm’s core product of at least 45%.
The contribution of the top product to firm sales decreases with the scope of the firm
(Navarro (2012), Arnarson (2016), Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016), Dhyne et al. (2017),
Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)). Dhyne et al. (2017) (Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)) docu-
ment that the core product accounts for 77.5% (80%) of firm sales for firms that produce
only two products, whereas its share decreases to 69.5% (66%) for firms that produce three
products and to 49.4% (45%) for firms that produce six or more (six) products. For firms
producing nine or more products, the sales share of the core product falls down below 50%
and the shares of the second and third largest products amount then to 20% and 10%,
respectively (Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016)).
For internationally active firms, the sales distribution across destinations within firms
is also skewed towards a top element, even so this skewness is less pronounced compared
to the product level (Amador and Opromolla (2013)). Differentiating between products,
the sales of the top product are much more concentrated in the top destination, while less
important products are more homogeneously sold across markets; so here the degree of
skewness is positively related to the product rank. Arnarson (2016) looks at the number
of destination per product and finds that over 65% of the products are only exported to a
single destination and a large majority of products (81%) with a total firm trade value of 9%
are exported to three or less destinations. The skewness within firms is further expressed
by the fact that products exported to three or less destinations and ranked second or lower
account for 71.4% of the products but only for 5% of the firm export value. Contrary,
a few products (5.2%) that are exported to four or more destinations and ranked among
the three highest in the firm sales distribution are responsible for 66.9% of the firm export
value.
In a study on the firm-product-level efficiency, Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2017)
find that productive plants tend to be relatively efficient across their whole product port-
folio and not just for their core product, which is consistent with the concept of flexible
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manufacturing. Moreover, the variable on which the product rankings (hierarchies) within
firms are established turns out to be relevant: The standard concept of establishing product
ladders according to the sales of the products leads to a seemingly contradictory pattern:
Products that are sold at the largest scale and are therefore top-ranked exhibit higher
physical efficiency but also higher marginal costs. The discrepancy is likely to be driven by
product quality, which exerts an upward pressure on marginal costs, due to higher input
prices, but leaves physical efficiency largely unaffected.16
2.2.5 Divergence of Production and Exports - Carry-along Trade
Regularity 5 Multi-product exporters are to a large degree engaged in carry-along trade
(CAT), both across and within them: They do not produce all the products and/or all the
value that they export by themselves, but source a proportion of the number of their export
products and/or their export value from outside.
Multi-product firms in general have three extensive margins that do not necessarily coin-
cide: (i) the production scope, i.e. the number of products that the firm produces by itself,
(ii) the domestic scope, i.e. the number of products that the firm sells in the domestic
market and (iii) the export scope, i.e. the number of products that the firm sells abroad by
exporting. A divergence between the firms’ production and sales can also exist at their in-
tensive margin: Firms sell as many products to the domestic market or the market abroad
as they produce, but the sales amount of a product is larger than its production amount.
By examining jointly the production and exporting of multi-product firms in Belgium,
Bernard et al. (forthcoming) detect that the overwhelming majority of manufacturing ex-
porters export more products or more of a product than they produce and thus undertake
some (complementary) export activities of non-produced goods, which is labeled by them
as “carry-along trade” (CAT): Except for the category of single-product exporters, firms in
all other categories report greater numbers of products exported than products produced
and 89% of the firms are CAT exporters, i.e. exporting firms with at least one CAT prod-
uct. A CAT firm-product is thereby defined as a product of a firm whose value of exports
by the firm is greater than the value of production by the firm.17 Given that about 16% of
the firms are single-product exporters, CAT is widespread across multi-product exporters.
CAT firm-products can be differentiated between two non-overlapping, exhaustive cat-
egories: Pure-CAT firm-products, for which the firm export value is positive but no pro-
duction in that product is recorded, and mixed-CAT firm-products, for which production
and export values are positive but the value of exports is greater than that of production.
16For the importance of the quality (vs. productivity) dimension of firm heterogeneity: See the Section
2.2.7.
17Besides the CAT firm-products, two further mutually-exclusive categories at the firm-product level
exist: Non-exported firm-products, i.e. products that are reported as produced by the firm but not recorded
as exports, and regular export firm-products, i.e. products that are reported both as produced and exported
by the firm and whose value of exports is less than or equal to their value of production.
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Product exports without any production of the product by the firm is common across the
firms that are active in CAT: 98.3% of the CAT exporters are firms with at least one pure-
CAT product. While the number of exported products is given by the sum of the number
of regular products and the number of CAT products, the number of produced products is
given by the sum of the number of non-exported products, the number of regular products
and the number of mixed-CAT products.
Along the categories, the firm export value can be divided into a produced export value,
which is given by the sum of exports of regular firm-products and the exports of mixed-
CAT firm-products that are produced by the firm, and a sourced export value, which is
given by the sum of exports of pure-CAT firm-products and the exports of mixed-CAT
firm-products that are sourced by the firm.
Multi-product exporters do not produce the majority of the products that they export:
Even if multi-product exporters are also multi-product domestic producers, the number of
exported products increases much more rapidly than the number of produced products, as
one follows the categorization of firms according to their export scope from small to large.
Sourcing is done in almost all product categories, in particular 98.7% of the products are
reported as CAT by at least one firm, and for a large number of firm-product pairs, in
particular 87% of the firm-products are reported as CAT. Within firms, the probability
that a product is produced rather than sourced is increasing in the number of its export
destinations.
CAT is both widespread and quantitatively important: CAT exports account for at
least 5% of total firm exports for more than two-thirds (67.3%) of all firms and more
than three-fourths (75.5%) of CAT firms, and it even accounts for at least 10% of total
firms exports for more than 60% (61.2%) of all firms and more than two-thirds (68.7%) of
CAT firms. Focusing solely on pure-CAT exports, the numbers are quite large: Pure-CAT
exports account for at least 5% of total firm exports for more than fifth-ninths (58.5%) of
all firms and more than two-thirds (66.9%) of pure-CAT firms, and it even accounts for
at least 10% of total firms exports for more than half (51.1%) of all firms and more than
fifth-ninths (58.4%) of pure-CAT firms. Even though the share of CAT exports in the total
value of exports is quite sizeable, i.e. 29.9% of total exports, and pure-CAT products in
turn are relevant as they account for 96% of the number of CAT products and 74% of the
value of sourced exports, the majority of the export value is made in-house by the firms.
In general, the margins of firm exports18 and a distinctive feature of the firm, namely
its total factor productivity, are related as follows: The total firm exports are strong
positively correlated with firm productivity, which is revealed by an elasticity significantly
greater than one. Both margins, the number of distinct products exported and the average
18The margins of firm exports are the following: total firm exports (Xf ), number of distinct products
exported (Pf ) and average exports per product (X¯f ).
Xf = Pf × X¯f ,
whereas X¯f = 1/Pf ×
∑
pXpf .
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exports per product, are also strong positively correlated with firm productivity. The more
productive firms export more products and more of each product. Differentiating the total
firm exports into produced and sourced product exports reveals notable differences in the
relation with productivity between them: While the value of both produced and pure-
CAT exports increases with firm productivity, both total factor productivity and value-
added per worker and pure-CAT exports at a slightly lower rate, the rise in produced
exports is mostly caused by a rise in the average exports per product and much less by
an increase in the number of produced products that are exported. Exports of pure-CAT
products are significantly lower than produced exports within the firm and their increase
with productivity is roughly evenly caused by rising numbers of pure-CAT products and
an increase in their average export value. While the extensive margin of pure-CAT exports
is larger than that of produced products and increases much faster in firm productivity,
the intensive margin of pure-CAT exports is lower than that for produced products and
increases at a much lower rate as firm productivity increases.
The increase in the number of exported products for more productive firms is mostly
caused by an increase in the number of pure-CAT products, as a strong (weak) positive
relationship between firm productivity and the number of sourced (produced) products that
are exported leads to a rising share of pure-CAT products in total exported products for
more productive firms. The most productive manufacturing exporters sell more products
to the market, whereas they both produce more products and source more products.
CAT appears to be some feature of firms’ cross-border activities which is both pervasive
across firms and products (prevalence) and responsible for a substantial share of exports
(importance). As ascertained by company interviews, firms are most likely active in CAT in
order to extend their range of products that are produced in-house and thereby to meet and
enhance customer demand, as the bundling of manufactured goods with complementary
sourced products turns out to be vital for this firm objective.
2.2.6 Production and Export Diversification
Regularity 6 Multi-product firms are remarkably diversified in the way that they jointly
produce and/or export products belonging to different industries or even sectors.
Firms producing multiple products have to decide about their product portfolio, in partic-
ular composition, and therefore the degree of diversification. A remarkable share of firms
produce products belonging to different industries (multi-industry firms): Most studies re-
port that about 30% of firms in an economy are diversified in this form19 (Goldberg et al.
(2010b) [33%], Bernard et al. (2010) [28%], Navarro (2012) [22%], So¨derbom and Weng
(2012) [34%], Bernard and Okubo (2015) [28%], Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016) [30%] and
Boehm et al. (2016) [32%]). On average, those firms are then active in two to three in-
dustries (Goldberg et al. (2010b) [2.01], Bernard et al. (2010) [2.8], Navarro (2012) [2.6],
19An exception is given by Adalet (2009): She reports a share of 61%.
2.2. EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 41
So¨derbom and Weng (2012) [2.25], Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016) [2.7] and Boehm et al.
(2016) [2.55]). For almost all studies, a considerably smaller share of firms is even more
diversified in the sense of producing products that belong to different sectors (multi-sector
firms)20: Goldberg et al. (2010b) [24%], Bernard et al. (2010) [10%], Navarro (2012) [9%],
So¨derbom and Weng (2012) [9%], Bernard and Okubo (2015) [14%], Lo Turco and Mag-
gioni (2016) [16%] and Boehm et al. (2016) [19%]. On average, those firms are active in
two sectors (Goldberg et al. (2010b) [1.68], Bernard et al. (2010) [2.3], Navarro (2012) [2.2],
So¨derbom and Weng (2012) [2.08], Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016) [2.2] and Boehm et al.
(2016) [2.34]).
Multi-industry and multi-sector firms represent large firms being responsible for large
shares of country-wide output: For India, they account for 62% and 54% of sales respec-
tively (Goldberg et al. (2010b)), for Japan, 70% and 52% respectively (Bernard and Okubo
(2015)), for Turkey, 44% and 27% respectively (Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016)) and for
India again, 62% and 49% of sales (Boehm et al. (2016)). Comparing sizes of firm types,
Bernard and Okubo (2015) further report that multi-sector firms are more than five times
larger than multi-product firms being active in only one industry.
Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016) undertake an analysis of diversified Turkish firms: In-
ternationalized, i.e. exporting, large firms and firms being active in a more competitive
market (for their main (core) product) are more diversified in their activity across prod-
ucts. Over the period of observation (2005-2009), all domestic firms as well as exporters
and importers experienced a slight increase in the diversification measure (entropy index),
while foreign owned firms became less diversified.21 A foreign competition threat regarding
the core product has no impact on the diversification (strategy) of firms and a tariff cut
(firm-weighted tariffs) is associated with a higher concentration of firms’ sales.
Looking at the extent of diversification, Amador and Opromolla (2013) report that
exporters in Portugal are relatively diversified: About half of the exporters that ship two
products are active in two different sectors, almost two-thirds of three-product exporters
ship products that belong to more than one sector and more than 80% of firms exporting
between eleven and 50 products are active in five and more sectors. Based on an alter-
native indicator of diversification, which takes into account the firm’s product scope, the
distribution of sales across the products as well as the input relatedness of the products
and therefore represents a generalized index of diversification, Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017)
detect for Ethiopia that all single-product firms and 18% of the multi-product firms are
non-diversified, whereas a firm for which the diversification index is larger than the industry
average is considered to be diversified.
In a study on the (dynamic) firm structure in a developing (African) country, in par-
ticular Ethiopia, Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017) analyses the firms’ transition process from
a single-product to a multi-product firm: The vast majority of start-ups (70%) enters the
20An exception is given by Adalet (2009): She reports a share of 56%.
21Lopresti (2016) documents a decrease in diversification for U.S. firms between 1982 and 1995.
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manufacturing sector as single-product firms and only few of them extend their product
portfolio to multiple products: 25% of single-product firms observed at a given point in
time change into multi-product firms in the subsequent six years and the rate of tran-
sition further decreases after that interval, letting transition from a single-product to a
multi-product firm status be extremely rare (negative duration dependence). Most of the
single-product firms are likely to remain so and do not expand. Nevertheless, among them,
differences in the likelihood of becoming a multi-product firm exist: Single-product firms
with lumpy investments22 are nearly twice as likely as their counterparts without lumpy
investments to become multi-product firms in a given year. A further factor that facili-
tates the transition process of firms is labor productivity: Single-product firms with higher
initial levels of labor productivity are more likely to become multi-product firms, as a
one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of initial labor productivity increases the
likelihood of a transition to a multi-product firm by 11% to 14%.
In addition, firm-level investments and especially lumpy investments have a significant
positive effect on diversification: Firms with lumpy investments are nearly 1.9 times more
likely to change to becoming a diversified multi-product firm than firms that do not under-
take such investments. Taken both together, conditional on the initial levels of firm size,
labor productivity and firm age, firms that undertake substantial investments in a given
year are more likely to either expand or diversify product offerings than firms without such
investments, which indicates the existence of substantial investment costs to product scope
expansion and diversification.
Investigating the firms’ motives for product scope expansion and diversification, Lo-
presti and Shiferaw (2017) find that more diversified firms have a lower variance of sales,
where the sales volatility of multi-product firms with a median generalized index of diver-
sification is 11% lower than that for a single-product firm. Furthermore, an increase in the
index of diversification from 0 to 0.1 lowers the firm’s coefficient of variation by 0.063 or
9% of the mean. Across heterogeneous industries, single-product firms in industries with a
high sales variance23 are 46% more likely to become multi-product firms than their coun-
terparts in industries with a low sales variance and firms in high-variance industries are
51% more likely to introduce markedly distinct products compared to firms in industries
with a low sales variance. As a result, firms expand their product scope or diversify their
product portfolio in order to mitigate risk which is accompanied with their operations.
2.2.7 Firm and Firm-product Competences
Regularity 7 Multi-product firms operate and compete on the basis of their overall and/or
product-specific productivity or quality and especially the latter plays an important role for
22Lumpy investments are defined as investment spikes for which the investment rates exceed 20% of the
capital stock.
23High(low)-variance industries are defined as industries with a coefficient of variation above (below) the
global median.
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this firm type. A product market characteristic, namely the market’s degree of product dif-
ferentiation, decides about the relative contribution of the two dimensions: Product quality
is more relevant in more differentiated markets.
The heterogeneity of firms and products within firms rests on either their productivity
respectively cost of production or their quality of output and firms thus compete with
their products on the basis of their superiority in either of the two dimensions, providing
the sets of possible fundamentals for their activity and performance differentials.24
Manova and Yu (2017) examine the role of product quality in the operations of Chi-
nese multi-product firms during the period 2002-2006 and find that the differentiation of
product quality across firms and across products within firms represent a key feature for
understanding the differentials in the firms’ export performance and the effects of trade
reforms.
Firms that export products at higher average prices and firms that vary prices more
across their product range export more and exhibit a faster export growth. Similar patterns
also hold when output quality25 instead of the price of the output as its quality indicator is
employed. Furthermore, superior firms, i.e. firms with a higher productivity, employment
and intensity of skill, capital, advertising as well as research and development, sell their
products at higher average prices and quality as well as reveal a greater price and quality
dispersion across their products. Analyzing the variation within a product across firms, the
study finds that the export price and the export revenue are positively correlated. A one-
standard-deviation increase in the export revenues is accompanied by 20% higher export
prices. The output quality used likewise positively correlates with the export revenue,
overall providing an indication for a differentiation of quality across firms.26 In addition,
differentials are also in place across the products within firms: The export prices and
revenues are systematically positively correlated across a firm’s product range: Products
that are the firms’ top sellers tend to be their most expensive ones. In 45% and 19% of
the time, the firm’s best-performing product in terms of the export revenues is also its
most or second-most expensive product. Conversely, the firms’ most expensive products
tend to be their top-selling ones. In 45% and 18% of the time, the firm’s most expensive
product is its best- or second-best-performing one in terms of the export revenues. Due
to the obtained finding that, across all the products in a firm’s portfolio, the price rank
of a given product most likely coincides with its sales rank, indicating a differentiation of
24Eckel et al. (2015) develop a model of multi-product firms, in which the firms’ competence is based
either on cost or quality, being identifiable by a negative or respectively positive correlation of the firms’
price and sales profiles across their products. They empirically test the model’s key prediction that firms
in sectors with differentiated products exhibit a quality-based competence and find its confirmation in a
Mexican data set. In addition, the empirical analysis yields the compatible as well as reinforcing result
that the export sales of firms in non-differentiated-product sectors exhibit the opposite pattern.
25Output quality is inferred from data on export prices and quantities or proxied with the price or the
inferred quality of imported inputs.
26As in Eckel et al. (2015), the theory on which Manova and Yu (2017)’s study is based states that a
negative correlation between prices and revenues indicates an efficiency sorting, while a positive correlation
a quality sorting.
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quality across the products within firms, one can infer that the firms’ core products are the
expensive and high-quality ones that generate the highest revenues, while the cheap and
low-quality products that are sold at low volumes represent the firms’ peripheral ones.
Analyzing the variation across products within a firm, the study reveals that firms
allocate their activities across products in accordance with their differentiation of quality
and therefore both the quality differentiation and the resulting product hierarchies gov-
ern the operations of multi-product firms. The export price and the export revenue are
once again positive correlated. On the one hand, more expensive goods generate system-
atically higher global sales. An increase by a one-standard-deviation in export revenues
is associated with 10.6% higher export prices. As to bilateral sales on the other hand,
exporters earn higher revenues from their more expensive products also within each des-
tination. A one-standard-deviation increase in bilateral exports is related to 9.5% higher
bilateral units values.27 As before, in addition to the export price as the product’s quality
indicator, the study more directly employs output quality. And for the two specifications,
qualitatively similar results are obtained, even so quantitative differences exist: The global
export revenue positively correlates with the output quality across the products within a
firm and also a strong positive correlation between the bilateral export revenue and the
output quality across the products within a firm-destination exists. By contrast, the point
estimates in the latter specification are substantially higher. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the bilateral export revenues is associated with a 280% higher product qual-
ity. The firms’ core products reveal both high quality and high production efficiency as
manifested in low quality-adjusted prices, thereby overall indicating a quality differentia-
tion across a firm’s products. The positive correlations between prices and revenues, both
within a product across firms and across products within a firm, are invariant to a firm’s
market power across its products, possibly influencing its pricing strategy, and the asso-
ciations are stronger for products with arguably greater scope for quality differentiation,
such as differentiated goods and sectors intensive in research and development (R&D) as
well as combined R&D and advertising.
Multi-product firms differentiate the output quality across their products by making
use of inputs of varying quality levels. Input prices positively correlate with the output
price across the products within a firm, with an elasticity ranging between 0.11 and 0.13,
depending on the matching procedures between inputs and outputs. With input quality28
instead of the price as its quality indicator, a strong positive correlation between input and
output quality across the products within a firm is found. The relationship between the
input prices and the output price is thereby invariant to the firms’ market power both in
the output market and in the input market as well as invariant to processing imports and
matching procedures. Moreover, the firms’ export prices rise substantially more quickly
27Investigating the correlation based not only on the levels of the export price and revenue but on the
within-firm ranks, a strong positive correlation between the products’ global and bilateral rank by price
and by revenue across the products within exporters can be found and reinforces the study’s findings.
28Input quality is inferred from data on import quantities and prices.
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with their input prices when the output product is differentiated.
For the variation across destinations within a firm, Manova and Yu (2017) detect that
the export product scope and the export revenues are positively correlated. Exporters thus
generate systematically higher revenues in destinations where they sell more products. The
typical firm earns 85% higher bilateral revenues when it exports 50% more products to a
given country. Thereby, the distribution of the sales across its products is not indepen-
dent from its export scope. Instead of, firms concentrate more on their core competence
products in markets being smaller for them, in the way that they skew their exports more
towards their top-selling, most expensive and highest-quality products in markets with a
smaller export scope. Reducing the product range by 50% comes along with a 21% (8.5%,
15.5%) rise in the revenues from the best-selling (most expensive, highest-quality) prod-
uct relative to the second-best (second-most, second-highest). Qualitatively similar results
are obtained when separately considering firms’ homogeneous and differentiated products.
Quantitatively however, the concentration of sales towards the expensive and towards the
high-quality products falls faster with the export product scope for differentiated products
than for homogeneous products, while the opposite is true for the concentration of sales
towards the best-selling product.29 Therefore, firms reallocate their activities towards their
core, high-quality products in destinations with a smaller export scope both along their ex-
tensive margin, by dropping lower-quality peripheral products, and their intensive margin,
by concentrating sales towards their high-quality products.30
In addition, the export product scope is also related to the average price at which
firms sell their products: Both are negatively correlated. The relationship is not driven
by cross-country differences in a firm’s market power and existent in the sample of differ-
entiated products with some potential for quality upgrading, while being absent among
homogeneous products. The typical firm lowers its average bilateral price by 1% when it
exports 50% more products to a given destination. For differentiated products, the corre-
lation is 20% higher.31 As firms adjust their export scope, they operate at the lower end
of their product hierarchies: Exporters expand (restrict) their product range across mar-
kets by consistently exporting their core, expensive products of high quality and adding
(dropping) their peripheral, cheaper products of lower quality. So, a negative correlation
between the export product scope and the average output quality across a firm’s products
exists. Even though, the weighted average quality is significantly positively correlated with
the export product scope across destinations within a firm-year.
Aw and Lee (2017) investigate the relative importance of the two dimensions of firm
heterogeneity, productivity and quality, for the export performance of Taiwanese multi-
product firms in the period 2000-2004. Firms with high demand and productivity measures
29Similar results are received in case of an alternative sales concentration measure: The Herfindahl index.
30According to the theory, the findings are inconsistent with constant markups, but variable markups
importantly affect the sales decisions of multi-product firms.
31However, the relationship between export product scope and the revenue-weighted average price is
markedly less negative and not statistically different from zero.
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have a higher likelihood to export and to export a large number of products. As the
firms decide about their export participation and export product scope, quality plays a
larger role for export decisions of firms in more differentiated product markets and for
export decisions of products with lower cost elasticities of quality improvements, while
productivity has a larger influence on export decisions of firms in markets with lower
degrees of product differentiation and on export decisions of products with higher cost
elasticities of quality improvements. Regarding product-level characteristics, the lowest-
selling products of large-scope exporters reveal firm-product demand and productivity
measures that are progressively lower than that of the lowest-selling products of small-
scope exporters, indicating that large-scope exporters face lower thresholds in productivity
and demand for their products to be existent in the export market.
2.2.8 Production Innovation and Firm Survival
A strand of the literature looks at the effect of a product innovation on the survival of the
innovating firm, which is ex ante ambiguous and therefore worth to be investigated empir-
ically. In a competitive and rapidly changing economic environment, a product innovation
and some degree of diversification by adjusting or extending the firm’s product portfolio
commonly prove to be necessary for firms to ensure their sustainable performance and ex-
istence in the economy by matching the consumers’ demand, capturing a market position
and balancing the segments’ volatility. A firm’s product innovation however arrives only at
the discount that it generates some entrepreneurial risks due to uncertainties inherent in
the realization of its commercialization. At the time of the market launch of the new prod-
uct, it is eminently unclear for the firm to what extent the innovation fits the consumers’
demand, whether it is not quickly imitated or replaced by the new products developed by
competitors and therefore to what extent the innovation can be commercialized, which is
essential to at least amortize the typically high fixed costs associated with any innovation
process and to pay off the investments undertaken by the innovating firm. Any medium-
or long-term absence of a commercial success of the innovation in the market therefore
jeopardizes to some degree the survival of the innovator. Firms producing multiple prod-
ucts are by nature more or less engaged in product innovation as well as diversification
and the insights of the literature on the innovation-survival relationship thus apply to a
comprehensive consideration of this type of firms.
In a recent contribution to the literature, Fernandes and Paunov (2015) basically ob-
serve a negative relationship between a product innovation32 and the exit probability of the
conducting plant, i.e. product innovating plants reveal a lower hazard of exit, and the re-
lationship holds for a qualitative as well as a quantitative measure of innovation: A plant’s
32In the study, a product innovation describes a product that is new to the plant and not supplied by
it in previous periods, but the product is not necessarily new to the country or the rest of the world.
Therefore, research and development (R&D) expenditures do not necessarily correlate with the product
innovation measure that is applied in the study.
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engagement in product innovation and its introduction of a larger number of new products
lead to a reduction of its exit probabilities. In particular, the higher is the number of new
products that are introduced by a plant, the lower is the plant’s hazard of exit. In terms of
the magnitudes, the choice of a plant to engage in product innovation decreases its death
probability by 22% and the introduction of an additional new product reduces a plant’s
death probability by 11%. Applying plant and industry controls to the analysis, survival
odds turn out to be varying both across heterogeneous plants and industries: Plants with a
higher sales growth and firms consisting of multiple plants exhibit lower exit probabilities.
2.2.9 Export Dynamics
The export strategies of multi-product firms in entering and defending foreign sales markets
are investigated by studies by Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik
(2010). They find that new exporters33 start small in terms of both values and number
of exported products. Firms begin their endeavor abroad with one or two export varieties
(on average: 1.7 (Iacovone and Javorcik (2008)); 1.5 (Iacovone and Javorcik (2010))), and
already two years after entering the average number of exported products raises to two.
The products with which the firms start their export activity are typically those for which
the firms have gained some experience in the domestic market: In about 68% to 90% (on
average: about 85%) of the cases, new exporters enter foreign markets with a variety that is
previously sold domestically (Iacovone and Javorcik (2010): in at least one of the previous
three years: 79% of the cases, within the past two years: 75% of the cases, in the year
before: over two-thirds of cases (68%)). Although, the total number of varieties sold by
the firm increases slightly in the year of entering foreign markets, but is stable afterwards.
The volume of exports with which the firm starts is very small relative to the total sales of
the variety and the first-year exports represent only a small fraction of the firm’s total sales
(about 12% (Iacovone and Javorcik (2010))). This share increases subsequently, but less
than firm’s total sales (close to 20% in the fifth year of exporting (Iacovone and Javorcik
(2010))). The whole distribution of export values of varieties in their first year of being
exported, normalized by the total sales of the variety by a given firm, is skewed to the left
and therefore indicates that most trading relationships start with small volumes.
With increasing familiarity with the export market, firms are willing to launch products
that are new to them: In nearly one-third (on average: about 31%) of the cases, experi-
enced exporters34 introduce to export markets a variety that has not been previously sold
domestically by them. And those products start to be exported at a larger scale, i.e. with
a larger volume in absolute terms and relative to domestic sales: 43% of the production is
exported relative to 13% for the other group of products. The introduction of a new export
33According to Iacovone and Javorcik (2008, 2010), new exporters are firms that were not exporting in
the previous year, but are exporting in the current year under observation.
34According to Iacovone and Javorcik (2008, 2010), experienced exporters are firms that are in their
second or later year of exporting activity.
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product by foreign firms35 is characterized by the fact that this product is more likely to
be of higher quality, i.e. higher unit value. About a quarter (28%) of newly introduced
export varieties are export discoveries, which are newly introduced export varieties that
were not exported before by any firm, and those are more frequent in the immediate period
after a devaluation of the domestic (Mexican) currency, the Peso. In detail, all types of
firms (experienced and new exporters, domestic and foreign exporters) are accountable for
the export discoveries, since they represent comparable shares of newly introduced export
products across firm types: Out of the new export products introduced by experienced
exporters and new exporters, export discoveries take a share of 30% and 27%, respectively,
while for domestic (foreign) firms, they account for 29% (29%).
Export products that are exported for the first time at the country level experience a
process of fast diffusion. These export discoveries are typically introduced by more than
one firm - between one and two firms - and for approximately half of them, an additional
firm starts exporting in the following year. Not before three years after the discovery,
the rate of diffusion slows down but continues until at least the eighth year. Before and
after starting an export activity, within-firm adjustments are undertaken. A surge in in-
vestment in physical assets and technology acquisition precedes the introduction of new
export varieties, while at the same time, there is no evidence for increased research and
development activity in preparation for exporting. Instead of, research and development
increases after the introduction of a new export variety. And this pattern of investment is
not only restricted to new exporters, but also experienced exporters show higher volumes
of investment in the surrounding of the introduction of new export varieties, suggesting
the existence of fixed costs associated with the export variety introduction and not with
the export activity by itself. In line with this, the export status of firms play an important
role for investments undertaken by them. While only 51% of non-exporters invest, more
than 70% of the exporters are active in some forms of investment, indicating a substantial
difference in the frequency of investments between exporters and non-exporters. The dif-
ference however is much smaller between exporters introducing a new export product and
those not introducing a new export product (77% versus 71%), nonetheless some difference
exists.
Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) further report that a vast percentage of the export vari-
eties does not survive for more than a year in the foreign market. In particular, only about
two-thirds of the new export varieties are exported for more than one year, between 46%
and 60% of the varieties are able to stay in the foreign markets for at least three years and
only a bit more than one-third (37%) of the export varieties introduced to foreign markets
in 1995 are still exported eight years later. In addition, the export variety’s survival rate
increases with its tenure in the export market. Specifically, the survival rates are lowest in
the varieties initial period of being supplied abroad, only between half and two-thirds of
35According to Iacovone and Javorcik (2008, 2010), foreign firms are firms with some foreign (vis-a-vis
Mexico) participation in 1994.
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the varieties survive between the entry year and the subsequent period and between 76%
and 88% survive between the second and third year after entry.
In addition to the empirical evidence above, which suggests among others that firms
feel their way into export markets by starting small and with a domestically approved
portfolio, A´lvarez et al. (2013) explicitly analyze the question of whether some previous
export experience can be an important factor for prospective exports and find that the
firm’s own previous export experience with a product or market plays an important role.
An increase in the cumulative export value of a particular product in the previous period
by 1% increases the probability that the firm will export the same product to a new market
by 2.3% and an increase in the previous experience in a given market by 1% increases the
probability of exporting different products to that market by 2.7%. Not only the firm’s
own experience with export markets and products has an influence on its exports, but
also other firms’ export experience seems to have an impact on the firm’s export behavior.
The probability that a firm exports a new product-market pair increases by 0.69% when
the cumulative export amount of the same product by other exporters to the same market
increases by 1%. The increase in probability is even higher (0.74%) when other firms export
the product to other markets at a larger scale, i.e. when the cumulative export amount
of the same product by other exporters to other markets increases by 1%. Furthermore,
an increase in the cumulative export value of different products to the same market by
other firms by 1% increases the probability of introducing a new product to that market
by 1.16%.
The effect of past export activity on the firm’s exports, which is contextualized by get-
ting or making some experience in exporting and thereby reducing uncertainty associated
with the export process, differs across heterogeneous firms and products. While larger
firms are in general more likely to introduce a new product, smaller firms benefit more
from having exported a product in the past. The effect of having experience in exporting
a product is also stronger for relatively more heterogeneous products and gets particularly
important in those sectors that are more dependent on external finance. Furthermore,
firms benefit more from previously exporting relatively simple products and thereby from
experience in those goods’ exporting. Overall, one can observe diminishing returns to ex-
perience at some point in the firm’s learning process and a congestion effect among firms
exporting the same product. However, firms whose export product-market pairs are more
concentrated show a lower probability of introducing new products in new markets.
Lo Turco and Maggioni (2015) analyze the impact of the export (and import) activity
of firms on their (product) innovation activity and therefore on their scope. They find
that firms which start to export their own produced products increase both their product
scope and their product innovation intensity.36 In the entry year, the number of products
increases by 18% and a year later by 14%. The probability of expanding the product scope
36In case of a broader treatment of exported goods, i.e. exports also include non-produced goods, the
positive effect of exports is relevantly downsized.
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shifts upwards by about 6% in the entry year. With regard to new products, their number
increases by 20% in the entry year and the probability that the firm introduces a new good
is higher by 9.1% in the entry year. In contrast, starting to import has no significant effect
on scope and innovation. This observation alters if one takes a look at firms that enter the
export and import market at the same time: Those firms are more likely to both expand
scope and innovate and this effect is higher than for new exporters, which implies that there
is some complementarity between export and import activities. However, starting to export
and starting to import have not symmetric effects on the innovation activity of firms that
consequently switch to two-way trading: While the innovation activity of importing firms
that start exporting increases, adding an import activity does not substantially improve
the innovation activity of the exporting firms. Giving up exporting by contrast implies
a contraction of both scope and innovation: Switching from export starters to import
starters, a substantial and significant reduction in the firms’ innovation propensity and
product scope is observable. Therefore, product innovations seem to be attributable to the
firm’s relationship to foreign customers and the effect is enhanced when the firm sources a
part of its inputs from abroad. A learning process in firms takes particularly place in case
of a two-way trading of the firms.37 Using foreign intermediates alone however does not
contribute to an intensified innovation activity of firms. Regarding the timing of the firms’
activity in their sales endeavor abroad, Lo Turco and Maggioni (2015) report that firms
are most active in the same year they enter the foreign market, i.e. right at the beginning
of their activity. The possibility of exporting turns out to be especially important in
enhancing the weight of newly introduced products in the firm’s production and product
portfolio and starting to import simply reinforces the positive effects of the export entry.
In addition to the insights above, two-way traders reveal a higher likelihood for the
introduction of new goods of higher quality and starting to export exerts a mild effect on
the probability to start introducing new goods of higher quality the year after the entry.
2.2.10 Product Switching
Regularity 8 Multi-product firms frequently and to a large extent change their product
portfolio by adding and/or dropping products. Nevertheless, notable differences in the prod-
uct switching behavior exist both across firms and products within firms being heterogeneous
in terms of productivity and size.
A strand of the studies takes up a dynamic perspective when looking at multi-product
firms and analyses their product portfolio changes, their characteristics, relevance(s) and
37The activity of Turkish firms in simultaneously exporting and importing is interpreted as their self-
initiated participation in a two-way trading. Due to the central role of Turkey in global supply chains, it is
also possible to interpret the firms’ activity as part of a production to order, where firms in Turkey merely
operate as offshoring units for foreign buyers in advanced countries. In this way, offshored productions can
turn into new products for Turkish firms which crucially depend on the imported inputs in the offshoring
relationship. Lo Turco and Maggioni (2015) though do not find evidence for production to order and stick
to the learning interpretation.
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implications.38 Due to the availability of micro (panel) data sets the studies can track firms
and products over time and thereby identify firms (products) that add products (that are
added), firms (products) that drop products (that are dropped) and firms (products) that
both add and drop products simultaneously (that are added and dropped simultaneously).
The latter course of action should be called “product churning” and the overall sum of
actions “product switching”.
In their seminal paper to the phenomenon, Bernard et al. (2010) take a look at (fre-
quent) product portfolio changes of multi-product firms in the U.S. manufacturing and
document their prevalence. Overall, more than half of all surviving firms (54%) are active
in some product mix changes over a 5-year period with about 46% of them simultaneously
adding and dropping products, indicating some more fundamental changes of the product
supply. Restricting the sample to multi-product firms, product mix changes are an even
more widespread firm strategy: 80% of multi-product firms change their product mix dur-
ing a 5-year period, and 45% of them add and drop products at the same time. Therefore,
multi-product firms are more likely to change their product supply than single-product
firms.39
Liu (2010) confirms with another study to the firm behavior in the U.S. the widespread
product churning and switching across multi-product firms: According to his analysis,
73% of multi-product firms alter their product mix during each of 5-year periods, with a
minority of them (10%) only adding products, about 42% of them dropping products only
and a relative majority (48%) being active in churning products.
Analyzing manufacturing firms’ behavior in Japan, Bernard and Okubo (2015) show
that 20% of all firms change their product mix each year, whereby multi-product firms
are more likely to undertake product portfolio adjustments (33%). These changes take
primarily place through product churning (11% of all firms and 16% of multi-product
firms active in), whereby multi-product firms are twice as likely to churn their product mix
compared to single-product firms.
For a developing country like India, Goldberg et al. (2010b) report a less prevalent
product switching behavior of firms: Only 28% of continuing firms are active in some
product mix changes over a 5-year period with about 79% of them only adding products
and a less smaller share of firms (7%) churning products. During a one-year period, 10% of
continuing firms switch their supplied products, whereas 70% of them only add products
and none are simultaneously active in adding and dropping products. They also find multi-
38For the quantitative dimension of product portfolio changes: See Broda and Weinstein (2010). They
find that most of the sectoral product turnover takes place within existing firms, i.e. 92% (82%) of
product creation happens within existing manufacturers and 97% (87%) of product destruction happens
within existing manufacturers at a 1(4)-year frequency. Depending on the time frame used and looking at
consumption values, product entry and exit appear to be 6-30 times as important as manufacturer entry
and exit, illustrating the differences of the margins.
39This relation holds also true for several other dimensions: Exporters (compared to non-exporters),
large firms -firm’s output above the 75th percentile- (compared to small firms) and multi-plant firms
(compared to single-plant firms), even so in each category a smaller fraction of firms is active in product
switching compared to multi-product firms.
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product firms to be more likely to change their supplied products than single-product firms,
but less evidence for within-firm Schumpeterian creative destruction compared to firms’
behavior in U.S. manufacturing.
Contrary results for India are found in a study by Boehm et al. (2016): Documenting
product switching as a prevalent firm behavior, they find that 65% of all firms are active
in product mix changes over a 5-year period and even higher across multi-product firms,
85% of them change their product mix over this horizon. A decomposition reveals that a
minority of them (7%) only add products and another quarter only drop products, but the
large majority (68%) of multi-product firms add and drop products simultaneously.
The study by Navarro (2012) for Chilean plants documents that 32% of continuing
plants are active in product switching between two consecutive years, while the share
for multi-product plants (48%, compared to 15% for single-product plants) is somewhat
higher; in a 7-year period (1996-2003) however, 75% of continuing plants and the overall
majority of multi-product plants (93%, compared to 47% of single-product plants) change
their supplied product mix and thereby show relatively high shares in comparison to the
above mentioned evidence.40 Confirming the figures, A´lvarez et al. (2016) find that 68% of
Chilean plants are not active in product switching between two consecutive years, and vice
versa 32% of the plants either add, drop or simultaneously add and drop products over this
horizon. Dropping products is thereby the most prevalent change (17% of plants), followed
by adding products (15% of plants) and churning products (9% of plants).
Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016) find a share of about 24% of Turkish manufacturing
firms to be active in adding, dropping or churning products during a 1-year interval, almost
doubling it (45%) for 3-year periods. A similar pattern is found by Lopresti and Shiferaw
(2017) for Ethiopian firms. Over a 1-year horizon, 22% of the firms add at least one product
and 17% of the firms add exactly one product, while the share of firms that add at least
one product over a 3-year horizon almost doubles (41%). Product dropping is thereby less
frequent than product adding: Only 13% of the firms drop at least one product over a
1-year horizon. Across industries, the frequency of product adding varies between a high
of 31% (metal and light machinery sector) and a low of 6% (beverage sector). According
to So¨derbom and Weng (2012), 61% of surviving Chinese firms and 78% of those firms
producing multiple products in China realize some product mix changes over the sample
period of four years (2004-2008). Most of these changes consist of actions in which products
are added or churned rather than just dropped and multi-product firms are found to be
more likely to undertake those product mix changes than single-product firms.
Exceptionally high shares of firms being active in product mix changes are reported by
a recent study by Timoshenko (2015) for Brazilian firms: Nearly three quarters (72%) of
surviving exporters alter their product mix each year.
40Across multi-product exporters, 94% switch their products during a 7-year period (1996-2003) and
90% switch products they are exporting, slightly exceeding the share of product-switching multi-product
plants.
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Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) report substantial numbers of exporting Mexican firms
being active in some form of product switching, even so an average number hides such a
behavior: They find a remarkable stability in the average number of exported varieties per
exporter over time. In 1994, an exporter sells on average 1.95 varieties abroad and this
number rises up to 2.2 in 1999, afterwards remaining closely around this level up to 2003.
The variation in the average number of exported varieties per firm over time is even smaller
for existing exporters41, who send between 2.18 and 2.26 varieties abroad. In contrast and
besides the difference in the level, new exporters reveal a much larger difference and more
volatile pattern in the number over time, as it varies more discontinuously between 1.2 and
1.58. Over the period of the study (1995-2003), in each year, about 250 to 700 exporters
introduce new export varieties, with some declining pattern over time except for 2003,
while between about 250 and 400 firms drop existing export varieties, with some peak in
1999.42 A much smaller number of firms, about 30 to 90, simultaneously introduce new
export varieties and drop existing ones, with some peak in 1997. In relative terms at the
variety level, the export variety creation43 amounts to 18.8%, while the export variety
destruction44 accounts for 11.4% (for the whole economy and over all years); that is, about
every fifth export variety represents a new variety and about every tenth export variety
is a variety that is dropped out. Net switching, as the difference between export variety
creation and destruction, with a figure of 7.4% is much lower than gross switching, defined
as the sum of export variety creation and destruction, with a figure of 30.2%. Across the
sectors, high gross switching rates are observed ranging from a low of 19.8% in mineral-
based industries to a high of 38% in textiles, garments and leather as well as of 42.8% in
wood products. Export variety creation varies between 13.2% in mineral-based industries
and 27.7% in wood products, while export variety destruction runs from 6.6% in mineral-
based industries to 16.1% in textiles, garments and leather.45
Varying the degree of aggregation of the unit of treatment of the firm switching behavior
(product, industry, sector) and thereby capturing different levels of the extent of changes,
a robust finding across some studies is a (weakly) decreasing prevalence of the switching
behavior with an increasing degree of aggregation, i.e. product switching is more prevalent
than industry switching and the latter more prevalent than sector switching, which can
be made plausible with the more radical change of the firm nature and scope and so a
higher associated risk being inherent in a switching behavior of an increasing degree of
aggregation. Bernard et al. (2010) report for 5-year intervals that while more than half
41Existing exporters are defined as those in their second or later year of exporting.
42Exiting firms are included among those dropped export products.
43The export variety creation is defined as the number of new export varieties introduced at time t
divided by the total number of varieties exported at t.
44The export variety destruction is defined as the number of varieties ceasing to be exported at time t
divided by the total number of varieties exported at t.
45Excluding exiting firms from the calculation of the export variety destruction does not change much:
It ranges from 6% in mineral-based industries to 16% in textiles, garments and leather, and economy-wide
reaching 11.5%.
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(54%) of the firms in the U.S. are active in product switching, only 41% switch industries
they are active in and less than every fifth firm (16%) switch (even more aggregated)
sectors. Furthermore, product adding implies for 27% of the firms to enter at least one
new industry and for 9% of the firms to get active in at least one new sector every five
years.
In the study by Liu (2010) for U.S. firms, industry switching is relatively prevalent
across firms (73%), reaching the same firm share as product switching46, but it decreases
for sector switching (61%), even so this number of firms is high compared to the other
studies. Boehm et al. (2016) add evidence for a developing country, in particular India:
Over a 5(1)-year horizon, product switching represents a preferred product strategy for 65%
of the firms and 49% (38%) undertake some industry switching. An even smaller share of
firms (34% (26%)) is also willing to switch sectors they are active in. Across multi-product
firms, switching behavior is even more prevalent: While 85% of those firms switch their
products during a 5(1)-year interval, 78% (64%) are active in industry switching and only
a slightly smaller fraction of firms (74% (59%)) engage also in sector switching.
Overall, the studies reveal a remarkable prevalence of firm switching behavior, especially
across multi-product firms and irrespectively of the varying definitions of the observation
units. Given this fact, further aspects of this phenomenon are analyzed in the mentioned
studies: Along the two dimensions of the applied data sets, the questions of what type of
firms is active in product switching and of what type of products is switched arise. Looking
at the characteristics of product-switching firms, Bernard et al. (2010) find a positive
correlation (for both, single- and multi-product firms) between subsequent product adding
and initial firm productivity (TFP and labor productivity, given the firm’s existing product
mix), i.e. (ex ante) more productive firms are more likely to add products, whereas this
correlation is robust to controls such as firm size (employment) and age. It yields some
evidence for selection, representing an explanation approach for the productivity premium
of multi-product firms (apart from the alternative approach of learning).47 For Japanese
firms, Bernard and Okubo (2015) also report that firm productivity is positively related
to the probability of adding a product. By focusing in contrast on the survival of products
in the firms’ export mix, Go¨rg et al. (2012) document a decreasing hazard of dropping the
product with increasing firm productivity. So, more productive firms export products with
on average higher survival probabilities in export markets. Iacovone and Javorcik (2010)
detects that older producers are less likely to discontinue the production of a variety.
Besides productivity and age, firm size represents another potential characteristic being
correlated with the product-switching behaviour. The state of knowledge generated by the
studies is however ambiguous: While some studies suggest a higher probability of product
46One has to take into account the unit definitions: In Bernard et al. (2010), products are defined as
5-digit SIC categories, industries as 4-digit SIC categories and sectors as 2-digit SIC categories. In Liu
(2010) however, 4-digit SIC categories represent products or industries alike and 2-digit SIC categories
sectors.
47See the Section 2.2.2.
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switching among smaller firms (So¨derbom and Weng (2012) (smaller firms (output) more
likely to switch product lines), Go¨rg et al. (2012) (larger firms (employment) less likely to
drop products, growing firms less likely to drop export products) and Bernard and Okubo
(2015) (firm size (employment) negatively related to probability of adding products)),
others indicate the opposite (Miranda et al. (2012) and Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016)
(larger firms (employment) more likely to add new products, larger firms (employment)
more likely to drop products)) and Navarro (2012) (even distribution of product switching
across plant sizes, i.e. plant sales) cannot find any relation between size and switching. As
given by Bernard et al. (2010) for the U.S., 89% of output is attributed to firms that are
active in product switching in a 5-year interval. And firms that churn products produce
68% of output. In the sample of multi-product firms, the shares further increase to 94% and
75%, respectively. In India, product-switching firms account for smaller shares of aggregate
output, as documented by Goldberg et al. (2010b): Only 43% of total output is produced
by firms that switch products over a 5-year interval. Product-churning firms are responsible
for 12% of output. The shares slightly increases for the multi-product firms: Among those
firms, 47% of total output goes back to product-switching firms, while firms being active
in product churning account for 15% of output. Equivalent relevance of product-switching
is reported for the Chinese as well as Chilean economy: Due to So¨derbom and Weng
(2012), product-switching firms (over a 4-year interval) are responsible for 36% of output,
while only 13% of output is attributed to product-churning firms. Once again, shares are
higher in the sample of multi-product firms (45% and 25% respectively), but much smaller
compared to the U.S. economy. Similarly, A´lvarez et al. (2016) document that two-thirds
(66%) of the output are attributed to products that are not added, dropped or churned,
while adding (dropping, churning) products accounts for 20% (16%, 9%) of the output.
With an alternative dataset, Boehm et al. (2016) however show a significantly higher
relevance of product-switching for the Indian economy compared to other studies and
developing countries: Firms that switch products over a 5-year horizon produce 68% of total
output and product-churning firms are responsible for 47% of the output in the economy.
For multi-product firm, those shares further increase to 85% and 59%, respectively, and
suggest similar structures among those firms as in the U.S. economy.
By analyzing two subsets of firms in the countries, i.e. foreign-owned firms and ex-
porters, the studies derive further insights into the firm switching behavior. With respect
to the firms’ ownership structure, foreign firms48 are less active in product switching ac-
tivities and show a more stable product mix according to Go¨rg et al. (2012). The survival
probability of a product is about 18% higher when being part of the product mix of foreign
firms compared to domestic firms. In addition and with respect to the firms’ export status,
firms with a higher export-sales ratio export products for a longer period and some previ-
ous exporting experience seems to be a positive factor for success in export markets. In
48See foreign ownership definition in Go¨rg et al. (2012): More than 10% of firm shares owned by
foreigners.
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the study by Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016), non-exporters are firms that are more likely
to add new products.
The cross-study analysis of the characteristics of products being switched leads to the
results that firms drop products with a lower probability that have a high firm-level sales
amount and/or a large time of being part in the firm’s product portfolio, representing
products that are relevant for the revenue of the firm and turn out to be successful in the
sales market. According to Bernard et al. (2010), firms are less likely to drop a product
if its firm-level shipments and tenure are large relative to the average values across firms
producing the same product. Given the positive correlation between relative firm-product
size and tenure on the one hand and firm-product productivity on the other hand, the firm
behavior reveals some systematic within-firm reallocation of resources towards activities
generating more revenue per unit of factor input.49 In their study, Iacovone and Javorcik
(2010) find that products with a lower share in the firm’s total sales (relevance), a lower
value of the firm’s sales (sales volume) or a lower firm’s share in the national sales of the
product (market share) are more likely to be dropped. Navarro (2012) gets similar results
by deriving a decreasing probability of dropping a product with increasing (relative to
average across plants) product size (sales) and (relative to average across plants) tenure.
Not calculating a relative measure of product size across firms as the relevant covariate,
but instead within firms, i.e. the share of product sales in the firm’s export revenue, Go¨rg
et al. (2012) show a negative correlation between the importance of the product in the
firm’s total export revenue and the probability of dropping the product. Core products,
i.e. those with the highest shares in the firm’s export revenue, are exported longer than
other products and the hazard for the top three products of the firm is approximately 40%
smaller. As before, their study finds in addition that the hazard of dropping a product
decreases with its tenure. Setting the time since introduction for a product in relation
to the duration of the other products of the firm, thereby following the idea that a firm
starts to build up its (export) portfolio with those product it has an expertise in, it is
demonstrated that the later the firm started to export the product, the higher the hazard
of dropping the product. In line with previous results, Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016)
report a higher probability of product dropping for fringe products, i.e. products with a
smaller share in firm output.
Go¨rg et al. (2012) consider further product characteristics that are potentially influential
for product dropping. They calculate a variable for the share of wholesalers and retailers
in the export of each product and derive the result that a higher export involvement of
intermediaries is associated with a higher hazard of dropping the product. Furthermore,
the differentiation of products is taken into account by calculating for each product the
price dispersion across firms and indicating products with an above-median level of price
dispersion as high-price-dispersion products. Products more differentiated in this sense
feature a higher hazard of product dropping than less differentiated products. Interacting
49See the Section 2.2.11.
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the product differentiation measure with a proxy for product prices (relative unit value)
yields however that higher prices for more differentiated products are related to improved
survival, possibly reflecting their higher quality. Go¨rg et al. (2012) additionally differentiate
products according to their subsequent use (consumer, capital and intermediate goods) and
find differential export durations for them. Consumer goods have the highest probability of
survival, whereas intermediate goods are most likely to be dropped. As before, interacting
those categories with the relative unit value as a proxy for product prices, the effect of a
higher product price is stronger on survival for consumer goods.
With the exception of the last paragraph, the empirical studies suggest that the interac-
tion of firm and product characteristics, forming the so-called firm-product characteristics,
is the influential determinant of firms’ product switching. Product characteristics and some
product-specific superiority alone seem not be able to sufficiently explain the phenomenon.
Bernard et al. (2010) and Bernard and Okubo (2015) support this insight by deriving
a positive cross-product correlation between the rates at which products are added and
dropped. So, the products that are added by many firms are the same products that are
dropped by many other firms. On net, however, some products are added by firms, while
others are dropped and some net transfer of output across products takes place in the U.S.
and Japanese economies.
Product-switching behavior is not only numerically widespread across firms, but prod-
ucts being switched are also quantitatively important within firms.50 According to Bernard
et al. (2010), products which (surviving) firms added within the previous five years ac-
counted for 26% and 31% of firm output in the years 1992 and 1997, respectively. With
a similar order of magnitude, leading to the fact that gross changes in firm output being
substantially larger than net changes, 29% and 26% of firm output in the years 1987 and
1992, respectively, are associated with products which (surviving) firms drop in the follow-
ing five years. For the case of Brazilian exporters, Timoshenko (2015) finds higher figures,
given the smaller (one-year) horizon of changes51: 29% of firm-level export sales are derived
by products which surviving exporters adding at least one product in a given year add to
their export portfolio. The same share of firm-level export sales, 29%, is given by products
which surviving exporters dropping in the subsequent year at least one product discontinue
selling abroad. At the core of the study, showing the conditional export experience (age)
dependence of product switching, it derives that these shares gradually decline with the
age of the exporter: While for firms with two years of exporting, more than half (51%) of
total sales are attributed to added products, firms with five years of exporting only derive
28% of their total export sales from added products. Similar pattern emerges for product
50This fact is already indicated by the characteristics of products being switched, which are described
before in this section. For the country-wide quantitative importance of product-switching firms and its
variance across countries, see description some paragraphs before.
51In the study by Timoshenko (2015), figures for added (to-be-dropped) products are calculated across
exporters which added (will drop) at least one product between two consecutive years (in the subsequent
year). Those exporters represent large shares of surviving exporters (56% and 54%, respectively) and
account for large shares of Brazilian exports (74% and 70%, respectively).
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dropping, suggesting less engagement in product adding and dropping for firms exporting
for longer periods of time.
Several studies examine the contribution of the product-switching behavior of firms to
the growth of aggregate (country-wide) output or exports and thereby detect a significant
role of this type of firm activity52: Navarro (2012) finds that about 85% of the aggregate
sales growth of continuing plants can be attributed to some product switching and in
the same way So¨derbom and Weng (2012) are able to identify a significant contribution
of changes in firms’ product mix to aggregate output growth. For Brazilian exporters,
Timoshenko (2015) reports that nearly 40% of the annual export growth is due to the
product adding and dropping margin among surviving exporters, much larger than the
contribution of the firm entry and exit margin (exporter-turnover margin accounts for less
than 15% of annual export growth, gross contributions about five to six times larger than
the net), while gross contributions of product adding and dropping are three to four times
larger than the net, illustrating the enormous intensity of firm activities in both directions
at the product-level.
Similarly documented by Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017) for Ethiopian firms, the manu-
facturing sales growth among continuing products at surviving firms amounts to 7%, while
the respective values for added and dropped products are 8% and -5%, respectively. Given
a yearly total manufacturing sales growth of 11%, the net effect of product churning among
incumbent firms (3%) thus accounts for about 30% of the total sales growth, which is much
more than the share for which the net effect of firm churning (1%, with growth due to firm
entry (exit): 5%(-4%)) is responsible.
The product-switching behavior of firms exhibits some correlations with changes in
firm characteristics, besides the immediate effect on the firm-product scope. Bernard et al.
(2010) document that, among surviving firms, net product adding is associated with an
increase in firm size (both output and employment), as intuitively suggested, and firm
productivity (both labor and total factor productivity), which is more surprising following
the theoretical concept of flexible manufacturing.53 Net product dropping however is as-
sociated with a decrease in firm size (both output and employment) and firm productivity
(total factor productivity). In another study for firms in the U.S., Liu (2010) examines
the relationship between firms that (only) add and drop products and changes in their
characteristics. For firms dropping products, he finds a decrease in their product scope
and increases in the Herfindal index of sales, the sales share of core products as well as the
firm-level supply, demand, production and sector relatedness measures.
A´lvarez et al. (2016) study the (immediate and lagged) impact of product mix changes
on productivity and other plant-specific outcomes. The product dynamics at the firm level
52For the (individual) contributions of the extensive and intensive margins to aggregate and firm-level
growth: See the Section 2.2.3.
53The concept of flexible manufacturing and the thereby assumed existence of core competencies are
applied in the models by Eckel and Neary (2010), Qiu and Zhou (2013), Mayer et al. (2014), Arkolakis
et al. (2015), Eckel et al. (2015, 2016), Eckel and Irlacher (2017) and Flach and Irlacher (2018).
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have positive effects on total factor productivity and labor productivity two years after the
product mix changes were introduced (relative to plants with no changes in the product
mix: about 17% (18%, 30%) on total factor productivity for adding (dropping, churning)
products; similar effects for labor productivity), whereas these effects are mainly driven
by the firms that are active in product churning. Product creation and destruction in
isolation do not significantly affect the productivity and thus positive effects only appear
when product adds and drops are accompanied by another. Furthermore, positive effects
of product mix changes on employment and sales, but not on wages are observed (relative
to plants with no changes in the product mix: sales: plants adding (dropping, churning)
products: about 19% (12%, 24%); employment: plants adding (dropping, churning) prod-
ucts: about 5% (5%, 9%) only immediately (1 year, 1 year) after the change). Once again,
no effects on outcomes exist when the analysis is restricted to firms that only add or drop
products. Across the active and in-active plants, characteristics differ: Plants with prod-
uct mix changes are larger in terms of output and employment than plants that do not
change their product mix. However, there are no significant differences in the plants’ total
factor productivity growth before and after the changes in the product mix and plants with
product mix changes reveal a better performance along several indicators before and after
the treatment. Both facts reject the hypothesis that these changes would be the plants’
response to a poor past performance.
Based on propensity scores, A´lvarez et al. (2016) find that total factor productivity
growth in the previous year does not have a significant effect on the probability of changing
products, once again rejecting the hypothesis of product mix changes as a (defensive) firm
measure of rehabilitation, while the number of products and the plant’s market share
positively affect the probability of introducing changes in the product mix. In contrast,
larger firms54 are less likely to introduce product mix changes and the firms’ export status
does not play any role for changes in the product mix.
2.2.11 Firm-product Adjustments to Exogenous Shocks
With the appearance of (disaggregated) micro, i.e. firm-level, data sets in the 1990s,
the empirical literature of international trade documents and analyses the heterogeneity
of firms within narrowly defined industries and within-industry reallocations across firms
following exogenous shocks, in particular trade liberalizations.55
Besides the documentation of a within-firm heterogeneity of products,56 the appear-
ance of (even further disaggregated) micro, i.e. firm-product-level, data sets then allows
the analysis of a new and additional margin of adjustment following exogenous shocks in
international trade, i.e. within-firm reallocations at the product-extensive and the product-
54Firms are categorized as large in case of an employment of more than 200 employees.
55For a review of the empirical literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade: See Bernard et al.
(2012).
56See the Section 2.2.4.
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intensive margins. Their nature, relevance and implications at the micro and aggregate
level are at the core of some recent empirical studies, investigating in detail trade liberal-
izations57 and exchange rate fluctuations as examples of those exogenous shocks.
Trade Liberalization
Regularity 9 Multi-product firms in general adjust their product portfolio in case of an
increased (import) competition in the way that they drop peripheral products (product-
extensive margin) and skew sales towards their core products (product-intensive margin),
thereby refocusing in their product portfolio on their core competencies. Nevertheless, no-
table differences in the responses to both trade liberalization and import competition exist
across firms being heterogeneous along several dimensions, especially the size as well as
status of domestic and international engagement (innovator and exporter status).
With the bilateral reduction in trade costs between countries, i.e. trade liberalization,
(multi-product) firms in general may face three and in part adversely working effects:
(i) They compete more with foreign firms offering output goods that are more or less
substitutable to their own goods (output trade liberalization - import competition for the
domestic market), exporting firms get an improved access to the foreign sales market
(output trade liberalization - improved access for the foreign market) and (ii) they get an
improved access to foreign-made input goods (input trade liberalization).58
Let us start with the multi-product firms’ responses to one of the unilateral components
of the output trade liberalization [(i)], in particular the import competition. Liu (2010)
57Apart from (multi-product) firm adjustments along its product dimensions/margins, a notable strand
of the empirical literature documents a set of within-firm adjustments in response to trade liberalization
and import competition, including in particular some form of production technology and/or skill upgrading
(Lileeva and Trefler (2010) on the impact of CUSFTA on Canadian plants, Bustos (2011) on the impact of
MERCOSUR on Argentinian firms, Mion and Zhu (2013) on the impact of imports on Belgian firms and
Bloom et al. (2016) on the impact of Chinese imports on European firms), some form of product quality
upgrading (Fernandes and Paunov (2013) on the impact of imports on Chilean firms, Fan et al. (2015, 2018)
on the impact of tariff reductions due to China’s WTO accession on its firms, Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015)
on the impact of tariff reductions due to China’s WTO accession on its firms and Hayakawa et al. (2017)
on the impact of tariff reductions on Indonesian plants) and some form of firm reorganization (Guadalupe
and Wulf (2010) on the impact of CUSFTA on US firms and Bloom et al. (2010) on the impact of imports
on Asian, European and North-American firms).
Beyond the effects on firms and industries (investment responses: Pierce and Schott (2018a)), a re-
cently emerging strand of the empirical literature investigates the effects of trade liberalization and import
competition on an array of socio-economic outcomes: Health of workers and mortality (McManus and
Schaur (2016), Lang et al. (forthcoming), Pierce and Schott (2018b)), marriage and fertility (Autor et al.
(forthcoming), Keller and Utar (2018)), public goods (Feler and Senses (2017)), crime (Che et al. (2018),
Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018)), political elections (Autor et al. (2017), Che et al. (2017)), media coverage (Lu
et al. (2018)).
58By analyzing bilateral trade shocks along the two dimensions of their impacts, i.e. the range (output
- input) and the direction (increased competition in the domestic market - improved access to the foreign
market), four effects and therefore one additional effect can be simply identified: With the output trade
liberalization, a firm faces both an increased import competition in the domestic market and improved
export opportunities to the foreign market. When the input trade gets liberalized between two countries,
a firm not only gets an improved access to foreign-made inputs, but also faces increased competition in
the domestic market on the home-made inputs (input competition). However, the empirical evidence in
the literature on the last effect is very limited and it is therefore not further considered here.
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studies the effect of the import competition59 on the product portfolio of multi-product
firms in the United States. Being confronted with an increase in import competition, multi-
product firms refocus in their product portfolio on their core competencies by dropping
peripheral products and skewing sales towards their core products. As the study reveals,
a product exit is in general more likely as imports rise, but firms are relatively less (more)
likely to drop core (peripheral) products60 and products being closer to the firm’s core
product. In this way, a 10% increase in the imports across all a firm’s product lines raises
the probability that the firm exits a peripheral product by 5.2%, while at the same time, the
probability of exiting the firm’s core product decreases by 6.7%.61 However, the probability
of a peripheral product being dropped varies across those products and is determined by
the strength of the linkages it shares with the firm’s core product:62 So, the stronger the
linkages in terms of a larger extent of joint sales to buyers, joint purchases of inputs, joint
production and joint sectorship, the less likely the peripheral product is to be divested
in the face of import competition. When a firm is confronted with a 10% increase in the
imports, the probabilities of exiting are 4% (3.7%) lower for core products and 5.7% (8.2%)
higher for peripheral products that share no supply (demand) relationship with the core.
In general, the initial product size, its initial profitability, the firm growth and the industry
growth are all negatively related to the probability of product exiting. Furthermore, the
reallocation within a multi-product firm due to the import competition, i.e. the firm’s
refocusing on the core production, does not only take place at the extensive margin by
dropping peripheral products, but also at the intensive margin by skewing sales towards
the firm’s core products. A rising import competition generally leads to declining sales
shares of all the firm’s products, but is also associated with an increasing sales share of
core products and a decreasing share of peripheral products; the latter effect is accentuated
for products being further away from the core product and sharing fewer linkages with it
in terms of supply, demand, production and sector membership.
The study by Iacovone et al. (2013) conducts an analysis of the Mexican economy when
being challenged by a surge of Chinese exports and the competition for Mexican manufac-
turing (multi-product) producers associated with it.63,64 The increased competition from
China leads to plant and product exits as well as to sales contraction. These effects how-
ever are highly asymmetric at the plant and product level and suggest some reallocation
59Measure for the import competition: The industry/product-level imports.
60A core product is defined as the firm’s product with the largest sales share (peripheral products as
the residual products) and product closeness to the core is measured by the within-firm sales rank of the
corresponding product.
61Using the product sales rank within a firm as the measure for the product-level differentiation within
firms, the values change to 32% and 3.8%, respectively.
62Within-firm linkages between products produced at a lower scale and the firm’s core product are
quantified by relatedness measures regarding sales, procurement, production and sector membership.
63Measure for the import competition: At the product level, the share of Chinese imports in total
imports; at the plant level, the sales-weighted average product-level Chinese import share.
64In the study by Iacovone et al. (2013), the terms firm and plant are used interchangeably due to their
approximate equivalence in the data.
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both between products within plants and between plants within sectors. Comparing firms
facing low (below median) and high (median and above median) competition, respectively,
firm survival and evolution seem to be more difficult in the latter case, i.e. higher plant
exit, lower probability of one-product firms evolving into two or more product firms, higher
probability of five-plus product firms cutting back below five products or of exiting alto-
gether and higher probability of a change in product numbers, with slightly higher chances
of cutting back than expanding. However, the exit probability of plants decreases with
their size. In industries with higher competition, products reveal a higher dynamic in the
sense that they are more likely to enter and exit the market, and less likely to continue.
And at the product-intensive margin, products facing higher competition are found to grow
by a lower extent. As at the plant level, the competition effect is mitigated for products
produced at a larger scale (core products). These results regarding plant and product
entry or exit as well as product contraction remain the same for export products facing
competition in the U.S.
Mayer et al. (2014, 2016) analyze French multi-product manufacturers’ exports across
and within export market destinations. In the study by Mayer et al. (2014), it is shown
that the skewness of a firm’s exported product mix65 consistently varies with destination
characteristics such as size (gross domestic product (GDP)) and geography (proximity to
other big countries)66: Firms sell relatively more of their better performing products in
bigger and more centrally located markets and therefore skew their export sales towards
their core competencies in destination markets with a higher competition. Subsequently,
Mayer et al. (2016) examine the response of a firm’s export sales skewness67 to demand
shocks68 within a destination over time. Thereby, they observe that positive demand shocks
in a destination market induce multi-product exporters to increase their export sales to
that destination along both margins and to skew their export sales to that destination to-
wards their better performing products, in this way reacting to the increased competition
in that destination market. Furthermore, these positive destination-level demand shocks,
aggregated across a firm’s export destinations to get a firm-level demand shock, and their
induced reallocations within a firm have a substantial positive effect on a multi-product
firm’s productivity69, whereas the elasticity of labor productivity to trade shocks lies be-
tween 5% and 11%. The firm productivity response is concentrated within the quartile
of exporters with the highest export intensity. For the aggregate sector, the trade shocks
65Measures for the product mix skewness: The firm’s export sales ratio of the two or three top selling
products, the standard deviation of log export sales, a Herfindahl index and a Theil index.
66Measure for the geography following the supply potential concept: The destination’s foreign supply
potential as the aggregate predicted exports to that destination based on a bilateral trade gravity equation
with exporter fixed effects and standard bilateral measures of trade barriers/enhancers.
67Measure for the export sales skewness: A Theil index.
68Underlying measure for the demand shock: The gross domestic product (GDP) of the destination, the
total imports into the destination (excluding French exports), the imports into the destination in product
categories a specific French firm also exports to the destination.
69Measure for the (firm-level) productivity: The labor productivity as the deflated value added per
worker.
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account for a 1.2% average annual increase in the French manufacturing productivity over
the ten year sample.70
In a study on Korean manufacturing plants, Choi and Hahn (2017) consider their
responses to import tariff reductions. Those are found to be associated with a decrease in
plant shipments, product scope and production scale,71 whereas this effect is only significant
in the domestic market, in which firms face a higher competition, and not the export
market. Taking thereby into account possible differential responses across heterogeneous
firms, it turns out that plant total factor productivity (TFP) and a plant’s exporter status
do not matter in the plants’ responses to tariff reductions, but a plant’s innovation status72
indeed does. In this way, the study detects that innovators react quite differently in
comparison to non-innovators, particularly in the domestic market, in which all these firms
are confronted with an increased competition. Following the import tariff reductions,
innovators reduce their product scope but increase their production scale in total and
in the domestic market, while non-innovators show no significant change of the product
scope but a decrease in the production scale in the domestic market, overall leading to a
significant reduction in domestic shipments. A one-standard-deviation reduction in import
tariffs or a 3.9 percentage points reduction in the tariff rate in a three-year period causes
innovators to reduce their domestic product scope in the three-year period by about 2.6%
more than non-innovators. However, a one-standard-deviation reduction in import tariffs
causes innovators to increase the scale of their domestic production in the three-year period
by about 4.4% more than non-innovators. Further differentiating across the plant size73
reveals that large innovators reduce their product scope but increase their production
scale in total and in the domestic market, as it was the case for the innovators when not
differentiated. While small innovators undertake a reduction in their production scale in the
export market, small non-innovating plants reduce both their production scale and plant
shipments in the domestic market. Finally, when distinguishing between exporting and
non-exporting innovators and non-innovators, the study reaches the result that exporting
innovators reduce their product scope and increase their production scale in total and in the
domestic market, as it is done by large innovators. Exporting and non-innovating plants
instead increase their product scope and plant shipments in total. Plants that neither
export nor innovate undertake a reduction in their plant shipments in total and in the
domestic market and reduce their product scope in the domestic market.
70Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2017) stress that the result of export skewness in response to competi-
tion crucially depends on the efficiency measure that is used to rank the products within firms: With sales-
and physical-efficiency-based product rankings, the result still holds, while there is no export skewness in
case of marginal-costs- and revenue-efficiency-based product rankings.
71For a correspondence to the notation in the Section 2.2.3, plant shipments or plant size denote the firm-
intensive margin, product scope the product-extensive margin and production scale the product-intensive
margin.
72Measure for the innovator status: An engagement in research and development (R&D) in the beginning
year of the three-year period.
73Measure for the plant size: The number of employees (large plants: more than 100 employees, small
plants: less than 100 employees).
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Liu and Rosell (2013) study the relationship between the import competition that firms
in the United States are confronted with and the nature of the innovations that they un-
dertake. An innovation is called basic if it is tended to expand the general knowledge about
the physical world, while it is called applied if it intends to give a specific understanding of
a particular problem or application. The study finds that the firm innovation becomes less
basic74, when firms face a higher import penetration.75,76 A 10 percentage point increase
in the average import penetration decreases the research and development (R&D) expen-
ditures of firms by 0.014% and decreases the basic research expenditures of firms by about
0.4% to 1%. The indirect channel through which this works is given by the product diver-
sity responses of multi-product firms: Import competition induces multi-product firms to
narrow their firm activities and to become more focused by dropping peripheral products
and concentrating on those in which the firms are most competent in. But the narrowing
raises for the firms the basic innovation’s uncertainty to get its outcomes incorporated by
them and thus lowers the incentive to undertake this type of innovation. This view is
supported by the study’s findings that firms with more product lines generate more basic
innovations and a higher import competition lowers the number of product lines a firm op-
erates. In addition, it is found that more effective patents, which better allow firms to sell
or licence its innovations and generate benefits from basic innovations without needing to
use them itself, mitigate the impact of the import competition on the innovation basicness
by diminishing the importance of the firm product diversity.
Based on the estimation of multi-product production functions, which confirms the
theoretical proposition that their input coefficients are positive and the output coefficients
negative, Dhyne et al. (2017) investigate the effect of import competition77 on the techni-
cal efficiency with which Belgian multi-product firms produce their products. They find
that increases in the import share are positively correlated with the technical efficiency,
which is characterized by a high persistence on the firm-product level over time, indicat-
ing that changes in the technical efficiency are long-lived. However, the magnitude of the
effect crucially depends on the method with which it is measured: Applying ordinary least
squares estimators, an increase of 10% in the import share is only associated with a 1.0%
increase in firm-product technical efficiency, while the effect increases to 8.7% when apply-
ing instrumental variables (IV) estimators78. Given an average change in import shares of
74Measures for the innovation basicness: The Herfindahl basicness measure based on patent citations
and technology classifications of different levels of aggregation (as well as an industry classification), the
share of citations received from university patents and the count of non-patent citations received.
75Measure for the import competition: The firm’s import penetration ratio in a year, i.e. the revenue-
weighted average industry-level import penetration measure.
76Note that the main purpose of the study is to look at the nature of the innovation, not its quantity.
However, Liu and Rosell (2013) detect a positive relationship between the import competition and the
level of the firm inventive activity. This finding is consistent with other studies, as those suggest that an
increase in competition may spur firm innovation (e.g. Aghion et al. (2005)) and a trade liberalization in
form of an increased import competition increases firm innovation (e.g. Bloom et al. (2016)).
77Measure for the import competition: The import share as the product-level import penetration on net
(adjustment for re-exporting) imports.
78Instruments for the import share, which ought to be correlated with the shares but uncorrelated with
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4.7%, OLS estimators state that import competition plays only a relatively minor role in
promoting economic growth.
Provided that an asymmetry within firms in form of a product heterogeneity and hi-
erarchy exists79, import competition affects the products across the portfolio differently:
The within-firm ranking of products that is based on their revenue on average coincides
with the ranking that is based on the technical efficiency with which they are produced
(Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2017)). Including interactions between the import share
and the rank of the product within the firms in the regressions to account for differences in
the competitive effect across the products within firms increases the estimate to 1.2% for
the OLS estimators and 10.5% for the IV estimators. In the former case, the interactions
are all negative and A 1% increase in the import share is associated with a 1.05% increase
in the technical efficiency of the first and second ranked products, and a 0.65% increase in
the technical efficiency of all other products produced by the firm.
Another set of empirical studies looks at the output trade liberalization and its effects
on multi-product firms in a more comprehensive manner, by taking into account its bilateral
character between participating countries. Baldwin and Gu (2009) study all the scope, size
and diversification responses of Canadian manufacturing plants to the trade liberalization
with the United States between 1984 and 1997, given the free trade agreement between the
two countries (Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)) of 1989. They find
that tariff cuts lead to a reduction in the number of products produced by non-exporters;
in particular, a 1 percentage point decline in tariffs is associated with a 0.6% decline in
the number of products. In contrast, the effect of tariff cuts on the number of products
produced by exporters is only limited in the way that it is not statistically significant,
as it is the case for large plants. For plants that are a one-standard deviation smaller
than the average plant however, a one percentage point tariff cut is associated with a 5%
decline in the number of products. Overall, tariff cuts are linked to a larger rate of decline
in the number of products at smaller non-exporters than at larger non-exporters. While
exporters reduce their product ranges relative to non-exporters, the declines in the number
of products produced are not related to tariff cuts. The effect of being an exporter exists
for smaller plants but is not relevant for large plants. In general, large plants add new
products to their portfolio relative to small plants.
Looking at the plants’ product diversification, a similar pattern appears as for the
number of products: Tariff cuts are associated with a decline in the product diversification
index of non-exporting plants, while their effect on the product diversification of exporting
plants is only limited in the way that it is not statistically significant. The product diver-
sification of smaller plants is to a larger extent affected by tariff reductions than that of
larger plants. In this way, a one percentage point decrease in tariff rates is associated with
the innovations: (Effectively applied) European tariffs on Chinese imports (tariffs at the 6-digit HS level
for all products in that category) and (for each product and time) an estimate of world export supply
(excluding Belgium, total world exports net of those coming from Belgium).
79See the Section 2.2.4.
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a 0.2% decline in the product diversification index for plants that are a one standard de-
viation smaller than the average plant, where the effect on plants that are a one standard
deviation larger than the average plant is statistically insignificant. Putting both plant
characteristics then together, tariff cuts decline the product diversification index of smaller
non-exporters more than that of larger non-exporters. In general, exporters reduce their
product diversification relative to non-exporters and the impact primarily exists for small
exporters. Large plants increase their product diversification relative to small plants. For
entrants to the export market, tariff reductions do not significantly affect their product
diversification.
Tariff cuts are associated with a decline in the size of non-exporters, while, once again,
the effect on exporters turns out to be not statistically significant. The same is true for new
exporters. The contraction effect of tariff cuts however is more pronounced for larger plants
than for smaller plants. A one percentage point decline in the tariff rates is associated with
a 0.6% decline in the size of plants that are a one standard deviation larger than the average
plant, with only an insignificant effect for plants that are a one standard deviation smaller
than the average plant. For non-exporters, the negative effect of tariff reductions on their
size increases with the plant size. The rate of the decline in the plant size following the
tariff cuts is larger for larger non-exporters than for smaller non-exporters. Even without
a significant effect on the size of the average exporters, tariff reductions reduce the size of
larger exporters. In general, exporters and new exporters increase their plants’ size relative
to their reference groups.
Considering the production-run length of Canadian manufacturing plants, tariff cuts do
not have a significant effect on it for non-exporters, exporters and new exporters. In general
however, exporters increase their production-run length compared to non-exporters.
Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) look at Mexican firms’ response at the product-extensive
margin to trade liberalization. In case of an industry-level consideration, it is found that
industries that face a larger decline in U.S. tariffs on Mexican imports experience a larger
increase in the number of exported varieties. In addition, industries with a larger decline
in Mexican tariffs on U.S. imports have a larger increase in the number of varieties sold
domestically. Notably, at the firm level, a positive relationship between Mexican tariffs on
U.S. imports and the probability of a variety’s survival in the domestic market is found.
This effect of tariff protection turns out to be stronger for core varieties.
Using the introduction of the Euro in 1999 as a natural experiment, Berthou and
Fontagne´ (2013) analyze the responses of French multi-product exporters to a change in
the trade costs. They find that the introduction of the Euro has only a negligible positive
aggregate effect on the firm-level exports to destinations in the Euro area, thereby combin-
ing such adverse effects as the trade-creation and competition effect due to the lower trade
costs. In detail, the export propensity and the product-extensive margin are not affected,
while there is a weakly significant positive effect on the product-intensive margin. Overall
and also being only weakly significant, the introduction of the Euro increased the firm-level
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exports by about 5%. This finding however hides substantial differences across exporters
and destination markets. Taking into account the heterogeneity among exporters, it turns
out that while the Euro introduction has no effect on the exporters’ selection in Euro-
area markets, it fosters the exports only for the most productive firms. Those firms in
the quartile with the highest productivity increase their exports by 8.4%, whereas about
a quarter of the effect comes from the product-extensive margin and the rest from the
product-intensive margin. Furthermore, a significant difference exists across the Euro-area
destinations, considering their heterogeneity with respect to the intensity of the monetary
policy coordination before 1999. For destinations with a less close coordination before 1999,
the introduction of the Euro has a positive effect at all: In destinations of the Euro area
outside the D-mark zone, firm-level exports increased by 12.8%. More than three quarters
of this effect go back to the product-intensive margin, and the product-extensive margin
accounts for the rest of the effect. By contrast, the introduction of the Euro negatively
affects the firm-level exports, with a weakly significant decline of 5.5%, and the export
propensity in Euro-area destinations within the D-mark zone. The time dimension reveals
a steady increase in the effects over time, which suggests that firms adjust to the changed
trade conditions over time.
Decomposing the Euro introduction’s aggregate effect for French exporters into a trade-
expansion effect and a competition effect by explicitly accounting for the competition from
other Euro-area countries reveals that the competition within the Euro area plays a signif-
icant role: A 10% increase in the competition from other Euro-area countries reduces the
product-intensive margin by 5.8%. For the trade-expansion effect, the reduction in trade
costs due to the Euro introduction has strong positive effects on the firm-level exports, as
they increase by about 7%. The increase in the product-extensive margin contributes 18%
to this effect, and the remaining 82% comes from the product-intensive margin. However,
the export propensity is not affected by the introduction of the Euro. The competition
effects are concentrated among the intermediate productivity firms. Finally, the Euro in-
troduction increases industry-level French exports to the destinations in the Euro area,
whereas the effect turns out to be larger when controlling for the within-area competition,
and even larger effects for the Euro area excluding the D-mark zone. For the Euro area
within the D-mark zone, industry-level French exports decrease with falling trade costs,
though reflecting a weakly significant effect, while the effect gets insignificant in case of a
competition control.
Another study about the firm-level responses to changes in trade costs is provided by
Lopresti (2016). Taking the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) of 1989 as the
policy event being responsible for a decrease in trade costs between Canada and the United
States, the study finds a differential product portfolio response among U.S. firms that are
heterogeneous in terms of their involvement in foreign markets80, thereby explicitly trying
80By contrast, the differential pattern can not be found with respect to relative firm sales, as a second
form of firm heterogeneity.
68 CHAPTER 2. MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS - SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
to reconcile contradictory conclusions drawn in the models of multi-product firms. Firms
that are mainly concentrated on the domestic market and thus are engaged in foreign
markets only to a limited extent, i.e. with less than 10-20% of total sales accounted for
by foreign markets, reduce their product diversification81 as trade costs fall, while more
internationally oriented firms increase their product diversification or show no response.
A 10 percentage points reduction in bilateral tariffs is associated with a reduction in the
diversification index of 0.11 (0.173 with an alternative definition of involvement) for the
first type of firms, while it is associated with an increase of 0.065 (0.075) for the second firm
type. The change point between those two groups of firms lies around 18%. In general, it is
found that firms with higher levels of sales experience a rise in the diversification between
the years of the analysis relative to firms with lower sales and a negative correlation exists
between the foreign market orientation in levels and the changes in diversification. Overall
documented, trade increases the costs of production for approximately 13% of the firms.
Let us now turn to the effect of the input trade liberalization on multi-product firms
[(ii)], which is also considered in the study by Iacovone et al. (2013). Besides increased
competition, the availability of inputs for producers in Mexico increases with increased Chi-
nese exports to the country and larger plants and core products benefit disproportionately
from the expanded access to inputs. Firms are able to make better use of the availability of
Chinese inputs for their core products and the expanded access to cheaper Chinese inputs
helps them to improve the competitiveness of their core products. As a result of increased
penetration of Chinese input imports, the output of core products expands more, whereas
the output of marginal products do less so or not at all. Similarly, larger plants are better
able to make use of Chinese inputs.
Goldberg et al. (2010a) report for India that a decline in input tariffs is associated with
an increase in firm scope; in detail, a 10 percentage points fall in tariffs leads to a 3.2%
expansion of a firm’s product scope. Altogether, changes in the input tariffs account for a
substantial share of firm scope adjustments and contribute to aggregate output increases:
31% of the observed expansion in the firm’s product scope goes back to the declines in
input tariffs; thereby being responsible for 7.8% of the manufacturing output growth.
Furthermore, firms adjust more to changes in the extensive margin than to changes in the
price margin on the input side: The elasticity of the firm scope with respect to the input
extensive margin is higher than the elasticity with respect to the input price margin.
Further insights into the product-level adjustments of multi-product firms to input trade
policy changes are provided by Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2018). By investigating all
Indian anti-dumping measures or cases on the imports of raw material inputs that were
initiated between 1992 and 2007, they study within-firm input and output reallocations of
importing firms in response to the trade shocks on raw material inputs that are used in
their firm-level production. Each case involves one or several products, leading up to 1300
different firm-inputs that were subject to anti-dumping measures. Firms in the treatment
81Measure for the product diversification: Herfindahl-Hirschman-style index of firm diversification.
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group82 lower the use of treated relative to non-treated inputs on average by 25-40% and
thus more than control firms83 do and thereby skew their input use away from protected
inputs towards unprotected inputs when they are confronted with trade protection: The
induced reallocations however do not take place in form of contractions at the extensive
margin of the firms’ input usage, as trade protection does not have a significant impact on
input dropping, but firms that use protected inputs evade to alternative ones, as they tend
to increasingly start using other inputs than the protected ones and tend to add protected
inputs less frequently, when protection is imposed.
In terms of the firm-level impact of input trade policy changes, differences exist across
the anti-dumping measures and firms: The input reallocation effect is larger or stronger,
the longer the protection is in force, and the results on input reallocation are mostly driven
by the large firms84, as the effect is only significant for them. Moreover, the intensity with
which firms employ the protected input in their production plays some role: For the firms
that are insufficiently involved in making use of the protected input, i.e. with a share of
the protected input in the total value of inputs below 20%, the input reallocation effect is
weaker, even so still observable in input quantities, but no longer for input values.
The import protection on inputs has also effects on the firm behaviour outside the
period of its validity, both before and after the trade shock takes place: Firms anticipate
the import protection in the way that they already reduce their corresponding input use
in the year before trade protection is in force (investigation effect) and firms do not, or at
least not fully, return to their pre-protection input allocation, once protection has expired
(post-treatment effect), which illustrates that input trade policy changes exert a permanent
impact on the firms’ input usage, even so the measures by themselves are only temporary.
In general, the point estimates of the effects are similar for input values and quantities,
which indicates that the input purchase prices of protected inputs are unchanged on aver-
age, while however only the low intensive users of the protected inputs observe an increase
in the average input prices of the protected inputs.
Exchange Rate Fluctuations
Regularity 10 Multi-product firms increase their producer prices in response to a real
exchange rate depreciation, whereas an incomplete pass-through of the exchange rate shocks
82The treatment group consists of importers of raw material inputs that use an input in production on
which anti-dumping protection is imposed in the year the anti-dumping case is initiated (treated inputs
in treated firms). All other inputs within the treated firms are referred to as non-treated inputs in treated
firms. A year is considered as a treatment year if an anti-dumping measure has been in force for at least
six months in that year.
83Firms that employ an input on which anti-dumping protection is imposed, but are not importers of
raw material inputs belong to the non-importer control group. The treated inputs in control firms are the
inputs that are employed by these firms and are under import protection by the anti-dumping measure.
The non-treated inputs in control firms are given by all the other inputs that are employed by these firms.
84Firms are assigned to the categories of small or large firms based on the criterion of whether their size
is below or above the median size, whereas the firm size is measured in terms of net fixed assets in the
year the anti-dumping case is initiated.
70 CHAPTER 2. MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS - SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
exists. The responsiveness however differs across the firms as well as across the products
within the firms.
In a study of Brazilian data for 1997-2006, Chatterjee et al. (2013) investigate the effects
of exchange rate shocks on the export behavior of multi-product firms. They basically find
that increases in the real exchange rate, i.e. real depreciations, are associated with increases
in producer prices and the quantity exported, while the producer price responsiveness
turns out to be highly heterogeneous across different industries. On average, the estimated
producer price elasticity amounts to approximately 0.23, which implies that the exchange
rate pass-through to import prices abroad (in the destination’s currency) appears to be
around 0.77, implying some incomplete pass-through of exchange rate shocks. For multi-
product firms, the producer price responsiveness varies across products and the relative
position of a product within a firm represents its statistically and economically significant
determinant. In particular, products further away from the firm’s core expertise have a
significantly lower producer price response; for non-core products, it is 6% lower than for
core products and the producer price responsiveness for products with below median sales
is 8 percentage points lower than for products with above median sales.
In addition, the productivity of firms, which can be measured by different proxies, plays
a key role in determining the exchange rate pass-through. In the wake of a depreciation,
more productive firms increase their mark-ups to a greater extent than less productive firms.
But in case of multi-product firms, the heterogeneity in price responses can be certainly
attributed to both the productivity dispersion across firms and the within-firm productivity
dispersion across products. Further firm-level determinants of price responsiveness and
therefore factors for heterogeneity across firms seem to be the firm size, the wage bill
and the number of products exported (product-extensive margin). To be more concrete,
it emerges that the higher the ratio between imports of inputs and the wage bill of the
firm, the higher the response of prices to a depreciation. Furthermore, an increase in
bilateral distance and hence transportation costs reduce the producer price responsiveness,
while an increase in distribution costs increases the producer price responsiveness. In an
environment with a higher exchange rate volatility and a smaller market potential, firms
show a smaller response in producer prices to real exchange rates.
Besides the adjustments in producer prices due to exchange rate shocks, firms react
through their product-extensive margin in the way that real exchange rate depreciations
are found to be associated with an increase in the number of products exported. As the
product-level response to one-standard-deviation shocks in exchange rates is larger than
the response to one-standard-deviation changes in firm-level characteristics (employment,
wage bill, skill composition, imports and exports), one can draw the conclusion that fluc-
tuations in exchange rates are at least as important as firm-level fluctuations in explaining
the product-extensive margin of trade. However, the product-level response is found to
be heterogeneous across firms, based on the general result that more productive firms
(productivity measured in terms of firm size, fraction of skilled workers and export per-
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formance) export a larger number of products: More productive firms adjust their scope
to a lesser extent in response to exchange rate fluctuations. An increase in the firm size
by a one-standard-deviation of the cross-sectional distribution leads to an exchange rate
response that is lower in 0.02, an increase in average wages by a one-standard-deviation
of the cross-sectional distribution results in a response that is lower in 0.04 and a simul-
taneous increase in each of the characteristics (employment, skill composition, wage bill,
imports, exports) by a one-standard deviation of the respective cross-sectional distribution
yields a product-level response that is lower in 0.09, which represents almost half of the
average response across firms.
A third margin of adjustment due to exchange rate shocks is given by the product-
intensive margin. Following a real exchange rate depreciation, the within-firm sales distri-
bution across products becomes less skewed, since firms reallocate resources towards their
less efficient usage. Bernard et al. (2014) disaggregate the changes in bilateral trade flows
due to exchange rate fluctuations into the two margins, the extensive and intensive margin,
and document in a study for Belgium firms for the period 1998-2005 that both margins
matter: A 1% depreciation of the Euro is correlated with a 0.35% increase in exports and
this increase is driven by both changes in the extensive margins (increases in the number of
firms and the number of products at the country level) and the product-intensive margin
(increase in the average exports per firm-product). Thereby, the response is roughly evenly
split in magnitude between the extensive and intensive margins. It is also shown that the
within firm-product response is strongly increasing as the currency depreciates.
As reported before, significant variations in the effects exist across both firms with
different productivity and the products within firms: In terms of the export price, ex-
change rate changes exhibit a higher influence for more productive firms, and adjustments
due to exchange rate shocks are less pronounced for products further away from the core
competency of the firm. Stressed by Chatterjee et al. (2013), exchange rate shocks absorp-
tion into mark-ups varies across products, being larger for core products, which account
on average for two thirds of total firm-level exports.85 For the export quantity however,
it is exactly the other way round as compared to prices: More productive firms react
to exchange rate movements to a lesser extent, while adjustments are more marked for
products being further away from the core product of the firm. Focusing on the different
margins of adjustment, a real appreciation is associated with a reduction in the export
scope (product-extensive margin) and the export sales get more skewed towards the best
performing products. Firms concentrate on the products in which they are most efficient
in by reallocating resources towards the more productive exporting products. In line with
this result, the export duration of core products broadens, while it decreases for non-core
products following a real exchange rate appreciation. Furthermore at the firm level, more
productive, larger, more profitable and less finance-constrained firms have a lower hazard
rate of exiting an export market.
85For the skewness in the within-firm sales distribution: See the Section 2.2.4.
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Generally consistent (similar) results are drawn in two recent studies by Xu et al. (2016)
for China in the period 2000-2007 and Caselli et al. (2017) for Mexico in the period 1994-
2007. Looking at a real currency appreciation, Xu et al. (2016) document decreasing effects
on both export prices and export quantities. Quantitatively, an appreciation of 10% leads
to a drop of the export price by around 0.81%, indicating an incomplete pass-through
effect of the real effective exchange rate on firms’ export price.86 For the export quantity,
an appreciation of the same size implies a drop by around 4.5%.
Caselli et al. (2017) study the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on the markups
across the products within firms. They detect that a real depreciation induces an increase
in markups and producer prices of exports, whereas the former’s elasticity with respect to
the real exchange rate amounts to 0.06 and the latter’s elasticity with respect to the real
exchange rate is 0.29, which implies that the exchange rate pass-through to import prices in
foreign currency appears to be 0.71. Once again, the relative position of a product within
a firm determines the markup and producer-price responsiveness to real exchange rate
fluctuations: The markup and producer price of products with a higher productivity, and
thus products closer to the core competency variety, increase by a larger amount. Given a
value of -0.021 in the main specification for producer prices, the producer price of the third-
highest ranked product increases by 3% less than that of the second-highest ranked product
in response to a real depreciation of the exchange rate. Thereby, the response in producer
prices is accompanied by a qualitatively equivalent responsiveness of markups and producer
prices respond heterogeneously across the products within firms due to the heterogeneous
response of markups: Given a value of -0.013 in the main specification for markups, the
markup of the third-highest ranked product increases by about 7% less than that of the
second-highest ranked product in case of a real exchange rate depreciation. In addition,
differences in the producer price and markup responsiveness exist across industries and
firms: The increase in producer prices and markups as well as their heterogeneous response
within firms is particularly strong in industries with higher local distribution margins and
the increase in marginal costs due to a real exchange rate depreciation is larger for firms
with a higher share of imported inputs.
All in all, a robust finding in this strand of literature is an incomplete pass-through
effect of exchange rate changes on firms’ variables, suggesting some absorption of aggregate
fluctuations by exporters. As those firms are the ones that are large and productive, and
larger exporters are even more productive, they are able and willing to partially absorb
exchange rate fluctuations in their mark-ups, leading to the robust empirical finding of
relatively muted responses of aggregate exports to exchange rates.
86In addition, Xu et al. (2016) summarize that exporters reveal a pricing-to-market behavior; for the
meanwhile large literature on pricing-to-market, see e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Alessandria and Ka-
boski (2011) and Simonovska (2015).
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2.3 Conclusion
Motivated by the intensive treatment of multi-product firms in the more recent empirical
literature of international trade, which is based on the progressive availability of micro
data sets, this chapter asks for the actual state of knowledge about this type of firms
in international trade. It tries to generate a comprehensive answer by surveying and
evaluating a large body of empirical studies that employ micro data sets both for developed
and developing countries. Thereby, it turns out that several robust findings or stylized
facts can be derived, even so definitions about firms and products vary across the studies:
Multi-product firms (i) are national and especially international prominent, less prevalent
but important, (ii) are singular economic units with premia in terms of their nature and
performance, (iii) produce and export at different margins, (iv) are asymmetric within
themselves (“superstar products”), (v) do not produce all their exports, (vi) are relatively
diversified in production and export, (vii) compete on both a cost and quality basis, (viii)
are less prone to firm exit in the process of “creative destruction”, (ix) start exporting at
a small scale and scope and increase them over time, (x) frequently and to a large extent
change their product portfolio (“product switching”) and (xi) undertake adjustments in
response to exogenous shocks. These empirical regularities bind both the existing and
upcoming theoretical modeling of multi-product firms in international trade.
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Appendix B
B.1 Product Classifications
Typical classifications that are used to define products in empirical studies are the following:
• Harmonized System (HS) Classification
• Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
• International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)
• Combined Nomenclature (CN) Classification
• Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE)
• Classification for the Production of Manufactured Goods (PRODCOM)
B.2 Empirical Studies
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Chapter 3
Introduction to the Theory of
Multi-product Firms in International
Trade
In its historical evolution, the theory of international trade experienced a trend towards a
disaggregation and generalization of its models’ components, thereby driven by the mutu-
ally dependent phases of theorizing, empirical investigating, and updating existing models
or developing novel models: While Ricardo (1817) as well as Heckscher and Ohlin (1919
and 1924)1 (old trade theory) considered countries and trade between them based on labor
productivity and endowment differences (inter-industry trade), Krugman (1979) turned
towards firms and introduced increasing returns to scale to the production technology of
(homogeneous) firms that produce differentiated product varieties and are not strategically
active (monopolistic competition). In this way, he allowed for the empirically observable
but so far not theoretically captured trade within industries (intra-industry trade; new
trade theory) and the effect of the opening up to trade2 on firms got part of the modern
trade analysis. Induced by the progressive availability of micro, i.e. firm-level, data sets in
the 1990s and the arising gap between the empirical evidence - within a typical industry,
firms vary greatly in size, productivity, composition of inputs, wages and participation in
foreign trade - and the theoretical modeling, Melitz (2003) broke up the assumption of ho-
1The numbers in the parentheses represent the dates of publication of the most influential contributions
for the development of the respective theory. For the references (reprints and translations): See Sraffa
(ed., 1951) [On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817)] and Flam and Flanders (eds.,
1991) [The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income (1919, pp. 43-69) and The Theory of
Trade (1924, pp. 75-214)].
2In the theoretical literature of international trade, two main concepts exist for modeling the opening
up to trade as switching from the autarky to the open economy: In the sense of an integration of once
separated country-level markets and thus an increase in the sales market as well as in the competition for
each country’s firms, the opening up to trade is modeled by one part of the literature as an increase in the
population size of a country (as in Krugman (1979)) and, where appropriate explicitly, an increase in the
number of competitors. In contrast, the other part emphasizes the liberalization of trade between once
separated countries by the reduction of tariffs and therefore models the trade opening as a decrease in the
costs of transportation of goods between countries.
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mogeneous firms by developing a way to model the heterogeneity of (single-product) firms
in a monopolistic competition (new new trade theory)3 and intra-industry reallocations
across firms due to an exposure to trade.4,5,6
In times of the collection and publication of (even further disaggregated) micro, i.e.
product- and firm-product-level, data sets,7 a further part of the empirical evidence that
was so far not covered by the theoretical modeling - simultaneous production of several
products by a firm - became apparent and models of multi-product firms in international
trade emerged during the last decade and therewith broke up the assumption of single-
product firms, by obviously allowing firms to produce and sell more than only one product.8
In this way, a novel and likewise the most recent stage in the evolution of the theory of inter-
national trade has been entered.9 Given its meanwhile establishment in terms of the extent
of the research output, the existing models of firms producing multiple products vary in
several dimensions, in particular the market structure or the across-firms competition (mo-
nopolistic competition versus oligopoly), the within-firm heterogeneity (symmetric versus
asymmetric products) and the within-firm cannibalization (existence versus absence).10
Along the dimension of within-firm heterogeneity, its establishment in the theory es-
sentially proceeds with the seminal contribution by Eckel and Neary (2010). With their
model, in which firms of a non-zero measure compete in a (Cournot) oligopoly and a neg-
ative demand linkage (spillover) between a firm’s varieties (cannibalization) exists, they
introduce the concept of flexible manufacturing (supply (cost) linkage (spillover) between
a firm’s varieties) to the theoretical literature of multi-product firms in international trade,
and thereby concentrate for the within-firm heterogeneity on the firms’ cost side: Each
firm has a core competency variety with minimal unit production costs and the produc-
3Alternative, even if less often employed, approaches of modeling firm heterogeneity in international
trade are given by Bernard et al. (2003) and Yeaple (2005).
4For the empirical motivation of the development of a theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity in
international trade and (i) a review of the empirical literature on firm heterogeneity in trade: See Bernard
et al. (2012), or (ii) an exposition and review of the theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity in trade:
See Redding (2011) and Melitz and Redding (2014).
5For the normative implications of trade (gains from trade) in the presence of heterogeneous firms in
a monopolistic competition and in particular the gains’ sources: (i) Both an exposition and a review: See
Melitz and Trefler (2012), (ii) an exposition: See Feenstra (2016) and (iii) a review: See Feenstra (2018).
6For the role of oligopoly in the theory of international trade (“two and a half theories of trade”:
perfect competition, monopolistic competition and oligopoly), its empirical justification and possible ways
of development: See Neary (2010).
7For their utilization in (a meanwhile comprehensive body of) empirical studies on multi-product firms
in international trade: See the Chapter 2.
8In the industrial organization (IO) literature, multi-product firms are units of observation and analysis
since the 1980s: See Brander and Eaton (1984), Klemperer (1992), Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), Johnson
and Myatt (2003), Allanson and Montagna (2005) and Ottaviano and Thisse (2011).
9For other directions in the recent evolution of the international trade theory: (i) Endogenous firm
productivity through firm decisions in different fields, in particular technology adoption (Costantini and
Melitz (2008)), innovation (Sampson (2016)) and workforce composition (Helpman et al. (2010) and Help-
man et al. (2017)), (ii) (international) organization of production respectively firms: (a) A review: See
Antra`s and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) and (b) both an exposition and review: See Antra`s (2016).
10For an overview of the models of multi-product firms in international trade, arranged along these three
dimensions: See the Figure C.1 in the Appendix C.1.
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tion of additional varieties being increasingly further away from the core is associated with
increasingly higher unit production costs.11
Several subsequent contributions adopt the concept of flexible manufacturing and thus
also deal with products being asymmetric within firms, where the products of a firm are sold
in different amounts and at different prices, but the contributions vary either on one or both
of the other two dimensions: Eckel and Irlacher (2017) as well as Flach and Irlacher (2018)
consider a multi-product firm in a monopoly, which can be easily extended to an oligopoly,
whereas Qiu and Zhou (2013), Mayer et al. (2014) and Arkolakis et al. (2015) analyze multi-
product firms in a monopolistic competition and in case of the absence of a within-firm
cannibalization,12 among themselves differing in the assumptions on the demand side, i.e.
the preferences of consumers: While Arkolakis et al. (2015) apply constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) preferences with constant firm markups induced, Qiu and Zhou (2013)
and Mayer et al. (2014) assume quadratic preferences, leading to linear demand.13 With
Bernard et al. (2011) however, the source for within-firm asymmetries across products
varies, while maintaining the monopolistic competition and the absence of a within-firm
cannibalization: They focus on the demand side and incorporate random product attributes
that determine together with the firm ability (productivity) the profitability and survival
in the economy.
Feenstra and Ma (2008), Baldwin and Gu (2009), Dhingra (2013) and Nocke and Yeaple
(2014) follow the contrary approach of modeling symmetric products within multi-product
firms, where the products of a firm are sold in the same amount and at the same price.
While Baldwin and Gu (2009) take into account a cannibalization within firms that are of
a non-zero measure, have some market power and compete in an oligopoly, the other three
contributions assume a monopolistic competition for their models’ market structure. With
free entry of firms and no strategic interaction between firms of a limited measure, Nocke
and Yeaple (2014) do not consider a within-firm cannibalization, whereas Feenstra and Ma
(2008) as well as Dhingra (2013) incorporate it into their models: The former contribution
relaxes the constant aggregate price index assumption and thus enables the existence of
11In a way, two extensions to Eckel and Neary (2010)’s baseline model exist: Besides the model’s
configuration, in which the price and sales profiles of firms across their products are negatively correlated,
interpreted as the cost-based competency of firms, Eckel et al. (2015) develop a second configuration, in
which firms invest in their brand and products quality, leading to a positive correlation between the price
and sales profiles of firms across their products and interpreted as the quality-based competence of firms.
Eckel et al. (2016) however incorporate the investment of firms in their export market penetration and
are thereby able to reconcile the model with the empirical evidence that most firms sell more of all their
products at home than they export and only the largest firms exhibit a dominance of exports over home
sales.
12In their baseline model, Arkolakis et al. (2015) do not consider a within-firm cannibalization. Nonethe-
less, they incorporate in a generalization of their model a within-firm cannibalization by employing nested
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences, with different within-nest substitution elasticities be-
tween the nests. In particular, in the case that the products of a firm in the inner nest are closer substitutes
to each other than the product lines are substitutable across the firms in the outer nest, a within-firm
cannibalization exists.
13Qiu and Zhou (2013) additionally extend their model to CES preferences and stress the robustness of
their results with respect to this alternative demand configuration.
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negative demand linkages between a firm’s products, while with the identification of firms
as brands with multiple products within each, the latter contribution allows for a within-
brand cannibalization by introducing a parameter for the differentiation across brands into
the consumer’s utility function, which leads to negative demand linkages between products
of the same brand.
Product Scope Responses to Changes in International Trade
In general, multi-product firms do not only decide about the production (output) and sales
amount of a product (scale), as single-product firms do, but they also have to make a choice
on their supplied product portfolio, i.e. the number of products produced and sold (scope)
as well as its composition (space). Thereby, the multi-product firms’ choices on product
scope are constrained on the demand side through (within-firm) cannibalization and/or
on the supply side through (within-firm) dis-economies of scope. A firm does not expand
its scope any further if the additional profits of the last added product do not exceed (or
are equal to) the additional costs of the last added product. Within-firm cannibalization
occurs either as a result of the firms’ optimization (Feenstra and Ma (2008), Baldwin and
Gu (2009), Eckel and Neary (2010), Eckel et al. (2015, 2016), Eckel and Irlacher (2017)
and Flach and Irlacher (2018)) or the modification of the demand function in form of the
introduction of a product substitution parameter (Dhingra (2013)).
The product scope choice of multi-product firms in international trade evidently de-
pends not only on the firms’ characteristics, but also on a number of factors of the trade
setting in which the firms operate and hence a new and additional margin of adjustment
to changes in the setting of international trade (changes in trade costs: (de-)liberalization
and integration of formerly segregated economies: globalization14) is established in the
international trade theory: The number of products that a firm produces and/or exports
(product scope) can be changed by it to re-optimize the firm’s objective variable, in par-
ticular profits. As the firm type’s unique feature, the study of the extensive margin and
its adjustment (pattern) is central to all models in theory.15
The predictions of the models of multi-product firms in international trade on the firms’
scope adjustments can be categorized into two groups, according to qualitative differences
throughout the firm distribution:16 (i) Homogeneous response and (ii) heterogeneous re-
sponse. For the first group [(i)], Feenstra and Ma (2008), Eckel et al. (2016), Eckel and
Irlacher (2017) and Flach and Irlacher (2018) find that all firms increase their product
scope in response to liberalization or globalization, while Baldwin and Gu (2009), Eckel
and Neary (2010), Bernard et al. (2011), Mayer et al. (2014) and Arkolakis et al. (2015) de-
tect that all firms reduce their product scope in response to liberalization or globalization.
14The modeling concept of globalization goes back to Krugman (1979).
15For the study of the extensive margin and its adjustment (pattern) in the empirical contributions on
multi-product firms: See the Chapter 2.
16For an overview of the models’ predictions on the multi-product firms’ scope adjustment to changes
in international trade: See the Table C.1 and Table C.2 in the Appendix C.2.
85
In detail, while Eckel and Irlacher (2017) identify an increase in scope at the expense of
core products as each firm’s response to globalization, Eckel and Neary (2010) derive that
each firm’s decrease in scope takes place to the benefit of its core products, which implies
that multi-product firms get “leaner and meaner” in response to gloablization. Further-
more, Eckel et al. (2015) find that globalization has an ambiguous effect on the scope of
all firms and trade de-liberalization leads all multi-product firms to decrease their scope.
For the second group [(ii)], the contributions find that the firms that are ex-ante supe-
rior positioned, in particular exporters and/or more productive firms (exporters), are more
able to make use of and to cope with the changed environment and that these firms expand
their scope, whereas the other firms reduce it: Dhingra (2013) detects that non-exporters
and less productive exporters reduce their scope, while more productive exporters increase
their scope in response to globalization. Additionally, Qiu and Zhou (2013) predict a de-
crease in scope for less productive firms, while more productive firms may increase their
scope in response to globalization. In the contribution by Nocke and Yeaple (2014), it is
found that initially domestic firms decrease their scope and continuing exporters increase
their scope in response to trade liberalization.
The relevance of the step towards multi-product firms in the historical evolution of the
international trade theory gets illustrated by Breinlich and Cun˜at (2016): They evaluate
different versions and extensions of Melitz (2003)’s heterogeneous firms model by check-
ing their ability to quantitatively replicate the changes in trade flows and productivity in
Canada following the trade liberalization by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUS-
FTA) of 1989. While the baseline model is inherently incapable of matching both trade
and productivity increases, the only extension that substantially improves the model’s
performance in providing a good fit to the data and passing the over-identification tests
is one in which multi-product firms are considered. Thus, multi-product firms, their firm
type’s unique feature, in particular product scope, and their (more extensive set of) mar-
gins of adjustment need to be included in the international trade models to capture the
quantitative features of trade liberalization.
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Appendix C
C.1 Models of Multi-product Firms in International
Trade
Figure C.1: Models of Multi-product Firms in International Trade: Representation along
Three Dimensions: Market Structure or Across-firms Competition (Monopolistic Compe-
tition versus Oligopoly), Within-firm Heterogeneity (Symmetric versus Asymmetric Prod-
ucts) and Within-firm Cannibalization (Existence versus Absence) [?: Within-firm canni-
balization absent in the baseline model, but existent in a generalization of the model in the
online supplement, ??: Monopoly in the baseline model, but an extension to the oligopoly
either done in the appendix or possible with the respective reference]
C.2 Product Scope Responses to Changes in Interna-
tional Trade
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90 APPENDIX C.
Chapter 4
Multi-product Firms with Flexible
Manufacturing and Organizational
Capital in International Trade
4.1 Introduction
Multi-product firms quantitatively dominate manufacturing production both within na-
tional borders and in international trade. A rich body of empirical studies documents this
fact for several developed and developing countries and varying definitions of products.
Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2010) show for the U.S. that multi-product firms
account for 87% of the national output and are responsible for almost all (99%) of the ex-
port value. For Chile, Navarro (2012) detects some of the lowest figures across the studies,
but still reveals a significant importance of multi-product firms for domestic production
and activity across borders: 56% of the national output is produced by multi-product firms
and those account for 58% of the export value.
A similar robust fact that is documented in the empirical studies is the size and produc-
tivity premium of multi-product firms. They are on average larger in terms of output and
employment and more productive than their single-product counterparts (Bernard et al.
(2010) for the U.S., Goldberg et al. (2010b) for India, Navarro (2012) for Chile, Bernard
et al. (2014) for Japan). Goldberg et al. (2010b) and Navarro (2012) report that Indian
and Chilean multi-product firms respectively produce on average an about 25% higher
output, while Navarro (2012) finds Chilean multi-product firms to be on average 3% more
productive than single-product firms.
Given these facts of superiority of multi-product firms in several dimensions of economic
activity1, the question of how these firms are able to realize them arises and requires a
0I would like to thank my supervisors, Hale Utar and Gerald Willmann, as well as Wen Cheng, Carsten
Eckel, Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti, Claudia Tronconi and the participants of the 20th Workshop “Interna-
tionale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen” in Go¨ttingen for helpful comments, suggestions and support.
1In a recent work, Eckel and Irlacher (2017) offer an explanation approach to multi-product firms’
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detailed analysis of those firms and especially of their internal organization. In economics
and management, the firm as the central vehicle of economic transaction is naturally at
the core of some theoretical approaches, trying to obtain a deeper understanding of its
nature, existence, boundaries and organization. An attempt regarding the nature of the
firm, developed to explain the varying degree of competitive advantage of firms, goes
back to early contributions by Coase (1937) and Penrose (1959) and finds its fundamental
conceptualization in the studies by Rumelt (1984) and Wernerfelt (1984). It focuses on the
characteristic endowment of firms with some resources and therefore finds its way in the
literature as the resource-based theory of the firm.2
Starting with the assumption of a resource endowment of firms, thereby picking up the
traditional resource-based theory of firms and combining it with the most relevant form of
firms in international trade, this chapter tries to shed light on the internal organization of
resource-endowed and -constrained multi-product firms and their adjustment patterns to
trade liberalization. Thereby, it builds on the work by Nocke and Yeaple (2014) and as they
do, the resource of firms is identified by the concept of organizational capital3. Its allocation
to a firm’s product reduces the product’s cost of production and any increase of scope
reduces the amount of organizational capital allocated to each product, thereby increasing
its production costs (dis-economies of scope). In the model by Nocke and Yeaple (2014),
products within firms are symmetric in output and price, i.e. they contribute the same
amount to the firm’s output and they are supplied all with one price. The main contribution
of the chapter is now to reconcile dis-economies of scope, caused by the limited endowment
of firms with organizational capital and in turn building on the traditional resource-based
theory of firms, with the robust empirical finding of within-firm asymmetry. In particular,
Adalet (2009), Aw and Lee (2009), Bernard et al. (2010), Goldberg et al. (2010b), Liu
(2010), Bernard et al. (2011), Go¨rg et al. (2012), Navarro (2012), So¨derbom and Weng
(2012), Amador and Opromolla (2013), Chatterjee et al. (2013), Masso and Vahter (2014),
Arnarson (2016), Boehm et al. (2016), Lo Turco and Maggioni (2016), Lopresti (2016),
Caselli et al. (2017), Dhyne et al. (2017) and Lopresti and Shiferaw (2017) document for
multi-product firms located in several different countries substantial product differences
within these firms.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section describes the
resource-based theory of the firm and the concept of organizational capital, as well as draws
the existing connections to multi-product firms. In the following section, a model of multi-
product firms with organizational capital and flexible manufacturing is developed, starting
with a closed economy and then opening it up to trade. The subsequent section provides
superiority by introducing labour market imperfections/frictions into a model of multi-product firms.
2For an overview about and a critical appraisal of (the development of) the resource-based theory of
the firm (in management): See Lockett et al. (2009).
3In the literature, there is no uniform term for the employed concept. Organizational capital, orga-
nization capital and organizational resource are largely taken as synonyms and therefore interchangeably
used. However, in this chapter, preference is given to the term organizational capital.
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empirical evidence in support of (i) the general relevance of the organizational capital in
the firms’ production process and (ii) some of the main predictions of the developed theory.
The last section summarizes the main results.
4.2 Resource-endowed Multi-product Firms
4.2.1 Resource-based Theory of the Firm
In each economy, firms represent the central vehicle of transaction of factors and goods.
Naturally, they are at the core of some theoretical approaches in economics and manage-
ment, which try to gain a deeper understanding of the firms’ existence, nature, boundaries
and organization. One of those approaches, that is fundamentally conceptualized in 1984,
analyses the nature and thereby aims to develop an explanation for the varying degree of
competitive advantage of firms:4 The resource-based theory characterizes a firm as a histori-
cally determined (path-dependent) collection or bundle of assets or resources, which are tied
semi-permanently to the firm and its management (Rumelt (1984), Wernerfelt (1984)), and
states that the heterogeneous distribution of resource endowments among firms translates
into firm performance differences.5 Subsequent contributions in the literature, in partic-
ular Amit and Schoemaker (1993) and Makadok (2001), divide the encompassing term of
resources into resources and capabilities : While resources describe stocks of (externally)
available and transferable factors that are owned or controlled by the firm, for example
financial or physical assets (e.g. property, plant), know-how (e.g. patents, licenses) and
human capital, the firm’s capacities to deploy those resources are named capabilities. By
being largely responsible for the sustainable competitive advantage of a single firm (Hall
(1992)), these capabilities fulfill some unique characteristics, beyond which and given that
they feature a high degree of idiosyncracy in the way that they cannot be bought “off the
shelf” (Sutton (2012)): They are valuable in the sense that they enable the firm’s out-
performance or the reduction of the firm’s weaknesses, in short, it’s success in competition
(Barney (1991)), they are rare as they are limited in supply (Barney (1991)), they are inim-
itable as their replication is difficult for competitors (Barney (1991), Peteraf (1993)) and
they are non-substitutable in the way that a simple replacement by the firm is not possible
(Barney (1991), Peteraf (1993)). According to Barney (1991), these four characteristics
form the so-called VRIN characteristics. In addition, the capabilities are also appropriate
in the sense that firms can take control of the generated rents (Grant (1991)), durable as
4Early contributions to the approach are provided by Coase (1937) and Penrose (1959). For the ad-
vancement of the approach, given its essential features as well as the alternative approaches and their
shortcomings: See Montresor (2004). The alternative approaches are, for example, the transaction-cost
theory, pioneered by Coase (1937) and decisively developed by Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985), and the
property-rights theory, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986).
5Large parts of the development of the resource-based theory take place in (the literature of) man-
agement. For the impediments of its application to economics and future potentials: See Lockett and
Thompson (2001).
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they can repeatedly employed in the firm (Grant (1991), Prahalad and Hamel (1990)) and
non-transferable as their purchase and sale at the market is not possible (Grant (1991),
Peteraf (1993)). According to Amit and Schoemaker (1993), the capabilities with the
above characteristics do not only enable firms to make use of their resources, but provide
the efficient employment of factors within the firms.6 In the same way, Makadok (2001)
describes capabilities as some firm-specific and implicit productivity-enhancing means of
firms.7,8
Another strand of literature examines the relative importance of firm-specific and in-
dustry effects for long-run, outstanding firm performance and thereby makes possible to
empirically verify the explanatory power and relevance of the resource-based theory of the
firm, which attributes a firm’s sustainable comparative advantage to firm-specific capabil-
ities. Setting the standards for the analysis in the subsequent literature, McGahan and
Porter (1999) employ some data on a sample of U.S. firms across industries to study the
persistence of incremental industry, corporate-parent and business-specific effects on prof-
itability. They find that the incremental industry effects persist longer than the other two
effects, indicating that changes in the industry structure exert a more persistent impact
on firm profitability than changes in the firm structure. By differentiating across firms,
the business-specific effects however are found to erode faster for low performers than high
performers.
With a sample of firms in different sectors of the U.S. food economy, Schumacher and
Boland (2005) replicate the analysis on profitability persistence of industry, corporate-
parent and business-specific effects and derive the result that profits are more persistent
within an industry than within a specific corporation. Lin et al. (2014) apply the analysis
on a developing country by making use of data on firms in China: They show that the
incremental effects of industry on profitability persist longer than the incremental effects of
the firm. The competitive advantage of firms seems to be more predictable and sustainable
6See Amit and Schoemaker (1993): “They [capabilities] can abstractly be thought of as “intermediate
goods” generated by the firm to provide enhanced productivity of its resources, as well as strategic flexibility
and protection for its final product [...].” (p. 35).
7See Makadok (2001): “[...] a special type of resource - specifically, an organizationally embedded
non-transferable firm-specific resource whose purpose is to improve the productivity of the other resources
possessed by the firm.” (p. 389).
8In a dynamic and Schumpeterian perspective of firms, Teece et al. (1997) and Teece (2009, 2014, 2016)
identify capabilities that ensure the long-run and sustainable corporate success, called dynamic capabilities,
and distinguish them from ordinary ones: While, in the tradition of the literature, the latter’s purpose is to
provide the technical efficiency of production, ensuring the firm’s technical fitness, by concentrating on the
appropriate implementation of chosen opportunities (“doing things right”), dynamic capabilities represent
the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly
changing environments, thereby aiming to create a congruence of the firm’s agenda with customer needs
and business opportunities. Firms with these dynamic capabilities are characterised by evolutionary fitness,
realized through the appropriate choice of given opportunities (“doing the right things”). Dealing with
the same facts, Fujimoto (1998) distinguishes three levels of a firm’s capability: (1) Static capability, which
affects the level of competitive performance, (2) improvement capability (first-order dynamic capability),
which affects the pace of performance improvements and (3) evolutionary capability (second-order dynamic
capability), which is related to the accumulation of the above capabilities themselves. The constructed
trichotomy is then applied to the Japanese automobile industry.
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based on industry factors than firm factors. Results in the literature however are not
unambiguous in favor of a major role of industry effects in profit persistence, as several
other studies draw the opposite conclusion and thereby support the resource-based view
of the firm: For the largest manufacturing firms in Turkey, Yurtoglu (2004) detects in a
dynamic analysis with persistent profitability differences across firms a moderately quick
erosion of rents, except for the most highly profitable firms. Firm characteristics rather
than industry effects account for the differences in permanent profits. Bou and Satorra
(2007) apply structural equation models to data on Spanish firms. While they observe
significant and permanent differences between profit rates both at industry and firm levels,
the variation of abnormal returns at the firm level is greater than at the industry level.
Chen and Lin (2010) look at the IT industry in Taiwan and find that the incremental
effects of firms on profitability persist longer than the incremental effects of industry. In a
recent study on Chinese machinery manufacturing firms, Guan et al. (2015) get the result
that both industry and firm effects contribute to the profit persistence, but firm effects
persist longer than industry effects.
4.2.2 Organizational Capital
Parts of the economics literature refer to a specific firm capability as organizational cap-
ital. In line with the resource-based theory of the firm, organizational capital generally
represents an intangible input into the production process of each product produced and
managed by a firm, whereas it cannot be completely codified and hence transferred to other
firms, either upon the firm’s approval or against its approval through the imitation by com-
petitors. More precisely, Evenson and Westphal (1995) characterize organizational capital
as the firm’s knowledge of how to combine the inputs of the production process, in partic-
ular physical and human capital, into systems for producing and delivering want-satisfying
products.9 By its nature, much of the knowledge is tacit, thus not feasibly physically em-
bodied and neither codifiable nor readily transferable. In the same way, Atkeson and Kehoe
(2005) describe organizational capital as the firms’ stored and accumulated knowledge that
affects their technology of production. However, the within-firm components in which the
capability materializes are identified differently in the literature, thereby establishing two
strands of a perspective on firms and their organizational capital, whereas the second one
becomes prevalent over time:
(a) With connections to the concepts or models by Becker (1975) and Jovanovic (1979),
Prescott and Visscher (1980) stress in a dynamic study on firm characteristics the employ-
ees of firms as their central agents, about which the firm has some information with respect
to their suitability for particular tasks and information on their ability to work as a team
with particular fellow employees, which represent together with the firm-specific human
9Evenson and Westphal (1995) further distinguish technological capabilities into firms’ production ca-
pabilities, investment capabilities and invention capabilities.
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capital vested in individual employees an asset to the firm, which is called organization
capital. The information by itself is distinguished between some information about the
abilities of the firm’s personnel and the match between the workers and tasks (person-
nel information), some information about the match between employees working in teams
(team information) and some information about the skills of workers (human capital infor-
mation). Consequently, the firm is described as a storehouse of such information, in which
incentives for both the efficient accumulation and use of that information are generated,
overall providing and ensuring the efficiency in the production of the firms.
(b) With connections to the concepts or models by Arrow (1962) and Rosen (1972),
Tomer (1981) stresses the organization of firms in terms of their systems, procedures,
structures, and interpersonal and inter-groups relationships, which have been developed in
the firms, or more precisely, which have been jointly produced with the output (learning
by doing), to ensure their effectiveness and efficiency in the production and which all
together form an asset that is called organizational capital. In a subsequent study, Tomer
(1987) classifies as before organizational capital as some type or subcategory of human
capital, whereas the former is vested only in organizational relationships, while the latter
is vested only in individuals, but now differentiates more between human and organizational
capital by setting up a human-organizational capital spectrum, in which pure human capital
and pure organizational capital form the extremes and some human-organizational capital
hybrids lie in between them. According to Tomer (1987), Prescott and Visscher (1980)’s
concept of organizational capital captures simply one of those hybrids.
As organizational capital is defined as an intangible production input, the theory of
intangible assets10 of firms and its identification and classification approaches provide char-
acterizations of organizational capital which mainly follow the dominating approach (b)
and evidently have an overlap with the resource-based theory of firms11: Intangible assets
are in general characterized as those assets of the firm that lack a physical existence or em-
bodiment, but contribute to the value of the firm or represent sources of future corporate
benefits (Edvinsson and Malone (1997), Lev (2005), Webster and Jensen (2006)). Accord-
ing to Lev (2005), the unique features of intangible assets are their partial excludability
in the sense that the property rights over intangible assets are not as tightly defined and
secured as they are for physical and financial assets as well as their non-marketability in
the sense that intangibles are by and large not traded in active and transparent markets.
In particular, knowledge or information that exists in a firm to generate comparative ad-
vantage by satisfying customer needs is also referred to as an intangible asset (Ferna´ndez
10The terms intangibles, intangible assets, intangible capital and intellectual capital are taken as syn-
onyms and therefore used interchangeably. For an overview about the literature on intangibles (see Petty
and Guthrie (2000)) and the definitions and classifications of intangibles used in the literature: See Kauf-
mann and Schneider (2004) and Choong (2008). For an overview about the empirical literature on intel-
lectual capital and firm performance: See Inkinen (2015).
11The theories vary in the (narrowness of the) definition of their essential elements, but nevertheless
coincide in the postulation of their implications. For the provision of a sustainable competitive advantage
of intangible assets to the firms that maintain them: See Villalonga (2004).
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et al. (2000), Kaplan and Norton (2004)).
Edvinsson and Malone (1997) divide intellectual capital into human capital, which is
the combined knowledge and skills of the firm’s individual employees at work as well as the
firm’s value and culture, and structural capital such as hardware and software, databases,
organizational structure, trade and brand names and everything else of organizational
capability that supports those employees’ productivity. In short, the latter is “everything
left at the office when the employees go home” (p. 11). Structural capital in turn is further
classified into organizational, process and innovation capital, whereas organizational capital
contains the firm’s systems, tools, and operating philosophy that accelerates the flow of
knowledge through the organization and out to the supply as well as distribution channels.
Several further approaches of a classification of the intangibles and thereby of a char-
acterization of organizational capital exist as alternatives: Ferna´ndez et al. (2000) differ-
entiate intangible assets into human capital, organizational capital, technological capital
and relational capital. Organizational capital includes the firm’s norms and guidelines,
databases, organizational routines and corporate culture as well as its strategic alliances.
Kaplan and Norton (2004) classify intangible assets into human capital, information capital
and organization capital, which is composed of the firm’s culture, leadership, alignment of
its goals and incentives with the strategy and teamwork. Lev (2005) sorts intangible assets
according to their categories of products and services, customer relations, human resources
and organizational capital. The latter includes unique corporate organizational designs and
business processes that allow companies to outperform competitors in generating revenues
or by economizing on production costs. Webster and Jensen (2006) differentiate intangibles
into human capital, organizational capital, marketing (or relational) capital and produc-
tion capital, whereas organizational capital includes the organizational architecture and
the systems for monitoring activity and communicating within the firm.
Focusing on organizational capital and thereby likewise following its dominating ap-
proach (b), Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) address the systematic out-performance of
single firms in almost all industries and sectors and identify its source precisely not in
some monopoly power or competition-restricting regulation but in the firms’ organization
which gets manifested by their systems, practices, processes and designs. All that together
builds a collective capability as the firm’s major and unique factor of production, which
is called organization capital and which is predominantly tacit, therefore not or not com-
pletely codifiable, transferable to and imitable by the competitors, and capable of providing
the competitive advantage and so yielding superior returns for the firm12. By contrast, al-
most all of the other production factors, in particular capital and labour, merely represent
commodities or resources to which all the firms have equal access and which yield, at best,
the cost of capital. Taken all together, organizational capital is described as some ag-
glomeration of technologies, including business practices, processes, designs and systems,
that together enable the firms to consistently and efficiently extract from a given level of
12For the VRIN characteristics of the capabilities: See the Section 4.2.1.
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physical and human resources a higher value of products than other firms would find pos-
sible to attain. Typical examples of specific business processes and designs as components
of organization capital are Wal-Mart’s supply chain, which features the direct transmis-
sion of barcodes of purchased products, registered at the checkout, to suppliers who are
largely responsible for the inventory management, Cisco’s Internet-based product installa-
tion and maintenance system with a huge cost savings potential and Dell’s path-breaking
built-to-order distribution system, allowing unique levels of customization.
Black and Lynch (2005) single out three firm practices as paradigmatic components of
organizational capital that have been shown to be associated with a higher productivity for
the firms and/or higher wages for the workers: workforce training, employee voice and work-
place organization. While the decisions about worker education (level of human capital)
are assumed to be individual-based and taken independently from the specific employment
relationship, workforce training is the result of a decision of investment in skill upgrading
that is jointly made by the worker and the firm at which he is employed (investment in
human capital). The component that is called employee voice subsumes all organization
structures contributing to and promoting the participation of (non-managerial) workers
in the decision making associated with the design of the production process and greater
autonomy and discretion in the structure of the employees’ work. Finally, workplace or-
ganization13 includes as examples of applied practices restructuring activities that lead to
adjustments in the occupational structure of the workplace, the number of workers per
supervisor, the number of levels of management within the firm, the existence and diffu-
sion of job rotation and job share arrangements. In addition, methods of monitoring the
applied practices and connected comparisons to competitors (benchmarking) also belong
to the firm practices. Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010) merely take the last component
mentioned and refer to these workplace practices in form of an asset as organizational cap-
ital. The practices include the allocation of decision rights, the design of incentive systems,
cumulative investments in training and skill developments and even supplier and customer
networks.14
Stressing the role and importance of capabilities in the competition between firms
in a globalized world, Sutton (2012) follows as well the organization approach (b) and
so locates organization capital in the organizational structure of the firm, which is the
architecture of a firm’s organization, originating in some framework of rules, routines and
tacit understandings that have been put in place or have evolved over time, combined with
the assembling of a team of people who work effectively together.
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) exceed by far with their study a theoretical conceptual-
13For the (firm-level) complementarity between the changes in workplace organization and the invest-
ments in information technology (IT): See Bresnahan et al. (2002). For the relation between computeri-
zation and organizational capital: See Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) and the explanations below.
14For an overview about the literature on human resource management practices (employee training,
hiring criteria, teamwork, job design and employee hierarchies), whose empirical part is generated through
an “insider econometrics” approach: See Ichniowski and Shaw (2003).
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ization and practical illustration of organization capital, as they also undertake therewith
the first attempt of its estimation, quantification and valuation. Thanks to its nature
as a capability, organizational capital is difficult to operationalize and document and so
there exits no evident and widely accepted operational measure of it, neither at the input
(investments or costs) nor output (e.g. designs and processes) level. While parts of the in-
vestment in organizational capital are not fully tracked and recorded by firms, especially by
smaller firms, its output is given in form of an intermediate product without an observable
market price. Consequently, firms’ existing accounting systems do not explicitly capture
organizational capital and do not distinguish its contribution to the final output of the firm
from the contribution of the other inputs in the production process, therefore failing to be
adequately equipped to constitute a direct reference of any estimation, quantification and
valuation task of organizational capital.
Based on a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, which puts a firm’s output
(sales) into a unique relation to its inputs, in particular physical capital, labour as well
as research and development (R&D) capital, and which exhibits constant returns to scale,
organizational capital can be estimated in two different ways: First, the residual of the
function can be taken as an estimate of organizational capital, which can be achieved either
by extracting the systematic component of the error term or by inserting a firm-specific
dummy variable. Such a procedure follows the pioneering attempt by Solow (1957) to
estimate total factor productivity (TFP). The drawback of the residual estimate however
is that it essentially represents a black box, reflecting all told random shocks and various
omitted variables along with TFP and organizational capital, which can not be separately
identified. Second and as an estimation alternative, the income statement item “selling,
general, and administrative (SGA) expenses” can be used as a proxy for organizational
capital, since SGA expenses capture the non-production related costs of the business op-
eration that are interpreted as investments in the capability of the firm. While the selling
expenses capture all the spending related to the process of putting produced products to
customers (e.g. salaries of sales people, advertising costs, brand enhancement costs, costs
of Internet-based supply and distribution channels), general and administrative expenses
arise from the management of the business (e.g. salaries of executives, payments to sys-
tems and strategy consultants, employees training costs, IT outlays, insurance costs, office
rents). Even so this income statement item indeed includes most of the expenditures that
generate and enhance organizational capital, it goes in part beyond what can be viewed as
an expenditure that is relevant for the organizational capital of the firm, e.g. compensation
of executives.
In their estimation approach, Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) consider two types of or-
ganizational capital: An economy-wide, common organizational capital, which is available
to all firms, and a firm-specific organizational capital, which is developed and maintained
by each firm. The volume of a firm’s SGA expenses is in turn determined by the level
of its activity as a short-term scaling factor, measured by its output, and the committed
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portion of expenditures as a long-term scaling factor, measured by the lagged value of its
SGA expenses. To account for the endogeneity of the SGA expenses, they are modelled
as a function of both elements. After taking logarithms of annual changes, the production
function, which is enriched by the SGA expenses as a proxy for organizational capital,
and the relation for the SGA expenses are estimated by using a two-stage least squares
procedure cross-sectionally on the COMPUSTAT database with listed firms that operate
in twelve major industry categories15. The sample for the period 1978-2002 is restricted
to firms with both annual sales and total assets greater than $5 million, which leads to a
total of 90,237 firm-year observations.
The research and development (R&D) capital of a firm as a stock is computed by
capitalizing and amortizing its annual R&D expenditures as a flow variable over five years,
whereas an annual amortization rate of 20% is employed, and the sample is then divided
into two groups of firms: Those with R&D expenditures, in short R&D firms, and those
without R&D expenditures, in short non-R&D firms. At the mean, R&D firms are larger
in terms of output, physical capital and employment than non-R&D firms, while at the
median, the reverse applies, indicating the existence of some very large R&D firms in the
sample. For both R&D and non-R&D firms, the logarithm of growth in the economy-wide,
common organizational capital is 0.03, which represents approximately 3% of the average
output growth. The marginal productivity of physical capital in case of R&D (non-R&D)
firms is 0.08 (0.10), while the one of labour is 0.33 (0.15), the one of R&D is 0.09 and the
one of organizational capital is 0.41 (0.58). Deducing from the statistical (non-)significance
of the difference between the marginal productivities in the two groups, R&D turns out not
to essentially influence the efficiency of physical capital, while it enhances the efficiency
of employees in form of some process R&D and non-R&D firms have some competitive
edge through organizational processes and designs to compensate for the absence of R&D.
Overall, organizational capital is a major input in the production process of firms.
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) furthermore provide firm-specific estimates of the annual
contribution of organizational capital to output (sales) growth. Specifically, given two
defined expectations of a firm’s output, in particular the expected output of a given firm
in a given year with and without the common and firm-specific organizational capital, the
firm-specific measure of organizational capital is obtained by taking the difference between
these two sales expectations. The mean of organizational capital amounts to $96 million,
which represents about 4% of average sales, while the mean annual change in sales is $90
million, implying that the estimated average contribution of organizational capital to sales
growth is almost 100% and illustrating the relevance of organizational capital in generating
15The industry categories are the following: Consumer non-durables: food, tobacco, textiles, apparel,
leather, toys; consumer durables: cars, TVs, furniture, household appliances; manufacturing: machinery,
trucks, planes, office furniture, paper, commercial printing; energy, oil, gas, and coal extraction and prod-
ucts; chemicals and allied products; business equipment: computers, software, and electronic equipment;
telecom, telephone, and television transmission; utilities; wholesale, retail, and some services (laundries,
repair shops); health care, medical equipment, and drugs; money, and finance; other: mines, construction,
building materials, transportation, hotels, business services, and entertainment.
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output growth.
Bresnahan (2005) however is critical of Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005)’s approach by
questioning the appropriateness of the measure of organization capital and the estimation
methodology. Given the chosen measure, firm-level inefficiencies, which lead to higher
SGA expenses, would imply higher levels of organization capital for the firm, which is not
intended by the measure’s choice. In addition, the measure includes marketing as well as
managerial expenditures, but does not capture potentially relevant aspects that are not
directly correlated with the observable expenditures, e.g. managerial talent, and it does not
consider the organization of firms (hierarchy, centralization, dynamic incentive contracts,
divisional structure, workplace organization in productive units, corporate culture, role
of management)16. Furthermore, the estimation of the organizational capital basically
operates with production function residuals, even in the second proposed way, with all
their drawbacks in the identification: In the second proposed way, a productivity residual
is projected onto SGA expenses and the interaction of SGA expenses with other inputs
and then called organizational capital. Consequently, organizational capital is measured
either by a production function residual at the firm level or by the portion of a production
function residual that is explained by the variation in SGA expenses. In this case, the
difficulty both to make sure and convince that production function residuals at the firm
level in fact measure organizational capital, and not any other feature of differences in firms
or operating circumstances, turns out to be especially serious for the paper’s statement of
the relevance of organizational capital. In addition to it, any estimation at the firm level
is connected to some problems due to the heterogeneity of firms, making it difficult to
distinguish between selection, the endogeneity in the inputs, and the true advantages of
the firm.
Further estimation attempts exist that employ the production function framework as
in Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005), but differ in the choice of the organizational capi-
tal measure and its application in the estimation:17 De and Dutta (2007) pick the item
administrative expenses, which is a sub-class of the SGA expenses, out of the income
statement of firms and compute the organization capital by capitalizing (a fraction of, i.e.
a capitalization rate of (i) 20% and (ii) 10%) the expenses with the perpetual inventory
method18, while assuming a depreciation rate of (i) 10% and (ii) 20%, respectively, yielding
two stock measures. Based on the estimation of a more augmented Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function, which includes physical, brand, human and organization capital as factors
of production, on a sample of 165 Indian IT firms over the period 1997-2005, they find
that organization capital has the highest output elasticity among the inputs. Tronconi
16For an overview about firm organization: See Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
17In an early estimation attempt, Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) document a substantial output elasticity of
organizational capital for firms that have invested in IT.
18The perpetual inventory method is a widely used concept in the R&D literature to construct a stock
of innovation (knowledge) capital: See e.g. Hall et al. (2010) for an overview about the literature on
measuring R&D returns.
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and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) replicate the task for a sample of 828 European firms over
the period 2005-2006. Thereby, they follow the approach of choosing a capitalized income
statement item as a proxy for organization capital, but different from De and Dutta (2007),
they do not apply the administrative expenses but rather the more general SGA expenses,
and capitalize them by using the perpetual inventory method with a capitalization rate
of 20% as well as a depreciation rate of 10%. For a production function that includes
four inputs, in particular physical capital, labor, R&D stock and organization capital, and
specialized in two functional forms (Cobb-Douglas and translog19), it is found that labor
and organization capital have the highest output elasticities, once more confirming the
significance of organization capital for production.
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) undertake an approach of valuation of organizational
capital by employing an equity valuation model, which relates the firm’s stock price, i.e.
the firm’s market value, to its existing assets, i.e. the firm’s book value, and its growth
potential, which is represented by the firm’s future abnormal earnings that describe the
earnings in excess of the required rate of return on the assets, i.e. the cost of capital. The
difference or gap between the firm’s assessment in the market and its assessment on the
balance sheet reflects the value of the firm’s intangible assets, given that these are included
in the investors’ evaluation of the assets of the firm but excluded in its own evaluation
because of limiting accounting rules. This forms a basic valuation principle for intangible
assets20 and provided that organizational capital captures important elements of the firm’s
future abnormal earnings potential, the value of the firm’s intangible assets measures to a
large degree the value of organizational capital.
With a regression of the firm’s contribution of organizational capital to sales on the
difference between the firm’s market value, that is computed as the stock price multiplied by
the number of common shares outstanding and based on the Center for Research on Stock
Prices (CRSP) database, and book value, that is based on the COMPUSTAT database,
all elements scaled by sales, Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) obtain an estimate for the
degree by which the value of organizational capital captures the value of intangibles, based
on a sample of 44,073 firm-year observations for the period 1978-2002. An adjusted R2
value of the regression of about 24% indicates that organizational capital by itself explains
about a quarter of the cross-sectional variation in the difference between market and book
values. Consequently, organizational capital captures a major component of the firm’s
intangible assets and is indeed closely connected to the firm’s capacity to generate future
abnormal earnings or growth, as stated by the theory. Furthermore, the contribution of
organizational capital in a given year to the future abnormal earnings lasts for about three
years, given a coefficient on organizational capital of 2.26 and a discount rate of 12%. By
differentiating the sample into groups of firms with yearly high, medium and low market-
19The transcendental logarithmic (translog) functional form of a production function goes back to Berndt
and Christensen (1973) and finds several applications in the empirical literature (e.g. Kim (1992)).
20For alternative measures based on the same principle (market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s q): See the
Footnote 19.
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to-book values21, whereas firms with a high market-to-book value can be assumed to be
relatively more intensive with intangibles or organizational capital and for those firms
organizational capital ought to contribute more to future abnormal earnings, it turn out
that the coefficient on organizational capital is 4.67 for the high market-to-book firms,
which implies that the contribution of organizational capital to future abnormal earnings
lasts for about five year, while the coefficient on organizational capital is 1.65 (0.35) for the
medium (low) market-to-book firms, which implies that the contribution of organizational
capital to future abnormal earnings lasts for about two years (less than a year).
Introducing financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings as a proxy for future earnings into
the regression and conducting it both with and without organizational capital, Lev and
Radhakrishnan (2005) detect that the addition of organizational capital to the valuation
substantially improves the model’s explanatory power from 24% to 32% and that the coef-
ficient on organizational capital is 2.02 and highly statistically significant, which indicates
that financial analysts fail to capture with their evaluations a major contributor to future
benefits. In a sample that is partitioned into groups of firms with different market-to-book-
values, organizational capital improves the model’s explanatory power for the gap between
the market and book values for all groups, while the increase is largest for the medium and
high market-to-book firms: The adjusted R2 raises for the medium (high) market-to-book
firms from 22% (32%) to 52% (55%). Thus, financial analysts are not able to fully com-
prehend the value of organizational capital and their failure is especially pronounced for
the high-growth firms.
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) do not only estimate the organizational capital in the
production process of firms and value it in their market capitalization, but also consider
the relation between organizational capital and information technology (IT). Thereby, it
is possible for them to add once more to the literature that evaluates the contribution of
organizational capital to the market valuation of firms, in this way valuing organizational
capital itself: First, as several business practices and process, such as Internet-based sup-
ply and distribution channels as well as production design and control systems, depend
heavily on the IT infrastructure of a firm, IT theoretically represents a major promoter
of the generation and enhancement of organizational capital. Based on annual data on
IT expenditures of firms from the Information Week reports that are published in its IT
500 survey (1991-1997), Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) detect that a correlation between
IT investments and organizational capital exists and IT investments explain to some de-
gree organizational capital in a regression:22 They investigate the Spearman rank correla-
21The market-to-book ratio is defined as the ratio of the firm’s value in the capital market to its value
on the balance sheet. It represents the gap between the investors’ assessment of the firm’s assets and their
assessment in the firm’s accounting system, that exists mainly due to the omission of the intangible assets
by the latter, therefore serving as a measure of the intangibility of the firm’s assets (cf. Tobin’s q as an
alternative measure).
22For the effects of the information and communication technology (ICT) on the firm organization: See
e.g. Bloom et al. (2014). For the effects of the information technology (IT) on the firm organization and
the firm performance: See Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) as a survey.
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tions among organizational capital, IT investments, lagged IT investments and the market
share. Organizational capital is found to be positively correlated with both the current
IT spending as well as the lagged IT spending, which provides some simple evidence that
IT spending is associated with building organizational capital. Brynjolfsson et al. (2002)
as well compute the Spearman rank correlations and get the same result in the sense that
firms that invest in IT are more likely to build up organizational capital.23 In addition to
the correlation analysis, Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) conduct a regression analysis with
organizational capital as the dependent variable and specifications of IT as the independent
variables. The coefficients on both the prior year’s IT expenditures and the current year’s
change in IT expenditures are found to be positive and highly significant, which indicates
that IT is a major contributor to organizational capital. By differentiating the sample
into groups of firms with yearly high, medium and low market-to-book values, whereas
firms with a high market-to-book value can be assumed to be relatively more intensive
with intangibles or organizational capital, an asymmetric effect of IT investments across
heterogeneous firms turns out to exist in the way that IT expenditures contribute much
more strongly to organizational capital for the group with medium and high market-to-
book ratios. Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) also perform a regression in which organizational
capital is the independent variable and either computer assets, capital or other assets serve
as the dependent variables. The coefficient on organizational capital is only positive and
significant in the computer assets specification. Taken all together, not only IT investments
seem to explain to some degree organizational capital, but the inverse relation seems also
to be true.
Second, Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) as well as Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2016) find
that financial markets put a higher value on firms with more installed computer assets and
obtain a large estimate of the contribution of IT to the market value of firms: $1 of IT
investment raises the firm value by about $10. The apparent excess valuation of IT by the
market may lead to the presumption that substantial intangible assets, adjustment costs or
other components of the market value that are correlated with computer assets are present
but omitted in the analysis. As organizational capital is included into the regression as
it is done in Brynjolfsson et al. (2002), it appears that firms with organizational capital
have higher market valuations, so an increasing effect of the intangible asset on the firms’
valuation exists, and the coefficient on computer assets drops, which indicates that at least
some part of the high observed value of IT is the result of computers serving as a proxy
for organizational capital. Third, computer assets and organizational capital behave as
complementarities for the market valuation of firms: As it gets revealed by employing an
interaction term in the regression, firms with both installed computer assets and organiza-
tional capital have disproportionately higher market valuations than firms that invest only
23Organizational capital is formed by (a cluster of) human resource as well as workplace practices, which
consists in turn of structural and individual decentralization, team incentives and skill acquisition, and so
gets quantified by their measures.
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in one of these dimensions and so much of the apparent excess value is located in firms
that have high levels both of IT and of organizational capital. The potential benefits of
computerization can be disproportionately realized by firms that simultaneously build up
organizational capital and thus IT is most valuable when it is coupled with organizational
capital.
4.2.3 Multi-product Firms
The resource-based theory of firms and in particular organizational capital are to a special
degree exposed and in fact applied to firms that produce multiple products. Compared to
single-product ones, those firms add to their internal space of action a second dimension:
Besides scale, i.e. the decision of how much to produce of a supplied product, multi-product
firms have to decide about scope, i.e. the number of supplied products. The additional
dimension becomes part of a large literature, trying to obtain a deeper understanding of
its existence, nature and organization (cf. the analogy to the theory of firms). In the light
of the significant presence of diversified firms in the U.S. economy, Montgomery (1994)
gives a summary of the theoretical approaches explaining corporate diversification. While
the market power view takes up the position that firms diversify to wield conglomerate
power across markets and thereby identifies the reason for diversification in the firm’s
interaction with its competitive environment, the agency view and the resource view as
alternatives focus on the firm’s inside. The agency view argues that managers pursuing
their own interests at the expense of the firm’s owners push on with the diversification.
With reference to Penrose (1959), the resource view explains diversification as a way to
utilize excess capacity in productive factors.24 Montgomery (1994) finally reports that
empirical research finds only little support for the market power view, but is to a large
extent consistent with the within-firm explanation approaches, the agency view and the
resource view.
Boehm et al. (2016) analyze the nature of corporate diversification by looking at the
firms’ product space and its determinants.25 Based on the theory that firms can be thought
of as a comprehensive bundle of productive capabilities and the approach of uncovering
them by the firm’s applied inputs and produced outputs, which are intended to illustrate
the performance-relevant realizations of the firm’s underlying capabilities, they empiri-
cally test for the influence of firm-level capabilities on the direction of product adoption.26
Thereby, horizontal and vertical firm-industry input-output (IO) measures indicate the
linkages between the firm and potential industrial areas of diversification and therefore
24Based on the resource view, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1988, 1991) investigate the relation between
the type of the underlying resources of a firm and its type of diversification.
25Additional work on (similarity or “distance”) factors (input similarity, physical distance to existing
locations of production, upstream-downstream connectedness) shaping the firm’s product mix is provided
by Flagge and Chaurey (2014).
26According to Teece (1982), the fact that the firm’s productive capability “lies upstream from the end
product” (p. 45) allows firms to diversify into its varying applications and to become multi-product firms.
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incentives to expand scope in a specific direction: Horizontally, economies of scope due to
inputs can motivate a firm to expand to an industry with on average similar input shares
and strategic complementarities in outputs represent an incentive for a firm to diversify to
an industry with on average similar output shares. Vertically however, a firm can move
to an industry that is upstream to its outputs or downstream to its inputs, both realizing
synergies with the existing product mix. In the empirical analysis, Boehm et al. (2016) use
the measures of input and output similarity as well as expected upstream and downstream
shares to predict the pattern of product adoption. They find that firms are more likely
to move into products that have horizontal and vertical linkages to the existing product
line, whereas idiosyncratic firm-level input linkages explain more product adoption, sug-
gesting that input (upstream) linkages form a relevant factor of firm diversification and
firm capabilities are more embodied in applied inputs.
The view of diversification as a firm’s strategy to leverage idiosyncratic resources often
includes the proposition of the existence of (management) costs that arise when firms
reallocate scarce internal resources from existing to added products.27 These internal
resources are for a long time subject of the literature and take different terms in different
settings, called span of control by Lucas Jr. (1978), organizational ability by Maksimovic
and Phillips (2001), knowledge capital by Klette and Kortum (2004) and organizational
capital by Santalo (2002) in the industrial organization literature and Nocke and Yeaple
(2014) in the international trade literature. Roberts and McEvily (2005) moreover argue
that numerous complementary resources are needed to make us of the firm’s intangible
resources. In case that these resources are limited in supply and acquiring and assimilating
additional resource capacity takes some time, any expansion of scope imposes costs on
already existing products by cannibalizing firm resources (resource cannibalization). Along
these lines, the costs or inefficiencies that emerge in the case of scope expansion due to the
inextricably linked reallocation of resources across the products within the firms are taken
in this chapter as dis-economies of scope. The empirical analysis of product introductions
in the pharmaceutical industry conducted by Roberts and McEvily (2005) supports the
result of resource cannibalization and suggests that product market experience helps to
offset some of the costs.
27A large literature investigates the impact of diversification on the aggregate value of firms, trying to
determine whether a premium or discount exists. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995)
show that diversified firms exhibit a discount in relation to a portfolio of comparable non-diversified
firms, suggesting that diversification annihilates to some extent firm value and more diversified firms are
less efficient. More recent contributions to the literature however draw a far more nuanced picture by
showing heterogeneity across firms with similar diversification as well as industry settings and economic
environments (e.g. Santalo and Becerra (2008), Hovakimian (2011) and Kuppuswamy and Villalonga
(2016)).
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4.3 Model
The following section analyses multi-product firms that are endowed with a (fixed) amount
of organizational capital and use a flexible manufacturing technology in their production
process. Firstly, a single autarkic economy with its demand, supply and resulting equilib-
rium is considered, and secondly, the economy is opened up to international trade. Due to
methodological reasons and without any contradictions to the literature, the model thinks
of organizational capital more as a resource than a capability in its physical embodiment.
4.3.1 Closed Economy
Preferences and Demand
The economy consists of L identical individuals (consumers, workers) with CES preferences
and a per capita income y. The (upper-tier) utility (function) is given by
U =
1∑
k=0
Uk, (4.1)
where k ∈ {0, . . . , 1} represents an industry and Uk denotes the utility index of industry
k, which takes the form
Uk =
[∫
Ωk
qk(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (4.2)
where qk(ω) represents the individual consumption of the (horizontally differentiated) prod-
uct variety ω ∈ Ωk in industry k that is produced and supplied to consumers, Ωk is the set
of product varieties in industry k that are produced and σ > 1 describes the elasticity of
substitution across product varieties within an industry. As it is assumed that the elastic-
ity of substitution within firms is the same as the elasticity of substitution across firms, a
within-firm (demand) cannibalization effect is ex-ante excluded.28
To solve the consumption problem, each individual maximizes the utility subject to the
budget constraint γky =
∫
Ωk
pk(ω)qk(ω)dω, with γk as industry k’s budget share (
∑
k γk =
1) and pk(ω) as the price of the product variety ω ∈ Ωk, and thereby derives the individual
product demand, which can be aggregated over the L individuals to get the aggregate
demand for the product variety ω ∈ Ωk:
xk(ω) = Akpk(ω)
−σ, (4.3)
with
Ak ≡ LγkyP σ−1k
28For models of multi-product firms that deal with a (demand) cannibalization effect: See Feenstra and
Ma (2008), Baldwin and Gu (2009), Eckel and Neary (2010), Dhingra (2013), Eckel et al. (2015, 2016),
Eckel and Irlacher (2017), Flach and Irlacher (2018) and Herzig (2019a) (Chapter 5).
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as the residual demand of industry k, whereas Pk ≡
[∫
Ωk
pk(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
thereby represents
the CES price index of industry k.29
Production and Supply
The market structure of the economy is characterized by a monopolistic competition be-
tween firms with a mass of them in each industry, and a sufficiently large mass of atomless
and ex ante identical firms always try to enter the economy and to start their business.
Each active firm produces a continuum of product varieties with labor as the standard
factor of production, for which the price (wage) equals w. The production process thereby
reveals a flexible manufacturing technology, which goes conceptually back to Prahalad and
Hamel (1990) and finds its application in models of multi-product firms in international
trade: Eckel and Neary (2010), Qiu and Zhou (2013), Mayer et al. (2014), Arkolakis et al.
(2015), Eckel et al. (2015, 2016), Eckel and Irlacher (2017), Flach and Irlacher (2018) and
Herzig (2019a) (Chapter 5).30 Due to this technology, the unit production costs h(ω) of
variety ω exhibit the properties that ∂h(ω)
∂ω
> 0 and h(0) = 1 hold, i.e. each firm has a core
competency variety ω = 0 with minimal unit costs and the production of any other variety
requires higher unit costs, whereas varieties can be ordered regarding their firm-specific
efficiency in production and therefore varieties further away from the core competency
variety can only be produced with increasingly higher unit costs.31
Pivotal to the model, each multi-product firm is endowed with a fixed amount of a
resource or capability O, which reduces the firm’s costs in the production process and is
called organizational capital. It can be split up as well as reallocated across the products
that are produced by the firm. The more organizational capital a firm assigns to one of its
products, the lower the production costs of this product.
By assumption, each firm is only active in one industry k. Upon entry, a firm pays a
fixed cost fE in domestic labor units and discovers the productivity
1
z
of its core competency
variety, i.e. its specific ability of making use of labor, where z is drawn from a distribution
B(z), with a probability distribution function b(z) and support on [0, z¯]. Only a mass Nk
of firms pays the fixed cost of entry and free entry drives the expected profits down to zero.
Therefore, the per capita income y equals the wage rate w.
Firms face and solve a two-stage production problem: In the first stage, the firm de-
cides of whether to pay a fixed industry penetration cost F pk in domestic labor units and,
in case of doing so, whereas only a subset of the firms pays the fixed cost, the firm discov-
29See the Appendix D.1 for the details of derivation.
30Besides the international trade literature, the industrial organization literature also deals with flexible
manufacturing in the production process, see e.g. Eaton and Schmitt (1994).
31In a more general definition of flexible manufacturing, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) link the technology
to the firm’s ability to quickly adjust to market conditions. In the literature, it is also related to the firm’s
ability of introducing more varieties, of reducing delivery times (Tseng (2004)) and of changing production
scale with only minor adjustment costs (Gal-Or (2002)). Empirical evidence in support of the concept of
flexible manufacturing is provided by Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2017).
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ers its endowment with the organizational capital O, which is drawn from a distribution
Gz(O), with a probability distribution function gz(O) and support on [0, O
max,z]. In the
second stage, given z and O, the firm decides about (i) the number of products that it
produces, which is called the firm’s product scope δk(z, O), (ii) the allocation of its organi-
zational capital ok(ω) across the products that are produced by the firm and (iii) the price
pk(ω, z, O) that the firm charges for each produced product variety ω ∈ [0, δk(z, O)]. Firms
in the production process can be uniquely identified by their (random drawn) type (z, O),
consisting of the productivity of their core competency variety and their organizational
capital endowment.32
In the production process, the marginal production costs for the product variety ω in
industry k are given by33
ck(ω, z) = awznk(ω) = awzhk(ω)ok(ω)
−θ, (4.4)
with a > 0 as the (constant) cost parameter and nk(ω) ≡ hk(ω)ok(ω)−θ as the composite
cost component of the product variety ω in industry k. The unit production costs of product
variety ω in industry k, hk(ω), thereby reflect the flexible manufacturing technology and
ok(ω) describes the allocation of the organizational capital to product variety ω in industry
k, while θ > 0 simply denotes some (fixed) parameter.34
The multiplicative specification of the composite cost component nk(ω) of variety ω in
industry k implies that any increase in the unit production costs due to the production of
some variety with less competency increases the marginal costs:
∂ck(ω, z)
∂hk(ω)
= awz
∂nk(ω)
∂hk(ω)
= awzok(ω)
−θ > 0, (4.5)
whereas the cost increase appears to be smaller, the higher the organizational capital
allocated to the corresponding product variety. In this way, organizational capital such as
established business processes and knowledge works as some corporate resource which is
able to mitigate the increase in production costs due to lacks of competency and production
(labor) efficiency. With an increase in the allocated organizational capital, the firm can
reduce the production costs of the corresponding product variety ω:
∂ck(ω, z)
∂ok(ω)
= awz
∂nk(ω)
∂ok(ω)
= −θawzhk(ω)ok(ω)−θ−1 < 0. (4.6)
The overall change in the marginal production costs due to the production of some variety
32In the international trade literature, models that incorporate more than one dimension of firm hetero-
geneity already exist: See Cherkashin et al. (2015) and Aw and Lee (2017).
33In the basic model, costs are specified in a multiplicative way, but model extensions in the Appendix
D.2 and the Appendix D.3 show alternative cost specifications and their implications.
34In an extension, one can enhance the composite cost component by introducing a parameter for the
firm’s ability of making use of the organizational capital. For the details and limitations of this approach,
see the Appendix D.4.
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with less competency is given by
∂ck(ω, z)
∂ω
= awz
∂nk(ω)
∂ω
= awz
(
∂hk(ω)
∂ω
ok(ω)
−θ − θhk(ω)ok(ω)−θ−1∂ok(ω)
∂ω
)
(4.7)
and thus depends on (the change in) the flexible manufacturing technology and the within-
firm allocation of organizational capital across the product varieties. The marginal costs
are increasing (decreasing) in the product varieties further away from the core competency
if and only if the semi-elasticity of the unit production costs is larger (smaller) than the
adjusted semi-elasticity of the organizational capital allocation:
∂ck(ω, z)
∂ω
T 0 ⇔ ∂hk(ω)
∂ω
hk(ω)
−1 T θ∂ok(ω)
∂ω
ok(ω)
−1. (4.8)
For a firm endowed with some amount of organizational capital O and under the as-
sumption that the quantity of organizational capital cannot be changed in the short to
medium period, i.e. any investment in the firm’s organizational capital is excluded,35 the
behavior of the firm is restricted by its resource constraint:∫
ω∈{0,...,δk}
ok(ω)dω ≤ O. (4.9)
The firm’s production problem can then be solved backwards: Starting with the second
stage and the firm’s decision about the price pk(ω, z, O) that is charged for the product
variety ω in industry k, the firm maximizes its overall profits
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[(pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O))xk(ω, z, O)− fk,ω] dω, (4.10)
with δk(z,O) as the number of product varieties that are produced by the firm with orga-
nizational capital O and a cost draw z in industry k (product scope), xk(ω, z, O) as the
(received) demand for the product variety ω in industry k and fk,ω as the fixed costs for
the introduction of a new product variety (production and distribution adjustment costs).
As it is well established for the CES demand structure and a monopolistic competition, the
profit-maximizing price emerges as some constant mark-up over the marginal production
35In the economics and management literature, capabilities are described and characterized as an id-
iosyncratic, non-transferable and organizationally embedded input to the firm’s transformation process
(Makadok (2001)) and in particular organizational capital as an input that can not be bought “off the
shelf” (Sutton (2012)); in this sense, capabilities are taken as intangible and intrinsic to the firm as well
as a relatively stable outcome of a within-firm evolution process. Owing to their nature, changes in these
capabilities by the firm’s people in authority are difficult, demanding and if at all possible only in the long
term (Following a somewhat broader definition of capabilities, in which parts of those are embodied in
the firm’s personnel, thereby becoming at least in parts fungible and tradeable for firms: “[...] managers
constitute one part of what are known as the capabilities of a firm. While managers can come and go,
other aspects of firm-level capabilities are rooted in well-established processes, values, and culture that are
slower to change.” (Teece (2016), p. 204)).
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costs (standard constant-markup pricing rule):36
pk(ω, z, O) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
ck(ω, z, O), (4.11)
whereas the markup solely depends on the within-industry elasticity of substitution across
product varieties. The higher the elasticity of substitution across varieties, the smaller the
markup:
∂
(
σ
σ−1
)
∂σ
=
σ − 1− σ
(σ − 1)2 = −
1
(σ − 1)2 < 0, (4.12)
i.e. in industries with product varieties that are more substitutable with each other (more
homogeneous industries), the firms’ wedge between the marginal production costs and the
charged prices is smaller and, for a given ω, z and O, prices are lower in more homogeneous
industries. For the decision about the within-firm allocation of organizational capital ok(ω),
the firm solves the following maximization problem:
max
ok(ω)
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[(pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O))xk(ω, z, O)− fk,ω] dω (4.13)
subject to
∫ δk(z,O)
0
ok(ω)dω ≤ O.
With the pricing rule and the product demand applied to the maximization problem in
equation (4.13), it can be rewritten in the form
max
ok(ω)
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σok(ω)θ(σ−1) − fk,ω
]
dω s.t.
∫ δk(z,O)
0
ok(ω)dω ≤ O,
with ζk(z) ≡ 1σ−1Ak
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ = Ak
σ
(
1
awz
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
> 0 as the variety-invariant con-
stant in the profit function that is both industry- and firm-specific.
Due to the (strict) monotone increase of the profit function in the allocated organi-
zational capital,37 the firm completely exploits its organizational capital and the resource
constraint is therefore fulfilled with equality:∫ δk(z,O)
0
ok(ω)dω = O ∀δk(z,O). (4.14)
The profit maximization over ok(ω) then yields that
ok(ω) =
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
(4.15)
units of organizational capital are allocated to the product variety ω, with λk > 0 as
the Lagrange multiplier of the maximization problem and hence representing the marginal
36See the Appendix D.5 for the details of derivation.
37See the Appendix D.6 for the proof.
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profitability of the organizational capital.38 Given that a firm’s product scope is constant,
the within-firm allocation of organizational capital across products depends quantitatively
on firm characteristics (z, O), (the change in) the flexible manufacturing technology (h(ω),
∂h(ω)
∂ω
), where the latter is assumed to be always positive and therefore determines the
production efficiency advantage of the firm’s core competency, industry characteristics (σ,
Ak, w) and cost parameters (a, θ):
39
∂ok(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
=
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
−1∂hk(ω)
∂ω
,
(4.16)
and qualitatively on the cost parameter (θ) as well as the within-industry elasticity of
substitution across product varieties (σ): In industries with a low elasticity of substitution
across product varieties, i.e. σ < 1 + 1
θ
((more) heterogeneous industries), multi-product
firms allocate decreasingly less organizational capital to varieties further away from their
core competency variety and thus concentrate in their organizational capital allocation on
varieties close to their core competency variety:
∂ok(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
< 0 ⇔ 1 < σ < 1 + 1
θ
, (4.17)
while in industries with more substitutable product varieties, i.e. σ > 1 + 1
θ
((more)
homogeneous industries), multi-product firms face a stronger competitive pressure from the
demand, allocate increasingly more organizational capital to varieties further away from
their core competency variety (fringe products) and therefore focus in their organizational
capital allocation on varieties in which they have less competency or (labor) efficiency:
∂ok(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
> 0 ⇔ σ > 1 + 1
θ
.
Therefore, organizational capital as a firm resource serves as some cost-reducing mean,
whose deployment across the firm’s product mix depends on the industry-level demand
conditions.
Analyzing the marginal production costs and taking into account the (endogenous) firm
decision on organizational capital, the composite cost component nk(ω) can be written in
dependence on the unit production costs as40
nk(ω) = hk(ω)ok(ω)
−θ = ψk(z)hk(ω)
− 1
θ(σ−1)−1 , (4.18)
with ψk(z) ≡
(
θ(σ−1)ζk(z)
λk
) θ
θ(σ−1)−1
> 0 as an industry-firm-specific constant of the composite
cost component, thereby overall providing the firm’s (marginal) cost profile ck(ω, z), which
38See the Appendix D.7 for the details of derivation.
39See the Appendix D.7 for the details of derivation.
40See the Appendix D.8 for the details of derivation.
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qualitatively equals the firm’s price profile pk(ω, z, O), due to equation (4.11), and which
is thus crucially characterized or determined by41
∂nk(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
= − ψk(z)
θ(σ − 1)− 1hk(ω)
− θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
∂hk(ω)
∂ω
. (4.19)
In industries with a low elasticity of substitution across product varieties (heterogeneous
industries), multi-product firms concentrate on their competency and reveal an increasing
cost profile across their product mix:
∂nk(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
> 0 ⇔ 1 < σ < 1 + 1
θ
, (4.20)
while in industries with more substitutable product varieties (homogeneous industries),
multi-product firms take their deficiency in production at the fringe of their product mix
into account, allocate more organizational capital to those products and thereby over-
compensate the increasing cost structure of the flexible manufacturing technology, finally
resulting in a decreasing cost profile across their product mix:
∂nk(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
< 0 ⇔ σ > 1 + 1
θ
. (4.21)
Multi-product firms with a higher productivity 1
z
have lower marginal production costs
ck(ω, z) for some variety ω, provided that the composite cost component nk(ω) for the
variety is kept constant: dck(ω,z)
dz
|nk(ω)=const. = awnk(ω) > 0. Taking into account that a
change in the firm’s productivity also implies a change in the within-firm structure in terms
of the organizational capital allocation, the change in the industry-firm-specific constant
depends on the industry characteristic (σ), given that the firm’s product scope and the
marginal profitability of organizational capital are kept constant:
dψk(z)
dz
∣∣∣∣
λk=const.
=
θ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)
λk
) θ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 θ(σ − 1)
λk
dζk(z)
dz
and
dζk(z)
dz
= −Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(aw)1−σ z−σ.
In industries with a low elasticity of substitution across product varieties (heterogeneous
industries), multi-product firms concentrate on their most efficient, i.e core, products,
reveal an increasing cost profile across their product mix and both variables, the industry-
firm-specific constant and consequently the composite cost component, are decreasing in
firm productivity, i.e. dnk(ω)
dz
= hk(ω)
− 1
θ(σ−1)−1 dψk(z)
dz
> 0⇔ 1 < σ < 1+ 1
θ
. The overall effect
of an increase in productivity on the marginal production costs is unambiguously negative
41See the Appendix D.8 for the details of derivation.
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for firms in industries with a low substitution elasticity: dck(ω,z)
dz
= awnk(ω)+awz
dnk(ω)
dz
> 0,
that is, given the endowment with organizational capital and the product scope, more
productive multi-product firms have lower marginal production costs. On the contrary,
in industries with a high elasticity of substitution across product varieties (homogeneous
industries), multi-product firms concentrate on their least efficient, i.e. fringe, products,
reveal a decreasing cost profile across their product mix and both variables, the industry-
firm-specific constant and consequently the composite cost component, are increasing in
firm productivity, i.e. dnk(ω)
dz
= hk(ω)
− 1
θ(σ−1)−1 dψk(z)
dz
< 0 ⇔ σ > 1 + 1
θ
. The overall effect
of an increase in productivity on the marginal production costs is ambiguous for firms in
industries with a high substitution elasticity: dck(ω,z)
dz
= awnk(ω) + awz
dnk(ω)
dz
≷ 0, that
is, the direct effect of a productivity increase lowers marginal production costs, but the
counteractive indirect effect increases them due to shifts in organizational capital. More
productive firms decrease the amount of organizational capital allocated to each product
variety, thereby being able to increase the number of products produced (scope), which
takes place at the discount of higher marginal production costs for the product varieties
being already in the firm’s product portfolio.
Given the binding resource constraint of firms,
∫ δk(z,O)
0
ok(ω)dω = 0, the marginal
profitability of organizational capital takes the form42
λk(z,O, δk(z,O)) = θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk(z, O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−1 (4.22)
with Hk(δk(z, O)) ≡
[∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1
as an (aggregate) index of the flexible
manufacturing technology. Thus, the firm’s marginal profitability of organizational capital
depends on its productivity, its resource endowment as well as chosen scope, since the cost-
reducing resource has to be split up and allocated across the products produced. Thereby,
the variable that captures the additional profits of the last employed unit of organizational
capital summarizes the within-firm processes and structures of the resource-endowed multi-
product firms and thus its properties play a decisive role in their analysis.
Changes in the productivity, resource endowment and scope has the following implica-
tions for the marginal profitability of organizational capital:43
∂λk(z,O, δk(z,O))
∂z
= θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk(z,O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−1∂ζk(z)
∂z
< 0, (4.23)
∂λk(z,O, δk(z,O))
∂O
= (θ(σ − 1)− 1)θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk(z, O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−2 ≷ 0 (4.24)
and
∂λk(z,O, δk(z,O))
∂δk(z, O)
= −θ(σ − 1)2ζk(z)Oθ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk(z,O))−σ ∂Hk(δk(z,O))
∂δk(z, O)
≶ 0, (4.25)
42See the Appendix D.9 for the details of derivation.
43See the Appendix D.9 for the details of derivation.
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where ∂λk
∂O
≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≷ 1 + 1
θ
and ∂λk
∂δk
≶ 0 ⇔ σ ≷ 1 + 1
θ
holds.
Taking the firm’s last decision in the second stage, i.e. the decision on the number of
varieties produced (scope), the firm maximizes the profit function
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σok(ω)θ(σ−1) − fk,ω
]
dω
=
∫ δk(z,O)
0
( 1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − fk,ω
 dω,
to derive its choice, which is implicitly given by the condition44
revenue of the marginal variety︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+
(
1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k Hk(δk(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
∂λk
∂δk(z,O)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra-marginal revenue effect of the scope adjustment (IMRE)
= fk,ω.︸︷︷︸
cost of the
marginal variety
(4.26)
Multi-product firms expand their scope up to the point where the (additional) revenue
of the marginal variety equals the revenue effect of the scope adjustment on all the intra-
marginal varieties (dis-economies of scope - IMRE: σ < 1 + 1
θ
: ∂λk
∂δk
> 0 and IMRE< 0;
σ > 1+ 1
θ
: ∂λk
∂δk
< 0 and IMRE< 0) due to the necessary reallocation of organizational capital
across product varieties and the (additional) fixed cost of the marginal variety. For the
optimal scope, the internalization of the within-firm reallocation of resources drives a wedge
between the revenue and the fixed cost of the marginal variety, whose equalization often
states the optimal scope condition in multi-product firm models without resources.45 Due
to the existence of the dis-economies of scope in form of a resource cannibalization effect
and its associated performance implications,46 the marginal variety of a resource-endowed
multi-product firm is required to generate a higher revenue than the corresponding variety
of firms for which the effect does not exist and, under the assumption that the revenue of
the marginal variety decreases in scope, which is unambiguously the case for σ < 1 + 1
θ
,
resource-endowed multi-product firms restrict their product scope and expand it less than
44See the Appendix D.10 for the details of derivation.
45See Qiu and Zhou (2013) for a more abstract analysis of multi-product firms’ decisions, which encom-
passes some characteristic features of several models of multi-product firms in international trade.
46Roberts and McEvily (2005) look at the diversification of firms and the implied leverage or cannibal-
ization of resources due to a product-line expansion, depending on the properties of the resource usage of
products.
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firms without the resource cannibalization effect.47
The behavior of multi-product firms at the extensive margin is characterized by the
equation on the marginal profitability of organizational capital (equation (4.22)) and the
equation on product scope (equation (4.26)). Their total differentiation provides insights in
the firms’ adjustment of their product scope in response to changes in the two dimensions
of firm heterogeneity, i.e. productivity and organizational capital.48 The elasticity of the
product scope with respect to organizational capital is therefore given by49
δkd ln δk
d lnO
= − 14θ(σ − 1)ρk(z), (4.27)
where 4 ≷ 0 denotes the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the system of the total
differentiations of the two fundamental equations that is written in matrix notation and
ρk(z) ≡ 1σ−1A−1k
(
σ−1
σ
)−σ
(awz)σ−1 − θHk(δk)1−σλ−1k θOθ(σ−1)−1
!
> 0. For σ < 1 + 1
θ
, the
determinant 4 is unambiguously negative (4 < 0), while it is positive or negative (4 ≷ 0)
for σ > 1 + 1
θ
:
4 ≷ 0 ⇔ 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1hk(δk)
−1∂hk(δk)
∂δk
≷ θ
(
hk(δk)
Hk(δk)
) σ−1
θ(σ−)−1
⇔ ε¯hk(δk) ≷ θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
(
hk(δk)
Hk(δk)
) σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
,
where ε¯hk(δk) denotes the semi-elasticity of the flexible manufacturing technology at the
firm’s marginal variety. Accordingly, the determinant 4 is negative (4 < 0) for firms
with a small scope, i.e. ε¯hk(δk) < θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
(
hk(δk)
Hk(δk)
) σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
, and positive (4 > 0) for
firms with a large scope, i.e. ε¯hk(δk) > θ(θ(σ − 1) − 1)
(
hk(δk)
Hk(δk)
) σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
. In heterogeneous
industries, multi-product firms that are endowed with a cost-reducing resource operate
with a larger product scope when they are endowed with a larger amount of organizational
capital. Empirical support for the theoretical result of a positive relationship between the
organizational capital (endowment) and the product scope of multi-product firms is derived
in the Section 4.4.2. In homogeneous industries, multi-product firms that are endowed with
a cost-reducing resource and that operate only with a small scope have a (relatively) larger
product scope when they are endowed with a larger amount of organizational capital,
while multi-product firms that are endowed with a cost-reducing resource and that operate
already with a large scope have a (relatively) smaller product scope when they are endowed
with a larger amount of organizational capital.
47In contrast, the demand cannibalization effect that is analyzed in Eckel and Neary (2010) exerts a
contracting implication on the product-intensive margin.
48See the Appendix D.11 for the details of derivation.
49See the Appendix D.11 for the details of derivation.
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The elasticity of the product scope with respect to productivity is then given by50
δkd ln δk
d ln z
=
1
4(σ − 1)ρk(z). (4.28)
In heterogeneous industries, multi-product firms that are endowed with a cost-reducing
resource have a larger product scope when they are more productive. Empirical support
for the theoretical result of a positive relationship between the productivity and the product
scope of multi-product firms is documented in the Section 4.4.2. In homogeneous industries,
multi-product firms that are endowed with a cost-reducing resource and that operate only
with a small scope have a (relatively) larger product scope when they are more productive,
while multi-product firms that are endowed with a cost-reducing resource and that operate
already with a large scope have a (relatively) smaller product scope when they are more
productive.
As multi-product firms are especially characterized by the existence of multiple mar-
gins, in particular and already analyzed the product-extensive margin, i.e. the number of
products produced δk(z,O), but also the product-intensive margin, i.e. the output of each
product xk(ω, z, O) as well as the firm-intensive margin, i.e. the overall output of the firm
Xk(z,O), the relationships between these margins describe the unique constitution and
structure of the multi-product firms in the bi-parametric nature of the model. The overall
output of a firm with organizational capital O and productivity 1
z
being active in industry
k (firm-intensive margin)
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
xk(ω, z, O)dω
can be written in the form:51
Xk(z,O) = A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k
× θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω, (4.29)
whereas
xk(ω, z, O) = A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k
× θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1 (4.30)
thereby describes the product-intensive margin.
The correlation between the product-extensive margin and the product-intensive margin
50See the Appendix D.11 for the details of derivation.
51See the Appendix D.12 for the details of derivation.
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is given by52
∂xk(ω, z, O)
∂δk(z,O)
=
θσ
θ(σ − 1)− 1A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
×λ
θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
∂λk
∂δk
,
and thus the two margins are negatively correlated for the multi-product firms, independent
of the kind of industry in which these firms operate (σ < 1 + 1
θ
: ∂λk
∂δk
> 0 and ∂xk
∂δk
< 0;
σ > 1 + 1
θ
: ∂λk
∂δk
< 0 and ∂xk
∂δk
< 0). Any increase in the product scope requires a reallocation
of organizational capital from the intra-marginal to the marginal varieties, which implies
a reduction in the output of all the varieties. Empirical support for the theoretical result
of a negative correlation is provided by Elliott and Virakul (2010) and Navarro (2012).
Any change in the product-extensive margin has both a direct and indirect effect on
the firm-intensive margin:53
∂Xk(z, O)
∂δk(z,O)
=
output of the marginal variety︷ ︸︸ ︷
A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k θ
− θσ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
+ A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(
θσ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
∂λk
∂δk︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra-marginal output effect of the scope adjustment (IMOE)
× θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
IMOE (cont.)
The direct effect of an increase in the product scope is given by an increase in the overall
output due to the (additional) output of the marginal variety, but the necessary realloca-
tions of organizational capital from intra-marginal product varieties to the marginal variety
lead to output reductions of the intra-marginal varieties, stating the indirect effect of the
scope adjustment (dis-economies of scope - IMOE: σ < 1 + 1
θ
: ∂λk
∂δk
> 0 and IMOE< 0;
σ > 1+ 1
θ
: ∂λk
∂δk
< 0 and IMOE< 0). Only the joint effect determines the overall adjustment
of the firm-intensive margin due to changes of the product-extensive margin. The empirical
evidence documents the (monotone) finding that the direct effect is larger than the indirect
effect, as firm exports are positively correlated with the number of products exported by
the firm (Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Adalet (2009), Bernard et al. (2011), Berthou and
Fontagne´ (2013) and Bernard et al. (2014)).
Multiplying each product’s output (product-intensive margin) by its price and summing
up over all the products produced by a firm (product-extensive margin), the overall sales
52See the Appendix D.12 for the details of derivation.
53See the Appendix D.12 for the details of derivation.
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(revenue) of a firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being active in industry
k can be written as54
Rk(z,O) = Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σ Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk(z,O))−(σ−1)
and the firm’s corresponding overall profits are given by55
Πk(z,O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk(z,O))−(σ−1) − δk(z,O)fk,ω,
whereas each product’s profits take the form56
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σHk(δk(z,O))
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1−fk,ω.
(Industry) Equilibrium
A resource-endowed multi-product firm is characterized by its productivity 1
z
, its endow-
ment with organizational capital O as well as its intensive margin (scale) Xk(z, O) and
extensive margin (scope) δk(z,O). Each entrant has to decide about production in in-
dustry k: Given z, an organizational capital threshold O?k(z) exists at which the firm is
indifferent to produce or not to produce its most favorable product variety. For the val-
ues of organizational capital above O?k(z), it is profitable for the firm to produce at least
one product variety and thus the firm is active in industry k. In contrast, firms with a
productivity 1
z
and a value of organizational capital below O?k(z) are not able to profitably
produce at least one product variety and thus these firms are not active in industry k. The
most favorable product variety which will be produced first, and possibly solely, is always
the firm’s core competency variety, given that the firm concentrates all its organizational
capital on the production of a single product variety:
pik(ω, z, O)|ok(ω)=O =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ hk(ω)1−σOθ(σ−1) − fk,ω
and
∂pik(ω, z, O)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
ok(ω)=O
=
1− σ
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ Oθ(σ−1)hk(ω)−σ
∂hk(ω)
∂ω
< 0.
The profits of the core competency variety on which the organizational capital is com-
pletely allocated are then given by
pik(0, z, O)|ok(0)=O =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ hk(0)1−σOθ(σ−1) − fk,ω
54See the Appendix D.12 for the details of derivation.
55See the Appendix D.12 for the details of derivation.
56See the Appendix D.12 for the details of derivation.
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and
pik(0, z, O)|ok(0)=O =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ Oθ(σ−1) − fk,ω,
and the value of O for which the profits are equal to zero, i.e. pik(0, z, O
?
k(z))|ok(0)=O = 0,
given the productivity 1
z
, represents the organizational capital threshold:57
O?k(z) =
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ)
(
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(awz)
1
θ ,
whereas it is decreasing in the productivity 1
z
and increasing in the elasticity of substitu-
tion across product varieties58. Given σ, more productive firms need less organizational
capital to be able to profitably produce and to be active in the industry (relationship of a
substitutability of the two dimensions of firm heterogeneity), while firms in more homoge-
neous industries need more organizational capital to be able to profitably produce and to
be active in these industries, given 1
z
.
Besides the decision on production in industry k based on the organizational capital
threshold O?k(z),
59 each firm has to decide of whether to enter the industry: A firm with cost
draw z only enters the industry k as long as its expected profits over the possible realizations
of the organizational capital (endowment) exceed the fixed industry penetration cost F pk ,
whereas the firm’s expected profits are given by
E[Πk(z)] =
∫ Omax,z
O?k(z)
Πk(z,O)gz(O)dO.
The marginal firm in industry k with cost draw z?k is then the industry’s least productive
firm which is indifferent to enter or not to enter the industry as its expected profits are
exactly equal to the fixed industry penetration cost, i.e.
E[Πk(z
?
k)] = F
p
k .
Figure 4.1 illustrates the entry and production decisions of a set of firms with some values
of productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O in industry k.
For a firm with cost draw z > z?k, it is not profitable to enter the industry and thus the
firm does not pay the fixed cost F pk . In contrast, a firm with cost draw z < z
?
k pays the
fixed cost F pk and discovers its organizational capital draw O. In case of a draw O < O
?
k(z),
the firm does not produce any variety. If its draw is above the threshold, i.e. O > O?k(z),
the firm produces and has a positive scope and scale.
A firm pays the fixed cost fE if its expected profits over the possible realizations of the
57See the Appendix D.13 for the details of derivation.
58See the Appendix D.13 for the proof.
59As it turns out, firms have both a positive scale and a positive scope only in heterogeneous industries.
See the Appendix D.14 for the proof.
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productivity 1
z
,
Πk = B(z
?
k)
∫ z?k
0
E[Πk(z)]µ(z)dz,
with µ(z) as the distribution of cost draws conditional on z being below the threshold z?k
µ(z) =

b(z)
B(z?k)
if z < z?k
0 otherwise,
exceed the fixed cost of entry. Free entry implies that the firm’s expected profits are exactly
equal to the fixed cost of entry:
Πk = wfE.
Figure 4.1: Entry and Production Decisions of Firms in Industry k in the Closed Economy
According to the equilibrium concept that is presented in Cherkashin et al. (2015), the
mass of firms Nk that are active in industry k is computed by integrating the probabilities
over the gray area in Figure 4.1:
Nk = N
∫ z?k
0
∫ Omax,z
O?k(z)
dGz(O)dB(z)
and the total revenues are given by
Tk = N
∫ z?k
0
∫ Omax,z
O?k(z)
Rk(z,O)gz(O)b(z)dOdz.
In equilibrium, goods markets clear, i.e.
Tk = φkwL,
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with φk as the share of the budget that is spent on product varieties of industry k, and
the equilibrium allocation is characterized by the firms’ decisions on prices pk(ω, z, O) and
scope δk(z, O), free entry as well as the goods markets clearing.
4.3.2 Open Economy
The following sub-section opens the economy up to international trade. For the implemen-
tation, it is assumed that the world consists of I countries (i, j ∈ {1, . . . , I}) between which
multi-product firms trade goods. Firstly, the preferences and demand in (a representative)
country j, secondly, the production and supply with which country j is internationally
served, and thirdly, the resulting equilibrium are considered. Fourthly, changes in the cost
parameters of international trade, in particular the transportation costs and the variety
introduction costs, and their implications on the firms’ extensive and intensive margins of
trade are analyzed.
Preferences and Demand
Country j consists of Lj identical individuals (consumers, workers) with CES preferences
and a per capita income yj. The (upper-tier) utility (function) is given by
Uj =
1∑
k=0
Uk,j, (4.31)
where k ∈ {0, . . . , 1} represents an industry and Uk,j denotes the utility index of industry
k in country j, which takes the form
Uk,j =
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
qk,ij(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
, (4.32)
where qk,ij(ω) represents the individual consumption of the (horizontally differentiated)
product variety ω ∈ Ωk,ij in industry k that is produced in country i and shipped (exported)
to consumers in country j, Ωk,ij is the set of product varieties in industry k that are
produced in country i and supplied to country j and σ > 1 describes the elasticity of
substitution across product varieties within an industry. As it is done in the closed economy,
the elasticity of substitution within firms is assumed to be the same as the elasticity of
substitution across firms and therefore a within-firm (demand) cannibalization effect is ex-
ante excluded.
To solve the consumption problem, each individual in country j maximizes the utility
subject to the budget constraint
γk,jyj =
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)qk,ij(ω)dω, (4.33)
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with γk,j as industry k’s budget share in country j (
∑
k γk,j = 1) and pk,ij(ω) as the price
of the product variety ω ∈ Ωk,ij in industry k that is produced in country i and supplied to
country j, and thereby derives the individual product demand, which can be aggregated
over the Lj individuals to get the aggregate (country-wide) demand for the product variety
ω ∈ Ωk,ij in industry k that is produced in country i and supplied to country j:
xk,ij(ω) = Ak,jpk,ij(ω)
−σ (4.34)
with
Ak,j ≡ Ljγk,jyjP σ−1k,j
as the residual demand of industry k in country j, whereas Pk,j ≡
[∑I
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
thereby represents the CES price index of industry k in country j.60
Production and Supply
The production and supply of product varieties by multi-product firms is basically the same
as it is in the closed economy, just replicated for each country out of the set of I countries
and allowing for the firms’ possibility of serving foreign countries: The market structure
of each country is characterized by a monopolistic competition with a mass of firms being
available in each industry. Within an industry, each firm produces a continuum of product
varieties with labor as the standard factor of production and a flexible manufacturing
technology. Upon entry, firms pay a fixed cost fE in domestic labor units and draw a cost
parameter z from a distribution Bi(z), with a probability distribution function bi(z) and
support on [0, z¯i]. In this way,
1
z
represents the productivity of the firm’s core competency
variety. Pivotal to the model, each firm is endowed with a fixed amount of a cost-reducing
resource that is called organizational capital.
Taken together, the firm’s productivity 1
z
and its (endowment with) destination-specific
organizational capital O constitute the two dimensions of firm heterogeneity in the model
and, on their way to production and supply, firms face a two-stage (production) problem
with decisions on the (destination-specific) price, the (destination-specific) organizational
capital allocation and the (destination-specific) scope as well as the realization of the orga-
nizational capital (endowment) that is drawn from a distribution Gz(O), with a probability
distribution function gz(O) and support on [0, O
max,z].
To export product varieties to a destination j, a firm in country i has to pay iceberg
transportation costs τij > 1, with τii = 1. The marginal production costs for a product
variety ω in industry k that is produced in country i and supplied to country j are then
given by
ck,ij(ω, z) = τijawiznk,ij(ω) = τijawizhk(ω)ok,ij(ω)
−θ, (4.35)
with a as a (constant) cost parameter, wi as the wage in country i, and nk,ij(ω) ≡
60See the Appendix D.15 for the details of derivation.
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hk(ω)ok,ij(ω)
−θ as the composite cost component. Thereby, hk(ω) denotes the unit produc-
tion costs of the product variety ω and represents the flexible manufacturing technology,
with ∂hk(ω)
∂ω
> 0 and hk(0) = 1, and ok(ω) denotes the organizational capital allocated to
the product variety ω. In addition to the variable costs, firms have to cover the variety in-
troduction costs f ijk,ω for each produced product variety, whereas these costs are source- and
destination-specific, as they represent production and distribution adjustment costs which
may vary across the countries due to the different needs to invest in the customization of
the product varieties in terms of demand and dissemination.
As in the closed economy, the firm’s production problem can be solved backwards,
starting with the second stage and subsequent going further to the first stage. Given the
CES demand and the monopolistic competition as the market structure, each firm chooses
by the profit maximization a price which is a constant markup over the marginal production
costs (standard constant-markup pricing rule):61
pk,ij(ω, z, O) =
σ
σ − 1ck,ij(ω, z, O). (4.36)
With higher iceberg transportation costs τij, a firm charges a higher price for the product
variety that is shipped from country i to country j. As in the closed economy, each firm
completely exploits its organizational capital and, in order to maximize the firm profits, the
organizational capital is allocated across the product varieties within the firm according
to62
ok,ij(ω) =
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
, (4.37)
with ζk,ij(z) ≡ 1σ−1Ak,j
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
(awizτij)
1−σ = Ak,j
σ
(
1
awizτij
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
> 0. Given that a firm’s
product scope is constant, multi-product firms in heterogeneous industries allocate de-
creasingly less organizational capital to varieties further away from their core competency
variety and thus concentrate in their organizational capital allocation on varieties close to
their core competency variety. In contrast, multi-product firms in homogeneous industries
face a stronger competitive pressure from the demand, allocate increasingly more organiza-
tional capital to varieties further away from their core competency variety (fringe products)
and therefore focus in their organizational capital allocation on varieties in which they have
less competency or (labor) efficiency.
Given the binding resource constraint for each firm, the marginal profitability of orga-
nizational capital is given by63
λk,ij(z,O, δk,ij(z,O)) = θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)Hk(δk,ij(z, O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−1. (4.38)
As a firm’s final decision in its two-stage production problem, the number of product
61See the Appendix D.16 for the details of derivation.
62See the Appendix D.17 for the details of derivation.
63See the Appendix D.18 for the details of derivation.
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varieties that the firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being active in
industry k produces in country i and exports to country j, i.e. the (export) product scope
δk,ij(z,O), arises as a result of the firm’s profit maximization and is implicitly expressed
by the condition64
ηk,ij(z)λk,ij(z,O, δk,ij(z,O))
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
(
hk(δk,ij(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1λk,ij(z,O, δk,ij(z,O))
1−θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×∂λk,ij(z,O, δk,ij(z, O))
∂δk,ij(z, O)
)
= f ijk,ω, (4.39)
with
ηk,ij(z) ≡
(
1
ζk,ij(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
> 0.
(Industry) Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is exactly the same as it is in the closed economy: An organiza-
tional capital threshold O?k,ij(z) exists for which firms are indifferent of whether to produce
or not to produce their most favorable product variety for country j. The threshold takes
the form65
O?k,ij(z) =
(
Ak,j
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ) (
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(τijawiz)
1
θ . (4.40)
In strict correspondence to the closed economy, the destination-specific sales (revenue) of
a firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being active in industry k can be
written as
Rk,ij(z,O) = Ak,j
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(τijawiz)
1−σ Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij(z,O))−(σ−1)
and, with the organizational capital threshold in equation (4.40), these sales (the revenue)
can be rewritten as
Rk,ij(z, O) =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
O?k,ij(z)
θ(1−σ)(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
(
σ − 1
σ
)−σ
Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij(z,O))−(σ−1)
and simplified as
Rk,ij(z,O) = σO
?
k,ij(z)
θ(1−σ)f ijk,ωO
θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij(z, O))−(σ−1). (4.41)
64See the Appendix D.19 for the details of derivation.
65See the Appendix D.20 for the details of derivation.
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Similarly, the condition on the destination-specific product scope of a firm with productivity
1
z
and organizational capital O being active in industry k in equation (4.39) can be rewritten
by using the organizational capital threshold in equation (4.40) as66
hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 = (1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)−
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1O?k,ij(z)
θ(1−σ)Oθ(σ−1). (4.42)
With equation (4.42), the destination-specific firm sales (revenue) in equation (4.41) take
the form
Rk,ij(z,O) = σ
f ijk,ω
1− θ(σ − 1)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
and simplified
Rk,ij(z,O) =
σ
1− θ(σ − 1)f
ij
k,ω
(
hk(δk,ij)
Hk(δk,ij)
) 1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
. (4.43)
Besides the production threshold O?k,ij, a threshold for the entry into the industry k for
serving country j, z?k,ij, exists which represents the cost draw of the least productive firm
in the industry, i.e. the marginal firm, whose expected profits over the possible realizations
of the organizational capital (endowment) E
[
Πk,ij(z
?
k,ij)
]
are exactly equal to the fixed
industry penetration cost F pk,ij:
E
[
Πk,ij(z
?
k,ij)
]
= F pk,ij,
with
E [Πk,ij(z)] =
∫ Omax,z
O?k,ij(z)
Πk,ij(z,O)gz(O)dO.
A firm pays the fixed cost fE if its expected profits over the possible realizations of the
productivity 1
z
across all destinations,
Πk,i =
I∑
j=1
Bi(z
?
k,ij)
∫ z?k,ij
0
E [Πk,ij(z)]µi(z)dz,
with µi(z) as the distribution of cost draws conditional on z being below the threshold z
?
k,ij
µi(z) =

bi(z)
Bi(z?k,ij)
if z < z?k,ij
0 otherwise,
exceed the fixed cost of entry. Free entry implies that the firm’s expected profits are exactly
equal to the fixed cost of entry:
Πk,i = wifE.
66See the Appendix D.20 for the details of derivation.
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According to Cherkashin et al. (2015), the mass of firms Nk,ij that are active in industry
k, located in country i and serve country j is computed by integrating the probabilities
over the gray area in Figure 4.2:
Nk,ij = Ni
∫ z?k,ij
0
∫ Omax,z
O?k,ij
dGz(O)dBi(z)
and the total revenues are given by
Tk,ij = Ni
∫ z?k,ij
0
∫ Omax,z
O?k,ij
Rk,ij(z, O)gz(O)bi(z)dOdz. (4.44)
In equilibrium, goods market clear, i.e.
I∑
i=1
Tk,ij = φk,jwjLj,
with φk,j as the share of the budget that is spent in country j on product varieties of
industry k and the equilibrium allocation is characterized by the firms’ decisions on prices
pk,ij(ω, z, O) and scope δk,ij(z,O), free entry as well as the goods markets clearing.
Figure 4.2: Entry and Production Decisions of Firms in Industry k in the Open Economy
Comparative Statics
Any change in the cost parameters of international trade, in particular the iceberg trans-
portation costs τij and the variety introduction costs f
ij
k,ω, has some implications on the
multi-product firm’s margins of trade: the intensive margin, i.e. (export) sales (revenue), as
well as the extensive margin, i.e. (export) product scope. Moreover, these adjustments at
the firm level are accompanied by reallocations of organizational capital across the product
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varieties within the firms.
The elasticity of the (export) product scope with respect to τij is given by
67
δk,ijd ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
1
4(σ − 1)ρk,ij(z),
where 4 ≷ 0 denotes the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the system of the total
differentiations of the two fundamental equations that is written in matrix notation and
ρk,ij(z) ≡ 1σ−1A−1k,j
(
σ−1
σ
)−σ
(τijawiz)
σ−1 − θHk(δk,ij)1−σλ−1k,ijθOθ(σ−1)−1
!
> 0. Multi-product
firms in heterogeneous industries increase their product scope in response to a trade lib-
eralization, i.e. a reduction in the iceberg transportation costs τij, while they reduce their
product scope in response to a trade de-liberalization, i.e. an increase in the iceberg trans-
portation costs τij.
68 Under the assumption that the iceberg transportation costs τij are
increasing in the (geographical) distance between the source and destination countries and
thus differently interpreted, multi-product firms export more products to destinations that
are closer to their location.
Alternatively and providing further insights into the adjustment of multi-product firms
at their extensive margin in response to transportation costs changes, the elasticity of the
(export) product scope with respect to τij can be computed as
69
δk,ijd ln δk,ij
d ln τij
= − (σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1))
1
θ(σ−1) τ−1ij Ohk(δk,ij)
− 1
θHk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
− σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
.
Once again, multi-product firms in heterogeneous industries increase (reduce) their product
scope in response to a trade (de-)liberalization in terms of τij. However, given a (standard)
functional form specification for the unit production costs, i.e. hk(ω) = exp (µkω), with
µk > 0 as a (industry-specific) parameter, these multi-product firms do not uniformly
adjust their product scope: At their extensive margin, firms with a larger scope respond
less to trade shocks.70 As product varieties that are further away from the core competency
variety are produced at a smaller scale and thus contribute less to the overall output and
sales of a firm, multi-product firms with a large scope are relatively less sensitive to changes
in trade costs with respect to the production decision of their product varieties at the
margin and thus respond at their extensive margin less to trade shocks.
Along with the adjustment at the extensive margin, multi-product firms reallocate orga-
nizational capital across the product varieties in response to trade costs changes. Thereby,
67See the Appendix D.21.1 for the proof.
68Theoretically, multi-product firms with a small scope in homogeneous industries increase their product
scope in response to a trade liberalization, while they reduce their product scope in response to a trade
de-liberalization. However, multi-product firms with a large scope in homogeneous industries reduce their
product scope in response to a trade liberalization, while they increase their product scope in response to
a trade de-liberalization.
69See the Appendix D.21.1 for the details of derivation.
70See the Appendix D.21.1 for the proof. Theoretically, the result is ambiguous for multi-product firms
in homogeneous industries.
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the elasticity of the organizational capital allocation with respect to τij is given by
71
d ln ok,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= − 14(σ − 1)ρk,ij(z)
(
hk(δk,ij)
Hk(δk,ij)
) σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
,
where 4 ≷ 0 denotes the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the system of the total
differentiations of the two fundamental equations that is written in matrix notation and
ρk,ij(z) ≡ 1σ−1A−1k,j
(
σ−1
σ
)−σ
(τijawiz)
σ−1 − θHk(δk,ij)1−σλ−1k,ijθOθ(σ−1)−1
!
> 0. Multi-product
firms in heterogeneous industries increase their product scope and thus allocate less orga-
nizational capital to each (intra-marginal) product variety in response to a trade liberaliza-
tion, i.e. a reduction in the iceberg transportation costs, while they reduce their product
scope and thus allocate more organizational capital to each (intra-marginal) product vari-
ety in response to a trade de-liberalization, i.e. an increase in the iceberg transportation
costs.72
As adjustments at the extensive margin and the within-firm allocation of organizational
capital take place, changes in the cost parameters of international trade give also rise to
adjustments at the intensive margin. The elasticity of the overall (export) sales (revenue)
of a firm with respect to the variety introduction costs f ijk,ω is given by
73
d lnRk,ij(z,O)
d ln f ijk,ω
=
intensive margin︷︸︸︷
0 − (1− θ(σ − 1))εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
,
where εHk(δk,ij) ≡ − δk,ijHk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
> 0 denotes the absolute value of the elasticity of the
flexible manufacturing technology index with respect to scope and εhk(δk,ij) ≡ δk,ijhk(δk,ij)
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
>
0 describes the elasticity of the unit production costs with respect to scope. Any change
in the (destination-specific) variety introduction costs affects the overall sales (revenue)
of a firm only through the extensive margin of trade. As the variety introduction costs
decrease, the overall sales (revenue) of multi-product firms in heterogeneous industries
increase, while they decrease in response to an increase in the variety introduction costs.74
Differently, the elasticity of the overall (export) sales (revenue) of a firms with respect
71See the Appendix D.21.2 for the details of derivation.
72Theoretically, multi-product firms with a small scope in homogeneous industries allocate less organi-
zational capital to each (intra-marginal) product variety in response to a trade liberalization, while they
allocate more organizational capital to each (intra-marginal) product variety in response to a trade de-
liberalization. However, multi-product firms with a large scope in homogeneous industries allocate more
organizational capital to each (intra-marginal) product variety in response to a trade liberalization, while
they allocate less organizational capital to each (intra-marginal) product variety in response to a trade
de-liberalization.
73See the Appendix D.21.3 for the details of derivation.
74Theoretically, as the variety introduction costs decrease, the overall sales (revenue) of multi-product
firms in homogeneous industries decrease, while they increase in response to an increase in the variety
introduction costs.
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to the iceberg transportation costs τij is given by
75
d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln τij
=
intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(σ − 1) −(σ − 1) (1− θ(σ − 1))εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
,
where εHk(δk,ij) ≡ − δk,ijHk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
> 0 denotes the elasticity of the flexible manufacturing
technology index with respect to scope and εhk(δk,ij) ≡ δk,ijhk(δk,ij)
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
> 0 describes the
elasticity of the unit production costs with respect to scope. Any change in the (destination-
specific) transportation costs affects the overall sales (revenue) of a firm through both the
extensive and intensive margin, whereas the change through the intensive margin is inde-
pendent of the firm’s product scope and thus uniform across firms. As the transportation
costs decrease, the overall sales (revenue) of multi-product firms in heterogeneous industries
increase, while they decrease in response to an increase in the transportation costs.76
Multi-product firms in heterogeneous industries increase (decrease) their overall (ex-
port) sales (revenue) in response to a trade (de-)liberalization both in terms of f ijk,ω and τij.
However, given a (standard) functional form specification for the unit production costs, i.e.
hk(ω) = exp (µkω), with µk > 0 as a (industry-specific) parameter, these multi-product
firms do not uniformly adjust their export sales (revenue): At their intensive margin, firms
with a larger scope respond less to trade shocks.77 As product varieties that are further
away from the core competency variety are produced at a smaller scale and thus contribute
less to the overall output and sales of a firm, multi-product firms with a large scope are
relatively less sensitive to changes in trade costs with respect to the output decision of
their product varieties at the margin and thus respond at their intensive margin less to
trade shocks.
With changes in the cost parameters of international trade, in particular the iceberg
transportation costs τij and the variety introduction costs f
ij
k,ω, adjustments do not only
take place at the firm level, but also at the aggregate (industry) level. Taking the total
derivative of equation (4.44), while keeping the mass of entrants Ni constant, provides
a decomposition of the change in industry k’s total exports of goods from country i to
country j into its margins (Figure 4.3; the representation below is given for the case of
a change in the iceberg transportation costs τij, whereas such a representation is likewise
possible for a change in the variety introduction costs f ijk,ω):
dTk,ij =
∂Tk,ij
∂z?k,ij
dz?k,ij +
∂Tk,ij
∂O?k,ij(z)
dO?k,ij(z) +
∂Tk,ij
∂τij
dτij
75See the Appendix D.21.3 for the details of derivation.
76Theoretically, as −1 < (1−θ(σ−1))εHk(δk,ij)εhk(δk,ij)+θ(σ−1)εHk(δk,ij) < 0 holds and the transportation costs decrease, the
overall sales (revenue) of multi-product firms in homogeneous industries increases, while they decrease in
response to an increase in the transportation costs.
77See the Appendix D.21.3 for the proof. Theoretically, the result is ambiguous for multi-product firms
in homogeneous industries.
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and
dTk,ij = Ni
[∫ Omax,z
O?k,ij(z
?
k,ij)
Rk,ij(z
?
k,ij, O)gz(O)bi(z
?
k,ij)dO
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sales of firms at the cost cutoff (extensive margin)
dz?k,ij
−Ni
[∫ z?k,ij
0
Rk,ij(z, O
?
k,ij(z))gz(O
?
k,ij(z))bi(z)dz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sales of firms at the organizational capital cutoff
(extensive margin)
dO?k,ij(z)
+Ni
[∫ z?k,ij
0
∫ Omax,z
O?k,ij(z)
∂Rk,ij(z,O)
∂τij
gz(O)bi(z)dOdz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in the sales of active firms (intensive margin)
dτij (4.45)
Figure 4.3: Adjustments in Industry k due to a Change in the Trade Cost Parameters
The first component of equation (4.45) describes the change in total exports due to the
change in the cost cutoff z?k,ij and thus the set of entrants. Any increase in the cost cutoff
(e.g. from z?k,ij to z
?′
k,ij in Figure 4.3) causes the total exports to increase by the amount of
exports of firms at the cost cutoff (extensive margin). The second component of equation
(4.45) represents the change in total exports due to the change in the organizational capital
threshold O?k,ij and thus the set of active firms. Any decrease in the organizational capital
cutoff (e.g. from O?k,ij to O
?′
k,ij in Figure 4.3) causes the total exports to increase by the
amount of exports of firms at the organizational capital cutoff (extensive margin). Finally,
the third component of equation (4.45) describes the change in total exports due to the
change in the iceberg transportation costs (or the variety introduction costs) by itself. Any
decrease in the iceberg transportation costs (or the variety introduction costs) causes the
total exports to increase by the amount of export increases of the active multi-product
firms in the heterogeneous industries (intensive margin), which can be further decomposed
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into the changes in the exports at the firms’ intensive margin and the exports at the firms’
extensive margin.
4.4 Empirical Support
The following section provides both (i) empirical support for the (general) relevance of orga-
nizational capital as an input in the production process of firms (indirect empirical support
for the developed theory of multi-product firms in international trade) and (ii) empirical
support for some of the basic predictions of the developed theory of multi-product firms
(direct empirical support for the developed theory of multi-product firms in international
trade). Any empirical exercise that attempts to verify the theory’s predictions on the in-
ternal structure of multi-product firms faces the difficulty of a shortage of the required
firm-product-level data, which reveal the allocation of organizational capital across the
products within firms. Therefore, the empirical verification of the theory is limited to the
exercises that are undertaken in this section.
4.4.1 Organizational Capital
Given the concept of organizational capital and its treatment in the empirical literature
over time, a central question remains finally unresolved: Does organizational capital matter
for the performance of firms? The existing studies on that question suffer from serious
shortcomings in their conceptional designs or data applications, which considerably restrict
the validity of the findings that the studies generate as solutions to the question and that
constitute the current state of research: While Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) do not
employ a capitalized measure for the organizational capital, as it becomes prevalent for the
other important intangible asset of a firm, in particular research and development78, and
make use of an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator which is imperfect in its performance
of estimating production functions79, De and Dutta (2007) apply merely some part of the
capitalized income statement item that is generally used as a proxy for organizational
capital and restrict their study to a single developing country. In the most recent attempt,
Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) also employ an OLS estimator which reveals an
imperfect performance in the estimation of production functions.
The estimation of firm-level production functions by applying an OLS estimator to a
panel of (continuing) firms in a regression can be associated with several difficulties, but
the estimator’s imperfect performance is especially based on two biases:80 The selection
bias, which appears in the case of no allowance for the entry and exit of firms (balanced
78See the Footnote 17.
79For Bresnahan (2005)’s general critique on their attempt: See the Section 4.2.2.
80For a general overview on the static and dynamic estimation of market components (demand as well as
production functions): See Ackerberg et al. (2007). For a detailed overview on the estimation of production
functions, its associated difficulties and possible solutions: See van Beveren (2012).
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panel), and the endogeneity bias that occurs in the case of a correlation of the error term
and the independent variables. The source of the endogeneity bias is quite often the simul-
taneity in the sense that the firm’s input choice depends on some determinants that are
unobserved to the econometrician but observed by the firm, in particular the (expected)
productivity of the firm, much more than it is driven by the omitted variables (model mis-
specification) or the measurement errors. Several methods to deal with the endogeneity bias
exist: Parametric (fixed effects as well as instrumental variables and generalized method
of moments (GMM)), non-parametric (index numbers and data envelopment analysis) and
semi-parametric (algorithm developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), algorithm developed by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)) estimators.81 The main idea of the semi-parametric esti-
mators is that, under certain theoretical and statistical assumptions, one can “invert” the
optimal input decisions of the firms to essentially enable the econometrician to “observe”
the so far unobserved productivity shocks. To implement this idea, Olley and Pakes (1996)
identify the conditions under which the firm-level investment, conditional on the capital
stock, can be taken as a strictly increasing function of a scalar, firm-level, unobserved
productivity shock, in this way getting able to develop an algorithm with which one can
estimate firm-level production functions in an unbiased way by “controlling for” the un-
observed productivity shocks, while conditioning on a non-parametric representation of
the inverse function. Instead of inverting an investment demand function, Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) select an intermediate input demand function but otherwise follow the same
steps of the proposed algorithm.
While De and Dutta (2007) use a system GMM estimator to avoid the endogeneity
bias which may appear in the case of using an OLS estimator for the production function
estimation, both Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011)
indeed employ an OLS estimator and, while being aware of the problem, their studies suffer
from inadequately taking care of the imminence of the endogeneity bias of the estimator:
Both studies make use of lagged independent variables in the OLS estimation to instrument
for the independent and possibly endogenous variables, but recent studies by Reed (2015)
and Bellemare et al. (2017) show that this strategy is not able to fulfil its purpose and to
avoid the endogeneity bias.
In an empirical sidestep, this section removes the shortcomings of the previous studies
and thus robustly tests and thereby verifies the relevance of the organizational capital as an
input for the production process and output of firms by picking up on the most recent study
conducted by Tronconi and Vittucci Marzetti (2011) and using COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ
- Global and COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ - North-America as the databases, which provide
unbalanced panel data on the firm level for the periods 2000-2007 as well as 2010-2017
and the regions Asia, Europe and North-America. Accordingly, this section works in
total with six samples: Two for Asia with firms in 15 and 16 countries82, respectively
81For a comparison of the robustness of these methods: See Van Biesebroeck (2007).
82For the details on the countries that are covered by the samples: See the Appendix E.1.
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(“Asian samples”: 2000-2007: A-S1, and 2010-2017: A-S2), two for Europe with firms
in 32 countries83 (“European samples”: 2000-2007: E-S1, and 2010-2017: E-S2) and two
for North-America with firms in two countries (Canada and the USA) (“North-American
samples”: 2000-2007: NA-S1, and 2010-2017: NA-S2). This section takes into account (i)
more recent time periods (2000-2007 and especially 2010-2017), (ii) more regions of firm
(headquarters) location (Asia, Europe and North America), as well as applies (iii) more
measures for the dependent variable (revenue and value added), and (iv) more recent robust
estimation techniques (accounting for issues of endogeneity in the production function
estimation) than the previous studies. Consequently, this section constitutes a considerable
step on the way of validating the fundamental importance of organizational capital for the
production process of firms.
Empirical Methodology
This section estimates firm-level production functions that include four inputs, in particular
physical capital (K), labor (L), research and development (RD) and organizational capital
(OC), and occur in two functional specifications: (i) Cobb-Douglas:
qit = αi + βkkit + βllit + βrdrdit + βococit (4.46)
and (ii) translog, which relaxes the assumptions of constant output elasticities and constant
unit elasticity of substitution for inputs and represent thereby a more flexible form:
qit = αi + βkkit + βllit + βrdrdit + βococit + γkk
2
it + γll
2
it + γrdrd
2
it + γococ
2
it
+γklkitlit + γkrdkitrdit + γkockitocit + γlrdlitrdit + γloclitocit + γrdocrditocit, (4.47)
where variables in lower case letters indicate logs, i represents some firm and t some time.
The output variable qit describes the revenue of firm i at time t and αi captures unobservable
differences in production efficiency. In the COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ database, irrelevant
whether the Global or North-America section is made use of, revenue is identified by yearly
total revenue (REVT ), the physical capital variable by yearly net total property, plant and
equipment (PPENT ) and the labour variable by yearly number of employees (EMP).
To generate stock variables for the other inputs, in particular research and development
as well as organizational capital, in the analysis, flow variables that can be interpreted as
investments into these intangible assets are capitalized by using the perpetual inventory
method. For research and development, the database provides data on research and devel-
opment expenses (XRD) and these are capitalized with the assumption of a depreciation
rate of 20% and a growth rate of 8%, so that the result identifies the revenue and devel-
opment variable. For organizational capital, following the main approach in the literature,
while being aware of its shortcomings (Section 4.2.2), the organizational capital variable
83For the details on the countries that are covered by the samples: See the Appendix E.2.
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is identified by the capitalized income statement item “selling, general and administrative
(SGA) expenses” (XSGA), whose data in the raw, i.e. not capitalized, form are supplied by
the database, as a proxy for organizational capital. Once again, this item by itself includes
several expenses that can generate or enhance organizational capital, e.g. employee train-
ing costs, brand enhancement activities, payments to systems and strategy consultants
and IT outlays. The capitalization of the income statement item is conducted by using a
capitalization rate of 20%, a depreciation rate of 10% and a growth rate of 6%.
The production functions are estimated by using an OLS estimator and a semi-parametric
estimation algorithm, in particular the method by Olley and Pakes (1996). In the case of
the latter approach, investments as the “control variable” are identified by yearly capital
expenditures (CAPX ). With the OLS estimator, the production functions are estimated
both in levels and first differences (FDs). In the case of the estimations in levels, sector84
and country-group dummies are applied in the regressions. The countries in each sample
are thereby grouped according to their per capita income in a given year, which leads on to
groups of homogeneous countries.85 The estimations are also conducted in first differences
to eliminate any firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity, as far as it is correctly assumed
that firm heterogeneity is constant over time.
All the estimations are separately undertaken for two sub-samples of each sample:
The sub-sample that only comprises firms that incur research and development (R&D)
expenditures and thus have an R&D stock in a given year, in short referred to as R&D
firms, and the sub-sample that only comprises firms that do not incur R&D expenditures
and thus do not have an R&D stock in a given year, in short referred to as non-R&D firms.
This dichotomy in each sample is mainly motivated by the empirically documented fact
that R&D firms differ from non-R&D firms in their performance.86 Applied to this section,
which deals with multi-product firms that undertake some R&D by assumption, as they
innovate and introduce products to the market, R&D firms and the singularities in their
performance are of special interest. For the R&D firms, the input elasticities are estimated
both with the exclusion and the inclusion of organizational capital, thereby illustrating the
miss-measurement of the elasticities if organizational capital is omitted from the production
function.
The following analysis concentrates on the period 2010-2017. Firstly, the three samples,
each for Europe, North-America and Asia, and the firms that are covered by them are
described, secondly, the production functions are estimated, and thirdly, robustness checks
are conducted. For the details on the samples and the estimation results for the previous
period 2000-2007: See the Appendix E.5 and Appendix E.6.
84For the details on the sector classification: See the Appendix E.3.
85For the details on the construction of the country-group dummies: See the Appendix E.4.
86For an overview about the literature on the elasticity of R&D and the rate of return to R&D: See Hall
et al. (2010). For an overview about as well as a meta-analysis of this literature: See Ugur et al. (2016).
For an overview about the literature on the relationship between R&D (investment) and productivity: Hall
(2011) and Mohnen and Hall (2013).
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Descriptive Statistics
The analysis of the contribution of organizational capital to the performance of firms is
based on three samples on the period 2010-2017, each for Europe, North-America and Asia:
E-S2, NA-S2 and A-S2. All these samples cover medium- and large-sized firms, i.e. firms
with at least 175 employees.
European Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (E-S2)
The sample of European firms on the period 2010-2017 consists of 1,963 firms in 2017
whose headquarters are located each in one of 32 countries in Europe and which operate
each in one of 10 sectors.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Firms in the European Sample across the Countries (2017)
Figure 4.5: Distribution of Firms in the European Sample across the Sectors (2017)
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While about half (2017: 50.7%) of the firms in the sample are located either in Great
Britain, France or Germany, almost half (2017: 46.8%) of the firms operate in the man-
ufacturing sector that thereby represents by far the largest sector in the sample, followed
by the services sector in which 20.2% (2017) of the firms operate and the transportation
sector in which 13.2% (2017) of the firms operate (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5).
As compared with E-S1, the share of firms that are active in the manufacturing sector
decreases by 1.1%ps (2007: 47.9%), while the share of firms that are active in the services
sector and the share of firms that are active in the transportation sector increases by 0.6%ps
and 0.7%ps, respectively (2007: 19.6% and 12.5%, respectively). Over the 10-years period,
the manufacturing sector contracts, while the services sector and the transportation sector
expand (“structural change”).
Notes: Firms in the sample are grouped according to their number of employees, which yields
employment categories (on the left: category “175-749”: firms with at least 175 but less than
750 employees, category “750-2,499”: firms with at least 750 but less than 2,500 employees,
category “2,500-7,499”: firms with at least 2,500 but less than 7,500 employees, etc.). Higher-
ranked employment categories include firms with a larger workforce.
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Non-R&D Firms and R&D Firms in the European Sample
across the Employment Categories (2017)
The firms with less than 2,500 employees represent about half (2017: 52%) of the firms
in the sample and the firms in the two highest-ranked employment categories with at least
15,000 employees account for 17% (2017) of the firms, both types together constituting
about two-thirds of the sample population of firms, whereas R&D firms are incrementally
more present among the firms in the higher-ranked employment categories: The proportion
of R&D firms in the employment categories increases when moving along the categorization
of the firm size from firms with a workforce at a small to medium scale to firms with a
workforce at a medium to large scale, and the proportion increases once more when moving
further to firms with a workforce at a very large scale (Figure 4.6).
Comparing E-S2 with E-S1, the firm size distribution at the end of each sample changes
in the way that the lowest-ranked employment category and the two highest-ranked employ-
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ment categories contract, while the other categories expand as their weights are measured
in percentage terms of each sample’s population of firms and their changes are measured in
terms of percentage points. Over the 10-years period, the total mass of firms in the sample
shifts to some degree to the middle of the firm size distribution (“de-polarization”).
Figure 4.7: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the European Sam-
ple across the Sectors (Mean Values, 2017)
Figure 4.8: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the European Sam-
ple across the Sectors (Median Values, 2017)
For all the employment categories, the share of R&D firms in the employment categories
increases, but the increase is the largest in the two lowest-ranked employment categories
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with 13.8%ps for the lowest- and 16.9%ps for the second lowest-ranked category as well as
in the highest-ranked employment category with 5.4%ps.
The firms in the consumer durables, health care and chemicals sectors are on average
equipped with the largest R&D stocks across the sectors87, while the firms in the chemicals,
consumer durables, telephone and television as well as utilities sectors have on average the
largest organizational capital stocks (Figure 4.7).
Analyzing the input distributions within the sectors, the (strictly positive) differences
between the mean and median values for the R&D and organizational capital stocks for
all the sectors indicate that many firms with only small stocks and some firms with large
stocks coexist in all the sectors, whereas the right-skewed distribution varies in its shape
across the sectors (Figure 4.8).
North-American Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (NA-S2)
The sample of North-American firms on the period 2010-2017 consists of 2,737 firms in
2017 whose headquarters are located each either in the United States or Canada and which
operate each in one of 10 sectors.
While almost nine out of ten firms in the sample (2017: 87.2%) are located in the United
States, about one-third (2017: 37.1%) of the firms operate in the manufacturing sector that
thereby represents by far the largest sector in the sample, followed by the services sector
in which 18.6% (2017) of the firms operate and the finance sector in which 15.9% (2017)
of the firms operate (Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10).
Figure 4.9: Distribution of Firms in the North-American Sample across Canada and the
USA (2017)
As compared with the European sample, a smaller share of firms is active in the man-
ufacturing sector as well as in the transportation sector (2017: 6%), while a larger share
87For the details on the alternative sector classification: See the Appendix E.3.
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operates in the finance sector, and, as compared with NA-S1, the manufacturing sector
contracts as the share of firms that are active in it decreases by 4.3%ps (2007: 41.4%) over
the period of 10 years.
Figure 4.10: Distribution of Firms in the North-American Sample across the Sectors (2017)
Notes: Firms in the sample are grouped according to their number of employees, which yields
employment categories (on the left: category “175-749”: firms with at least 175 but less than
750 employees, category “750-2,499”: firms with at least 750 but less than 2,500 employees,
category “2,500-7,499”: firms with at least 2,500 but less than 7,500 employees, etc.). Higher-
ranked employment categories include firms with a larger workforce.
Figure 4.11: Distribution of Non-R&D Firms and R&D Firms in the North-American
Sample across the Employment Categories (2017)
The firms with less than 2,500 employees represent about half (2017: 51.4%) of the firms
in the sample and the firms in the two highest-ranked employment categories with at least
15,000 employees account for 16.5% (2017) of the firms, both types together constituting
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about two-thirds of the sample population of firms and being similar to the European
sample, whereas R&D firms are more present among the firms with a workforce at the
small to medium scale, especially at the medium scale, and the very large scale (Figure
4.11).
Figure 4.12: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the North-
American Sample across the Sectors (Mean Values, 2017)
Figure 4.13: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the North-
American Sample across the Sectors (Median Values, 2017)
As compared with the European sample, the proportion of R&D firms in the employ-
ment categories is smaller for all the employment categories.
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Comparing NA-S2 with NA-S1, the firm size distribution at the end of each sample
changes in the way that the lowest-ranked employment category contracts, while the other
categories expand as their weights are measured in percentage terms of each sample’s
population of firms and their changes are measured in terms of percentage points. Over
the 10-years period, the total mass of firms in the sample shifts to some degree upwards
along the categorization of the firm size.
For some of the employment categories, the share of R&D firms in the employment
categories increases, while it decreases for others, but the decrease is the largest in the
lowest-ranked employment category with 9.6%ps and the increase is the largest in the
middle-ranked employment categories with 3.5%ps for the third lowest- and 6.2%ps for the
third highest-ranked category.
The firms in the health care, consumer durables and business equipment sectors are on
average equipped with the largest R&D stocks across the sectors, while the firms in the
telephone and television, trade and services, chemicals, consumer non-durables and health
care sectors have on average the largest organizational capital stocks (Figure 4.12).
Analyzing the input distributions within the sectors, the (strictly positive) differences
between the mean and median values for the R&D and organizational capital stocks for
almost all the sectors indicate that many firms with only small stocks and some firms with
large stocks coexist in all the sectors, whereas the right-skewed distribution varies in its
shape across the sectors (Figure 4.13).
Asian Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (A-S2)
The sample of Asian firms on the period 2010-2017 consists of 6,198 firms in 2017 whose
headquarters are located each in one of 16 countries in Asia and which operate each in one
of 10 sectors.
Figure 4.14: Distribution of Firms in the Asian Sample across the Countries (2017)
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While about three-fourths (2017: 75.6%) of the firms in the sample are located either in
Japan or China, almost two-thirds (2017: 60.8%) of the firms operate in the manufacturing
sector that thereby represents by far the largest sector in the sample, followed by the
services sector in which 12.9% (2017) of the firms operate and the transportation sector in
which 7.5% (2017) of the firms operate (Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15).
Figure 4.15: Distribution of Firms in the Asian Sample across the Sectors (2017)
Notes: Firms in the sample are grouped according to their number of employees, which yields
employment categories (on the left: category “175-749”: firms with at least 175 but less than
750 employees, category “750-2,499”: firms with at least 750 but less than 2,500 employees,
category “2,500-7,499”: firms with at least 2,500 but less than 7,500 employees, etc.). Higher-
ranked employment categories include firms with a larger workforce.
Figure 4.16: Distribution of Non-R&D Firms and R&D Firms in the Asian Sample across
the Employment Categories (2017)
As compared with the European and North-American sample, a larger share of firms
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is active in the manufacturing sector, while a smaller share operates in the services sector,
and, as compared with A-S1, the manufacturing sector expands as the share of firms that
are active in it increases by 4.5%ps (2007: 56.3%) over the period of 10 years.
The firms with less than 2,500 employees represent almost two-thirds (2017: 63.7%)
of the firms in the sample and the firms in the two highest-ranked employment categories
with at least 15,000 employees account for 8% (2017) of the firms, both types together
constituting almost three-fourths of the sample population of firms and being different
to the European and North-American samples with a larger proportion of firms with a
workforce at a small scale and a smaller proportion of firms with a workforce at a large
scale, whereas R&D firms are less present among the firms with a workforce at the very
small scale (Figure 4.16). As compared with the European and North-American samples,
the share of R&D firms in the employment categories is the highest for all the employment
categories among the three samples.
Comparing A-S2 with A-S1 and being similar to the North-American sample, the firm
size distribution at the end of each sample changes in the way that the lowest-ranked
employment category contrasts, while the other categories expand as their weights are
measured in percentage terms of each sample’s population of firms and their changes are
measured in terms of percentage points. Over the 10-years period, the total mass of firms
in the sample shifts to some degree upwards along the categorization of the firm size.
Figure 4.17: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the Asian Sample
across the Sectors (Mean Values, 2017)
For the two highest-ranked employment categories, the share of R&D firms in the
employment categories decreases, while it increases for all the others.
The firms in the consumer durables, health care, business equipment as well as chemicals
sectors are on average equipped with the largest R&D stocks across the sectors, while the
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firms in the telephone and television, consumer durables as well as energy, oil, gas and coal
sectors have on average the largest organizational capital stocks (Figure 4.17).
Analysing the input distributions within the sectors, the (strictly positive) differences
between the mean and median values for the R&D and organizational capital stocks for
almost all the sectors indicate that many firms with only small stocks and some firms with
large stocks coexist in all the sectors, whereas the right-skewed distribution varies in its
shape across the sectors (Figure 4.18).
The magnitude of organizational capital in 2017 as one of the inputs in the firms’ pro-
duction process is large across all the samples, although substantial differences exist across
the regions (Europe, North-America and Asia) as well as the firm types (non-R&D firms
and R&D firms) (Table 4.1): In the European sample, the median value of organizational
capital is about 79.44 million EUR for the non-R&D firms and about twice as large (160.77)
for the R&D firms. In the latter case, it is about 4.5 times larger than R&D (34.97) and
yet almost 1.5 times larger than physical capital (114.9).
Figure 4.18: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the Asian Sample
across the Sectors (Median Values, 2017)
The median value of organizational capital is even larger in the North-American sample,
in fact substantially by about 104% for the non-R&D firms and 68% for the R&D firms:
161.85 million USD for the non-R&D firms and 269.45 million USD for the R&D firms. In
the latter case, organizational capital is about twice as large as both R&D (135.31) and
physical capital (136.9).
In the Asian sample, organizational capital is the smallest among the three samples, all
the more in the case in which Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (HJKST
as the country group’s corresponding acronym) as the countries with the highest levels of
the Human Development Index (HDI) are excluded from the sample and only the countries
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at a lower development status in life expectancy, education and per capita income remain:
With HJKST, the median value of organizational capital is about 45.24 million USD for
the non-R&D firms, which accounts for about 28% and 57% of its median value in the
North-American and European sample, respectively, and yet it is about 1.5 times larger
(67.29) for the R&D firms, which amounts to about 25% and 42% of its median value in
the North-American and European sample, respectively.
By excluding HJKST, the value decreases to about 20.78 million USD for the non-R&D
firms, which represents about 13% and 26% of its median value in the North-American and
European sample, respectively, and about 49.22 million USD for the R&D firms, which
accounts for about 18% and 31% of its median value in the North-American and European
sample, respectively.
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
A-S2a E-S2b NA-S2a A-S2a E-S2b NA-S2a
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
K 95.16227 98.46407 114.896 136.9 76.39655 73.98328 94.4 182.792
Lc 1.9965 1.729 2.755 2.516 1.232 1.0525 1.962 2.1885
RD 22.82059 21.2511 34.96591 135.3093 - - - -
OC 49.22255 67.29129 160.7675 269.4488 20.77567 45.23636 79.44357 161.8466
Notes: a: sample measured in million USD, b: sample measured in million EUR, c: employment
measured in thousands, and HJKST: acronym for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
Table 4.1: Physical Capital, Labor, Research and Development as well as Organizational
Capital in the Three Samples and the Two Sub-samples (R&D and Non-R&D Firms) of
Each Sample and 2017 (Median Values)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
A-S2 E-S2 NA-S2 A-S2 E-S2 NA-S2
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
K 3.56 1.14 -0.57 5.32 1.94 0.50 -1.22 2.67
L 2.69 2.19 3.01 3.77 0.42 1.24 2.50 2.47
RD 10.74 5.57 4.95 7.24 - - - -
OC 7.70 5.09 5.38 6.42 5.74 4.56 5.35 6.01
Notes: Measured in percentage and HJKST: acronym for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan.
Table 4.2: Growth of Physical Capital, Labor, Research and Development as well as Orga-
nizational Capital between 2016 and 2017 in the Three Samples and the Two Sub-samples
(R&D and Non-R&D Firms) of Each Sample (Median Values)
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For the R&D firms, the difference between the firms in the Asian and North-American
sample is especially large in their equipment with the intangible assets, R&D and orga-
nizational capital, compared to physical capital and labour: While physical capital and
labour in their median values represent about 70% to 72% and 69% to 79% of their val-
ues in the North-American sample, respectively, R&D and organizational capital in their
median values only represent about 16% to 17% and 18% to 25% of their values in the
North-American sample, respectively.
Organizational capital is always smaller than physical capital in the case of the non-
R&D firms, where its median value accounts for about 27% of the median value of physical
capital in the Asian sample without HJKST, for about 61% in the Asian sample with
HJKST and for about 84% in the European and 89% in the North-American sample, and
smaller than physical capital in the case of the R&D firms in the Asian sample, whereas its
median value amounts to a larger share (52% and 68%, respectively) of the median value
of physical capital than for the non-R&D firms in the Asian sample.
Overall, R&D firms possess in the median values more organizational capital than non-
R&D firms and North-American firms possess more organizational capital than European
firms and those in turn more than Asian firms. Compared with the year 2007, the median
value of organizational capital approximately doubles on average for the non-R&D firms
across the samples, less for the Asian sample with HJKST (increase by about 63%), aver-
agely for the North-American sample (increase by about 97%) and more for the European
sample as well as the Asian sample without HJKST (each revealing an increase by about
123%). For the R&D firms, the median value of organizational capital increases on average
by 69%, but a large variance exists across the samples: While the median value of orga-
nizational capital increases in the Asian sample without HJKST and the North-American
sample by about 165% and 116%, respectively, it increases in the European sample by only
about 6% and even decreases in the Asian sample with HJKST by about 11%.
The dynamics of the four production inputs in the period 2016-2017 shows that orga-
nizational capital has the highest median value of the growth rate among all the inputs for
the European sample and almost all the inputs for the other samples, even so its level is
already high (Table 4.2). Only R&D grows in the median value at a larger rate than the
intangible asset.
Overall, organizational capital as an input in the production process seems to be both
a large and very dynamic asset whose relevance in the firm needs to be verified. Compared
with the period 2006-2007, the median value of the growth rate of organizational capital is
smaller for almost all the samples and sub-samples, with the only exception for the R&D
firms in the Asian sample with HJKST. The dynamics or accumulation of organizational
capital decelerates in the final one-year period of the samples over the 10 years.
Given the descriptive statistics on E-S2, NA-S2 and A-S2, the following estimations are
evidently based on comprehensive data material which allows to draw meaningful conclu-
sions on the general relevance of organizational capital in the firms’ production process.
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Empirical Results
The relevance of the organizational capital as an input for the production process and
output of firms is tested and verified by estimating production functions both in the Cobb-
Douglas and in the translog specification, equation (4.46) and equation (4.47), respectively,
for the three samples E-S2, NA-S2 and A-S2.
For the European sample on the period 2010-2017, the estimated output elasticity of
organizational capital is both substantial and significant in the case of the application of
the OLS estimator (Table 4.3 for the Cobb-Douglas specification and Table 4.4 for the
translog specification).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.29*** 0.06* 0.25*** 0.06* 0.19*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
L 0.62*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.40***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04)
RD 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
OC 0.21*** 0.21** 0.31*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10)
Obs. 1,138 1,112 1,138 1,111 825 821
R-sq. 0.9280 0.3442 0.9376 0.3780 0.8196 0.5101
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.3: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the
European Sample
The resulting point estimates in the range between 0.21 and 0.51 are not only significant
in both specifications when estimating the production functions in levels for the year 2017,
but remain significant for the estimations in first differences for the period 2016-2017, with
a smaller significance in the latter case for R&D firms in the Cobb-Douglas specification.
The estimated output elasticity of organizational capital is always larger in the translog
specification than in the Cobb-Douglas specification, it is always larger than the output
elasticity of R&D and the latter decreases in its value if organizational capital is additionally
taken into account in the production function estimation.
In the case of employing the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure instead of the
OLS estimator to deal with and solve for its associated endogeneity bias (Table 4.5), the
estimated output elasticity of organizational capital is still significant and at least as large
as it is in the case of the OLS estimator, with resulting point estimates in the range between
0.23 and 0.65, which provides an unambiguous and robust indication of the existence of an
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additional relevant input besides physical capital, labour and R&D.
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.28*** 0.07** 0.24*** 0.08** 0.17*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
L 0.65*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
RD 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.05*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.24*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.40***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Obs. 1,138 1,112 1,138 1,111 825 821
R-sq. 0.9340 0.3567 0.9454 0.4229 0.8299 0.5512
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.4: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog Specifi-
cation in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the European
Sample
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.07 0.21*** 0.30*** -0.13** 0.21*** 0.32***
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09)
L 0.64*** 0.50*** 0.76*** 0.95*** 0.43*** 0.40***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
RD 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.17*** 0.54***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09)
OC 0.23*** 0.65*** 0.31*** 0.55***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
Obs. 7,654 7,654 7,654 7,654 6,020 6,020
Groups 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,030 1,030
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.5: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the European Sample on the Period 2010-2017
Compared with the output elasticity estimations for E-S1, organizational capital gains
in importance over the 10-years period as its estimated output elasticity increases in its
value with only a few exceptions in the variety of specifications, in particular in the case
of the OLS estimator for non-R&D firms in the Cobb-Douglas as well as the translog
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specification and first-differences estimation as well as in the case of the Olley and Pakes
(1996) estimation procedure for non-R&D firms in the Cobb-Douglas specification.
For the North-American sample on the period 2010-2017, the estimated output elasticity
of organizational capital is both substantial and significant in the case of the application
of the OLS estimator (Table 4.6 for the Cobb-Douglas specification and Table 4.7 for the
translog specification).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.32*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.22*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.12)
L 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.39*** 0.51*** 0.31*** 0.33***
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.12)
RD 0.13*** 0.15** -0.02 -0.07
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05)
OC 0.41*** 0.75*** 0.48*** 0.93***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10)
Obs. 1,111 1,107 1,111 1,107 1,626 1,626
R-sq. 0.9218 0.4332 0.9398 0.4831 0.8841 0.4484
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.6: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the
North-American Sample
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.30*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.04
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
L 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.46***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08)
RD 0.15*** 0.30*** -0.02 -0.05
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
OC 0.43*** 0.82*** 0.47*** 1.01***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
Obs. 1,111 1,107 1,111 1,107 1,626 1,626
R-sq. 0.9272 0.4512 0.9439 0.5138 0.8969 0.5279
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.7: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog Spec-
ification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the North-
American Sample
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The resulting point estimates in the range between 0.41 and 1.01 are not only significant
in both specifications when estimating the production functions in levels for the year 2017,
but remain significant for the estimations in first differences for the period 2016-2017.
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.33*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
L 0.54*** 0.38*** 0.57*** 0.46*** 0.30*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
RD 0.09*** -0.05*** 0.40*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02)
OC 0.40*** 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.51***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Obs. 7,786 7,786 7,786 7,786 11,782 11,782
Groups 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,682 1,682
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.8: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the North-American Sample on the Period 2010-2017
The estimated output elasticity of organizational capital is for almost all cases larger in
the translog specification than in the Cobb-Douglas specification, with the only exception
for the non-R&D firms in levels estimation, it is always larger than the output elasticity
of R&D and the latter decreases in its value, becomes negative and insignificant if organi-
zational capital is additionally taken into account in the production function estimation.
In the case of employing the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure instead of
the OLS estimator to deal with and solve for its associated endogeneity bias (Table 4.8),
the estimated output elasticity of organizational capital is still significant and substantial,
as the resulting point estimates in the range between 0.40 and 0.53 are larger than the
corresponding output elasticity of any other input.
Compared with the output elasticity estimations for NA-S1, organizational capital gains
in importance for some parts over the 10-years period as its estimated output elasticity
increases in its value for some sub-samples and specifications, in particular in the case of
the OLS estimator for non-R&D firms in the Cobb-Douglas specification and for all firms
in the translog specification as well as in the case of the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation
procedure for R&D firms in the translog specification. Compared with the output elasticity
estimations for E-S2, organizational capital has a greater impact on production outcome as
its estimated output elasticity is for almost all cases larger in the North-American sample,
with the only exceptions in the case of the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure
for R&D as well as non-R&D firms in the translog specification.
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For the Asian sample on the period 2010-2017, the estimated output elasticity of or-
ganizational capital is both substantial and significant in the case of the application of
the OLS estimator (Table 4.9 for the Cobb-Douglas specification and Table 4.10 for the
translog specification).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.06** 0.20*** 0.05*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
L 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06)
RD 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.02*** -0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.47*** 1.32*** 0.45*** 1.20***
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.18)
Obs. 4,210 4,148 4,210 4,148 1,988 1,988
R-sq. 0.8143 0.2580 0.8578 0.3868 0.8077 0.3157
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.9: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the
Asian Sample
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.07** 0.20*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
L 0.53*** 0.50*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.20***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
RD 0.14*** 0.33*** 0.04*** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.43*** 1.26*** 0.53*** 0.86***
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.11)
Obs. 4,210 4,148 4,210 4,148 1,988 1,988
R-sq. 0.8249 0.2867 0.8642 0.4188 0.8223 0.3458
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.10: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog Spec-
ification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the Asian
Sample
The resulting point estimates in the range between 0.43 and 1.32 are not only significant
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in both specifications when estimating the production functions in levels for the year 2017,
but remain significant for the estimations in first differences for the period 2016-2017.
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.10** 0.13*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
L 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.37*** -0.13** 0.19*** 0.03***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
R&D 0.08*** -0.02*** 0.07*** -0.17***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.07)
OC 0.54*** 0.10* 0.54*** 0.36***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Obs. 21,923 21,923 21,923 21,923 13,187 13,187
Groups 4,210 4,210 4,210 4,210 2,276 2,276
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.11: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the Asian Sample on the Period 2010-2017
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.39***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00004) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
L 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.08 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00002) (0.001) (0.05) (0.02)
RD 0.13*** 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.00002) (0.01)
OC 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.82***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13)
Obs. 16,247 16,247 16,247 16,247 4,136 4,136
Groups 3,128 3,128 3,128 3,128 764 764
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.12: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the Asian Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (Only Manufacturing Firms)
The estimated output elasticity of organizational capital is for almost all cases larger in
the Cobb-Douglas specification than in the translog specification, with the only exception
for the non-R&D firms in levels estimation, it is always larger than the output elasticity of
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R&D and the latter decreases in its value, in part becomes negative and less significant or
insignificant if organizational capital is additionally taken into account in the production
function estimation.
In the case of employing the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure instead
of the OLS estimator to deal with and solve for its associated endogeneity bias (Table
4.11), the estimated output elasticity of organizational capital is for almost all cases still
significant and substantial, as the resulting point estimates in the range between 0.36 and
0.54 are larger than the corresponding output elasticity of any other input, with only a
single exception: The output elasticity is smaller and less significant for R&D firms in the
translog specification.
By restricting the sample to firms that operate in the manufacturing sector, which
is motivated by the fact that this chapter has these firms in mind when conducting the
analysis, and replicating the estimations, both a substantial value and high significance of
the output elasticity of organizational capital are restored (Table 4.12).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.29*** 0.08** 0.23*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
L 0.58*** 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.19**
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10)
R&D 0.10*** 0.24*** 0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
OC 0.46*** 1.38*** 0.51*** 1.09***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
Obs. 2,176 2,133 2,176 2,133 895 895
R-sq. 0.7567 0.2666 0.8000 0.4125 0.7812 0.2673
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.13: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the
Asian Sample without Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
Compared with the output elasticity estimations for A-S1, organizational capital gains
in importance for some parts over the 10-years period as its estimated output elasticity
increases in its value for some sub-samples and specifications, in particular in the case of
the OLS estimator for R&D as well as non-R&D firms in the Cobb-Douglas specification
and first-differences estimation and for R&D firms in the translog specification and first-
differences estimation as well as non-R&D firms in the translog specification and levels
estimation. Compared with the output elasticity estimations for E-S2, organization capital
has a greater impact on production outcome as its estimated output elasticity is for almost
all cases larger in the Asian sample, with the only exceptions in the case of the Olley
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and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure for R&D as well as non-R&D firms in the translog
specification.
The countries in Asia that are covered by the Asian sample as they represent the loca-
tions of the headquarters of the firms in the sample reveal a heterogeneity in their economic
as well as social development status, as distinguished from the countries in the European
and North-American samples, and so belong to two different groups of a classification that
is based on the Human Development Index (HDI) which represents a combined measure
of the life expectancy, education and per capita income level in a country: A group of
countries that feature low (0.555-0.699) or medium (0.700-0.799) levels of the HDI and a
group of countries that feature high (0.800-1.000) levels of the HDI.88 To be able to disen-
tangle whether the observed differences in the estimated output elasticity of organizational
capital across the European, North-American and Asian samples go back to differences in
the geographical location of the firm or the development status of the countries or country
groups in which the firm is located, the estimations are also conducted on the Asian sample
without the countries in the high-level group, namely Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore
and Taiwan (HJKST as the country group’s acronym) (Table 4.13 for the Cobb-Douglas
specification, Table 4.14 for the translog specification and Table 4.15 for the method by
Olley and Pakes (1996)).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.27*** 0.11*** 0.23*** 0.06* 0.26*** 0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
L 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.24***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
R&D 0.17*** 0.47*** 0.08*** 0.10**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
OC 0.39*** 1.32*** 0.55*** 0.99***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.11)
Obs. 2,176 2,133 2,176 2,133 895 895
R-sq. 0.7719 0.3121 0.8080 0.4442 0.7955 0.2963
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.14: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog Spec-
ification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017) for the Asian
Sample without Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
For the Asian sample with HJKST and without HJKST, the estimated output elas-
ticity of organizational capital is quite similar in its value and identical in its significance
in the case of the OLS estimation in both the Cobb-Douglas and translog specification,
88For the details on the countries’ HDI levels: See the Appendix E.1 and Appendix E.2.
156 CHAPTER 4. MULTI-PRODUCT FIRMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL
with deviations of less than or about 15% in the restricted sample, while the estimated
coefficients on the other inputs change in part by a larger magnitude, especially those on
R&D, which suggests that the geographical location of the firm and regional idiosyncrasies
play a larger role for the impact of organizational capital on the firm outcome than the
development status of the location of the firm. In the case of the estimation procedure by
Olley and Pakes (1996), the estimated output elasticity is quite similar for the two samples
in the Cobb-Douglas specification, but a sizeable upward deviation in its value and a higher
significance for R&D firms exist in the restricted sample for the estimation in the translog
specification, which suggests that the development status of the location of the firm has
some influence on the impact of organizational capital. Alternatively, as the estimates are
closer to the estimates for the Asian sample with HJKST and only manufacturing firms
(Table 4.12), with deviations of less than 10%, the restriction of the sample to countries
with a low or medium level of the HDI may also be correlated with a change in the sectoral
composition of the sample, which suggests that the sectoral membership of the firm has
some influence on the impact of organizational capital.
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.08*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.32*** 0.35***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
L 0.53*** 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.31***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09)
R&D 0.08*** 0.02** -0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
OC 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.49*** 0.74***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.14)
Obs. 7,460 7,460 7,460 7,460 5,087 5,087
Groups 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176 1,050 1,050
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.15: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the Asian Sample without Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan on the Period
2010-2017
Summarizing, even so the empirical validation approach reveals some variability in the
relevance of organizational capital over time and regions, it turns out that organizational
capital appears to be a relevant input in the firms’ production process with a positive and
significant output elasticity.
Given the estimation results on E-S2, NA-S2 and A-S2, the integration of organizational
capital into the theory of multi-product firms in international trade is both justified and
required to get a realistic representation of the internal structure of multi-product firms.
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Robustness Checks
The estimations in this section serve by themselves as robustness checks for the outcomes
of the previous studies, but they can in turn be backed up by a series of further robustness
checks, whereas each suspends a single condition of the setting in which the estimations
are conducted as well as their results are derived and is thereby able to clarify their depen-
dency on the setting’s condition. In particular, the robustness checks consider the question
of whether and to which degree the findings still hold if (i) the parameters with which the
capitalization of the income statement item is conducted change (computation of organi-
zational capital), (ii) the sample is restricted to a specific sector (sample), (iii) the output
variable is captured by a different term (output variable) and (iv) the estimation method
that is able to account for the endogeneity bias changes (estimation method).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.29*** 0.06* 0.25*** 0.06 0.19*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
L 0.62*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.40***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04)
RD 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
OC 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.10)
Obs. 1,138 1,112 1,138 1,111 825 821
R-sq. 0.9280 0.3442 0.9377 0.3798 0.8210 0.5128
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.16: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the
Cobb-Douglas Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-
2017) for the European Sample (Capitalization Rate of 10% and Depreciation Rate of 20%
for the Organizational Capital Computation)
All the robustness checks that are depicted in this section are conducted for the Euro-
pean sample on the period 2010-2017. The results of the robustness checks for the other
samples are not shown in this section, but are available upon request. They allow a similar
conclusion.
First, the capitalization of the SGA expenses (XSGA) as the income statement item,
which yields the proxy for the organizational capital, is conducted with a capitalization
rate of 10%, instead of 20% as in the baseline specification, and a depreciation rate of 20%,
instead of 10% as in the baseline specification, and the estimations are subsequently under-
taken for the modified organizational capital computation (Table 4.16 for the Cobb-Douglas
specification, Table 4.17 for the translog specification and Table 4.18 for the method by
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Olley and Pakes (1996)).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.28*** 0.07** 0.24*** 0.07** 0.17*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
L 0.65*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
RD 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.37***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Obs. 1,138 1,112 1,138 1,111 825 821
R-sq. 0.9340 0.3567 0.9461 0.4228 0.8320 0.5516
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.17: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the
Translog Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017)
for the European Sample (Capitalization Rate of 10% and Depreciation Rate of 20% for
the Organizational Capital Computation)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.07 0.10*** 0.30*** -0.11* 0.21*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10)
L 0.64*** 0.49*** 0.76*** 0.94*** 0.42*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
RD 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.17*** 0.55***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
OC 0.24*** 0.58*** 0.32*** 0.53***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Obs. 7,654 7,654 7,654 7,654 6,020 6,020
Groups 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,138 1,030 1,030
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.18: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and
Pakes (1996) for the European Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (Capitalization Rate of
10% and Depreciation Rate of 20% for the Organizational Capital Computation)
Even so the organizational capital decreases both in its absolute quantity and its quan-
tity relative to the other inputs (decrease in its median value for the non-R&D firms by
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about 69% and for the R&D firms by about 70%)89, its output elasticity is still significant,
with an even higher significance in the case of the OLS estimator for the R&D firms in the
Cobb-Douglas specification and first-differences estimation, and the value of the elasticity
is quite similar to the one in the baseline specification, with either no changes or up- as
well as downward deviations between about 2% and about 12%.
Overall, the relevance of organizational capital is statistically verified independent of
the choice of the capitalization parameters.
Second, the sample on which the production functions are estimated is restricted to
the manufacturing sector, as it is motivated by the fact that this chapter has the firms in
this sector in mind when conducting the analysis, and the estimations are subsequently
undertaken for the modified sample (Table 4.19 for the Cobb-Douglas specification, Table
4.20 for the translog specification and Table 4.21 for the method by Olley and Pakes
(1996)).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.33*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.03 0.39*** 0.09
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
L 0.60*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.42*** -0.01 0.53***
(0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
RD 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.05*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
OC 0.27*** 0.21* 0.60*** 0.49***
(0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.20)
Obs. 725 715 725 715 194 194
R-sq. 0.9419 0.3295 0.9505 0.3421 0.8917 0.8042
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.19: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the
Cobb-Douglas Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-
2017) for the European Sample (Only Manufacturing Firms)
For manufacturing firms only, the output elasticity of organizational capital is still
significant, with a smaller significance in the case of the OLS estimator for the R&D firms
in the Cobb-Douglas specification and first-differences estimation as well as in the case of
the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure for the non-R&D firms in the translog
specification, and the value of the elasticity is for most of the cases at least as large as it
is in the baseline specification, with the only exception in the case of the Olley and Pakes
(1996) estimation procedure for the R&D firms in the translog specification, where it has
89Under the modified capitalization parameters, the median value of organizational capital for the non-
R&D firms amounts to 24.64 million EUR, while for the R&D firms, it amounts to 49.03 million EUR (and
cf. Table 4.1).
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a lower level with a deviation of about 55%, and otherwise either no changes or upward
deviations between about 17% and about 113%.
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.31*** 0.06 0.29*** 0.08** 0.34*** 0.14
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
L 0.62*** 0.36*** 0.44*** 0.27*** 0.02 0.34***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12)
RD 0.07*** 0.18*** 0.05*** 0.07
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
OC 0.24*** 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.61***
(0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.19)
Obs. 725 715 725 715 194 194
R-sq. 0.9479 0.3780 0.9572 0.4360 0.9037 0.8150
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.20: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the
Translog Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017)
for the European Sample (Only Manufacturing Firms)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.03 0.11 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.39***
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
L 0.57*** 0.39*** 0.59*** 0.42*** 0.03 -0.47***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.004) (0.001) (0.03) (0.14)
RD 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
OC 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.49*** 1.17**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.60)
Obs. 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052 1,525 1,525
Groups 725 725 725 725 282 282
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.21: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and
Pakes (1996) for the European Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (Only Manufacturing
Firms)
Overall, differences in the value of the estimated output elasticity of organizational
capital exist across the sectors, but the relevance of organizational capital is statistically
verified independent of the sample choice.
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R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.27*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.02 0.21*** 0.16*
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09)
L 0.58*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.37***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.07)
RD 0.11*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
OC 0.17*** 0.21** 0.19*** 0.32*
(0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.17)
Obs. 1,009 988 1,009 987 718 714
R-sq. 0.8946 0.1057 0.9003 0.1170 0.8264 0.1521
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table 4.22: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the
Cobb-Douglas Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-
2017) for the European Sample (Value Added as the Output Variable)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.26*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.03 0.21*** 0.20**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.11)
L 0.58*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.49*** 0.43***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.11)
RD 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.11*
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
OC 0.20*** 0.46*** 0.27*** 0.58***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.15)
Obs. 1,009 988 1,009 987 718 714
R-sq. 0.9012 0.1239 0.9082 0.1472 0.8430 0.1984
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table 4.23: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the
Translog Specification in Levels (Year 2017) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2016-2017)
for the European Sample (Value Added as the Output Variable)
Third, for the output variable, revenue is substituted by value added. Following thereby
I˙mrohorog˘lu and Tu¨zel (2014), value added is computed as the sales minus the materials.
Sales is identified by yearly net sales or turnover (SALE ). Materials in turn is computed
as the total expenses minus the labour expenses, which are identified by staff expense -
wages and salaries (XSTFWS ). Total expenses in turn are computed as the sales minus
the income, which is identified by operating income before depreciation and amortization
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(OIBDP). Overall, value added is therefore given by the income plus the labour expenses
and identified by operating income before depreciation and amortization plus staff expense
- wages and salaries and the estimations are subsequently undertaken for the modified
output variable (Table 4.22 for the Cobb-Douglas specification, Table 4.23 for the translog
specification and Table 4.24 for the method by Olley and Pakes (1996)).
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.09 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.17 0.22***
(0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.03)
L 0.59*** 0.51*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.64***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
RD 0.08*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.17***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
OC 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.53***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Obs. 6,716 6,716 6,716 6,716 5,245 5,245
Groups 1,009 1,009 1,009 1,009 910 910
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.24: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and
Pakes (1996) for the European Sample on the Period 2010-2017 (Value Added as the
Output Variable)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.27***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.003) (0.02)
L 0.39*** 0.30*** 1.09*** 0.63*** 0.23*** 0.39***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
RD 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.25*** 0.16***
(0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.03)
OC 0.18*** 0.48*** 0.17*** 0.67***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Obs. 5,844 5,844 5,844 5,844 4,726 4,726
Groups 875 875 875 875 806 806
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table 4.25: Robustness: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) for the European Sample on the Period 2010-2017
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For value added as the output variable, the output elasticity of organizational capital
is still significant, with a smaller significance in the case of the OLS estimator for the
non-R&D firms in the Cobb-Douglas specification and first-differences estimation, and the
value of the elasticity is for most of the cases smaller than it is in the baseline specification,
with the only exception in the case of the OLS estimator for the non-R&D firms in both
the Cobb-Douglas specification and translog specification and first-differences estimation,
where it has a higher level with a deviation of 28% and 45%, respectively, and otherwise
either no changes or downward deviations between about 4% and about 62%. However,
the output elasticity is still quite substantial as it almost never has the lowest level among
the inputs.
Overall, even so differences in the value of the estimated output elasticity of organiza-
tional capital exist across the output variables, the relevance of organizational capital is
statistically verified independent of the choice of the output variable.
Forth, the estimations are conducted with the method by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
instead of the method by Olley and Pakes (1996). Being structurally identical, the methods
only differ in the choice of the “control variable”, based on Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)’s
calculus that their variable is more likely to be strictly monotonic in the unobserved firm
productivity, as it is required by its theoretical foundation: While Olley and Pakes (1996)
use investments, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) employ intermediate inputs or materials.
These are computed as the production expenses, which are identified by cost of goods
sold (COGS ), minus the labour expenses, which are identified by staff expense - wages
and salaries (XSTFWS ). The estimations are subsequently undertaken with the modified
estimation method (Table 4.25).
For the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure as the estimation method, the output
elasticity of organizational capital is still significant and the value of the elasticity is for
most of the cases smaller than it is in the baseline specification, with the only exception
for the non-R&D firms in the translog specification, where it has a higher level with a
deviation of about 22%, and otherwise downward deviations between about 22% and about
45%. However, the output elasticity is still quite substantial as it never has the lowest level
among the inputs.
Overall, even so differences in the value of the estimated output elasticity of organiza-
tional capital exist across the estimation procedures, the relevance of organizational capital
is statistically verified independent of the choice of the estimation method.
Summarizing, the main finding of this chapter’s empirical task passes through the ro-
bustness checks and thus the empirical sidestep provides strong evidence for the statement
of the literature of organizational capital to which this section contributes with the anal-
ysis: Organizational capital is a relevant and thus non-negligible input in the production
process of firms.
Given the empirically significant and robust finding, organizational capital ought to be
included into the theory of multi-product firms in international trade.
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4.4.2 Organizational Capital, Productivity and Product Scope
In an empirical exercise, this section tests and thereby verifies some of the basic predictions
of the developed theory on multi-product firms that are characterized by two dimensions
of firm heterogeneity, i.e. productivity and organizational capital: In heterogeneous indus-
tries, multi-product firms with a higher productivity and multi-product firms with more
organizational capital have a larger product scope. Using Orbis-Amadeus as the databases,
which provide unbalanced panel data on the firm level for the period 2007-2017, simple
regressions on the firm characteristics are undertaken for a single point in time (2017):
ln (psf ) = a0 + a1 ln (fcf ) + εf ,
where psf denotes the product scope of firm f , fcf represents the respective character-
istic of firm f , in particular productivity and organizational capital, and εf denotes the
error term. In the Orbis-Amadeus database, product scope is identified by the number of
products that firm f produces, whereas products are defined as 5-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) categories. To obtain both the productivity variable and the organiza-
tional capital variable, data in the Orbis-Amadeus database are matched with data in the
COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ - Global database according to the firms’ identification codes.
Productivity is then computed with the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure as the estima-
tion method90 and organizational capital is identified by the capitalized income statement
item “selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses” (XSGA) as a proxy for organi-
zational capital. The capitalization of the income statement item is conducted by using the
perpetual inventory method with a capitalization rate of 20%, a depreciation rate of 10%
and a growth rate of 6%.91 The sample is restricted to the manufacturing sector in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom and covers in total 847 large- and medium-sized firms.
Machinery Textiles
TFPf 0.036*** 0.021*
(0.15) (0.24)
OCf 0.043*** 0.018
(0.21) (0.11)
Model Fit (R2) 0.89 0.81 0.77 0.79
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%.
Table 4.26: Regressions - Correlation between the firm product scope and total factor
productivity (TFPf ) or organizational capital (OCf )
The regression is separately undertaken for the industries which are defined as 2-digit
SIC categories and its results for the machinery industry (SIC code: 35) as well as textiles
90See Section 4.4.1 for the details of the method.
91See Section 4.4.1 for the details of the method.
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industry (SIC code: 23) are presented by Table 4.26. Verifying the model’s basic predic-
tions, firms in a heterogeneous industry, i.e. machinery, that have a higher productivity
or more organizational capital typically have a larger product scope, with the respective
elasticities varying between 3.6% and 4.3%. In contrast, for a homogeneous industry, i.e.
textiles, the positive and statistically (high) significant relationships do not hold anymore,
as predicted by the model.
As a robustness check, the regression is one by one conducted with (i) productivity
estimations based on the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure and (ii) organizational
capital computations based on the capitalization of the SGA expenses (XSGA) with varying
capitalization and depreciation rates (10% instead of 20% as well as 20% instead of 10%).
In addition, the regression is undertaken for (iii) different periods (2000-2010 and 2005-
2015) and points in time (2010 and 2015). All the results of the alternative specifications do
not vary systematically from the presented baseline specification and are thus not further
documented here.
Summarizing, the empirical exercise on manufacturing firms in three European coun-
tries verifies the model’s basic predictions that firms in heterogeneous industries that have a
higher productivity or more organizational capital have a larger product scope, in contrast
to firms in homogeneous industries for which the relationship does not hold.
4.5 Conclusion
Based on the traditional resource-based theory of firms, this chapter develops a theory of
multi-product firms with both dis-economies of scope and asymmetric products in inter-
national trade. Firms with a flexible manufacturing technology in production are endowed
with some production cost-reducing resource, called organizational capital, which is (in
the short run) for each firm limited in volume and for which firms have to decide over its
allocation across the product mix. In (sufficiently) heterogeneous industries, multi-product
firms concentrate in their organizational capital allocation on varieties close to their core
competency variety and operate with a larger product scope when they are endowed with a
larger amount of organizational capital. Furthermore, more productive multi-product firms
have a larger product scope. Opening up to international trade, firms adjust their alloca-
tion of organizational capital, their intensive and extensive margin in response to changes
in the cost parameters of trade. A trade liberalization induces the resource-endowed multi-
product firms to increase their product scope, to allocate less organizational capital to each
intra-marginal product and to increase their overall sales (revenue). Under some (standard)
functional specification for the production costs, firms with a larger scope respond less to
trade shocks, both at the extensive and intensive margin.
For firm-level data on production factors and performance, some of the basic predictions
of the theory are consistent with the provided empirical evidence and organizational capital
in general is shown to be a relevant factor in the production process of firms, which provides
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(i) direct and (ii) indirect empirical support for the developed theory of multi-product firms
in international trade.
Appendix D
D.1 Product Variety Demand
Each individual maximizes the utility subject to the budget constraint and thereby derives
the individual demand for the product variety ω ∈ Ωk. To implement this technically, the
Lagrange function L is established and its derivative with respect to qk(ω) is set equal to
zero, as it is required by the Lagrange theorem to compute the optimum of the objective
function:
L =
[∫
Ωk
qk(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
+ λk
[
γky −
∫
Ωk
pk(ω)qk(ω)dω
]
,
with λk > 0 as the (industry-specific) Lagrange multiplier, and
∂L
∂qk(ω)
=
σ
σ − 1
[∫
Ωk
qk(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1−1 σ − 1
σ
qk(ω)
σ−1
σ
−1 − λkpk(ω) != 0,
which yields
qk(ω)
− 1
σ
[∫
Ωk
qk(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] 1
σ−1
= λkpk(ω).
By making use of the utility index Uk, the first-order condition can be rewritten as
qk(ω)
− 1
σU
1
σ
k = λkpk(ω) ⇔ qk(ω) = Ukλ−σk pk(ω)−σ. (D.1)
To determine a term for Ukλ
−σ
k , qk(ω) by itself is plugged into the budget constraint
γky =
∫
Ωk
pk(ω)qk(ω)dω = Ukλ
−σ
k
∫
Ωk
pk(ω)
1−σdω
and the latter rearranged to get
γky
[∫
Ωk
pk(ω)
1−σdω
]−1
= Ukλ
−σ
k ,
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while its substitution back into the right equation of (D.1) yields
qk(ω) = γky
[∫
Ωk
pk(ω)
1−σdω
]−1
pk(ω)
−σ.
Aggregating the individual demand over the L individuals provides the aggregate demand
for the product variety ω ∈ Ωk, xk(ω) = Lqk(ω),
xk(ω) = Lγky
[∫
Ωk
pk(ω)
1−σdω
]−1
pk(ω)
−σ,
which can be written as
xk(ω) = LγkyP
σ−1
k pk(ω)
−σ,
with Pk ≡
[∫
Ωk
pk(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
as the CES price index of industry k, and, by summarizing
the variety-invariant parameters and aggregates, written as
xk(ω) = Akpk(ω)
−σ, (D.2)
with Ak ≡ LγkyP σ−1k as the residual demand of industry k.
D.2 Additive Cost Specification
For an additive specification, the marginal production costs of variety ω take the form
c(ω, z) = awzn(ω) with n(ω) ≡ h(ω) + o(ω)−θ (D.3)
and have the properties that they are increasing in the unit production costs
∂c(ω, z)
∂h(ω)
= awz
∂n(ω)
∂h(ω)
= awz > 0, (D.4)
decreasing in the allocated organizational capital
∂c(ω, z)
∂o(ω)
= awz
∂n(ω)
∂o(ω)
= −θawzo(ω)−θ−1 < 0 (D.5)
and their overall change due to the production of some variety with less competency
∂c(ω, z)
∂ω
= awz
∂n(ω)
∂ω
= awz
(
∂h(ω)
∂ω
− θo(ω)−θ−1∂o(ω)
∂ω
)
(D.6)
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depends on the change in the flexible manufacturing technology and the adjusted semi-
elasticity of the organizational capital allocation:
∂c(ω, z)
∂ω
T 0 ⇔ ∂h(ω)
∂ω
T θo(ω)−1∂o(ω)
∂ω
o(ω)−θ. (D.7)
D.3 Multiplicative Cost Specification with Spillovers
In a study on US manufacturing firms over the period 1982-2011, Chen and Inklaar (2016)
do not find any productivity spillovers of organizational capital between firms, but the
existence of spillovers between products within a firm is not examined by the authors and
thus can not be rejected by their work. For a multiplicative specification with product-level
spillovers of organizational capital, the marginal production costs of variety ω can take the
form
c(ω, z) = awzn(ω) + τO−ω with n(ω) = h(ω)o(ω)−θ (D.8)
and with O−ω ≡
∫
i∈{0,...,δ}\{ω,...,δ} o(i)
−θdi as the aggregate organizational capital allocated
to varieties closer to the core competency than variety ω by itself as well as τ ∈ (0, 1) as
the parameter of the strength of the organizational capital spillovers. Equation (D.8) can
be rewritten in the way that
c(ω, z) = (awzh(ω)− τ) o(ω)−θ + τ
∫ ω
0
o(i)−θdi (D.9)
and the marginal production costs therefore have the properties that they are increasing
in the unit production costs
∂c(ω, z)
∂h(ω)
= awzo(ω)−θ > 0, (D.10)
decreasing in the allocated organizational capital
∂c(ω, z)
∂o(ω)
= −θ (awzh(ω)− τ) o(ω)−θ−1 − τθo(ω)−θ−1 = −θawzh(ω)o(ω)−θ−1 < 0 (D.11)
and their overall change due to the production of some variety with less competency is
given by
∂c(ω, z)
∂ω
= −θ (awzh(ω)− τ) o(ω)−θ−1∂o(ω)
∂ω
+ o(ω)−θawz
∂h(ω)
∂ω
+ τo(ω)−θ, (D.12)
which can be simplified to
∂c(ω, z)
∂ω
=
(
−θ (awzh(ω)− τ) o(ω)−1∂o(ω)
∂ω
+ awz
∂h(ω)
∂ω
+ τ
)
o(ω)−θ.
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Therefore, the overall change in the marginal production costs depends on the adjusted
change in the flexible manufacturing technology, the adjusted semi-elasticity of the orga-
nizational capital allocation and the spillovers parameter:
∂c(ω, z)
∂ω
T 0 ⇔
LHS︷ ︸︸ ︷
awz
∂h(ω)
∂ω
T
RHS︷ ︸︸ ︷
θawzh(ω)
∂o(ω)
∂ω
o(ω)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
− τ
(
θ
∂o(ω)
∂ω
o(ω)−1 + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
. (D.13)
With τ = 0, the cost specification reduces to the simple multiplicative cost specification,
but it differs in the case that τ ∈ (0, 1) holds, i.e. the existence of spillovers of organizational
capital:
(1) In case of an increasing allocation of organizational capital, ∂o(ω)
∂ω
> 0, term (1) and
term (2) are positive and the spillovers by themselves make it more likely that LHS >
RHS holds and that an increasing cost profile is given. Therefore, the spillovers struc-
turally counteract the (decreasing) cost profile that is implied by the organizational
capital allocation.
(2) In case of a decreasing allocation of organizational capital, ∂o(ω)
∂ω
< 0, term (1) is
always negative and the sign of term (2) depends on the magnitude of the decrease
in the allocation of organizational capital:
For the case that (i) the decrease is only limited, i.e. θ ∂o(ω)
∂ω
o(ω)−1 ∈ (−1, 0), term
(2) is positive and the spillovers just reinforce the increasing cost profile. However,
for the case that (ii) the decrease is not limited, i.e. θ ∂o(ω)
∂ω
o(ω)−1 ∈ (−∞,−1), term
(2) is negative and the spillovers by themselves make it more likely that LHS <
RHS holds and that a decreasing cost profile is given, which is even more likely in
case of stronger spillovers, i.e. the larger the spillovers parameter τ . Therefore, the
spillovers structurally counteract the (increasing) cost profile that is implied by the
organizational capital allocation.
In sum, spillovers of organizational capital have counteracting effects on the cost profile
that is implied by the organizational capital allocation, partly provided that the allocation
of organizational capital is sufficiently strong in its change across the product varieties.
D.4 Organizational Efficiency
By incorporating a firm’s ability of making use of the organizational capital, which is
called organizational efficiency θ˜ and which can be related to the production efficiency 1
z
for making use of labor, the composite cost component can be written in the form
nk(ω, θ˜) = hk(ω)ok(ω)
−θ˜ (D.14)
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with θ˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Since a higher organizational efficiency θ˜ should be associated with lower
production costs for some allocated amount of organizational capital, it is required that
∂ck(ω, z, θ˜)
∂θ˜
=
∂ck(ω, z, θ˜)
∂ ln ck(ω, z, θ˜)
∂ ln ck(ω, z, θ˜)
∂θ˜
= −ck(ω, z, θ˜) ln ok(ω) ≤ 0,
which is satisfied for the case that ok(ω) ≥ 1. Therefore, the marginal production costs in
case of an organizational efficiency parameter θ˜ are written as
ck(ω, z, θ˜) =
awznk(ω, θ˜) = awzhk(ω)ok(ω)−θ˜ for ok(ω) ≥ 1+∞ otherwise. (D.15)
D.5 Price Setting
To set the optimal price, the firm solves the following profit maximization problem:
max
pk(ω,z,O)
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[(pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O))xk(ω, z, O)− fk,ω] dω.
With xk(ω, z, O) = Akpk(ω, z, O)
−σ as the (received) product demand, the profit function
can be written as
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
(pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O))Akpk(ω, z, O)−σ − fk,ω
]
dω
and its derivative with respect to pk(ω, z, O) is set equal to zero:
∂Πk(z,O)
∂pk(ω, z, O)
= Akpk(ω, z, O)
−σ + (pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O)) (−σ)Akpk(ω, z, O)−σ−1 != 0.
Rearranging the first-order condition to isolate the price yields
pk(ω, z, O) =
σ
σ − 1ck(ω, z, O). (D.16)
D.6 Profit Function
The profit function of a firm with z and O, Πk(z,O), is (strictly) monotonically increasing
in the allocated organizational capital ok(ω). It is given by
Πk(z, O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σok(ω)θ(σ−1) − fk,ω
]
dω (D.17)
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with ζk(z) ≡ Akσ
(
1
awz
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
> 0. The first and second derivatives with respect to ok(ω)
are then be written as
∂Πk(z,O)
∂ok(ω)
= ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σθ(σ − 1)ok(ω)θ(σ−1)−1 > 0 and (D.18)
∂2Πk(z, O)
∂ok(ω)2
= ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σθ(σ − 1) (θ(σ − 1)− 1) ok(ω)θ(σ−1)−2 ≷ 0, (D.19)
respectively. Depending on the elasticity of substitution across product varieties within the
industries, the second derivative is positive or negative and the profit function therefore
convex or concave in the organizational capital allocation. For a sufficiently high elasticity
of substitution (i.e. σ > 1 + 1
θ
), the profit function is convex in ok(ω), while for industries
with less substitutable product varieties (i.e. σ < 1 + 1
θ
), the second derivative becomes
negative and the profit function concave in the organizational capital allocation. The shape
of the profit function and therefore industry properties have important implications for the
chosen structure of the organizational capital allocation by multi-product firms.
D.7 Organizational Capital Allocation
To choose the optimal organizational capital allocation, the firm solves the following profit
maximization problem:
max
ok(ω)
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σok(ω)θ(σ−1) − fk,ω
]
dω s.t.
∫ δk(z,O)
0
ok(ω)dω = O.
To implement this technically, the Lagrange function L is established and its derivative
with respect to ok(ω) is set equal to zero, as it is required by the Lagrange theorem to
compute the optimum of the objective function:
L =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σok(ω)θ(σ−1) − fk,ω
]
dω + λk
[
O −
∫ δk(z,O)
0
ok(ω)dω
]
with λk > 0 as the (industry-specific) Lagrange multiplier and
∂L
∂ok(ω)
= ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σθ(σ − 1)ok(ω)θ(σ−1)−1 − λk != 0.
Rearranging the first-order condition to isolate the organizational capital allocation yields
ok(ω) =
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
. (D.20)
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Under the assumption that the product scope δk is kept constant, the derivative of equation
(D.20) with respect to ω is given by
∂ok(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
=
1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1−1
× 1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)λk(σ − 1)hk(ω)
σ−2∂hk(ω)
∂ω
.
Simplifying the derivative then yields
∂ok(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
=
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
−1∂hk(ω)
∂ω
.
D.8 (Marginal) Cost Profile
With the organizational capital allocation ok(ω) in equation (4.15), the composite cost
component can be written as
nk(ω) = hk(ω)ok(ω)
−θ = hk(ω)
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
)− θ
θ(σ−1)−1
.
Simplifying this equation then yields
nk(ω) =
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)
λk
) θ
θ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
− 1
θ(σ−1)−1 = ψk(z)hk(ω)
− 1
θ(σ−1)−1 , (D.21)
with ψk(z) ≡
(
θ(σ−1)ζk(z)
λk
) θ
θ(σ−1)−1
> 0 as the variety-invariant constant of the composite
cost component.
Under the assumption that the product scope δk is kept constant, the derivative of
equation (D.21) with respect to ω is given by
∂nk(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
= ψk(z)
(
− 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)
hk(ω)
− 1
θ(σ−1)−1−1∂hk(ω)
∂ω
,
which simplifies to
∂nk(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk=const.
= − ψk(z)
θ(σ − 1)− 1hk(ω)
− θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
∂hk(ω)
∂ω
.
174 APPENDIX D.
D.9 Marginal Profitability of Organizational Capital
With the organizational capital allocation ok(ω) in equation (4.15), the resource constraint
that is binding can be written as
∫ δk(z,O)
0
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
dω = O
and rearranging yields
λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω = O. (D.22)
To present the marginal profitability of organizational capital in a more compact way, an
(aggregate) index of the flexible manufacturing technology is defined:
Hk(δk(z, O)) ≡
[∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1
.
Its derivative with respect to δk(z,O) is then given by
∂Hk(δk(z,O))
∂δk(z,O)
=
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
[∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1 −1
hk(δk(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
and can be simplified to
∂Hk(δk(z,O))
∂δk(z,O)
=
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 Hk(δk(z,O))
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 ,
with the result that the relation
∂Hk(δk(z, O))
∂δk(z,O)
≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≷ 1 + 1
θ
holds.
Deploying the flexible manufacturing technology index in equation (D.22) provides
λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
Hk(δk(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 = O
and finally by rearranging
λk(z,O, δk(z,O)) = θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk(z,O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−1. (D.23)
The derivatives of the marginal profitability of organizational capital with respect to its
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arguments are given by
∂λk(z,O, δk(z,O))
∂z
= θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk(z,O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−1∂ζk(z)
∂z
,
∂λk(z,O, δk(z,O))
∂O
= (θ(σ − 1)− 1)θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk(z,O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−2
and
∂λk(z,O, δk(z,O))
∂δk(z,O)
= −θ(σ − 1)2ζk(z)Oθ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk(z, O))−σ ∂Hk(δk(z,O))
∂δk(z,O)
,
with
∂λk
∂z
< 0 and
∂λk
∂O
≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≷ 1 + 1
θ
as well as
∂λk
∂δk
≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≶ 1 + 1
θ
.
D.10 Product Scope Choice
To choose the optimal product scope, the firm solves the following profit maximization
problem:
max
δk(z,O)
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σok(ω)θ(σ−1) − fk,ω
]
dω.
With the organizational capital allocation ok(ω) in equation (4.15), the profit function can
be written as
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
[
ζk(z)hk(ω)
1−σ
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
− fk,ω
]
dω
and simplifying yields
Πk(z, O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
( 1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − fk,ω
 dω.
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The derivative of the profit function with respect to δk(z, O) is set equal to zero:
∂Πk(z,O)
∂δk(z, O)
=
(
1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − fk,ω
+
∫ δk(z,O)
0
( 1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1
× λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1−1
k
∂λk
∂δk(z, O)
]
dω
!
= 0
and, by rearranging, simplifying as well as deploying the flexible manufacturing technology
index, the first-order condition takes the form
(
1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+
(
1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k Hk(δk(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
∂λk
∂δk(z,O)
= fk,ω.
D.11 Firms’ Behavior at the Extensive Margin
The marginal profitability of organizational capital is given by
λk = θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1 (D.24)
and the product scope is implicitly determined by
ηk(z)λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 +
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1Hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1λ−1k
∂λk
∂δk
)
= fk,ω, (D.25)
with
ηk(z) ≡
(
1
ζk(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
> 0.
With ζk(z) =
1
σ−1Ak
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ, equation (D.24) can be rewritten as
λk = θ(σ − 1) 1
σ − 1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σHk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1 (D.26)
and equation (D.25) can be rewritten as
(
1
σ − 1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)− 1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1)− θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k
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×
(
hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 +
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1Hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1λ−1k
∂λk
∂δk
)
= fk,ω. (D.27)
Plugging ∂λk
∂δk
and ∂Hk(δk)
∂δk
into equation (D.27) and simplifying it yields
(
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)− 1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1Hk(δk)
σ−1−σ(θ(σ−1)−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 λ−1k θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Oθ(σ−1)−1(1− σ)
×θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 Hk(δk)
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω
and (
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)− 1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+θHk(δk)
σ−1−σθ(σ−1)+σ+θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 λ−1k θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Oθ(σ−1)−1(1− σ)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω,
which can be further rewritten by using ζk(z) =
1
σ−1Ak
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ:
(
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)− 1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+θHk(δk)
(θ(σ−1)−1)(1−σ)
θ(σ−1)−1 λ−1k θ(σ − 1)
1
σ − 1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
×Oθ(σ−1)−1(1− σ)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω. (D.28)
Rearranging and simplifying equation (D.28) further yields
(
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)− 1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1 + θHk(δk)
1−σλ−1k θAk
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ Oθ(σ−1)−1(1− σ)
)
= fk,ω,
(
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)− 1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
σ − 1A
−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)−σ
(awz)σ−1 − θHk(δk)1−σλ−1k θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω
and finally
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
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×
(
1
σ − 1A
−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)−σ
(awz)σ−1 − θHk(δk)1−σλ−1k θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω. (D.29)
The equation system on the marginal profitability of organizational capital and the product
scope is then given by the simplified equation (D.26)
λk = θAk
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σHk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1 (D.30)
and by equation (D.29)
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
σ − 1A
−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)−σ
(awz)σ−1 − θHk(δk)1−σλ−1k θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω. (D.31)
The total differentiation of equation (D.30) takes the general form
d lnλk =
∂ lnλk
∂ ln z
d ln z +
∂ lnλk
∂ lnO
d lnO +
∂ lnλk
∂ ln δk
d ln δk, (D.32)
with
∂ lnλk
∂ ln z
=
∂ lnλk
∂λk
∂λk
∂z
∂z
∂ ln z
=
z
λk
∂λk
∂z
,
∂ lnλk
∂ ln z
=
z
λk
(
θAk
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(aw)1−σ (1− σ)z−σHk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1
)
and
∂ lnλk
∂ ln z
=
z
λk
(1− σ)λkz−1 = (1− σ), (D.33)
∂ lnλk
∂ lnO
=
∂ lnλk
∂λk
∂λk
∂O
∂O
∂ lnO
=
O
λk
∂λk
∂O
,
∂ lnλk
∂ lnO
=
O
λk
(
θAk
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σHk(δk)1−σ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)Oθ(σ−1)−2
)
and
∂ lnλk
∂ lnO
=
O
λk
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)λkO−1 = (θ(σ − 1)− 1), (D.34)
∂ lnλk
∂ ln δk
=
∂ lnλk
∂λk
∂λk
∂δk
∂δk
∂ ln δk
=
δk
λk
∂λk
∂δk
,
∂ lnλk
∂ ln δk
=
δk
λk
(
θAk
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ (1− σ)Hk(δk)−σ ∂Hk(δk)
∂δk
Oθ(σ−1)−1
)
and
∂ lnλk
∂ ln δk
=
δk
λk
(1− σ)∂Hk(δk)
∂δk
λkHk(δk)
−1 = (1− σ) δk
Hk(δk)
∂Hk(δk)
∂δk
. (D.35)
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With
Hk(δk) =
[∫ δk
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1
and
∂Hk(δk)
∂δk
=
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 Hk(δk)
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 ,
equation (D.35) simplifies to
∂ lnλk
∂ ln δk
= (1− σ) δk
Hk(δk)
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 Hk(δk)
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
and
∂ lnλk
∂ ln δk
= −(θ(σ − 1)− 1)δkHk(δk)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 . (D.36)
Plugging equation (D.33), equation (D.34) and equation (D.36) into equation (D.32) pro-
vides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the marginal profitability of
organizational capital:
d lnλk = −(σ − 1)d ln z + (θ(σ − 1)− 1)d lnO
− (θ(σ − 1)− 1)δkHk(δk)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1d ln δk. (D.37)
The total differentiation of equation (D.31) takes the general form
d ln δk =
∂ ln δk
∂ ln z
d ln z +
∂ ln δk
∂ lnO
d lnO +
∂ ln δk
∂ lnλk
d lnλk, (D.38)
with
∂ ln δk
∂ ln z
=
∂ ln δk
∂δk
∂δk
∂z
∂z
∂ ln z
=
z
δk
∂δk
∂z
=
z
δk
(
− ∂F/∂z
∂F/∂δk
)
,
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∂
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∂
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  −
A
θ
(σ
−
1
)−
2
θ
(σ
−
1
)−
1
k
( σ−1 σ
)σθ(σ−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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1
)−
2
σ
θ
(σ
−
1
)−
1
(a
w
z)
(1
−
σ
)(
θ
(σ
−
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−
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−
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−
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∂
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∂
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−
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2
θ
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−
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θ
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
1
)−
2
θ
(σ
−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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−
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∂
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∂
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  −
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∂
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∂
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∂
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∂
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  −
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.3
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D.12 Margins of Multi-product Firms
The overall output of a firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being active
in industry k (firm-intensive margin) is given by
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
xk(ω, z, O)dω. (D.46)
With the (aggregate) demand xk(ω) = Akpk(ω)
−σ, equation (D.46) can be written as
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Akpk(ω)
−σdω
and it can be further rewritten by using firstly the price choice of the firm,
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1ck(ω, z, O)
)−σ
dω,
secondly the marginal production costs of the firm,
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awznk(ω))
−σ dω
and
Xk(z, O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)−σ(hk(ω)ok(ω)−θ)−σdω,
as well as thirdly the organizational capital allocation of the firm,
Xk(z, O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)−σhk(ω)−σ
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
dω,
whose simplified equivalent can be further rewritten by using ζk(z) ≡ Akσ
(
1
awz
σ−1
σ
)σ−1
as
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)−σ
(
θ(σ − 1)
λk
)− θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
Ak
σ
(
1
awz
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1)− θσθ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω. (D.47)
Simplifying equation (D.47) yields
Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) θσ(σ−1)−σ(θ(σ−1)−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(
θ(σ − 1)
σ
)− θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
×λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω,
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Xk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ+θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k
×θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω
and
Xk(z,O) = A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k
×θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω.
The output of each product (product-intensive margin) is thus given by
xk(ω, z, O) = A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k
×θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
and its derivate with respect to the product-extensive margin is computed as
∂xk(ω, z, O)
∂δk(z,O)
=
θσ
θ(σ − 1)− 1A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
×λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1−1
k
∂λk
∂δk
and
∂xk(ω, z, O)
∂δk(z,O)
=
θσ
θ(σ − 1)− 1A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
× λ
θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
∂λk
∂δk
. (D.48)
The derivative of the firm-intensive margin with respect to the product-extensive margin
is computed as
∂Xk(z, O)
∂δk(z,O)
= A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k θ
− θσ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
+A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(
θσ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)
λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1−1
k
∂λk
∂δk
×θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω
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and
∂Xk(z, O)
∂δk(z, O)
= A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θσ
θ(σ−1)−1
k θ
− θσ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1
+A
− θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ
σ − 1
) σ(1+θ)
θ(σ−1)−1
(
θσ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)
(awz)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ+1
θ(σ−1)−1
k
∂λk
∂δk
×θ− θσθ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ
θ(σ−1)−1dω.
The overall sales (revenue) of a firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being
active in industry k are given by
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
rk(ω, z, O)dω,
with rk(ω, z, O) = pk(ω, z, O)xk(ω, z, O) as the sales (revenue) of product variety ω, and
therefore by
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
pk(ω, z, O)xk(ω, z, O)dω. (D.49)
With the (aggregate) demand xk(ω) = Akpk(ω)
−σ, equation (D.49) can be written as
Rk(z, O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
pk(ω, z, O)Akpk(ω, z, O)
−σdω
and its simplified equivalent can be further rewritten by using firstly the price choice of
the firm,
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1ck(ω, z, O)
)1−σ
dω,
secondly the marginal production costs of the firm,
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awznk(ω))
1−σ dω
and
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σ
(
hk(ω)ok(ω)
−θ)1−σ dω,
as well as thirdly the organizational capital allocation of the firm,
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σ hk(ω)1−σ
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
dω,
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whose simplified equivalent can be further rewritten by using λk = θ(σ−1)ζk(z)Hk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1
as
Rk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σ hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
(
Hk(δk)
1−σOθ(σ−1)−1
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 dω
and
Rk(z, O) = Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σHk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)
×
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω. (D.50)
Simplifying equation (D.50) yields
Rk(z,O) = Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σHk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
and
Rk(z,O) = Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σ Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk(z,O))−(σ−1).
The profits of product variety ω are given by
pik(ω, z, O) = (pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O))xk(ω, z, O)− fk,ω. (D.51)
With the (aggregate) demand xk(ω) = Akpk(ω)
−σ, equation (D.51) can be written as
pik(ω, z, O) = (pk(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O))Akpk(ω, z, O)−σ − fk,ω
and it can be further rewritten by using firstly the price choice of the firm,
pik(ω, z, O) =
(
σ
σ − 1ck(ω, z, O)− ck(ω, z, O
)
Ak
(
σ
σ − 1ck(ω, z, O)
)−σ
− fk,ω
and
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Akck(ω, z, O)
1−σ − fk,ω,
secondly the marginal production costs of the firm,
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ nk(ω)1−σ − fk,ω
and
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ (hk(ω)ok(ω)−θ)1−σ − fk,ω,
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as well as thirdly the organizational capital allocation of the firm,
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ hk(ω)1−σ
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
−fk,ω,
whose simplified equivalent can be further rewritten by using λk = θ(σ−1)ζk(z)Hk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1
as
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
× (Hk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1 − fk,ω. (D.52)
Rearranging equation (D.52) yields
pik(ω, z, O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σHk(δk(z,O))
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1−fk,ω.
The overall profits of a firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being active
in industry k are given by
Πk(z,O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
pik(ω, z, O)dω,
Πk(z, O) =
∫ δk(z,O)
0
(
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σHk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1
×Oθ(σ−1)hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − fk,ω
)
dω,
and
Πk(z,O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σHk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)
×
∫ δk(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω − δkfk,ω. (D.53)
Simplifying equation (D.53) yields
Πk(z,O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σHk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − δkfk,ω
and
Πk(z,O) =
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk(z,O))−(σ−1) − δk(z,O)fk,ω.
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D.13 Organizational Capital Threshold
The organizational capital threshold O?k(z) is characterized by the condition
pik(0, z, O
?
k(z))|ok(0)=O = 0,
which takes the form
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak (awz)
1−σ (O?k(z))
θ(σ−1) − fk,ω = 0
and can be rearranged to isolate O?k(z) as
O?k(z) =
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ)
(
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(awz)
1
θ .
The organizational capital threshold O?k(z) is decreasing in the firm productivity
1
z
,
∂O?k(z)
∂z
=
1
θ
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ)
(
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(aw)
1
θ z
1
θ
−1 > 0,
and increasing in the elasticity of substitution across product varieties, whereas the loga-
rithm of the threshold can be written as
lnO?k(z) =
1
θ(1− σ) (lnAk − ln ((σ − 1)fk,ω)) +
σ
θ(1− σ) (ln(σ − 1)− lnσ) +
1
θ
ln(awz)
and its derivative with respect to ln σ is given by
∂ lnO?k(z)
∂ lnσ
=
∂ lnO?k(z)
∂σ
∂σ
∂ lnσ
and
∂ lnO?k(z)
∂ lnσ
= σ
(
θ
(θ(1− σ))2 (lnAk − ln ((σ − 1)fk,ω))−
1
θ(1− σ)
fk,ω
(σ − 1)fk,ω
+
θ(1− σ) + θσ
(θ(1− σ))2 (ln(σ − 1)− lnσ) +
σ
θ(1− σ)
(
1
σ − 1 −
1
σ
))
. (D.54)
Simplifying equation (D.54) yields
∂ lnO?k(z)
∂ lnσ
= σ
(
1
θ(1− σ)2 ln
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
)
+
1
θ(1− σ)2 +
1
θ(1− σ)2 ln
(
σ − 1
σ
)
+
σ
θ(1− σ)
σ − (σ − 1)
σ(σ − 1)
)
,
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and
∂ lnO?(z)
∂ lnσ
=
σ
θ(1− σ)2
(
ln
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
)
+ ln
(
σ − 1
σ
))
> 0.
D.14 Multi-product Firms in Heterogeneous Indus-
tries
With the organizational capital threshold
O?k(z) =
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ)
(
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(awz)
1
θ ,
the equation that characterizes the product scope (equation (D.31)),
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
σ − 1A
−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)−σ
(awz)σ−1 − θHk(δk)1−σλ−1k θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω,
can be written as
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1) − θHk(δk)1−σλ−1k θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω. (D.55)
With the marginal profitability of organizational capital λk(z, O, δk(z,O)) in equation
(4.22), equation (D.55) can be further rewritten as
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk)1−σ
×Oθ(σ−1)−1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk) σ−1θ(σ−1)−1 ( 1
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1)
−θHk(δk)1−σ
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk(z)Hk(δk)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1
)−1
θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= fk,ω,
which can be simplified to get
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1
×ζk(z)
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
(
1
(σ − 1)2fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1)
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−θHk(δk)1−σθ−1(σ − 1)−1ζk(z)−1Hk(δk)σ−1θ
)
= fk,ω
and rewritten by using ζk(z) =
1
σ−1Ak
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ as
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(awz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1
(
1
σ − 1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
× (awz)1−σ) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1 Hk(δk)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk) σ−1θ(σ−1)−1 ( 1
(σ − 1)2fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1) − θHk(δk)1−σ
×θ−1(σ − 1)−1
(
1
σ − 1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)−1
Hk(δk)
σ−1θ
)
= fk,ω. (D.56)
Simplifying equation (D.56) yields
A2k
(
σ − 1
σ
)2σ
(awz)
−θ(σ−1)2+2(σ−1)−θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1 Hk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
(σ − 1)2fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1) − θ(σ − 1)−1
(
1
σ − 1Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)−1)
= fk,ω,
which can be rewritten by using the organizational capital threshold,
O?k(z) =
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ)
(
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(awz)
1
θ ,
as
A2k
(
σ − 1
σ
)2σ
(awz)
−2(σ−1)(θ(σ−1)−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 Hk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
(σ − 1)2fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1) − θ
(σ − 1)fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1)
)
= fk,ω, (D.57)
and finally simplifying equation (D.57) yields(
Ak
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(awz)1−σ
)2
Hk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
× 1− θ(σ − 1)
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1) = fk,ω. (D.58)
The overall sales (revenue) of a firm with productivity 1
z
and organizational capital O being
active in industry k are given by
Rk(z,O) = Ak
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ
(awz)1−σ Oθ(σ−1)Hk(δk)−(σ−1). (D.59)
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With the organizational capital threshold
O?k(z) =
(
Ak
(σ − 1)fk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ)
(
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(awz)
1
θ ,
equation (D.59) can be rewritten as
Rk(z, O) =
σ
σ − 1O
?
k(z)
θ(1−σ)(σ − 1)fk,ωOθ(σ−1)Hk(δk)−(σ−1),
and
Rk(z,O) = σO
?
k(z)
θ(1−σ)fk,ωOθ(σ−1)Hk(δk)−(σ−1), (D.60)
while equation (D.58) can be rewritten as
(
(σ − 1)fk,ωO?k(z)θ(1−σ)
)2
Hk(δk)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×1− θ(σ − 1)
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)fk,ωO
?
k(z)
θ(σ−1) = fk,ω,
which can be simplified and rearranged as
O?k(z)
θ(1−σ)fk,ωOθ(σ−1) =
fk,ω
1− θ(σ − 1)hk(δk)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1 . (D.61)
Plugging equation (D.61) into equation (D.60) yields
Rk(z,O) = σ
fk,ω
1− θ(σ − 1)hk(δk)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk)
−(σ−1),
which can be simplified as
Rk(z, O) =
σ
1− θ(σ − 1)fk,ωhk(δk)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
and
Rk(z,O) =
σ
1− θ(σ − 1)fk,ω
(
hk(δk(z,O))
Hk(δk(z, O))
) 1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
.
D.15 Product Variety Demand in the Open Economy
Each individual in country j maximizes the utility subject to the budget constraint and
thereby derives the individual demand for the product variety ω ∈ Ωk,ij that is produced in
country i and supplied to country j. To implement this technically, the Lagrange function
L is established and its derivative with respect to qk,ij(ω) is set equal to zero, as it is
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required by the Lagrange theorem to compute the optimum of the objective function:
L =
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
qk,ij(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
+ λk,j
[
γk,jyj −
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)qk,ij(ω)dω
]
,
with λk,j > 0 as the (industry- and country-specific) Lagrange multiplier, and
∂L
∂qk,ij(ω)
=
σ
σ − 1
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
qk,ij(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1−1
σ − 1
σ
qk,ij(ω)
σ−1
σ
−1 − λk,jpk,ij(ω) != 0,
which yields
qk,ij(ω)
− 1
σ
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
qk,ij(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] 1
σ−1
= λk,jpk,ij(ω).
By making use of the utility index Uk,j, the first-order condition can be rewritten as
qk,ij(ω)
− 1
σU
1
σ
k,j = λk,jpk,ij(ω) ⇔ qk,ij(ω) = Uk,jλ−σk,j pk,ij(ω)−σ. (D.62)
To determine a term for Uk,jλ
−σ
k,j , qk,ij(ω) by itself is plugged into the budget constraint
γk,jyj =
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)qk,ij(ω)dω = Uk,jλ
−σ
k,j
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)
1−σdω
and the latter rearranged to get
γk,jyj
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)
1−σdω
]−1
= Uk,jλ
−σ
k,j ,
while its substitution back into the right equation of (D.62) yields
qk,ij(ω) = γk,jyj
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)
1−σdω
]−1
pk,ij(ω)
−σ.
Aggregating the individual demand over the Lj individuals provides the aggregate (country-
wide) demand for the product variety ω ∈ Ωk,ij that is produced in country i and supplied
to country j, xk,ij(ω) = Ljqk,ij(ω),
xk,ij(ω) = Ljγk,jyj
[
I∑
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)
1−σdω
]−1
pk,ij(ω)
−σ,
which can be written as
xk,ij(ω) = Ljγk,jyjP
σ−1
k,j pk,ij(ω)
−σ,
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with Pk,j ≡
[∑I
i=1
∫
Ωk,ij
pk,ij(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
as the CES price index of industry k in country
j, and, by summarizing the variety-invariant parameters and aggregates, written as
xk,ij(ω) = Ak,jpk,ij(ω)
−σ, (D.63)
with Ak,j ≡ Ljγk,jyjP σ−1k,j as the residual demand of industry k in country j.
D.16 Price Setting in the Open Economy
To set the optimal price, the firm solves the following profit maximization problem:
max
pk,ij(ω,z,O)
Πk,ij(z, O) =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
[
(pk,ij(ω, z, O)− ck,ij(ω, z, O))xk,ij(ω, z, O)− f ijk,ω
]
dω.
With xk,ij(ω, z, O) = Ak,jpk,ij(ω, z, O)
−σ as the (received) product demand, the profit func-
tion can be written as
Πk,ij(z,O) =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
[
(pk,ij(ω, z, O)− ck,ij(ω, z, O))Ak,jpk,ij(ω, z, O)−σ − f ijk,ω
]
dω
and its derivative with respect to pk,ij(ω, z, O) is set equal to zero:
∂Πk,ij(z,O)
∂pk,ij(ω, z, O)
= Ak,jpk,ij(ω, z, O)
−σ + (pk,ij(ω, z, O)− ck,ij(ω, z, O))
×(−σ)Ak,jpk,ij(ω, z, O)−σ−1 != 0.
Rearranging the first-order condition to isolate the price yields
pk,ij(ω, z, O) =
σ
σ − 1ck,ij(ω, z, O). (D.64)
D.17 Organizational Capital Allocation in the Open
Economy
To choose the optimal organizational capital allocation, the firm solves the following profit
maximization problem:
max
ok,ij(ω)
Πk,ij(z,O) =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
[
ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
1−σok,ij(ω)θ(σ−1) − f ijk,ω
]
dω
s.t.
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
ok,ij(ω)dω = O.
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To implement this technically, the Lagrange function L is established and its derivative
with respect to ok,ij(ω) is set equal to zero, as it is required by the Lagrange theorem to
compute the optimum of the objective function:
L =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
[
ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
1−σok,ij(ω)θ(σ−1) − f ijk,ω
]
dω + λk,ij
[
O −
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
ok,ij(ω)dω
]
with λk,ij > 0 as the (industry- and country-specific) Lagrange multiplier and
∂L
∂ok,ij(ω)
= ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
1−σθ(σ − 1)ok,ij(ω)θ(σ−1)−1 − λk,ij != 0.
Rearranging the first-order condition to isolate the organizational capital allocation yields
ok,ij(ω) =
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
. (D.65)
Under the assumption that the product scope δk,ij(z, O) is kept constant, the derivative of
equation (D.65) with respect to ω is given by
∂ok,ij(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk,ij=const.
=
1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1−1
× 1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)λk,ij(σ − 1)hk(ω)
σ−2∂hk(ω)
∂ω
.
Simplifying the derivative then yields
∂ok,ij(ω)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
δk,ij=const.
=
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
−1∂hk(ω)
∂ω
.
D.18 Marginal Profitability of Organizational Capital
in the Open Economy
With the organizational capital allocation ok,ij(ω) in equation (4.37), the resource con-
straint that is binding can be written as
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
dω = O
and rearranging yields
λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω = O. (D.66)
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To present the marginal profitability of organizational capital in a more compact way, an
(aggregate) index of the flexible manufacturing technology is defined:
Hk(δk,ij(z,O)) ≡
[∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1
.
Its derivative with respect to δk,ij(z,O) is then given by
∂Hk(δk,ij(z,O))
∂δk,ij(z,O)
=
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
[∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1 −1
hk(δk,ij(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
and can be simplified to
∂Hk(δk,ij(z,O))
∂δk,ij(z,O)
=
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 Hk(δk,ij(z,O))
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk,ij(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 ,
with the result that the relation
∂Hk(δk,ij(z, O))
∂δk,ij(z,O)
≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≷ 1 + 1
θ
holds.
Deploying the flexible manufacturing technology index in equation (D.66) provides
λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
Hk(δk,ij(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 = O
and finally by rearranging
λk,ij(z,O, δk,ij(z,O)) = θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)Hk(δk,ij(z,O))1−σOθ(σ−1)−1. (D.67)
D.19 Product Scope Choice in the Open Economy
To choose the optimal product scope, the firm solves the following profit maximization
problem:
max
δk,ij(z,O)
Πk,ij(z, O) =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
[
ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
1−σok,ij(ω)θ(σ−1) − f ijk,ω
]
dω.
With the organizational capital allocation ok,ij(ω) in equation (4.37), the profit function
can be written as
Πk,ij(z,O) =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
[
ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
1−σ
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
− f ijk,ω
]
dω
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and simplifying yields
Πk,ij(z,O) =
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
( 1
ζk,ij(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − f ijk,ω
 dω.
The derivative of the profit function with respect to δk,ij(z,O) is set equal to zero:
∂Πk,ij(z,O)
∂δk,ij(z, O)
=
(
1
ζk,ij(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij hk(δk,ij(z, O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 − f ijk,ω
+
∫ δk,ij(z,O)
0
( 1
ζk,ij(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
hk(ω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1
× λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1−1
k,ij
∂λk,ij
∂δk,ij(z,O)
]
dω
!
= 0
and, by rearranging, simplifying as well as deploying the flexible manufacturing technology
index, the first-order condition takes the form
(
1
ζk,ij(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij hk(δk,ij(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
+
(
1
ζk,ij(z)
1
θ(σ−1) θ(σ − 1)
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
θ(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1λ
1
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij Hk(δk,ij(z,O))
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
∂λk,ij
∂δk,ij(z,O)
= f ijk,ω.
D.20 Organizational Capital Threshold in the Open
Economy
The organizational capital threshold O?k,ij(z) is characterized by the condition
pik,ij(0, z, O
?
k,ij(z))|ok,ij(0)=O = 0,
which takes the form
1
σ − 1
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
Ak,j (τijawiz)
1−σ (O?k,ij(z))θ(σ−1) − f ijk,ω = 0
and can be rearranged to isolate O?k,ij(z) as
O?k,ij(z) =
(
Ak,j
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ) (
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(τijawiz)
1
θ .
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With the organizational capital threshold,
O?k,ij(z) =
(
Ak,j
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ) (
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(τijawiz)
1
θ ,
the equation that characterizes the product scope (equation (4.39)),
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(τijawiz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
σ − 1A
−1
k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)−σ
(τijawiz)
σ−1 − θHk(δk,ij)1−σλ−1k,ijθOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= f ijk,ω,
can be written as
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(τijawiz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1λ
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
k,ij hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1) − θHk(δk,ij)1−σλ−1k,ijθOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= f ijk,ω. (D.68)
With the marginal profitability of organizational capital λk,ij(z,O, δk,ij(z, O)) in equation
(4.38), equation (D.68) can be further rewritten as
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(τijawiz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 θ−
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)Hk(δk,ij)1−σ
×Oθ(σ−1)−1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk,ij) σ−1θ(σ−1)−1 ( 1
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1)
−θHk(δk,ij)1−σ
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)Hk(δk,ij)1−σOθ(σ−1)−1
)−1
θOθ(σ−1)−1
)
= f ijk,ω,
which can be simplified to get
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(τijawiz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1
×ζk,ij(z)
θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
(σ − 1)2f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1) − θHk(δk,ij)1−σθ−1(σ − 1)−1ζk,ij(z)−1Hk(δk,ij)σ−1θ
)
= f ijk,ω
and rewritten by using ζk,ij(z) =
1
σ−1Ak,j
(
σ−1
σ
)σ
(τijawiz)
1−σ as
A
θ(σ−1)−2
θ(σ−1)−1
k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σθ(σ−1)−2σ
θ(σ−1)−1
(τijawiz)
(1−σ)(θ(σ−1)−2)
θ(σ−1)−1 (σ − 1) θ(σ−1)θ(σ−1)−1
(
1
σ − 1Ak,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
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× (τijawiz)1−σ
) θ(σ−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
(
1
(σ − 1)2f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1)
−θHk(δk,ij)1−σθ−1(σ − 1)−1
(
1
σ − 1Ak,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(τijawiz)
1−σ
)−1
×Hk(δk,ij)σ−1θ
)
= f ijk,ω. (D.69)
Simplifying equation (D.69) yields
A2k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)2σ
(τijawiz)
−θ(σ−1)2+2(σ−1)−θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1 Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
(σ − 1)2f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1) − θ(σ − 1)−1
(
1
σ − 1Ak,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(τijawiz)
1−σ
)−1)
= f ijk,ω,
which can be rewritten by using the organizational capital threshold,
O?k,ij(z) =
(
Ak,j
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ) (
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(τijawiz)
1
θ ,
as
A2k,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)2σ
(τijawiz)
−2(σ−1)(θ(σ−1)−1)
θ(σ−1)−1 Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
×
(
1
(σ − 1)2f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1) − θ
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1)
)
= f ijk,ω, (D.70)
and simplifying equation (D.70) yields(
Ak,j
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
(τijawiz)
1−σ
)2
Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
× 1− θ(σ − 1)
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1) = f ijk,ω. (D.71)
By finally using the organizational capital threshold,
O?k,ij(z) =
(
Ak,j
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ) (
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(τijawiz)
1
θ ,
equation (D.71) can be rewritten as
(
(σ − 1)f ijk,ωO?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)
)2
Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
× 1− θ(σ − 1)
σ − 1
1
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
O?k,ij(z)
θ(σ−1) = f ijk,ω (D.72)
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and simplifying equation (D.72) yields
hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 = (1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)−
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1O?k,ij(z)
θ(1−σ)Oθ(σ−1).
D.21 Comparative Statics
D.21.1 Product Scope
The change in the product scope in response to any change in the iceberg transportation
costs τij is qualitatively as well as quantitatively exactly equal to the change in the product
scope in response to a change in the firm’s cost draw z of the same size as the change in the
iceberg transportation costs τij. Therefore, in strict correspondence to the computations
in the closed economy, the elasticity of the product scope in response to a change in the
iceberg transportation costs is given by
δk,ijd ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
1
4(σ − 1)ρk,ij(z),
with 4 ≷ 0 as the determinant of the coefficient matrix of the system of the total differen-
tiations of the two fundamental equations (equation (4.38) and equation (4.39)) that is writ-
ten in matrix notation and ρk,ij(z) ≡ 1σ−1A−1k,j
(
σ−1
σ
)−σ
(τijawiz)
σ−1−θHk(δk,ij)1−σλ−1k,ijθOθ(σ−1)−1
!
>
0.
The total differentiation of equation (4.42) takes the general form
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
d lnO?k,ij(z)
d ln τij
, (D.73)
with
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ ln τij
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂τij
∂τij
∂ ln τij
=
τij
δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂τij
=
τij
δk,ij
(
− ∂F/∂τij
∂F/∂δk,ij
)
= 0, (D.74)
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂O?k,ij(z)
∂O?k,ij(z)
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂O?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
(
−∂F/∂O
?
k,ij(z)
∂F/∂δk,ij
)
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
−−(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)θ(1− σ)O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)−1
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− (1− θ(σ − 1))O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)
Oθ(σ−1)
(
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1
)
Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
 ,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
1
δk,ij
− −(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)θ(1− σ)O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− (1− θ(σ − 1))O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)
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Oθ(σ−1)
(
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1
)
Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1−1 θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1 Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
 ,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
1
δk,ij
(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)−
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(σ−1)θ(1− σ)(1− θ(σ − 1))−1
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− (1− θ(σ − 1))Oθ(σ−1)
(
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1
)
Oθ(1−σ)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1
(1− θ(σ − 1))−1Oθ(1−σ)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1−1 θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1
Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
1
δk,ij
θ(1− σ)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)−1Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
= − 1
δk,ij
θ(σ − 1)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
− σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
, (D.75)
d lnO?k,ij(z)
d ln τij
=
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
∂ ln τij
=
1
θ
(
Ak,j
(σ − 1)f ijk,ω
) 1
θ(1−σ) (
σ − 1
σ
) σ
θ(1−σ)
(awiz)
1
θ (τij)
1
θ
−1 ,
and
d lnO?k,ij(z)
d ln τij
=
1
θ
O?k,ij(z)τ
−1
ij =
1
θ
(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1)Ohk(δk,ij)
1
θ(θ(σ−1)−1)
×Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 τ−1ij . (D.76)
Plugging equation (D.74), equation (D.75) and equation (D.76) into equation (D.73) pro-
vides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the product scope of multi-
product firms:
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
= − 1
δk,ij
θ(σ − 1)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
− σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
× 1
θτij
(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1)Ohk(δk,ij)
1
θ(θ(σ−1)−1)Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
and
− δk,ijd ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij Ohk(δk,ij)−
1
θHk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
− σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
. (D.77)
With the (standard) functional specification hk(ω) = exp (µkω), with µk > 0 as a (industry-
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specific) parameter, equation (D.77) takes the form
−δk,ijd ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)
− σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 exp
((
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µk exp (µkδk,ij)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+θ(σ − 1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1µkω
)
dω
]−1 . (D.78)
The derivative of equation (D.78) with respect to δk,ij has the property that
∂
(
− δk,ijd ln δk,ij
d ln τij
)
∂δk,ij
≷ 0 ⇔
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O
(
−1
θ
µk exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+ exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)
(−1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)))
×
(
− σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µk exp (µkδk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O
× exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)(
− σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
×
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µk exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µk exp (µkδk,ij)
+ exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)
)
+ θ(σ − 1)(−1)
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
≷ 0,
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
×
(
−1
θ
µk −
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)))
×
(
− σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µk exp (µkδk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)
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×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O
× exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)(
− σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
× exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)
[
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1 + 1
]
−θ(σ − 1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
≷ 0,
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
((
−1
θ
µk −
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
×
(
− σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µk exp (µkδk,ij)
+θ(σ − 1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)2
exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)
−θ(σ − 1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)))
≷ 0,
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
(
σ − 1
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)− (σ − 1)µk
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
×µk exp (µkδk,ij) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
−θ(σ − 1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
−
(
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)2
exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)
+θ(σ − 1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
≷ 0,
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(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
((
σ − 1
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) −
(
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)2)
exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
×µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)− (σ − 1)µk
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µk
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
≷ 0,
(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
(
− σ − 1
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2 exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)
+
(
−(σ − 1) + σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
)
µk
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
≷ 0
and(
(σ − 1)(1− θ(σ − 1)) 1θ(σ−1) τ−1ij O exp
(
−1
θ
µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
(
− σ − 1
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2 exp
((
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 − 1
)
µkδk,ij
)
µkµk exp (µkδk,ij)
−(σ − 1)θ(σ − 1)− 2
θ(σ − 1)− 1µk
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
≷ 0.
D.21.2 Organizational Capital Allocation
Taking the logarithm of the organizational capital allocation in equation (4.37),
ok,ij(ω) =
(
1
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)hk(ω)
σ−1λk,ij
) 1
θ(σ−1)−1
, (D.79)
yields
ln ok,ij(ω) =
1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 ((σ − 1) ln (hk(ω)) + ln (λk,ij)− ln (θ(σ − 1))
−
(
ln
(
1
σ − 1
)
+ ln (Ak,j) + σ ln
(
σ − 1
σ
)
+ (1− σ) (ln (awiz) + ln (τij))
))
.
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The total differentiation of equation (D.79) takes the general form
d ln ok,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
∂ ln ok,ij(ω)
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln ok,ij(ω)
∂ lnλk,ij
d lnλk,ij
d ln τij
, (D.80)
with
∂ ln ok,ij(ω)
∂ ln τij
=
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 (D.81)
and
∂ ln ok,ij(ω)
∂ lnλk,ij
=
1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 . (D.82)
The total differentiation of equation (4.38) takes the general form
d lnλk,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ lnλk,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ lnλk,ij
∂ ln δk,ij
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
, (D.83)
with
∂ lnλk,ij
∂ ln τij
= 1− σ, (D.84)
∂ lnλk,ij
∂ ln δk,ij
=
∂ lnλk,ij
∂λk,ij
∂λk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂ ln δk,ij
=
δk,ij
λk,ij
∂λk,ij
∂δk,ij
,
∂ lnλk,ij
∂ ln δk,ij
=
δk,ij
λk,ij
(
θ(σ − 1)ζk,ij(z)(1− σ)Hk(δk,ij)−σ ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
Oθ(σ−1)−1
)
,
∂ lnλk,ij
∂ ln δk,ij
=
δk,ij
λk,ij
λk,ij(1− σ)Hk(δk,ij)−1∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
= (1− σ) δk,ij
Hk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
(D.85)
and
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
1
4
1
δk,ij
(σ − 1)ρk,ij(z). (D.86)
Plugging equation (D.84), equation (D.85) and equation (D.86) into equation (D.83) pro-
vides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the marginal profitability of
organizational capital:
d lnλk,ij
d ln τij
= 1− σ + (1− σ) δk,ij
Hk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
1
4
1
δk,ij
(σ − 1)ρk,ij(z)
and
d lnλk,ij
d ln τij
= 1− σ − (σ − 1)2 1
Hk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
1
4ρk,ij(z). (D.87)
Plugging equation (D.81), equation (D.82) and equation (D.87) into equation (D.80) pro-
vides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the organizational capital
allocation of multi-product firms:
d ln ok,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1 +
1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
d lnλk,ij
d ln τij
=
1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
σ − 1 + d lnλk,ij
d ln τij
)
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and
d ln ok,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= − (σ − 1)
2
θ(σ − 1)− 1
1
Hk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
1
4ρk,ij(z),
which can be simplified to get
d ln ok,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= − 14(σ − 1)ρk,ij(z)
(
hk(δk,ij)
Hk(δk,ij)
) σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
.
D.21.3 Firm Sales (Revenue)
Taking the logarithm of the overall sales (revenue) of a firm in equation (4.43),
Rk,ij(z, O) =
σ
1− θ(σ − 1)f
ij
k,ω
(
hk(δk,ij)
Hk(δk,ij)
) 1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
, (D.88)
yields
lnRk,ij(z,O) = ln (σ)−ln (1− θ(σ − 1))+ln
(
f ijk,ω
)
+
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1 (ln (hk(δk,ij))− ln (Hk(δk,ij))) .
The total differentiation of equation (D.88) takes the general form
d lnRk,ij(z,O)
d ln f ijk,ω
=
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln f ijk,ω
+
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln δk,ij
d ln δk,ij
d ln f ijk,ω
, (D.89)
with
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln f ijk,ω
= 1, (D.90)
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln δk,ij
=
∂ lnRk,ij(z, O)
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂ ln δk,ij
= δk,ij
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂δk,ij
and
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln δk,ij
= δk,ij
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
1
hk(δk,ij)
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− 1
Hk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
)
. (D.91)
The total differentiation of equation (4.42) takes the general form
d ln δk,ij
d ln f ijk,ω
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ ln f ijk,ω
+
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
d lnO?k,ij(z)
d ln f ijk,ω
, (D.92)
with
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ ln f ijk,ω
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂f ijk,ω
∂f ijk,ω
∂ ln f ijk,ω
=
f ijk,ω
δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂f ijk,ω
=
f ijk,ω
δk,ij
(
−∂F/∂f
ij
k,ω
∂F/∂δk,ij
)
= 0, (D.93)
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂O?k,ij(z)
∂O?k,ij(z)
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂O?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
(
−∂F/∂O
?
k,ij(z)
∂F/∂δk,ij
)
,
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∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
−−(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1 θ(1− σ)O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)−1Oθ(σ−1)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− (1− θ(σ − 1))O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)
Oθ(σ−1)
(
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1
)
Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
 ,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
− −(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1 θ(1− σ)O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)−1Oθ(σ−1)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
−O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)Oθ(σ−1)θ(σ − 1)2
Hk(δk,ij)
− θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
 ,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
− −(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1 θ(1− σ)O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)−1Oθ(σ−1)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1 (1− θ(σ − 1))−1
Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(1−σ)Oθ(σ−1)θ(σ − 1)2Hk(δk,ij)−
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
 ,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
O?k,ij(z)
δk,ij
−−(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)− θ(σ−1)2θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij) σ−1θ(σ−1)−1 θ(1− σ)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ−1)2
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
O?k,ij(z)
θ(1−σ)−1Oθ(σ−1)
)
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
= − 1
δk,ij
−(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)−
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 θ(1− σ)O?k,ij(z)θ(1−σ)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ−1)2
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
Oθ(σ−1)
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
= − 1
δk,ij
−(1− θ(σ − 1))Hk(δk,ij)−
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 θ(1− σ)hk(δk,ij)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ−1)2
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
(1− θ(σ − 1))−1Hk(δk,ij)
θ(σ−1)2
θ(σ−1)−1Oθ(1−σ)Oθ(σ−1)
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
= − 1
δk,ij
−(1− θ(σ − 1))θ(1− σ)(1− θ(σ − 1))−1
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ−1)2
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
= − 1
δk,ij
θ(σ − 1)
1−σ
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ−1)2
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
,
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∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
1
δk,ij
θ(σ − 1)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ−1)
2
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
1
δk,ij
θ
1
θ(σ−1)−1hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
+ θ(σ−1)
1−θ(σ−1)Hk(δk,ij)
−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
,
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
=
1
δk,ij
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
hk(δk,ij)−1
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)∂δk,ij
(D.94)
and
d lnO?k,ij(z)
d ln f ijk,ω
=
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
∂ ln f ijk,ω
=
1
θ(σ − 1) . (D.95)
Plugging equation (D.93), equation (D.94) and equation (D.95) into equation (D.92) pro-
vides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the product scope of multi-
product firms:
d ln δk,ij
d ln f ijk,ω
=
1
θ(σ − 1)
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
,
with εhk(δk,ij) ≡ δk,ijhk(δk,ij)
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
> 0 as the elasticity of the unit production costs with
respect to scope and εHk(δk,ij) ≡ − δk,ijHk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
> 0 as the elasticity of the flexible
manufacturing technology index with respect to scope, and
d ln δk,ij
d ln f ijk,ω
=
1
(σ − 1)
θ(σ − 1)− 1
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
. (D.96)
Plugging equation (D.90), equation (D.91) and equation (D.96) into equation (D.89) pro-
vides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the overall sales (revenue) of
multi-product firms:
d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln f ijk,ω
= 1 +
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
εhk(δk,ij) + εHk(δk,ij)
) 1
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
,
d lnRk,ij(z,O)
d ln f ijk,ω
= 1− εhk(δk,ij) + εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
and
−d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln f ijk,ω
= 0 +
(1− θ(σ − 1))εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
.
The total differentiation of equation (D.88) takes the general form
d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln τij
=
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln τij
+
∂ lnRk,ij(z, O)
∂ ln δk,ij
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
, (D.97)
with
∂ lnRk,ij(z,O)
∂ ln τij
= 0. (D.98)
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The total differentiation of equation (D.42) takes the general form
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ lnO?ij(z)
d lnO?ij(z)
d ln τij
, (D.99)
with
∂ ln δk,ij
∂ ln τij
=
∂ ln δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂τij
∂τij
∂ ln τij
=
τij
δk,ij
∂δk,ij
∂τij
=
τij
δk,ij
(
− ∂F/∂τij
∂F/∂δk,ij
)
= 0 (D.100)
and
d lnO?k,ij(z)
d ln τij
=
∂ lnO?k,ij(z)
∂ ln τij
=
1
θ
. (D.101)
Plugging equation (D.100), equation (D.94) and equation (D.101) into equation (D.99)
provides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the product scope of multi-
product firms:
d ln δk,ij
d ln τij
=
1
θ
1
δk,ij
θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
hk(δk,ij)−1
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)∂δk,ij
. (D.102)
Plugging equation (D.98), equation (D.91) and equation (D.102) into equation (D.97)
provides the total differentiation of the equation that describes the overall sales (revenue)
of multi-product firms:
d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln τij
=
1− σ
θ(σ − 1)− 1
(
εhk(δk,ij) + εHk(δk,ij)
) 1
θ
1
δk,ij
× θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
hk(δk,ij)−1
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
− θ(σ − 1)Hk(δk,ij)−1 ∂Hk(δk,ij)∂δk,ij
,
d lnRk,ij(z,O)
d ln τij
=
(1− σ) (εhk(δk,ij) + εHk(δk,ij))
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
,
−d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln τij
=
(σ − 1) (εhk(δk,ij) + εHk(δk,ij))
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
,
−d lnRk,ij(z,O)
d ln τij
=
σεhk(δk,ij) − εhk(δk,ij) + σ2θεHk(δk,ij) − σ2θεHk(δk,ij) − 2σθεHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
+
2σθεHk(δk,ij) + θεHk(δk,ij) − θεHk(δk,ij) + σεHk(δk,ij) − εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
,
−d lnRk,ij(z, O)
d ln τij
=
(σ − 1)εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)2εHk(δk,ij) − (σ2θ − 2σθ + θ) εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
+
(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
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and
−d lnRk,ij(z,O)
d ln τij
= (σ − 1) + (σ − 1) (1− θ(σ − 1))εHk(δk,ij)
εhk(δk,ij) + θ(σ − 1)εHk(δk,ij)
.
With the (standard) functional specification hk(ω) = exp (µkω), with µk > 0 as a (industry-
specific) parameter, the elasticity of the unit production costs with respect to scope takes
the form
εhk =
δk,ij
hk(δk,ij)
∂hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
=
δk,ij
exp (µkδk,ij)
µk exp (µkδk,ij) = µkδk,ij
and the elasticity of the flexible manufacturing technology index with respect to scope is
then given by
εHk = −
δk,ij
Hk(δk,ij)
∂Hk(δk,ij)
∂δk,ij
= − δk,ij[∫ δk,ij
0
exp (µkω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp (µkω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 dω
] θ(σ−1)−1
σ−1 −1
exp (µkδk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1
and
εHk = −
θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
δk,ij exp (µkδk,ij)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1∫ δk,ij
0
exp (µkω)
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1 dω
= −θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
δk,ij exp
(
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1µkδk,ij
)
∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1µkω
)
dω
.
The fundamental expression in the overall (export) sales (revenue) elasticities then takes
the form
(1− θ(σ − 1))εHk
εhk + θ(σ − 1)εHk
=
(θ(σ−1)−1)2
σ−1
δk,ij exp( σ−1θ(σ−1)−1µkδk,ij)∫ δk,ij
0 exp( σ−1θ(σ−1)−1µkω)dω
µkδk,ij − θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) δk,ij exp(
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1µkδk,ij)∫ δk,ij
0 exp( σ−1θ(σ−1)−1µkω)dω
and
(1− θ(σ − 1))εHk
εhk + θ(σ − 1)εHk
=
(θ(σ−1)−1)2
σ−1
exp( σ−1θ(σ−1)−1µkδk,ij)∫ δk,ij
0 exp( σ−1θ(σ−1)−1µkω)dω
µk − θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp(
σ−1
θ(σ−1)−1µkδk,ij)∫ δk,ij
0 exp( σ−1θ(σ−1)−1µkω)dω
, (D.103)
whereas the derivative of equation (D.103) with respect to δk,ij has the property that
∂
(
(1−θ(σ−1))εHk
εhk+θ(σ−1)εHk
)
∂δk,ij
≷ 0 ⇔
(
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
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+
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
(−1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))(
µk − θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
(
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)(
−θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µk
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
− θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
(−1)
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
≷ 0,(
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
−(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))(
µk − θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
(
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
(
−θ(σ − 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
≷ 0,(
−(σ − 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
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× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))(
−θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
)
(µk − θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
(
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
×
(
−θ(σ − 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
≷ 0,(
−(σ − 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))((
−θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1
)
(µk − θ(θ(σ − 1)− 1)
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
−
(
θ
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1))
≷ 0,
(
−(σ − 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))
×
(
−θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 µk + θ
(θ(σ − 1)− 1)2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)
×
[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
−θ (θ(σ − 1)− 1)
2
σ − 1 exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1)
≷ 0
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and (
−(σ − 1)µk exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−1
+(θ(σ − 1)− 1) exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
)[∫ δk,ij
0
exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkω
)
dω
]−2
× exp
(
σ − 1
θ(σ − 1)− 1µkδk,ij
))(
−θ(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 µk
)
≷ 0.
Appendix E
E.1 COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ - Global: Countries
in Asia
The countries in Asia which are ultimately covered by the samples whose firm-level data
are compiled by COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ - Global are the following, whereas each is listed
with its ISO 3166-1 ALPHA-3 country code and its level of the Human Development Index
(HDI) that is published in 2018 (unless otherwise indicated) in parentheses: Bangladesh
(BGD, 0.608), Cambodia (KHM, 0.582), China (CHN, 0.752), Hong Kong (HKG, 0.933),
India (IND, 0.640), Indonesia (IDN, 0.694), Japan (JPN, 0.909), [Korea (KOR, 0.903),]
Malaysia (MYS, 0.798), Pakistan (PAK, 0.562), Philippines (PHL, 0.699), Singapore (SGP,
0.932), Sri Lanka (LKA, 0.770), Taiwan (TWN, 0.885 [2017]), Thailand (THA, 0.755) and
Vietnam (VNM, 0.694).
E.2 COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ - Global: Countries
in Europe
The countries in Europe which are ultimately covered by the samples whose firm-level data
are compiled by COMPUSTAT - Capital IQ - Global are the following, whereas each is listed
with its ISO 3166-1 ALPHA-3 country code and its level of the Human Development Index
(HDI) that is published in 2018 (unless otherwise indicated) in parentheses: Austria (AUT,
0.908), Belgium (BEL, 0.916), Bulgaria (BGR, 0.813), Croatia (HRV, 0.831), Cyprus (CYP,
0.869), Czech Republic (CZE, 0.888), Denmark (DNK, 0.929), Estonia (EST, 0.871), Fin-
land (FIN, 0.920), France (FRA, 0.901), Germany (DEU, 0.936), Great Britain (GBR,
0.922), Greece (GRC, 0.870), Hungary (HUN, 0.838), Iceland (ISL, 0.935), Ireland (IRL,
0.938), Israel (ISR, 0.903), Italy (ITA, 0.880), Latvia (LVA, 0.847), Lithuania (LTU, 0.858),
Luxembourg (LUX, 0.904), Malta (MLT, 0.878), the Netherlands (NLD, 0.931), Norway
(NOR, 0.953), Poland (POL, 0.865), Portugal (PRT, 0.847), Romania (ROU, 0.811), Slo-
vakia (SVK, 0.855), Slovenia (SVN, 0.896), Spain (ESP, 0.891), Sweden (SWE, 0.933) and
Switzerland (CHE, 0.944).
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E.3 Empirical Methodology - Sector Classification
The sectors are constructed as groups of 2-digit SIC codes and are so the following: Agri-
culture (SIC codes 01-09), mining (SIC codes 10-14), construction (SIC codes 15-19), man-
ufacturing (SIC codes 20-39), transportation (SIC codes 40-49), wholesale trade (SIC codes
50-51), retail trade (SIC codes 52-59), finance (SIC codes 60-69), services (SIC codes 70-
90), public administration (SIC codes 91-99).
Following Fama and French (1997), an alternative sector classification is applied:
The sectors are constructed as groups of 4-digit SIC codes and are so the following: Con-
sumer non-durables: food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, and toys (SIC codes 0100-
0999, 2000-2399, 2700-2749, 2770-2799, 3100-3199, 3940-3989), consumer durables: cars,
TVs, furniture, and household appliances (SIC codes 2500-2519, 2590-2599, 3630-3659,
3710-3711, 3714, 3716, 3750-3751, 3792, 3900-3939, 3990-3999), manufacturing: machin-
ery, trucks, planes, office furniture, paper, and commercial printing (SIC codes 2520-2589,
2600-2699, 2750-2769, 3000-3099, 3200-3569, 3580-3629, 3700-3709, 3712-3713, 3715, 3717-
3749, 3752-3791, 3793-3799, 3830-3839, 3860-3899), energy, oil, gas, and coal extraction
and products (SIC codes 1200-1399, 2900-2999), chemicals and allied products (SIC codes
2800-2829, 2840-2899), business equipment: computers, software, and electronic equipment
(SIC codes 3570-3579, 3660-3692, 3694-3699, 3810-3829, 7370-7379), telecom, telephone,
and television transmission (SIC codes 4800-4899), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949, whole-
sale, retail, and some services (laundries, repair shops) (SIC codes 5000-5999, 7200-7299,
7600-7699), health care, medical equipment, and drugs (SIC codes 2830-2839, 3693, 3840-
3859, 8000-8099), money, and finance (SIC codes 6000-6999), others: mines, construction,
building materials, transportation, hotels, business services, and entertainment (all other
SIC codes).
E.4 Empirical Methodology - Country-group Dum-
mies
For the European samples:
The groups on which the country-group dummies for 2007 are constructed are the following:
• Group 1: Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania
and Hungary
• Group 2: Croatia, Slovakia, Estonia, Malta, Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Greece and Spain
• Group 3: Cyprus, Italy, France, Great Britain, Israel, Belgium, Germany, Finland,
Denmark and Austria
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• Group 4: Sweden, Iceland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Norway, Liechten-
stein, Monaco and Luxembourg
The groups on which the country-group dummies for 2017 are constructed are the following:
• Group 1: Ukraine, Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Latvia, Greece
and Hungary
• Group 2: Poland, Estonia, Portugal, Slovakia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Slovenia, Czech
Republic and Spain
• Group 3: Italy, Malta, France, Great Britain, Finland, Belgium, Israel, Sweden,
Germany and Denmark
• Group 4: the Netherlands, Austria, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Ireland, Liechten-
stein, Luxembourg and Monaco
For the Asian samples:
The groups on which the country-group dummies for 2007 are constructed are the following:
• Group 1: Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam
• Group 2: Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka
• Group 3: Philippines, Indonesia and China
• Group 4: Thailand, Taiwan and Malaysia
• Group 5: Korea, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore
The groups on which the country-group dummies for 2017 are constructed are the following:
• Group 1: Cambodia, Bangladesh and Pakistan
• Group 2: India, Vietnam and Philippines
• Group 3: Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand
• Group 4: Taiwan, China and Malaysia
• Group 5: Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore
E.5 Descriptive Statistics
All the samples cover medium- and large-sized firms, i.e. firms with at least 175 employees.
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E.5.1 European Sample on the Period 2000-2007 (E-S1)
The sample of European firms on the period 2000-2007 consists of 1,225 firms in 2007
whose headquarters are located each in one of 32 countries in Europe and which operate
each in one of 10 sectors.
Figure E.1: Distribution of Firms in the European Sample across the Countries (2007)
Figure E.2: Distribution of Firms in the European Sample across the Sectors (2007)
While almost half (2007: 47.2%) of the firms in the sample are located either in Great
Britain, Germany or France, almost half (2007: 47.9%) of the firms operate in the man-
ufacturing sector that thereby represents by far the largest sector in the sample, followed
by the services sector in which 19.6% (2007) of the firms operate and the transportation
sector in which 12.5% (2007) of the firms operate (Figure E.1 and Figure E.2).
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The firms with less than 2,500 employees represent about half (2007: 51.1%) of the
firms in the sample and the firms in the two highest-ranked employment categories with
at least 15,000 employees account for 21.8% (2007) of the firms, whereas R&D firms are
incrementally more present among the firms in the higher-ranked employment categories:
Notes: Firms in the sample are grouped according to their number of employees, which yields
employment categories (on the left: category “175-749”: firms with at least 175 but less than
750 employees, category “750-2,499”: firms with at least 750 but less than 2,500 employees,
category “2,500-7,499”: firms with at least 2,500 but less than 7,500 employees, etc.). Higher-
ranked employment categories include firms with a larger workforce.
Figure E.3: Distribution of Non-R&D Firms and R&D Firms in the European Sample
across the Employment Categories (2007)
Figure E.4: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the European
Sample across the Sectors (Mean Values, 2007)
The proportion of R&D firms in the employment categories increases when moving
along the categorization of the firm size from firms with a workforce at a small to medium
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scale to firms with a workforce at a medium to large scale, and the proportion increases
once more when moving further to firms with a workforce at a very large scale (Figure
E.3).
The firms in the consumer durables, health care and chemicals sectors are on average
equipped with the largest R&D stocks across the sectors, while the firms in the chemicals,
consumer durables, health care as well as telephone and television sectors have on average
the largest organizational capital stocks (Figure E.4).
Figure E.5: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the European
Sample across the Sectors (Median Values, 2007)
Analyzing the input distributions within the sectors, the (strictly positive) differences
between the mean and median values for the R&D and organizational capital stocks for
all the sectors indicate that many firms with only small stocks and some firms with large
stocks coexist in all the sectors, whereas the right-skewed distribution varies in its shape
across the sectors (Figure E.5).
E.5.2 North-American Sample on the Period 2000-2007 (NA-S1)
The sample of North-American firms on the period 2000-2007 consists of 3,281 firms in
2007 whose headquarters are located each either in the United States or Canada and which
operate each in one of 10 sectors.
While about nine out of ten firms in the sample (2007: 92.4%) are located in the
United States, a proportion between one-third and half (2007: 41.4%) of the firms operate
in the manufacturing sector that thereby represents by far the largest sector in the sample,
followed by the services sector in which 18.1% (2007) of the firms operate and the finance
sector in which 15.1% (2007) of the firms operate (Figure E.6 and Figure E.7).
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Figure E.6: Distribution of Firms in the North-American Sample across Canada and the
USA (2007)
The firms with less than 2,500 employees represent a proportion between half and two-
thirds (2007: 58.2%) of the firms in the sample and the firms in the two highest-ranked
employment categories with at least 15,000 employees account for 13.5% (2007) of the firms,
whereas R&D firms are more present among the firms with a workforce at the medium
scale (Figure E.8).
Figure E.7: Distribution of Firms in the North-American Sample across the Sectors (2007)
The firms in the consumer durables, health care and business equipment sectors are on
average equipped with the largest R&D stocks across the sectors, while the firms in the
telephone and television, consumer durables as well as trade and services sectors have on
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average the largest organizational capital stocks (Figure E.9).
Analyzing the input distributions within the sectors, the (strictly positive) differences
between the mean and median values for the R&D and organizational capital stocks for
all the sectors indicate that many firms with only small stocks and some firms with large
stocks coexist in all the sectors, whereas the right-skewed distribution varies in its shape
across the sectors (Figure E.10).
Notes: Firms in the sample are grouped according to their number of employees, which yields
employment categories (on the left: category “175-749”: firms with at least 175 but less than
750 employees, category “750-2,499”: firms with at least 750 but less than 2,500 employees,
category “2,500-7,499”: firms with at least 2,500 but less than 7,500 employees, etc.). Higher-
ranked employment categories include firms with a larger workforce.
Figure E.8: Distribution of Non-R&D Firms and R&D Firms in the North-American Sam-
ple across the Employment Categories (2007)
Figure E.9: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the North-American
Sample across the Sectors (Mean Values, 2007)
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Figure E.10: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the North-
American Sample across the Sectors (Median Values, 2007)
E.5.3 Asian Sample on the Period 2000-2007 (A-S1)
The sample of Asian firms on the period 2000-2007 consists of 3,937 firms in 2007 whose
headquarters are located each in one of 15 countries1 in Asia and which operate each in
one of 10 sectors.
Figure E.11: Distribution of Firms in the Asian Sample across the Countries (2007)
While almost two-thirds (2007: 65.4%) of the firms in the sample are located in Japan,
about half (2007: 56.3%) of the firms operate in the manufacturing sector that thereby
1Compared to A-S2, firms in Korea do not appear in A-S1.
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represents by far the largest sector in the sample, followed by the services sector in which
13.1% (2007) of the firms operate and the retail trade sector in which 8% (2007) of the
firms operate (Figure E.11 and Figure E.12).
Figure E.12: Distribution of Firms in the Asian Sample across the Sectors (2007)
Notes: Firms in the sample are grouped according to their number of employees, which yields
employment categories (on the left: category “175-749”: firms with at least 175 but less than
750 employees, category “750-2,499”: firms with at least 750 but less than 2,500 employees,
category “2,500-7,499”: firms with at least 2,500 but less than 7,500 employees, etc.). Higher-
ranked employment categories include firms with a larger workforce.
Figure E.13: Distribution of Non-R&D Firms and R&D Firms in the Asian Sample across
the Employment Categories (2007)
The firms with less than 2,500 employees represent about two-thirds (2007: 69.4%) of
the firms in the sample and the firms in the two highest-ranked employment categories
with at least 15,000 employees account for 6.2% (2007) of the firms, whereas R&D firms
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are more present among the firms with a workforce at the medium scale than at the small
scale and more present among the firms with a workforce at the large scale than at the
medium scale (Figure E.13).
Figure E.14: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the Asian Sample
across the Sectors (Mean Values, 2007)
Figure E.15: Distribution of R&D and Organizational Capital Stocks in the Asian Sample
across the Sectors (Median Values, 2007)
The firms in the consumer durables, telephone and television as well as health care
sectors are on average equipped with the largest R&D stocks across the sectors, while
the firms in the telephone and television, utilities and consumer durables sectors have on
average the largest organizational capital stocks (Figure E.14).
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Analyzing the input distributions within the sectors, the (strictly positive) differences
between the mean and median values for the R&D and organizational capital stocks for
all the sectors indicate that many firms with only small stocks and some firms with large
stocks coexist in all the sectors, whereas the right-skewed distribution varies in its shape
across the sectors (Figure E.15).
E.5.4 Input Levels and Growth Rates
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
A-S1a E-S1b NA-S1a A-S1a E-S1b NA-S1a
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
K 53.60111 92.52966 235.85 53.3855 26.46432 42.68395 68.17936 91.611
Lc 1.6635 1.3655 4.75 1.374 0.943 0.875 1.4815 1.88
RD 1.018829 12.52332 49.48603 67.66069 - - - -
OC 18.57816 75.55068 151.8951 125.0278 9.310842 27.80197 35.64378 82.19669
Notes: a: sample measured in million USD, b: sample measured in million EUR, c: employment
measured in thousands, and HJKST: acronym for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
Table E.1: Physical Capital, Labor, Research and Development as well as Organizational
Capital in the Three Samples and the Two Sub-samples (R&D and Non-R&D Firms) of
Each Sample and 2007 (Median Values)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
A-S1 E-S1 NA-S1 A-S1 E-S1 NA-S1
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
w/o
HJKST
w/
HJKST
K 21.03 0.62 3.75 6.83 13.19 4.90 5.79 7.87
L 4.20 2.94 6.17 4.26 3.66 3.09 7.21 3.77
RD 14.59 3.30 9.62 8.42 - - - -
OC 13.18 4.31 8.41 8.06 10.92 7.73 8.77 8.39
Notes: Measured in percentage and HJKST: acronym for Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan.
Table E.2: Growth of Physical Capital, Labor, Research and Development as well as
Organizational Capital between 2006 and 2007 in the Three Samples and the Two Sub-
samples (R&D and Non-R&D Firms) of Each Sample (Median Values)
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E.6 Empirical Results
E.6.1 E-S1: European Sample (2000-2007)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.34*** 0.09* 0.33*** 0.09* 0.24*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09)
L 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.65*** 0.47*** 0.48***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.13)
RD 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.03*** 0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.28*** 0.31***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09)
Obs. 607 558 607 526 618 578
R-sq. 0.9449 0.5009 0.9470 0.5081 0.8460 0.4217
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table E.3: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2007) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2006-2007) for the
European Sample
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.33*** 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.12** 0.23*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07)
L 0.66*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.40***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
RD 0.04*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.07*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
OC 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.49***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.11)
Obs. 607 558 607 526 618 578
R-sq. 0.9482 0.5266 0.9527 0.5437 0.8571 0.4771
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table E.4: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog Specifi-
cation in Levels (Year 2007) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2006-2007) for the European
Sample
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R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.15 0.16*** 0.20**
(0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09)
L 0.64*** 0.53*** 0.77*** 0.70*** 0.42*** 0.38***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.004) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)
RD 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.18*** 0.23***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.15*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.37***
(0.002) (0.06) (0.02) (0.14)
Obs. 2,618 2,618 2,618 2,618 2,451 2,451
Groups 607 607 607 607 732 732
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table E.5: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the European Sample on the Period 2000-2007
E.6.2 NA-S1: North-American Sample (2000-2007)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.11*** 0.23*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
L 0.58*** 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.31*** 0.21***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
RD 0.10*** 0.23*** -0.05*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
OC 0.43*** 0.76*** 0.46*** 0.74***
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09)
Obs. 1,402 1,391 1,402 1,391 1,879 1,879
R-sq. 0.9172 0.4690 0.9354 0.5338 0.8676 0.3785
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table E.6: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2007) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2006-2007) for the
North-American Sample
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R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.28*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.09*** 0.22*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
L 0.60*** 0.51*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.33*** 0.35***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
RD 0.12*** 0.29*** -0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
OC 0.42*** 0.75*** 0.46*** 0.75***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07)
Obs. 1,402 1,391 1,402 1,391 1,879 1,879
R-sq. 0.9220 0.4867 0.9385 0.5502 0.8769 0.4091
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table E.7: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog Spec-
ification in Levels (Year 2007) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2006-2007) for the North-
American Sample
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.18*** 0.34*** 0.21*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
L 0.63*** 0.45*** 0.77*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.41***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.004)
RD 0.08*** -0.07*** 0.21*** -0.08
(0.003) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08)
OC 0.40*** 0.13 0.47*** 0.69***
(0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
Obs. 9,586 9,586 9,586 9,586 11,651 11,651
Groups 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 983 983
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table E.8: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the North-American Sample on the Period 2000-2007
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R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.35***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
L 0.62*** 0.42*** 0.50*** 0.41*** 0.20*** 0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
RD 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.22***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
OC 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.16***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Obs. 7,050 7,050 7,050 7,050 2,592 2,592
Groups 1,014 1,014 1,014 1,014 412 412
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table E.9: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the North-American Sample on the Period 2000-2007 (Only Manufacturing Firms)
E.6.3 A-S1: Asian Sample (2000-2007)
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas (w/o OC) Cobb-Douglas Cobb-Douglas
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.45*** 0.11* 0.29*** 0.07 0.28*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
L 0.42*** 0.50*** 0.26*** 0.40*** 0.25*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.06)
RD 0.10*** 0.14*** -0.003 0.09***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.69***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.09)
Obs. 2,312 2,240 2,312 2,233 1,625 1,609
R-sq. 0.8497 0.3039 0.8944 0.3894 0.8183 0.3840
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and
estimations in levels with sector and country-group dummies.
Table E.10: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Cobb-Douglas
Specification in Levels (Year 2007) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2006-2007) for the
Asian Sample
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R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Transloga (w/o OC) Transloga Transloga
Levels FDs Levels FDs Levels FDs
K 0.45*** 0.21*** 0.32*** 0.13*** 0.28*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
L 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08)
RD 0.09*** 0.18*** -0.01 0.13***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
OC 0.44*** 0.64*** 0.45*** 0.93***
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
Obs. 2,312 2,240 2,312 2,233 1,625 1,609
R-sq. 0.8621 0.3903 0.9072 0.4973 0.8328 0.4506
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, estima-
tions in levels with sector and country-group dummies, and a: evaluation at the sample medians.
Table E.11: Output Elasticity Estimations with the OLS Estimator and the Translog
Specification in Levels (Year 2007) and First Differences (FDs, Years 2006-2007) for the
Asian Sample
R&D firms Non-R&D firms
Cobb-Douglas Transloga Cobb-
Douglas
Transloga
w/o OC w/ OC w/o OC w/ OC w/ OC w/ OC
K 0.03 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.18***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01)
L 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.67*** 0.47*** 0.13*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
RD 0.08*** -0.05*** 0.23*** 0.09***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.03) (0.01)
OC 0.57*** 0.65*** 0.60*** 0.46***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Obs. 14,641 14,641 14,641 14,641 9,064 9,064
Groups 2,312 2,312 2,312 2,312 1,832 1,832
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%, and a: evalua-
tion at the sample medians and application of the Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction.
Table E.12: Output Elasticity Estimations with the Method by Olley and Pakes (1996) for
the Asian Sample on the Period 2000-2007
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Chapter 5
Multi-product Exporters in a World
with Heterogeneous Countries and
Non-homothetic Preferences
5.1 Introduction
With the increasing availability of disaggregate data, three facts about both countries and
firms robustly appear in the empirical literature of international trade: First, countries with
a higher per capita income import more product varieties from other countries. Hummels
and Klenow (2002) analyze the trade flows between 110 exporting and 59 importing coun-
tries by decomposing each country’s trade into an extensive margin (number of product
varieties1 and number of markets) and an intensive margin (value of each product)2 as well
as the quality of exports (using available quantity data). In addition to the result that the
extensive margin accounts for a substantial share of the greater exports of larger economies,
they find that countries with a higher per capita income not only import greater values,
but even a larger number of product varieties. The extensive margin thereby accounts for
a notable, compared to exports although smaller share of the greater imports. Applying
data on bilateral trade flows in the analysis, parts of the empirical literature deal with the
frequently observable absence of potential trade relations,3 which are called “zeros” due to
their corresponding entries in tables of trade. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) identify the
1In their baseline study, Hummels and Klenow (2002) identify products in the applied U.N. data by 6-
digit Harmonized System (HS) classification categories and are therefore able to deal with 5,017 products.
For a robustness check of their results, they also examine US import data from 119 countries in 13,386
10-digit HS classification categories as products.
2In contrast to the standard characterization of the extensive and intensive margins as absolute measures
of the decomposed trade flows, Hummels and Klenow (2002) apply relative measures for those margins
to take the respective country’s trade proportions and those of its traded products relative to the overall
world into account. By doing this, the analysis puts weights on the absolute measures according to the
country’s products’ quantitative importance in world trade. However, the relevant qualitative evidence for
the margins is unchanged (shown by robustness checks), and therefore representable in the way above.
3See Hummels and Klenow (2005) for (export) data at the product level, Bernard et al. (2007) for trade
data at the firm level and Helpman et al. (2008) for trade data at the country level.
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real GDP per worker in the destination country as a significant determinant of zeros in
U.S. export data, thereby leading up to the inference that the destination’s income level
may play a significant role for both extensive margins of trade, i.e. whether a country is
served with product varieties at all and whether the country imports a particular number
of product varieties.
Second, imports and exports are concentrated among a relatively small number of firms,
so that firms in form of “export superstars” exist and represent the “granular” components
of the set of internationally active players.4 Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2009)
report a highly skewed distribution of trade among firms in the United States: In 2000,
the top 1% of trading firms by value are responsible for over 80% of the value of total
trade, and the top 10% of trading firms account for over 95% of the value of total trade.
Importers reveal a similar, even though slightly smaller degree of concentration compared
to exporters. For several European countries, Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) document
comparable patterns: The top 1% of exporters in Germany account in 2003 for 59% of
the total manufacturing exports, while the top 10% of exporters are responsible for 90% of
exports. In France, the distribution of exports across firms is even more skewed: More than
two-thirds (68%) of the total manufacturing exports go back to the top 1% of exporters and
the top 10% of exporters carry responsibility for 94% of exports. Extending the analysis
to a set of mostly developing countries, Freund and Pierola (2015) confirm the finding of a
high concentration of exports among only a few firms, which they call “export superstars”:
Across 32 countries and mostly for the period 2004-2008, the top firm on average accounts
for 14% of a country’s total exports (17% of a country’s manufacturing exports), and the
top five firms add up to 30%.
And third, multi-product firms are prevalent and dominant in international trade. With
firm-product-level data for the United States, Bernard et al. (2007) show that in 2000 about
58% of the exporting firms export more than one product5 (multi-product exporters) and
are responsible for more than 99% of the export value. Amador and Opromolla (2013)
describe comparable figures for Portugal for the period 1996-2005: About 61% of the ex-
porting firms are multi-product exporters6 and they account for about 92% of the export
value. In a study on exporters in Belgium in 2005, Bernard et al. (2014) document that
about 66% of the exporting firms export at least two products7 and make up the over-
whelming share of the export value (about 98%).
The appearance of the last two facts in the empirical literature of international trade
draws the attention to the relatively small set of pivotal firms in the international economy
that produce and export a range of products, i.e. multi-product exporters, and are thereby
4Eaton et al. (2013) theoretically show how heterogeneous and granular firms contribute to the existence
of the extreme skewness in exporter size and of the zeros in international trade; see the Section 5.2.2.
5In their analysis, Bernard et al. (2007) identify products as 10-digit HS classification categories.
6Amador and Opromolla (2013) employ a 4-digit HS classification category as the definition reference
for a product.
7Based on their export data, Bernard et al. (2014) define products as 8-digit Combined Nomenclature
(CN) classification categories.
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responsible for substantial shares of country-level exports, i.e. export superstars.8 Together
with the first fact, the question arises as to which role these multi-product exporters may
play in the variation of the trade flows’ extensive margin across countries. The present
chapter therefore studies the export behavior of multi-product firms and analyses in par-
ticular in a non-standard but well-founded model the number of exported products (export
scope) of multi-product firms across countries that differ in terms of their per capita in-
come. With non-homotheticity in the preferences of consumers, the model thereby allows
for income effects in demand, which represent a potential determinant of the firms’ deci-
sion about their export scope to significantly heterogeneous countries9, but are completely
neglected by the standard models of multi-product firms in the theoretical literature of
international trade.10 Further reflecting the real world, multi-product firms are modeled as
“granular” components of the international economy, whose product portfolio and size are
not of measure zero, leading to an oligopoly in the competition between firms11 and to a
cannibalization effect within firms, likewise internalized by them while taking the decision
about scope, and multi-product firms are as well modeled to be asymmetric or heteroge-
neous within themselves, in the sense of differentials across products within firms in several
dimensions.12 Following the standard approach in the literature, called flexible manufac-
turing, each firm possess a core competency in the production of a single product variety
and other varieties can only be produced by the firm at higher marginal costs, whereas
those varieties are ordered regarding their firm-specific efficiency in production, with the
core competency variety revealing minimal marginal costs in production and increasingly
higher costs for varieties further away from the firm’s most efficient production option.13
As the main insight to the raised question, the present chapter derives that multi-
8Bernard et al. (forthcoming) provide empirical evidence that large shares of the multi-product firms
in the manufacturing sector export products that they do not produce but source and call it ”carry-
along trade”. Recent work that deals with firms of a non-zero measure that potentially produce or export
multiple products is given by Hottman et al. (2016) and Bernard et al. (2018). In the latter case, firms that
participate in the international economy along multiple margins and account for large shares of aggregate
trade are referred to as “global firms”. Parenti (2018) studies a market in which large and oligopolistic
firms coexist with a monopolistically competitive fringe of small firms.
9In the real world, the heterogeneity of per capita income across countries is in fact significant in form
of the existence of both rich and poor countries (Figure 5.1). For the global (interpersonal) distribution
of income and its polarization: See e.g. Roope et al. (2018).
10See Feenstra and Ma (2008), Eckel and Neary (2010), Bernard et al. (2011), Dhingra (2013), Mayer
et al. (2014) and Nocke and Yeaple (2014).
11For an overview about the application of an oligopoly as the market structure in the theory of inter-
national trade and its rise and fall in the literature over time, see Head and Spencer (2017).
12Empirical evidence for a skewed sales or export distribution across products within firms is given by
a large set of studies on multi-product firms: See e.g. Goldberg et al. (2010b) for India, Bernard et al.
(2010, 2011) and Liu (2010) for the US, So¨derbom and Weng (2012) for China, Amador and Opromolla
(2013) for Portugal and Lopresti (2016) for the US.
13For the conceptual background of the flexible manufacturing, see Prahalad and Hamel (1990), and for
its applications in the literature of multi-product firms in international trade, see Eckel and Neary (2010),
Qiu and Zhou (2013), Mayer et al. (2014), Eckel et al. (2015) and Eckel et al. (2016). In a more general
definition of flexible manufacturing, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) link the technology to the firm’s ability
to quickly adjust to market conditions. In the broader literature, it is also related to the firm’s ability
of introducing more varieties, of reducing delivery times (Tseng (2004)) and of changing production scale
with only minor adjustment costs (Gal-Or (2002)).
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Figure 5.1: Per Capita Income Differences in the World (Average Gross Domestic Product
Per Adult (2017), in EUR, k = 1, 000 EUR, Source: World Wealth and Income Database
(WID))
product firms export more product varieties to countries with a higher per capita income
and thus adjust their export scope but also their prices and markups in response to the
income but also trade cost changes across the heterogeneous destinations, while the ad-
justments vary across the firms and their product varieties.
The remainder of the present chapter is organized as follows: The next section describes
the literature in international trade and beyond which is related to the chapter’s issue and
on which the chapter builds when trying to generate an answer to raised question. In the
subsequent section, a non-standard model of multi-product firms in a world with heteroge-
neous countries and non-homothetic preferences is set up and analyzed both in general and
with a cost specification, for which a comparative statics analysis in international trade is
undertaken. The chapter then ends with a summarizing section on the main results of the
consideration.
5.2 Related Literature
Three general strands of the literature are related to the present chapter: The first one deals
with non-homothetic consumer preferences as well as income effects and their implications
for the outcomes of the theoretical trade models in which they are applied. The second
one looks at the granularity of economies and its contribution to the micro-macro nexus.
And finally, the third strand of the literature analyses multi-product firms in international
trade and makes some statements about their behavior.
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5.2.1 Non-homotheticity and Income Effects - Demand-driven
Trade
Traditional (“(neo)classical”) theories in international trade base their explanations of the
exchange of goods between countries on (i) whose differences in production technologies or
labor productivities and resource endowments: Ricardo (1817) and Heckscher and Ohlin
(1919 and 1924)14 (inter-industry trade between countries, “old” trade theory) and (ii)
the economies of scale in the production technologies of the firms and their imperfect
competition: Krugman (1979, 1980) (intra-industry trade between countries, “new” trade
theory).15 According to these theories, countries trade due to the associated gains that
can be realized through the countries’ concentration in production on the narrower set
of goods (“specialization”) in whose manufacturing (i) they are advantaged by supply or
(ii) they exploit the scale economies and their export of these goods to other countries
as well as their import of the goods produced by those other countries, overall resulting
in an expansion of the countries’ consumption possibilities. Besides these supply-driven
approaches, some demand-driven approaches exist that allow income to be a factor in the
consumption allocation decision of individuals, thereby attribute income a crucial role in
their theoretical structures of parts of the international economy and in particular identify
the basis for trade in the similarities in income across the countries.
A first approach is the Prebisch-Singer (1962 and 1950) hypothesis16, which states that
the price of primary commodities declines relative to the price of manufactured goods
over the long term, implying a terms-of-trade deterioration of primary-commodity-based
economies, which are mostly given by countries in the developing South of the world.
Classical theorists by contrast would establish the opposite statement, i.e. an improvement
of the terms of trade of primary commodities in time, since land and natural resource
are only given in a limited and exhaustive supply, leading to an upward trend in their
price. Considering not the side of the supply but demand, Singer and Prebisch argue
that the income elasticity of demand varies across goods categories and in practice that
the demand for manufactured goods is more elastic with respect to income than that for
primary goods, especially food. As income rises over time, the demand for manufactured
goods therefore increases more rapidly than the demand for primary goods, which leads to
a shift of the relative demand away from the developing South, typically specialized in the
cultivation, exploitation or production of goods with low income elasticities, and towards
the industrialized North, typically specialized in the production of goods with high income
elasticities. Due to the change in their demand for primary commodities and manufactured
14The numbers in the parentheses represent the dates of publication of the most influential contributions
for the development of the respective theory. For the references (reprints and translations): See Sraffa
(ed., 1951) [On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817)] and Flam and Flanders (eds.,
1991) [The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income (1919, pp. 43-69) and The Theory of
Trade (1924, pp. 75-214)].
15For the development of incorporating heterogeneous firms: See Melitz (2003) (“new new” trade theory).
16Going back to the work by Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1962).
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goods, prices adjust in the way stated by the hypothesis and the South’s economies’ terms
of trade deteriorates with the decline in the relative price of their export goods. The South
thereby benefits just a little from productivity improvements in its export sectors, i.e.
in the sectors of primary commodities, because the increased purchasing power is spent
mostly on the Northern goods.
The empirical evidence on the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is only mixed:17 Based on
both United Nations and World Bank data series (using the Sauerbeck price index for 37
primary commodities), Spraos (1980) analyses the long-run dynamics of the net barter
terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactured goods and finds a deteri-
orating trend for the early period between 1876 and 1938.18 In the extended period from
1900 up to 1970, statistically significant evidence in favor of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis
can not be found by the study. By taking into account a structural instability in the param-
eters of the growth path for the identical data base, which is updated to the early 1980s,
Sapsford (1985) however gets strong support for a deteriorating trend of the net barter
terms of trade over the entire period of time (both, Spraos’ original and the extended one)
and thereby the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.19 Grilli and Yang (1988) construct a novel
price index of 24 primary commodities for the period 1900-1986 and detect that the rela-
tive prices of primary commodities fall on trend, inferring a deterioration in the terms of
trade of commodity-exporting developing countries and therefore strongly supporting the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.
Subsequent studies on the evidence of the demand-driven approach consider less the
issue of improvements in the quality of the data sets on which they are based, but account
more for econometric issues in their analysis, which follows the purpose of verifying a
trend in the time series of relative prices. While the early studies mentioned above assume
an underlying trend-stationary process and deduce misleading results in the case of a
unit root, the body of succeeding studies described in the following allows for a difference-
stationary process, in whose case of misspecification inefficiencies appear.20 A considerably
more recent study conducted by Harvey et al. (2010) employs a new data set for primary
commodity prices, initially applies trend-significance testing procedures that are robust to
the existence of a unit root and thereby draws a mixed picture: By analysing 25 primary
commodity price data series, partly going back as far as 165021, and addressing issues of the
17For an overview about the studies examining the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis: See Baffes and Etienne
(2016). About half of the post-1980 studies supports the hypothesis, while the other half rejects it.
18Prebisch (1962) by himself provides evidence in support of the hypothesis jointly worked out with
Singer (1950) by employing data for the United Kingdom. Spraos (1980) summarizes the critics on and
shortcomings of Prebisch (1962)’s data choice and tries to develop a remedying approach on a more
meaningful data base. His study confirms a deteriorating trend in the terms of trade detectable in the
data, but only with a less distinct magnitude compared to Prebisch (1962).
19Replicating Spraos (1980), the sub-periods before and after World War II reveal significant downward
trends in the net barter terms of trade.
20See e.g. Cuddington and Urzu´a (1989), Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) and Kim et al. (2003) (all
studies using some (reduced or extended) version of the Grilli and Yang data set). Those studies have
found evidence against the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.
21Twelve series begin in the seventeenth century, three series begin in the eighteenth century, eight series
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trend function (order of integration) as well as the existence of structural breaks, whose
misspecification leads to further errors of inference, they detect no uniform long-term
development, but eleven series of primary commodity relative prices reveal a significant
downward trend over all or some fraction of the sample period. Ghoshray (2011) by
contrast conducts a study that allows for up to two structural breaks in the unit root
tests for 24 primary commodity prices (using an extended version of the Grilli and Yang
data set for the period 1900-2003) and finds that eleven commodity prices are difference
stationary, while the remaining thirteen prices are trend stationary with either one or two
structural breaks and sixteen relative price series exhibit a negative trend over at least
one period segment. In some further study provided by Arezki et al. (2014), the data set
constructed by Harvey et al. (2010) is employed in time series stationary tests that allow for
endogenous multiple structural breaks. And once again, the commodity price series thereby
reveal no uniform long-term development, even so the majority of them shows a negative
trend as hypothesized by Prebisch and Singer. Using a bivariate approach and bootstrap
panel co-integration tests without structural breaks on a subsample of the extended Grilli-
Yang data set for three commodity price indices, Di Iorio and Fachin (2018) find that the
hypothesis is never confirmed for the period 1950-1980, but derive support for the entire
period 1950-2011 for agricultural products, even so not for metal goods.
A second approach is given by the Linder (1961) hypothesis22, which states that coun-
tries with similar levels of per capita income consume similar bundles of goods and trade
more intensively with one another; in this way, stressing similarities in demand as trade
determinants instead of differences in supply, as done by the classical theorists. They
would establish the opposite statement: A larger difference in the capital-labor ratios of
two countries and hence in the per capita incomes result in stronger specialization and
more trade. Linder by contrast argues that a robust local demand for a good provides
an incentive for the firms to invest in their productive capacity for it, and these under-
taken investments lead in the longer term to a surplus of its supply over its demand and
hence to exports to countries with some demand for the good that is not met by their own
domestic production. Consequently, countries that share similar consumption patterns
will trade intensively with each other. And finally, to the extent that the preferences are
non-homothetic, an intensive trade between countries that have similar demand structures
implies an intensive trade between countries that have similar levels of per capita income.
The empirical evidence on the Linder hypothesis is mixed, but in substantial parts sup-
ports it:23 Based on a total trade data set for 32 exporting countries and the years 1955/58,
Linder by himself tests his hypothesis by initially compiling a matrix, in which both each
of its rows and each of its columns represents one of these countries with arranging them
according to the per capita income, in such a way that the countries with more similar per
begin in the nineteenth century and two series start from 1900.
22Going back to the work by Linder (1961).
23For reviews of the early parts of the evidence: See Deardorff (1984) and Leamer and Levinsohn (1995).
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capita incomes are positioned closer together in the matrix, and that then contains the bi-
lateral average propensities to import, giving rise to the so-called import propensity matrix.
By approaching the northwest-southeast diagonal of this matrix from above or from below,
one ought to observe an increase in the bilateral propensities to find the Linder hypothesis
to be empirically validated. Illustrating the result for merely 14 of these countries, Linder
graphs for a given exporter and his trading partners the bilateral average propensities to
import in opposite to the per capita incomes of the importing countries. The resulting
graphs’ general tendency to peak near the per capita income of the exporter provides some
support for the Linder hypothesis.
Subsequent studies on the empirical validation of the hypothesized country-level posi-
tive relation between the bilateral trade intensity and the per capita income similarity in
principle follow Linder’s approach but employ more systematic econometric techniques.24
To pursue that strategy, they largely adopt the average propensity to import as the mea-
sure for the bilateral trade intensity, rather than the actual volume of trade as a possible
alternative with the aim to eliminate size effects, and introduce the absolute difference in
the per capita income as the measure for the per capita income similarity.25 Utilizing Lin-
der’s total trade data set for 31 exporting countries, Sailors et al. (1973) rank for a given
exporter import propensities and per capita income differences with his trading partners
and examine those measures’ relation by means of a Spearman rank correlation analysis.
They obtain a finding in favor of the Linder hypothesis for 16 countries, with a prepon-
derance of favorable results among those countries that are organized in the European
Economic Community. By eliminating moreover those countries that specialize in manu-
factures exports that require non-transportable natural resources or whose manufactures
exports represent only a small part of their total exports, the study is left with 25 countries
and in this sample support for the Linder hypothesis is provided for 14 countries. In a
comment to this study, Hoftyzer (1975) criticizes the non-consideration of the geographical
distance between the countries in the intended analysis of the determinants of bilateral
trade patterns, as it is possibly correlated with the per capita income difference as well
as a proxy for both transportation costs and trade horizons and thus may represent the
true explanatory variable for the bilateral trade intensities, but is so far hidden by the per
capita income difference as the single factor under consideration. He further demonstrates
the objection’s relevance through a regression analysis. In addition to this, the employ-
ment of Linder’s total trade data set gets criticized, as the Linder hypothesis is explicitly
formulated for trade of manufactured goods.
Responding to the above critique, Greytak and McHugh (1977) replicate the Spearman
24In an alternative validation exercise that has not been established in the literature, Hufbauer (1970)
examines a commodity composition corollary of the Linder hypothesis by using a trade similarity index in
a regression analysis.
25Besides the absolute difference in the per capita income, Kohlhagen (1977) applies the percentage
income overlap constructed by using country-level income distribution data as a measure for the per
capita income similarity in a regression analysis.
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rank correlation analysis for a different trade data set, which includes 7 regions within the
United States for the year 1963 and is restricted to manufactures, and moreover consider
the geographical distance between the regions as another factor for the bilateral trade
intensities. In this way, they derive some, although less significant, support for the Linder
hypothesis for 3 regions, while the distance turns out to have in total more explanatory
power than the per capita income difference in the determination of trade patterns of
manufactured goods among these regions, as it is relevant for 6 regions. Qureshi et al.
(1980) subsequently extend the last study’s treatment to trade between 10 regions in the
United States and receive in a Kendall rank correlation analysis a finding along the same
lines but even more pronounced, with virtually no support for the Linder hypothesis, in
particular a weak significant supportive result for solely 1 region, and the distance as
an important determinant of regional trade in manufactures and having in total more
explanatory power than the per capita income difference in the determination of trade
patterns, as it is relevant for 8 regions.
Subsequent studies on the empirical validation of the Linder hypothesis take the devel-
opment so far accomplished by the literature, i.e. the adjustment of the data base as well
as the consideration of the geographical distance, up and partly allow for more variation
in the data base, but basically alter the econometric technique. While the early studies
mentioned above examine the relation by way of a rank correlation analysis, the body of
succeeding studies described in the following applies a regression analysis that involves
geographical distance as a factor. An exceptionally early contribution by Fortune (1971)
thereby investigates a data set of trade in finished manufactures for 23 exporting countries
and the years 1966/67 and find support for the Linder hypothesis for 7 countries, whereas
the per capita income similarity appears to be a better explanation for trade intensity
between some of the wealthier countries. As it is also found in the studies with a rank
correlation analysis above, distance plays a relevant role as it has some explanatory power
in the case of 17 countries. Hirsch and Lev (1973) however alter the measures for trade in-
tensity and per capita income similarity by employing industry-level exports and restricted
differentials in the per capita income in form of an income ratio for 4 exporting countries,
5 industries and the year 1966. They detect some, although less significant, support for
the Linder hypothesis in the case of 3 countries.
In an alternative approach to account for geographical distance, Kennedy and McHugh
(1983) do not regress the values of the average propensities to import on the values of
the absolute per capita income differences, but their respective changes with the aim to
eliminate time-invariant factors, in particular distance, and thereby find for a data set on
total trade and trade in manufactures for 1 exporting country, in particular the United
States, and the non-consecutive years 1963, 1970 and 1976 no support at all for the Linder
hypothesis. Based on a panel data set on total trade for a cross-section of 17 exporting
countries and a time series consisting of the years 1974-1982, Thursby and Thursby (1987)
conduct a regression analysis, which is grounded on a gravity equation and employs ab-
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solute differences in the per capita income and exports as the respective measures for the
components of the hypothesis. By obtaining a finding in favor of the Linder hypothesis for
14 countries, they provide strong support for the hypothesis that is under examination.
Greytak and Tuchinda (1990) generalize the analyses by allowing for linear and non-
linear regression specifications as well as alternatives for the components’ measures. Besides
the absolute differences in the per capita income as usual, a measure for the consumption
similarity in form of Spearman rank correlations of the consumption vectors, and besides
the average import propensities as usual, average export and total trade propensities are
employed in the study. Given a data set on total trade for the federal states in the United
States and the year 1963, they find in a linear (non-linear) specification with absolute
differences in the per capita income and import propensities support for the Linder hy-
pothesis for 18 (15) out of 35 (33) states, being a bit lower for the other specifications with
the absolute differences in the per capita income, with the exception that the support sub-
stantially increases in the linear specification by applying total trade propensities, i.e. 22
out of 30 states. Using the rank correlations, similar results are derived, e.g. support for 15
(14) out of 31 (30) states for the linear (non-linear) specification with import propensities,
while the support substantially increases in the non-linear specification with total trade
(export) propensities, i.e. 37 (19) out of 41 (28) states. Once again, distance turns out as
being a strong explanatory variable and, as a first appearance, being better captured by
the non-linear specifications.
Based on a total trade data set for 24 exporting countries and the years 1983/84 as
well as a gravity equation, Hanink (1990) does not regress import propensities but simply
imports on the absolute differences in the per capita income and find some, although
less significant, support for the Linder hypothesis for 8 countries, especially among the
wealthier ones, but distance turns out to be an important factor of explaining trade for 22
countries. With the same measures, but a panel data set on total trade for 6 developing
countries in Africa that export and the years 1984-1992, McPherson et al. (2001) detect by
means of a fixed-effects Tobit estimation procedure that accounts for zeros in the bilateral
trade flows a finding in favor of the Linder hypothesis in the case of 5 countries. In the
most recent contribution, Choi (2002) conducts a further fixed-effects regression analysis,
which is based on a gravity equation, with a panel data set for 63 countries and the non-
consecutive years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1992. But as the measures, the absolute differences
in the per capita income over the sum of the per capita incomes and, besides the average
import propensities, the exports over the sum of the incomes are employed in the study. For
almost all periods, the pooled data and specifications, the Linder hypothesis is supported
and distance appears once more as a significant factor for explaining trade.
In complementary strands of the literature, relations close to the one that is hypoth-
esized by Linder are established: First, countries’ income levels do not only affect the
quantity or volume of trade between them, as stated by the Linder hypothesis, but also the
quality of the goods produced, consumed and exchanged, largely provided that variations
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in unit values (prices) reflect differences in quality. While Schott (2004) and Hummels and
Klenow (2005) discover that export prices within narrowly defined product categories are
strongly positively correlated with the countries’ income per capita and Hallak and Schott
(2011) find that richer countries specialize in quality production, Bils and Klenow (2001)
and Hallak (2006) figure out that the demand for quality is strongly positively correlated
with the household income, i.e. the richer households demand goods of higher quality. In
their data on trade, Choi et al. (2009) detect an analogy to the Linder hypothesis that is
based on product quality, whereas the distributions of income instead of its levels matter
for it: Country pairs with more similar income distributions import baskets of goods of a
more similar quality, as they have more similar import price distributions. Supported by
the evidence on product quality and income levels, Hallak (2010) picks up on Linder’s orig-
inal emphasis on product quality as the driving force of his hypothesis and thus formulates
a “quality view” of the Linder hypothesis at the sectoral level of trade: Countries with
more similar levels of per capita income trade more with each other as such country pairs
demand and produce goods of similar quality. While the Linder hypothesis does not find
empirical support at the aggregate level of trade on a sample of 64 countries in 1995, its
quality version at the sectoral level of trade does hold while controlling for its inter-sectoral
determinants. This discrepancy in the empirical support can thereby be rationalized by a
cross-sector aggregation bias.
Second, a determinant of trade is not only given by the level of per capita income,
but also by the within-country distribution of per capita income. Firstly, the income dis-
tribution of the importing country plays some role for the kind of its imported goods:
Considering the trade patterns between developed and developing countries, Francois and
Kaplan (1996) find that an increase in the per capita income and inequality in the de-
veloping countries lead them to shift their imports to differentiated, manufactured goods
from developed countries. Dalgin et al. (2008) show that the import of luxuries (necessi-
ties) is positively (negatively) related to the importing country’s inequality. Secondly, as
in the vein of the Linder hypothesis, the similarity between the trading partners, in this
instance in terms of their income distributions, comes into play for the volume of trade
between them: While Mart´ınez-Zarzoso and Vollmer (2016) observe an analogy to the
Linder hypothesis with the income distribution similarity as the determinant of bilateral
trade volumes, i.e. the countries with more similar income distributions trade more with
each other, Eppinger and Felbermayr (2015) find, in contrast to the Linder hypothesis,
that differences in per capita incomes between two countries increase the bilateral trade,
while differences in the income dispersions reduce it.
Going beyond the trade of goods between countries, Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) derive
a Linder hypothesis for the horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) in a model with
non-homothetic preferences for quality and monopolistic competition. Taking into account
both a purely demand-driven specialization and a proximity-concentration trade-off for the
decision about how to serve foreign countries, either via exports or FDIs, they find that
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FDI is more likely to occur between countries with similar per capita income levels and
empirical evidence in its support is provided.
Theoretically, income effects as they are claimed and observed above are generated by
non-homothetic consumer preferences. Preferences are called to be homothetic if they can
be represented by an utility function that is homogeneous of degree one, i.e. with the prop-
erty that increasing the quantities of consumption by some factor raises the level of utility
out of them by the same factor. Each indifference curve is simply a magnified or reduced
version of every other indifference curve. The feature of homotheticity consequently has
the implication that the slope of the indifference curves is constant along the rays beginning
at the origin. As a result, each income expansion curve with constant prices is given by a
straight line and the proportional composition of the consumption basket is independent of
the per capita income, i.e. constant expenditure shares across per capita income. Finally,
all expenditure (income) elasticities of demand are equal to one.26
A notable body of the empirical literature rejects the homotheticity of preferences,
going far back up to Engel (1857). In a study on Belgian workers, he observes that the
proportion of income spent on food falls as income rises, which becomes known as “En-
gel’s Law”. In this way, richer workers spend a smaller fraction of their income on their
essentials. Houthakker (1957) checks for the robustness or universality of the Engel’s law
across different sectors (food, housing, clothing and all other items) and countries and
he observes by employing a double-logarithmic functional form that the total expenditure
elasticities for food are all less than one, thereby confirming Engel’s law in the case of the
observed countries. Furthermore, the elasticities for clothing are all larger than one and
in most cases less than 1.5, while the elasticities for housing (miscellaneous expenditures)
are mostly (all) below (above) one. Subsequent empirical studies confirm that the total
expenditure (income) elasticities are not equal to one and vary across sectors and coun-
tries: Using an extended linear expenditure system, Lluch et al. (1977) discover that the
elasticities for food are all less than one, while those for clothing and housing fall about
evenly on either side of one. Theil and Clements (1987) however report income elasticities
for food and clothing that are all less than one and elasticities for housing in most cases
between one and 1.5.27
Hunter and Markusen (1988) once again find for a linear expenditure system that the
income elasticities vary between 0.45 and 1.91 across the categories of consumption goods,
illustrating deviations from homotheticity that are statistically significant and in addition
to it economically relevant for trade: They show that per capita income can operate as
a basis for trade, which is totally neglected in the traditional theories in international
trade that apply identical and homothetic preferences, and that its consideration in theory
implies some significant changes in terms of the predicted volume of trade. Quantita-
26See e.g. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
27In their exercise on trade indices, Ballance et al. (1985) also reject the hypothesis of homothetic
preferences.
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tively and on the basis of a linear expenditure system, Hunter (1991) detects that the
non-homotheticity accounts for about one quarter of the inter-industry trade flows. The
imposition of homothetic preferences instead reinforces trade directions and so increases
net trade flows, providing the insight that the effect of non-homotheticity is a reduction
of the volume of inter-industry trade, i.e. trade among countries with different per capita
income levels.
Non-homotheticity and so income effects may thus provide a theoretical approach to
close the existing gap of consistency between the traditional theories in international trade
and the empirical facts on trade volumes and the factor content of trade. In particular, the
empirical literature robustly documents that (i) the trade between countries in the North
(i.e. North-North (N-N) trade) is large relative to the trade between countries in the North
and the South (i.e. North-South (N-S) trade) (a “trade volume” variation, e.g. Deardorff
(1984)) and (ii) the aggregate trade-to-GDP ratios are higher in countries with a higher
per capita income (a “trade openness” variation, see the Figure 5.2), which would not be
captured by the supply-driven trade theories. And finally, (iii) a “missing trade” puzzle
(Trefler (1995)) exists: The factor content of trade is smaller than in the predictions made
by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model, i.e. the HOV model reveals some tendency
to over-predict world trade.28,29
Theoretically addressing the non-homotheticity’s potential to reconcile the traditional
trade theories and the empirical evidence, Markusen (1986) constructs a model that incor-
porates on the one hand the central elements of the traditional theories in international
trade, i.e. differences in the relative factor endowments and scale economies in form of
monopolistic competition with product differentiation, with both being able to replicate
the direction of trade observed in the empirical evidence, i.e. inter- and intra-industry
trade, but additionally includes on the other hand a third element, i.e. non-homothetic
preferences, with all three elements together being able to replicate both the direction
and volume of trade. Other possible explanation approaches (trade frictions, i.e. higher
North-South trade barriers, and a low total gross national product in the South) however
seem to be partial but not complete solutions to the differences in the volumes between
28In general, countries in the North are assumed to be already developed and characterized by a high per
capita income (“rich”), while countries in the South are assumed to be still developing and characterized
by a low per capita income (“poor”).
29In addition to the non-homothetic preferences that are omitted in the traditional trade theories,
several other explanation approaches for the “missing trade” puzzle in the standard HOV models exist,
in the way that each alleges one of the following other missing features whose consideration possibly
brings theory and empirical evidence into accord: (Armington) Home biases in consumption, based on
a limited substitutability between home and foreign goods (goods are differentiated due to their origins,
economic or political reasons) and cross-country technology differences (Trefler (1995)), trade frictions
(Davis and Weinstein (2001), Waugh (2010) finds systematically asymmetric trade frictions between rich
and poor countries in the sense that poor countries face higher costs to export) and systematic differences
in the price and the quality across countries (Schott (2004)). Evaluating the relative importance of those
approaches in the puzzle’s explanation, Cassing and Nishioka (2015) find that preference biases between
rich and poor countries explain a larger proportion of the missing factor trade than technology differences,
whereas they do not distinguish preference differences from the non-homotheticity of preferences.
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Figure 5.2: Trade-to-GDP Ratios and Per Capita Income (GDP Per Capita (in Current
US$) and Trade (% of GDP) (Both 2016), Excluding Hong Kong, Luxembourg and Singa-
pore, Source: World Bank Database)
N-N and N-S trade. In the model’s framework, he finds that increases in the degree of
non-homotheticity lead to reductions in the N-S inter-industry trade, but to increases in
the N-N intra-industry trade, based on the assumption that a good’s capital (skilled-labor)
intensity in production and its income elasticity of demand in consumption are positively
correlated. Countries with a high per capita income, located in the North, are typically
relatively capital (skilled-labor) abundant and both produce and export the capital-(skilled-
labor-)intensive goods, but, more importantly, also consume these goods. The countries
are thus relatively “specialized” in the production and consumption of the same goods.
For these goods’ transactions across countries as a consequence, a disproportionate trade
between and among the countries with a similar (high) per capita income in the North,
i.e. a “Linder-type” trade, relative to the trade with the (poor) countries in the South, i.e.
a “Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek-type” trade, takes place, being consistent with the empirical
evidence.
Fundamental to the model and its result is the directed product-level connection be-
tween the production and demand side mentioned above that is simply assumed in the
model: The positive correlation between a good’s capital (skilled-labor) intensity in the
production and its income elasticity in the consumption. While both Reimer and Hertel
(2010) and Caron et al. (2014) do not find any significant correlation between a good’s cap-
ital intensity and its income elasticity, the latter document a positive correlation of more
than 45% between a good’s skilled-labor intensity and its income elasticity, even when
accounting for trade costs and a number of other factors, in particular cross-country differ-
ences in prices. Non-homotheticity, whose reasonableness as an assumption in the theory
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is further emphasized by the documentation of large deviations of the income elasticity
estimates from the unitary values as implied by homothetic preferences and a considerable
variation of the income elasticity of demand across goods from different industries, however
does not only help to give an explanation for the trade volume variation, but also for the
trade openness variation and helps to solve in part the missing trade puzzle: The strong
correlation between the factor content of production and consumption across countries can
be explained in about half by trade costs, but non-homotheticity turns out to be as impor-
tant quantitatively. So, non-homothetic preferences and the correlation respectively can
reduce the HOV’s over-prediction of the variance of the net factor content of trade relative
to that in the data by about 60%. As the countries tend to specialize in the consumption
of the same goods that they are specialized in producing, they will source a larger share
of their consumption from themselves and lower levels of trade-to-GDP ratios occur. For
the trade openness variation though, its explanatory power is smaller than that of another
channel: A positive sector-level correlation between the income elasticity and a sector’s
tradability exists. The income-elastic goods that are produced by the high-income coun-
tries are systematically more tradable and thus a positive relationship between the per
capita income and trade openness results.
Beyond both trade volumes and the factor content of trade, non-homotheticity has the
potential to reconcile the traditional trade theories and the empirical evidence in terms of
the positive correlation between an importer’s per capita income and the extensive margin
of bilateral trade (positive importer income elasticity of the extensive margin of bilateral
trade, see Section 1), as it is shown by Hepenstrick and Tarasov (2015) based on a Ricardian
model with a continuum of goods and countries.
Besides the classical contributions by Markusen (1986) and Bergstrand (1990) that stick
to CES preferences for differentiated products but introduce non-homotheticity through a
homogeneous product with a minimum consumption requirement, non-homothetic prefer-
ences are applied in a range of models of international trade, coming up especially in the
second decade of the 21st century and meanwhile setting up an alternative to or an enhance-
ment of the traditional trade theories: Following the extensions of the Ricardian model,
first Matsuyama (2000) incorporates non-homothetic preferences in form of consumption
indivisibilities, representing an orthogonal version to the CES preferences, in a Ricardian
model with a continuum of goods a` la Dornbusch et al. (1977), while subsequently Fieler
(2011) integrates constant relative income elasticity preferences, representing some gen-
eralized version of the CES preferences, and Hepenstrick and Tarasov (2015) incorporate
preferences that allow for binding non-negativity constraints in a Ricardian model with a
continuum of goods and countries a` la Eaton and Kortum (2002). In a Heckscher-Ohlin as
well as an imperfect competition model, Markusen (2013) applies a variation of Stone-Geary
preferences and thereby generates some “generic” model that is able to replicate several
empirical facts. Etro (2017) employs non-homothetic preferences in a Heckscher-Ohlin
model with monopolistic competition. Moreover, Foellmi et al. (2018) incorporate non-
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homothetic preferences in form of consumption indivisibilities in a model of monopolistic
competition. In the tradition of the monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous
firms a` la Melitz (2003), Behrens et al. (2014) apply CARA preferences and Simonovska
(2015) employs Stone-Geary preferences as alternative types of non-homothetic preferences
in a heterogeneous firm model of trade. Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Fajgelbaum et al.
(2015) incorporate vertical product differentiation in trade models with non-homothetic
preferences. Applying indirectly additive preferences, Bertoletti et al. (2017) consider a
monopolistic competition model with trade between two countries and homogeneous firms,
while Bertoletti et al. (2018) open the model up to general trade with heterogeneous firms.
In a normative analysis with an almost-ideal demand system (Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980)), Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) consider the unequal gains from trade across
heterogeneous consumers within countries.
5.2.2 Granularity
A recently established strand of literature takes the empirically documented distribution
of firm sizes30 into account and focuses on the role of single firms for aggregate patterns
and outcomes in macroeconomics and international trade, thereby putting forth the term
“granularity” for the existence of a few large influential firms, the “granular” components
(grains) of the economy.31,32
In a conceptual contribution to the theoretical literature, Neary (2010) demonstrates
how the feature of endogenous entry and exit can be integrated into a model of oligopoly,
thereby retaining the existence of a small number of dominating firms in equilibrium (gran-
ularity), the strategic interaction between them and thus being distinguishable from models
of perfect and monopolistic competition. Three mechanisms make this possible: Heteroge-
neous industries with a variation in fixed costs, a natural oligopoly as the case where the
equilibrium number of firms does not increase as the market size rises and superstar firms
as the outcome of a firm choice to become large which is associated with additional fixed
costs.
Eaton et al. (2013) illustrate how to adjust a standard trade model with heterogeneous
firms, which are conventionally treated as points on a continuum, to overcome its short-
comings in empirical consistency: With only an integer number of firms and therefore some
degree of granularity in the economy, the model can account for both the extreme skewness
in exporter size and zeros in bilateral trade.
30A small number of larger firms coexists alongside a large number of smaller firms: Axtell (2001)
documents for the Unites States that the distribution of firm sizes is described by a power law with an
exponent close to one (Zipf’s law). Such a distribution can theoretically be generated by a model of
proportional random growth, satisfying Gibrat’s law, which by itself leads to a log-normal distribution,
with a small friction and some adding-up constraint for the total size of the system. For an introduction
to the power laws in economics: See Gabaix (2016).
31For the role of granularity in the comparative advantage: See Gaubert and Itskhoki (2016).
32For the welfare consequences of deviations from a Pareto distribution in the firm productivity distri-
bution in models of heterogeneous firms in international trade: See Bee and Schiavo (2018).
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By providing a microfoundation for aggregate shocks,33 Gabaix (2011) shows in his
seminal study that idiosyncratic shocks to the incompressible grains of economic activity,
i.e. large firms, are able to explain a large part of the aggregate, i.a. business-cycle,
fluctuations and do not average out in the aggregate as suggested by the central limit
theorem, since this breaks down given the extreme fat-tailed distribution of firm sizes
(granularity). And in fact, about one-third of the variations in output growth is found to
be attributable to the idiosyncratic shocks to the largest 100 firms in the United States.34
Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) apply this insight to patterns of international trade,
by studying the role of large firms in explaining cross-country differences in aggregate
volatility with respect to the country’s size and trade openness: Accounting for the empiri-
cal facts that smaller as well as more open countries reveal a higher volatility, idiosyncratic
shocks to large firms account substantially for the aggregate volatility due to the very fat-
tailed distribution of firm sizes and so the fact that the typical economy is dominated by
a few very large firms. In smaller countries with fewer firms, shocks to the largest firms
matter more, while trade openness increases the granularity of the economy as only the
largest and most productive firms are selected and thus large firms get more important,
thereby increasing aggregate volatility. For a sample of the 50 largest economies in the
world, it turns out that a typical country that accounts for 0.5% of world GDP has an
aggregate volatility that is two times higher than that of the largest world economy, the
United States, and trade can increase the aggregate volatility by 15-20% in some small
open economies.
Providing empirical evidence for the relevance of shocks to single firms for aggregate
fluctuations, Di Giovanni et al. (2014) decompose the annual sales growth rate of an indi-
vidual firm to a single sales market into three components, i.e. a macroeconomic shock, a
sectoral shock and a firm-specific shock, and find for a data set capturing the universe of
French firms for 1990-2007 that the firm-specific component contributes substantially and
more to aggregate fluctuations than the other two components. Splitting firm sales up into
domestic and export sales, the firm-specific component makes a larger contribution to the
volatility of exports than that of overall sales, nevertheless substantially accounting for the
volatility of aggregate domestic sales as well. A further decomposition of the firm-specific
component into a direct effect, i.e. due to the fat-tailed distribution of firm sizes (granular-
ity), idiosyncratic shocks to large firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations, and a
linkages effect, i.e. due to input-output linkages across the economy, aggregate fluctuations
are attributable to idiosyncratic shocks, provides a more comprehensive understanding of
the at work. While empirical evidence for both effects can be provided, in particular firm-
33In an alternative or complementary approach to granularity, Acemoglu et al. (2012) argue that input-
output linkages between firms play the crucial role for the contribution of firm-specific shocks to aggregate
fluctuations.
34Di Giovanni et al. (2017, 2018) extend the granularity approach to international business cycle co-
movements and observe that idiosyncratic shocks to the large firms matter for international business cycle
co-movements, as they matter for aggregate fluctuations.
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specific shocks in more concentrated industries contribute more to aggregate volatility and
sectors with stronger input-output linkages tend to exhibit a significantly greater correla-
tion of firm-specific shocks, and the direct effect of firm shocks on aggregate fluctuations
is quantitatively relevant, the linkages effect is approximately three times as important at
the direct effect in driving aggregate volatility.
Friberg and Sanctuary (2016) replicate the previous study for the universe of Swedish
firms for 1997-2008. Even so Sweden shows up as a more granular economy with a higher
overall sales volatility and the firm-specific component once again accounts substantially
for aggregate fluctuations, its contribution is lower in Sweden compared to France, in the
way that both the firm-specific and other components contribute roughly equally to the
aggregate volatility. As in the case for France, firm-specific shocks in Sweden are more
important for the volatility of export sales than that of total sales.
5.2.3 Multi-product Firms
For the analysis of the behaviour of multi-product firms in international trade, the theo-
retical contributions in the literature35 typically take the case of homogeneous countries
in the world. A heterogeneity in terms of per capita income, which is obviously observed
in reality and captured in the present chapter, never plays a role, as standard models of
multi-product firms in the literature of international trade ignore the income effects on the
firms’ scope by employing either quasi-linear preferences (Feenstra and Ma (2008), Dhin-
gra (2013), Mayer et al. (2014) and Cheng and Tabuchi (2018)), homothetic preferences
(Bernard et al. (2011), Nocke and Yeaple (2014)) or by construction of the model (Eckel
and Neary (2010))36. However, Mayer et al. (2014) and Cheng and Tabuchi (2018) allow
for a country heterogeneity in terms of its market size (and location), which is obviously
the case in the real world, and thereby form an exception in the international trade litera-
ture. Mayer et al. (2014) illustrate how the market size and geography of trading partners
affect both a firm’s exported product range and its exported product mix across market
destinations. In a model of monopolistic competition and quadratic preferences, a tougher
competition in a larger or more centrally-located export market induces a firm to cut its
worst performing products from its export scope and to skew its export sales towards its
better performing products. Both reallocations within firms lead to an increase in firm
productivity. Considering a model of oligopolistic multi-product firms conducting trade
between countries of different sizes, Cheng and Tabuchi (2018) show that more firms but
fewer exporters exist in a larger country, and firms produce a wider range of products but
35Note the wide strand of literature on multi-product firms in the field of industrial organization, already
starting in the 1980s and therefore much earlier than the international trade literature: See e.g. Brander
and Eaton (1984), Klemperer (1992), Eaton and Schmitt (1994), Johnson and Myatt (2003), Klette and
Kortum (2004) and more recently Peng and Tabuchi (2007) as well as Ottaviano and Thisse (2011).
36Eckel and Neary (2010) assume a configuration of firms described as “large in the small, and small in
the large”, i.e. a firm is large in the industry in which it is active, but small relative to the overall economy
consisting of infinitely many industries.
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export fewer varieties.
With only a relatively small number of firms dominating international trade, as it
can be observed in the real world, each of those firms has some market power and thus
its decisions have some impact on the market aggregates, and likewise typically also on
the firm’s own variables. In this way, it is imaginable and reasonable to think that any
(additional) sales of a (new) product crowd out sales of the other existing products by the
same firm, i.e. some negative within-firm demand spillover, called cannibalization (effect),
exists.37 A within-firm cannibalization by itself is not a novel feature to the models of
multi-product firms in international trade. However, it is generated in the present chapter
by some novel mechanism: A first group of models (Baldwin and Gu (2009), Eckel and
Neary (2010), Eckel et al. (2015, 2016), Eckel and Irlacher (2017) and Flach and Irlacher
(2018)) apply an oligopolistic or monopolistic market structure and some preferences that
yield a utility function which all varieties enter symmetrically, independent of whether or
not they are produced by the same firm. Cannibalization is thereby ultimately linked to
the feature of large firms.38 In a second group of models (Dhingra (2013) and Hottman
et al. (2016)) by contrast, a nested structure for the preferences is chosen which provides
the case that the elasticity of substitution across varieties within firms and the elasticity of
substitution across firms fall apart and differ as a matter of fact in the way that the first
one is larger than the second one, following the idea that the within-firm cannibalization
is linked to the higher substitutability of the varieties of the same firm compared to those
of the competitors. The present chapter instead generates a within-firm cannibalization
through the so far neglected income effect and in particular the adjustment of the marginal
utility of income due to the additional supply of a large firm’s products. Its mechanism
thus follows the first group.
Empirical contributions in the literature of international trade however generate insights
into the export behavior of multi-product firms in the real world with heterogeneous coun-
tries and thereby point to asymmetries across countries, both the domestic market and the
destination markets abroad. Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) detect that firms export only a
fraction of their domestic scope and Mayer et al. (2014) are able to confirm their theoretical
predictions by establishing the empirical result that firms skew their export sales towards
their core products in destinations with a stronger competition. Furthermore, within-firm
37Early contributions in the (management) literature dealing with a cannibalization effect within firms
are Copulsky (1976) and Kerin et al. (1978). In contrast, Bernard et al. (forthcoming) propose a positive
within-firm demand spillover, called a demand-scope complementarity, which captures the possibility that
expanding the set of products that a firm offers to a market could increase the demand for all of the
firm’s existing products. As mentioned by the authors, a demand with such a feature can be generated
by a preference for ”one-stop shopping” (Oxenfeldt (1966)). Spillovers however may not only exist on the
demand side, but also on the supply side: E.g. a scale-scope spillover within firms is explicitly suggested
by Ushchev (2017) in a model of monopolistic competition: An extension of a firm’s product range reduces
the marginal costs of production of existing varieties.
38Therefore, in models of monopolistic competition, the absence of firms with some market power, and
symmetric varieties in the utility function, cannibalization does not occur: See Bernard et al. (2011), Qiu
and Zhou (2013), Mayer et al. (2014), Nocke and Yeaple (2014) as well as Arkolakis et al. (2015). A single
exception is given by Feenstra and Ma (2008).
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asymmetries exist in the sense that the core varieties are exported across more destinations
than non-core products, derived in a study by Arkolakis et al. (2015).
5.3 Model
The world consists of I countries and each country i ∈ {1, . . . , I} is inhabited by Li identical
individuals, who are endowed with quadratic preferences of consumption and a per capita
income Ei. Thereby, the model assumes as intended a within-country homogeneity and an
across-country heterogeneity by letting Ei varying across the countries. In each country
i, each firm f produces a continuum of varieties and sells them to country j ∈ {1, . . . , I},
with ω ∈ [0, . . . , δf,ij] as a product variety out of firm f ’s set of produced varieties δf,ij
(scope). Firms of non-zero measure compete in an oligopoly on the basis of the amount of
outputs that they generate (Cournot competition), which results in a discrete number of
homogeneous firms39 mi being active in country i. Serving a market in a country j other
than the one in which the firm is located (i.e. j 6= i) requires the coverage of some iceberg
trade costs τij > 1, which reduce to one (τii = 1) in case of serving the domestic market.
5.3.1 Preferences and Demand
Each individual has quadratic preferences over the possibilities of consumption40, which
are expressed by the following utility (function) of a representative agent in country j:
Uj =
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
[
aqf,ij(ω)− 1
2
bqf,ij(ω)
2
]
dω, (5.1)
with a and b as (constant) parameters and qf,ij(ω) as the individual consumption of product
variety ω produced by firm f in country i and shipped to country j. The utility maximiza-
tion subject to each consumer’s budget constraint
∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
pf,ij(ω)qf,ij(ω)dω ≤ Ej
with pf,ij(ω) as the price of variety ω produced by firm f in country i and shipped to
country j yields the following individual inverse demand:
pf,ij(ω) =
1
λj
(a− bqf,ij(ω)) (5.2)
with λj as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, representing the
marginal utility of income of consumers in country j. With plugging the individual inverse
demand (equation 5.2) into the budget constraint of each individual, which holds for the
consumption allocation with equality, an expression for the marginal utility of income can
39Models of oligopolistic firms tend to assume their homogeneity in terms of the cost structure due to
issues of tractability. See e.g. Eckel and Neary (2010) and Ottaviano and Thisse (2011).
40As applied by Neary (2016) in a general equilibrium model of oligopoly.
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be derived:
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(a− bqf,ij(ω))
λj
qf,ij(ω)dω = Ej
and
λj =
1
Ej
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(a− bqf,ij(ω)) qf,ij(ω)dω. (5.3)
λj is obviously decreasing in per capita income Ej, i.e.
∂λj
∂Ej
< 0: The richer consumers
in country j are, the less utility they receive from the last unit of income. Furthermore,
the marginal utility of income is increasing in the scope of each firm δf,ij, i.e.
∂λj
∂δf,ij
> 0,
because the last unit of income is associated with a higher utility for a larger consumption
choice. For a sufficiently small (large) consumption quantity qf,ij(ω), the marginal utility
of income is increasing (decreasing) in the quantity:
∂λj
∂qf,ij(ω)
=
1
Ej
∂ [(a− bqf,ij(ω)) qf,ij(ω)]
∂qf,ij(ω)
=
1
Ej
((a− bqf,ij(ω))− bqf,ij(ω)) ,
∂λj
∂qf,ij(ω)
≷ 0 ⇔ a− bqf,ij(ω) ≷ bqf,ij(ω) ⇔ a ≷ 2bqf,ij(ω)
and
∂λj
∂qf,ij(ω)
≷ 0 ⇔ a
2b
≷ qf,ij(ω).
Aggregating the individual demand over the Lj individuals gives the aggregate demand in
country j: xf,ij(ω) = Ljqf,ij(ω). To get a plausible model setting, the following assumption
is made throughout the section:
xf,ij(ω)
Lj
<
a
2b
⇔ 2 b
a
xf,ij(ω) < Lj ∀ω, (model assumption)
i.e. the destination country j is sufficiently large in terms of its population. The aggregate
inverse demand takes the form
pf,ij(ω) =
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
(5.4)
and the marginal utility of income is given by
λj =
1
LjEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω. (5.5)
Finally, the aggregate demand can be written as
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
b
(a− λjpf,ij(ω)) . (5.6)
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The demand’s elasticity with respect to the price derives in its absolute value as
εf,ij(ω) = −∂xf,ij(ω)
∂pf,ij(ω)
pf,ij(ω)
xf,ij(ω)
=
λjpf,ij(ω)
a− λjpf,ij(ω) (5.7)
and is increasing in the marginal utility of income,
∂εf,ij(ω)
∂λj
=
apf,ij(ω)
(a− λjpf,ij(ω))2
> 0,
i.e. the more the individuals in country j value the last unit of income, the more they
are concerned about its optimal usage in consumption and thus the more elastic is their
demand with respect to changes in the price, while under the model assumption, the price
elasticity of demand decreases with the per capita income,41
dεf,ij(ω)
dEj
=
∂εf,ij(ω)
∂λj
dλj
dEj
< 0,
i.e. the richer the individuals in country j, the less they value the last unit of income and
thus the less elastic is their demand to changes in the price and those consumers therefore
have a larger, or if at all, positive demand for varieties with a higher price.42
5.3.2 Production and Supply
Each firm produces a continuum of product varieties with labor as the only factor of pro-
duction in a flexible manufacturing technology, which goes conceptually back to Prahalad
and Hamel (1990) and finds its application in multi-product firm models by Eckel and
Neary (2010), Qiu and Zhou (2013), Mayer et al. (2014), Arkolakis et al. (2015), Eckel
et al. (2015, 2016), Eckel and Irlacher (2017), Flach and Irlacher (2018) as well as Herzig
(2019b) (Chapter 4).43 Due to this technology, the marginal production costs are increas-
ing over the product varieties, while being minimal for some variety ω = 0, called the firm’s
core competency:
∂cf,ij(ω)
∂ω
> 0 and cf,ij(0) = 1, i.e. producing product varieties that are
successively further away from the firm’s core competency variety and thus expanding the
firm’s product portfolio is associated with increasingly higher marginal costs of production,
which establishes for the firm a ladder of products depending on their decreasing efficiency
in production.44 Ultimately, this asymmetry in the firm’s production efficiency across its
product varieties leads to a within-firm heterogeneity in the price and quantity dimensions,
41See the Appendix F.1 for the proof.
42Note that the choke price of richer consumers in country j is larger than that of poorer consumers in
country k, i.e. Ej > Ek: p
max
f,ij =
a
λj
> pmaxf,ik =
a
λk
, given that dλdE < 0.
43Besides the international trade literature, the industrial organization literature also deals with flexible
manufacturing in the production process, see e.g. Eaton and Schmitt (1994).
44Empirical evidence in support of the concept of flexible manufacturing is provided by Garcia-Marin
and Voigtla¨nder (2017).
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which can be indeed observed in reality45.
In its production, each firm has to take two decisions: Taking other firms’ choices
as given, it simultaneously decides about the quantity produced xf,ij(ω) for variety ω ∈
[0, . . . , δf,ij] and about the mass of varieties produced δf,ij for j = {1, . . . , I}. These
decisions are made based on the maximization of the firm’s profit function:
Πf,i =
I∑
j=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− cf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) dω − wiF (5.8)
with λj given by equation (5.5), wi as the wage rate in country i
46 and F as some fixed
operation cost (measured in domestic labor units). The first-order condition with respect
to the quantity xf,ij(ω) is then given by:
47
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
= cf,ij(ω), (5.9)
where the first term on the left-hand side of the equation represents the marginal revenue
and the term on the equation’s right-hand side the marginal cost. In the standard models
of monopolistic competition with differentiated product varieties and increasing returns to
scale48, firms act as monopolists and set those two terms, marginal revenue and marginal
cost, equal to each other to determine their profit-maximizing output quantity. As the
entry to the economy is assumed to be free, which leads to zero long-run profits, and a
sufficiently large number of firms exist in the economy, precluding strategic interaction
between the economic agents, the effects of firms’ actions on aggregates are assumed away
and thus firms do not take them into account while making their choices, especially not
the effect of their quantity choice on the marginal utility of income (
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
= 0) in the
respective case of its relevance.49
With only a few firms acting in the oligopolistic economy, each firm represents a substan-
tial part of the economy, thus influences the economy’s aggregates, especially the marginal
utility of income (
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
6= 0),50 and takes this into account while making its choices,
leading to the first-order condition in equation (5.9) with the additional second term on
its left-hand side. Provided that the destination country j is sufficiently large in terms
of its population (model assumption, i.e. Lj > 2
b
a
xf,ij(ω)), an increase in the supply of
variety ω raises the marginal utility of income:
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
> 0, i.e. a consumer in country
45See for the quantity (sales/exports) dimension e.g. Goldberg et al. (2010b), Bernard et al. (2010),
Amador and Opromolla (2013) and Lopresti (2016).
46As labor is inelastically supplied by assumption, each firm takes the wage rate as exogenously given.
47See the Appendix F.2 for the details of derivation.
48Going back to the seminal contributions by Lancaster (1975, 1979), Spence (1976) and Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) as well as the model’s application to international trade by Krugman (1979).
49Once again, in the present model, the marginal utility of income is in general relevant and thus the
income effect is provided by the non-homotheticity of the preferences and the absence of a nume´raire
variety.
50See the Appendix F.3 for the details of the response of the marginal utility with respect to the quantity.
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j receives more utility from the last unit of income obtained when facing a larger supply
of a variety ω. A higher marginal utility of income due to an increase in the supply of
a variety ω reduces the demand for all the other product varieties (equation (5.6)) and
the second term on the left-hand side of equation (5.9), which turns out to be negative,
therefore represents a cannibalization effect within the multi-product firm: Through the
income effect, any expansion of the supply of a product variety crowds out the demand
of other varieties and can thus only be taken out at their expense. The firm internalizes
this effect of cannibalization in its choice and adjusts its output of variety ω, compared to
the case of an absence of a cannibalization effect, by reducing it, thereby attenuating the
cannibalization between product varieties and optimizing profits.
Given the market dominance of a firm f located in country i in country j by gf,ij, which
is defined as a measure of the firm’s sales share in the country’s market and represents an
index for its concentration or granularity, the first-order condition (equation (5.9)) can be
rewritten:51
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
[1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(ω). (5.10)
As it gets obvious, the standard first-order condition of the equalization of marginal rev-
enue and marginal cost is adjusted by the firm’s market dominance: The larger and more
dominant a firm is in terms of its sales share in a country’s market, the stronger is the canni-
balization effect and the lower is the marginal revenue for some variety ω. By internalizing
this effect, the firm ends up with a smaller output amount chosen for the variety.
Regarding the firm’s second decision, the first-order condition with respect to the mass
of varieties (scope) δf,ij is given by:
52
(
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
− cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
=
1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
∂λj
∂δf,ij
, (5.11)
such that the firm chooses its scope in the way that the profit from the marginal variety
(term on the left-hand side) is just equal to the variety’s sales-depressing effect due to the
cannibalization on the firm’s intra-marginal varieties (term on the right-hand side).53 With
the market dominance of the firm f located in country i in country j, given by gf,ij, in
hand, the first-order condition (equation 5.11) can be rewritten:54
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij) [1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij). (5.12)
51See the Appendix F.4 for the details of derivation.
52See the Appendix F.5 for the details of derivation.
53See the Appendix F.3 for the details of the response of the marginal utility with respect to the scope.
Given the above assumption, i.e. Lj > 2
b
axf,ij(ω), the marginal utility of income necessarily increases
with an increase in the firm’s scope, i.e.
∂λj
∂δf,ij
> 0.
54See the Appendix F.6 for the details of derivation.
5.3. MODEL 259
As it turns out, the firm expands its scope until the demand for the marginal variety
is driven down to zero: xf,ij(δf,ij) = 0, representing the solution to equation (5.12).
55
From the modified first-order condition for the marginal variety (equation (5.10)), one gets
therefore an implicit solution for the firm’s decision about its scope:
a
λj
[1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(δf,ij). (5.13)
Due to the flexible manufacturing technology, the right-hand side is increasing in the mass
of varieties δf,ij. With a constant market dominance of the firm gf,ij, the left-hand side is
increasing in the per capita income of the destination market j, Ej, because the marginal
utility of income λj decreases with Ej. Thus, keeping the firm’s market dominance constant,
the firm exports more varieties to the richer countries. This fact of a variation in the export
scope across countries that are heterogeneous in terms of their per capita income is so far
absent in and therefore novel with respect to the standard models of multi-product firms
in international trade that ignore the effect of the export destination’s income on the firm’s
scope.
In addition, for a given destination market, a firm with a larger market dominance faces
a stronger cannibalization effect and therefore exports less varieties to the country, i.e. the
firm exports a smaller scope. In multi-product firm models of monopolistic competition
with gf,ij = 0 by construction, this fact can not be reproduced.
The optimal output, price and markup profiles of the firm are then given by:56
xf,ij(ω) =
aLj
2b
(
1− cf,ij(ω)
cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
, (5.14)
pf,ij(ω) =
1
2 [1− gf,ij] (cf,ij(ω) + cf,ij(δf,ij))
and
pf,ij(ω) =
1
2 [1− gf,ij]
(
1 +
cf,ij(δf,ij)
cf,ij(ω)
)
cf,ij(ω). (5.15)
The firm with a scope δf,ij exhibits a decreasing output and an increasing price profile
over the firm’s products ladder, such that it charges the lowest price for the variety in
which it is most efficient in production (core variety) and sells it with the highest amount.
Firms with a larger scope produce and sell more of each of their products, which indicates
a positive correlation between the product-extensive and product-intensive margin at the
firm level. Empirical evidence in line with this finding is provided by Elliott and Virakul
(2010) for firm exports in Thailand, Goldberg et al. (2010b) for firm output in India, Liu
(2010) for firm sales in the U.S., Bernard et al. (2011) for firm exports in the U.S. and
Berthou and Fontagne´ (2013) for firm exports in France. In addition, a typical scale effect
for the output profile exists: Firms export more of each of their products to markets with
55See the Appendix F.7 for the proof.
56See the Appendix F.8 for the details of derivation.
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a larger size.
As it is shown in equation (5.15), the price for a variety ω can be represented by
the product of its marginal production cost and its markup. Markups thereby vary both
across firms and across varieties within firms. Multi-product firms with a larger scope and
a higher market dominance in the export destination are able to charge higher markups
for their products: The cannibalization effect being relevant for those firms leads to some
restriction of the firms’ scope and quantities, making possible the implementation of higher
markups. Even so a firm charges the lowest price for its core variety among its products,
the core variety’s markup is the highest and markups fall with the distance to the core
variety (down to 1
1−gf,ij for the marginal variety, which is singularly determined by the
market dominance of the firm). This finding of the model is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided by De Loecker et al. (2016).
Given these insights, the export behavior of a multi-product firm towards countries
that are heterogeneous in terms of their per capita income obviously follows a clear pattern
which gets determined by the within-firm, i.e. product, as well as the country heterogeneity :
While both consumers with a low and consumers with a high per capita income demand
varieties with a low price, being the firm’s core products, only consumers with a higher per
capita income have a larger, or if at all, positive demand for varieties with a higher price57,
which are in turn those varieties in whose production the firm is less efficient in, i.e. its
non-core or marginal varieties. Thus, taken this together, each firm exports its core and
relatively cheap varieties to possibly all destinations, but its marginal varieties with the
higher prices are only exported to the richer countries. Consequently, firms export their
core products across more destinations than the non-core products; a finding of the model
that is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Arkolakis et al. (2015). Overall,
this leads to export scopes which are shortened or extended by the firm along its products
ladder depending on the country’s per capita income.
5.3.3 Multiplicative Cost Specification
A functional form specification for the marginal cost of production and delivery cf,ij(ω)
provides deeper insights to the model:
cf,ij(ω) = τijwizf,iω
η, (5.16)
where τij represents the iceberg cost of transportation from country i to country j (with
the standard assumption that τii = 1), wi the wage rate in the country of production i, zf,i
the production efficiency of firm f in country i and η > 0 the elasticity of the marginal cost
with respect to the distance to the core variety, i.e.
∂cf,ij(ω)
∂ω
ω
cf,ij(ω)
= η. As assumed by the
flexible manufacturing technology, each firm has some lowest marginal cost of production
57See the Section 5.3.1.
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and delivery for its core variety (ω = 0) and the marginal cost for other varieties increases
with their distance to this variety. The rate of the increase is thereby captured by η.
Given the cost specification, the revenue of the firm from exports to country j can be
explicitly expressed in terms of its scope:58
Rf,ij =
a2ηLjδf,ij
2bλj (2η + 1)
=
a
2b
η
(2η + 1)
Ljτijwizf,i
[1− gf,ij] δ
η+1
f,ij , (5.17)
where the revenue depends overall on the demand parameters (a and b), the supply pa-
rameter (η as the marginal cost elasticity and representing the flexible manufacturing
technology), both countries’ characteristics (wi as the wage rate in country i and Lj as the
market size of the destination country j), the geographical distance between both countries
(τij as the iceberg transport cost) and the firm characteristics (zf,i as the firm’s efficiency
in production, gf,ij as the market dominance of the firm in country j and δf,ij as the firm’s
export scope).
The firm’s export scope as the crucial variable of its choice portfolio is in general deter-
mined by the two countervailing effects: the income effect which provides incentives for the
firm to expand its scope in case of a higher per capita income and the cannibalization effect
which provides incentives for the firm to restrict or contract its scope due to the within-firm
cannibalization. With the above cost specification, one gets an explicit expression for the
firm’s export scope, disclosing those effects:59
δf,ij =
[
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
[
1 +
1
2η
]
[1− gf,ij] Ej
δj
] 1
η
, (5.18)
where δj =
∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1 δf,ij denotes the number of varieties available in country j. As it
was already derived in case of the implicit solution for the export scope, but now being
explicit, all else constant, firms export more varieties to richer countries, i.e. countries with
a higher per capita income Ej. Consumers in those countries reveal a lower price elasticity
of demand60 and are willing to purchase the more expensive goods. Multi-product firms
thus export their core products to all the destinations, but their non-core products are
only exported to the richer countries. In addition, comparing both the domestic and
export scope and due to the transportation cost with τii = 1 and τij > 1, firms export only
a fraction of their domestic scope to the destination abroad, given that all else is equal for
both countries. Empirical evidence for this finding of the model is provided by Iacovone
and Javorcik (2010).
For some constant number of varieties available in country j, any increase in the firm’s
dominance in the market is associated with a reduction in its scope due to the cannibal-
ization effect. However, it is possible to go one step further to get an even deeper insight:
58See the Appendix F.9 for the details of derivation.
59See the Appendix F.10 for the details of derivation.
60See the Section 5.3.1.
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The market dominance of the firm f located in country i in country j can be expressed
as the ratio of the firm’s export scope to the destination and the overall number of vari-
eties available in country j, i.e. gf,ij =
δf,ij
δj
.61 With this finding, the firm’s export scope
(equation (5.18)) gets:
δf,ij =
[
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
[
1 +
1
2η
]
[1− gf,ij] gf,ijEj
] 1
η+1
, (5.19)
which yields a non-linear relationship between the firm’s export scope and its market
dominance: Small firms, i.e. firms that have a market dominance of less than 0.5, with
a relatively weak within-firm cannibalization effect expand their scope with an increase
in their market dominance. In contrast, firms with an already large market dominance,
i.e. larger than 0.5, experience a strong cannibalization effect and thus a decrease in their
export scope whenever their market dominance rises further.62
To complement the analysis under the given cost specification, explicit solutions for the
firm’s export costs and its operating export profits from the operation to country j are
derived:63
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,i
η
(η + 1)(2η + 1)
δη+1f,ij (5.20)
and
Πf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,i
η(η + gf,ij)
(η + 1)(2η + 1)(1− gf,ij)δ
η+1
f,ij . (5.21)
Overall, the firm realizes profits out of its activities among the I countries:
Πf,i =
I∑
j=1
Πf,ij − wiF, (5.22)
whereas it has to pay some fixed operation cost F for the establishment of its production
facilities in country i, which is measured in domestic labour units and therefore weighted
by the country’s wage rate wi.
With the above cost specification, the model additionally provides the following finding:
First, the sales ratio of two varieties ω and ω′ of firm f in country j can be expressed in
terms of the firm’s export scope:64
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
=
1−
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η . (5.23)
Easily verifiable,65 the sales ratio of two varieties ω and ω′ with ω < ω′ decreases with
61See the Appendix F.11 for the details of derivation.
62See the Appendix F.12 for the proof.
63See the Appendix F.13 for the details of derivation.
64See the Appendix F.14 for the details of derivation.
65See the Appendix F.14 for the proof.
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the firm’s export scope. As the competition increases and the firm’s market dominance
decreases, the firm with a market dominance below 0.5 reduces its export scope and its sales
ratio of varieties closer to the core competency to varieties being further away increases.
Therefore, in case of an increased competition, multi-product firms alter their product mix
by skewing their export sales towards their core products.
For its part, the model replicates with this finding a robust empirical fact, or regularity,
of multi-product firms in international trade, which gets established in the literature:66
Being confronted with an increased competition, multi-product firms adjust their product
mix at the extensive and intensive margin by dropping peripheral products and undertaking
a within-firm reallocation, i.e. shifting their sales away from their peripheral products and
concentrating more on their core products, leading to an increased skewness in the firms’
sales distribution across their products. First, Liu (2010) reports for the United States
that a rising import competition induces multi-product firms to divest their peripheral
products, whereas those products with weaker linkages to the core are more likely to be
dropped, and to reallocate their product composition towards their core production, i.e.
increase the sales share for the core products and decrease the sales share for the peripheral
products. In a related study of the effects of an increased Chinese competition for Mexico,
Iacovone et al. (2013) find an asymmetry at the extensive and intensive margins across the
products of multi-product plants: Marginal products are more likely to be dropped and
their sales compressed, while core products are relatively impervious to the competition
surge, implying a within-firm reallocation in terms of market shares. Mayer et al. (2014)
document for French exporters that those firms skew their export sales towards their better
performing products in export markets with a tougher competition. In a follow-up study,
Mayer et al. (2016) do not consider the variation in the firms’ export skewness across
destinations, but in a given destination across time and find that positive demand shocks
in export markets lead French multi-product firms to skew their export sales in those
destinations towards their better performing products, in this way reacting to an increased
competition.
5.3.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is given by an allocation of the number of firms in each country
j ∈ {1, . . . , I}, mj, the scope of each firm f ∈ {1, . . . ,mi} in country i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, δf,ij,
and the per capita income of each country j ∈ {1, . . . , I}, Ej, such that
(i) firms choose the mass of varieties they sell domestically and export,
(ii) free entry drives profits to zero, which implies Ej = wj, and
(iii) labor and goods markets clear and trade is balanced.
66For additional regularities of multi-product firms in international trade: See the Chapter 2.
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5.3.5 Comparative Statics
Further following the chapter’s purpose of examining the behaviour of multi-product firms
across countries that differ in terms of their per capita income, its model’s comparative
statics provide additional insights. For the analysis of the changes in the endogenous
variables, i.e. the price respectively the markup and the scope, in response to changes in
the exogenous variables, i.e. the cost of transportation and the per capita income, the
following system of model equations is used, whereas, once again, the cost specification in
the Section 5.3.3 is applied:
pf,ij(ω) =
τijwizf,i
2 (1− gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
, (5.24)
µf,ij(ω) =
1
2 (1− gf,ij)
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)
, (5.25)
δf,ij =
(
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
) 1
η
(
1 +
1
2η
) 1
η
(1− gf,ij)
1
η
(
Ej
δj
) 1
η
(5.26)
and
gf,ij =
δf,ij
δj
. (5.27)
Starting with a ceteris paribus consideration, more productive firms, i.e. firms with a higher
productivity in the production and thus a lower zf,i, charge a lower price for each variety
and export a larger scope of varieties to destinations abroad, while the markup is unaffected
by the firm productivity. In the following, the interrelations between the variables are taken
into account, first assuming that the overall number of varieties available in the destination
country j, δj, is constant. The elasticity of the price with respect to the transportation
cost derives then as67
ε¯p,τ =
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηωη (1− gf,ij)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(5.28)
and the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost is given by68
ε¯µ,τ =
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= −ηδ
η
f,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
. (5.29)
As can be seen, the price for each variety decreases with a decrease in the transportation
cost but the price pass-through is incomplete, i.e. the elasticity of the price with respect
to the transportation cost is less than one.69 Multi-product firms thus absorb some part
of a change in the transportation cost in their markups, as the markup for each variety
increases with a decrease in the transportation cost, and do not fully pass trade cost reliefs
67See the Appendix F.15.1 for the details of derivation.
68See the Appendix F.15.2 for the details of derivation.
69See the Appendix F.15.3 for the proof.
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and difficulties through to the consumers.
However, quantitative differences exist across firms70: The transportation cost elasticity
of the price is decreasing with the firm’s market dominance.71 Thus, a firm with a higher
market share has a lower pass-through of prices. Empirical evidence for this finding of
the model is provided by Amiti et al. (2014). Exporters with a more dominant market
positioning adjust their prices to a lesser extent to the change in the transportation cost.
In this way, these firms reveal the capacity and willingness to absorb a larger part of the
cost variation in their markups, as the absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with
respect to the transportation cost is increasing in the firm’s market dominance.72 The
same pattern holds true for the firm’s export scope: The transportation cost elasticity of
the price decreases with the firm’s export scope.73 Firms that are larger in terms of the
number of varieties shipped abroad undertake smaller price adjustments and follow a more
stable and less volatile price policy. A larger part of the cost reduction is captured by these
firms in form of larger markups, as the absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with
respect to the transportation cost is increasing in the firm’s export scope.74
Quantitative differences in the firms’ price pass-through are not only in place across
firms, but also within firms across their products: The transportation cost elasticity of the
price is increasing in the firm’s product portfolio.75 While for products that are closer to
the firm’s core and have larger markups, firms absorb a larger part of the cost variation in
those products’ markups, peripheral products that are produced with a lower productivity
and higher costs react with their prices more to the change in the transportation cost. And
as the absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation
cost is decreasing in each firm’s product portfolio,76 a decrease in the transportation cost
leads to a larger increase in the markups of the products that are closer to the firm’s core
and to a smaller increase in the peripheral products’ markups.
Export prices and markups do not only vary due to the changes in the cost of trans-
portation to the sales market abroad, but also due to the changes in the per capita income
of the destination country. As it turns out, the elasticities of the price and the markup
with respect to the per capita income are given by77,78
ε¯p,E =
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
=
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
= ε¯µ,E. (5.30)
70For an overview about the properties of the elasticities of the price, markup and scope: See the Table
5.1.
71See the Appendix F.15.3 for the proof.
72See the Appendix F.15.4 for the proof.
73See the Appendix F.15.3 for the proof.
74See the Appendix F.15.4 for the proof.
75See the Appendix F.15.3 for the proof.
76See the Appendix F.15.4 for the proof.
77See the Appendix F.15.5 for the details of derivation.
78See the Appendix F.15.6 for the details of derivation.
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Both, the price and the markup for each variety increase with an increase in the per
capita income, and do so by the same amount, i.e. the elasticities are identical. Again,
the adjustments quantitatively vary across firms: The income elasticities of the price and
the markup are increasing in the firm’s market dominance.79,80 For more dominant firms,
prices and markups are adjusted to a larger extent in response to a change in the per capita
income. The identical pattern applies as well to larger firms: The income elasticities of
the price and the markup are increasing in the firm’s export scope.81,82 Firms that export
more varieties abroad undertake larger price and markup adjustments following a change in
the per capita income. However, quantitative differences exist across the products within
firms: The income elasticities of the price and the markup are decreasing in the firm’s
product portfolio.83,84 When the per capita income changes, the prices and the markups
of products that are closer to the firm’s core and in whose production the firm is more
efficient in are adjusted to a larger extent than the prices and the markups of products
that are further away and productional less efficient.
Besides their reactions along the prices, multi-product firms can also vary the number
of products that are exported, i.e. their export scope, in response to a change in the cost
of transportation and the per capita income of the destination country. From now on, the
assumption of a constant overall number of varieties being available in the destination j,
δj, is suspended and instead it varies like the other variables. The elasticity of the scope
with respect to the transportation cost is then given by85
εδ,τ =
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= − 1
η + 2gf,ij
.
As the cost of transportation decreases in the wake of a trade liberalization and exporting
becomes less costly, multi-product firms expand their export scope. As it is obvious,
quantitatively varying across firms, the absolute value of the elasticity of the scope with
respect to the transportation cost decreases with the firm’s market dominance, due to
the cannibalization effect.86 Firms that account for a larger sales share in the destination
market and are therefore more dominant face a stronger cannibalization effect and thus
reveal a smaller scope response to a change in the transportation cost; in particular, they
expand their export scope less in case of a trade liberalization.
Appearing once again as a situation which is more or less rewarding for trade efforts, a
variation in the destination’s per capita income leads to a structurally identical result in
the firms’ extensive margin adjustment as a variation in the cost of transportation: The
79See the Appendix F.15.7 for the proof.
80See the Appendix F.15.8 for the proof.
81See the Appendix F.15.7 for the proof.
82See the Appendix F.15.8 for the proof.
83See the Appendix F.15.7 for the proof.
84See the Appendix F.15.8 for the proof.
85See the Appendix F.15.9 for the details of derivation.
86See the Appendix F.15.10 for the proof.
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elasticity of the scope with respect to the per capita income derives as87
εδ,E = −εδ,τ = d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η + 2gf,ij
.
An increase in the per capita income and therefore richer consumers in the destination
abroad induce multi-product firms to expand their export scope, selling not only the rel-
atively cheap core products to those consumers, but also the more expensive marginal
products, for which those consumers meanwhile have some demand. However, quantita-
tive differences exist once more across firms: The elasticity of the scope with respect to the
per capita income decreases in the firm’s market dominance.88 Constrained by a stronger
cannibalization effect, more dominant firms are less reactive in their export scope to a
change in the per capita income; in particular, they expand their export scope less to an
increase in the destination’s per capita income.
Replicating the above considerations of the price and the markup adjustments in re-
sponse to changes in the cost of transportation and the per capita income, but now allowing
for a variation in the overall number of varieties being available in the destination country,
the elasticity of the price with respect to the transportation cost is then given by89
εp,τ =
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
.
and the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost derives as90
εµ,τ =
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= −ηδ
η
f,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
. (5.31)
As can be seen, the price for each variety decreases with a decrease in the transportation
cost but the price pass-through is incomplete, i.e. the elasticity of the price with respect to
the transportation cost is less than one, at the firm and product level.91 Empirical evidence
for this finding of the model is provided by Berman et al. (2012), Chatterjee et al. (2013),
Amiti et al. (2014), Li et al. (2015), Chen and Inklaar (2016), Garetto (2016) as well as
Caselli et al. (2017) for exchange rates.92 Firms absorb some part of the cost change in
their markups and do not fully pass it through to the consumers, as the markup for each
variety increases with a decrease in the transportation cost. Yielding qualitatively identical
results, a quantitative difference between this measure of the price pass-through, εp,τ , and
the one for which the overall number of varieties being available in the destination country
87See the Appendix F.15.11 for the details of derivation.
88See the Appendix F.15.12 for the proof.
89See the Appendix F.15.13 for the details of derivation.
90See the Appendix F.15.14 for the details of derivation.
91See the Appendix F.15.15 for the proof.
92For industry-level studies on the price pass-through of tariffs and exchange rates and the incomplete-
ness: See e.g. Feenstra (1989) and Mallick and Marques (2008). At the firm level, Ludema and Yu (2016)
instead find that
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is hold fixed, ε¯p,τ , quite exists. These measures’ proportion indeed is ex ante ambiguous
and depends on both the firm’s market dominance and the elasticity of the marginal cost:93
ε¯p,τ T εp,τ ⇔ δηf,ij
(
(η − 1) g2f,ij − ηgf,ij
)
T ωη
(
(η + 1) g2f,ij
)
If the elasticity of the marginal cost is not too large, i.e. η < 1 and so an adjustment in the
firm’s product portfolio is merely associated with a moderate cost, making firms basically
more willing to undertake adjustments at their extensive margin, then εp,τ > ε¯p,τ , i.e. the
price pass-through in case of considering a change in the overall number of varieties available
in the destination country is larger than the price pass-through under the assumption of
a constant δj. In the first-mentioned case, firms thus absorb a smaller part of the cost
change in their markups and pass a larger part through to the consumers. When a trade
liberalization in form of a cut of the transportation cost proceeds, firms in the latter
case are confronted with a stronger cannibalization effect and restrict adjustments at the
extensive margin and at the intensive margin by lowering prices less, capturing more of
the cost release in their markups and thus mainly generating additional profits through
a better profitability on the existing product portfolio and product scale. By contrast,
firms in the former case undertake adjustments at the extensive margin and lower prices
more, thereby initiating larger sales per product, i.e. raising the intensive margin, therefore
mainly generating additional profits through a larger extensive and intensive margin.
As before, quantitative differences in the price pass-through exist across firms and
within firms across their products: The transportation cost elasticity of the price is increas-
ing with the firm’s market dominance.94 Firms with a larger sales share in the destination
market and that are thus more dominant in it adjust their prices more to a change in the
transportation cost and absorb a smaller part of the cost change in their markups, as the
absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost is
decreasing in the firm’s market dominance95; in this way, these firms pass more through
to the consumers. The transportation cost elasticity of the price is decreasing with the
firm’s export scope.96 Firms that are larger in terms of the number of products exported
pass through a smaller part of the change in the transportation cost to the consumers.
These firms accordingly reveal a capacity or willingness to absorb a larger part of it in
their markups, as the absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the
transportation cost is increasing in the firm’s export scope97, thereby following a more
stable price policy. Finally, the transportation cost elasticity of the price is increasing in
each firm’s product portfolio.98 While firms adjust the prices of the products that are
closer to the core less and absorb a larger part of the cost variation in those products’
93See the Appendix F.15.15 for the details of derivation.
94See the Appendix F.15.15 for the proof.
95See the Appendix F.15.16 for the proof.
96See the Appendix F.15.15 for the proof.
97See the Appendix F.15.16 for the proof.
98See the Appendix F.15.15 for the proof.
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larger markups, peripheral products react with their prices more to the change in the
transportation cost. As the absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to
the transportation cost is decreasing in each firm’s product portfolio99, a decrease in the
transportation cost leads to a larger increase in the markups of the products that are closer
to the firm’s core and to a smaller increase in the peripheral products’ markups.
Letting the overall number of varieties available in the destination country be variable,
the elasticities of the price and the markup with respect to the per capita income are given
by100,101
εp,E =
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
=
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
= εµ,E.
Both, the price and the markup for each variety increase with an increase in the per
capita income, and do so by the same amount, i.e. the elasticities are identical. As an
implication of the non-homothetic preferences, exporting firms charge higher prices for
their products in richer destinations. Empirical evidence for this finding of the model is
provided by Bastos and Silva (2010) for Portugal, Manova and Zhang (2012) for China,
Martin (2012) for France, Simonovska (2015) for a single online retailer in the apparel sector
and Go¨rg et al. (2017) for Hungary. In general, price variations by an exporting firm within
a product (product category) across heterogeneous countries may indicate differences in
(i) the markups charged in the countries, as suggested by the present chapter’s theory,
and/or (ii) the quality supplied to the countries. Indeed, the theoretical and empirical
trade literature identifies a significant role of vertical product differentiation and product
quality in shaping the patterns of international trade, also of trade between countries with
different income levels102, as it is this chapter’s setting. Nevertheless, by concentrating
on the multi-product firms’ export scope across those heterogeneous countries, product
quality represents a feature that is beyond the scope of this chapter; even so it would fit
in with the present chapter’s theory, its presented narrative and the empirical evidence:
With non-homothetic preferences, firms have an incentive to improve the product quality
and to export higher-quality products when they face wealthier consumers with a lower
marginal utility of income and a larger willingness to pay for higher quality.103 Another,
though to the above references closely related strand of the literature observes a pattern
that is typically called “pricing to market”, i.e. the price variations across countries at the
99See the Appendix F.15.16 for the proof.
100See the Appendix F.15.17 for the details of derivation.
101See the Appendix F.15.18 for the details of derivation.
102For both the respective theory and empirics: See Section 5.2.1.
103In a recent contribution, Bastos et al. (2018) approach the topic of quality differences in exports across
heterogeneous destinations by considering their inputs to the production process and in detail investigating
the relationship between the destination’s income and the prices of the exporters’ inputs. They detect that
exporting to richer countries leads firms to pay higher prices for inputs, which supports the presumption
that selling to richer destinations is associated with an increase in the quality of the products produced
and sold as well as the purchase of higher-quality inputs.
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more aggregate, i.e. country, level: The prices of tradable consumption goods are higher
in countries with a higher per capita income; such a finding is obtained by Alessandria and
Kaboski (2011) and Bekkers et al. (2012).
Quantitative differences in the price and the markup adjustments are in place both
across firms and within firms across their products: The income elasticities of the price
and the markup are decreasing in the firm’s market dominance.104,105 More dominant firms
adjust their prices and markups less to a change in the per capita income of the destination
country. In contrast, the income elasticities of the price and the markup are increasing
in the firm’s export scope.106,107 When firms export more products, they undertake larger
price and markup adjustments in response to a variation in the per capita income. Finally,
the income elasticities of the price and the markup are decreasing in each firm’s product
portfolio.108,109 For products closer to the core, firms adjust their prices and markups in
response to a change in the per capita income more, whereas the prices and the markups
of peripheral products reveal smaller adjustments and a more stable policy.
pf,ij(ω) µf,ij(ω) δf,ij
gf,ij δf,ij ω gf,ij δf,ij ω gf,ij
τij
δj < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
? > 0? < 0? -
δj > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
? > 0? < 0? < 0?
Ej
δj > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 -
δj < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
Notes: The cell in row i and column j reports the (quantitative) change in the elas-
ticity of the upper variable in column j (at the top) with respect to the parameter
in row i (at the left) following an increase in the lower variable in column j (at the
second row), differentiated whether the number of varieties is assumed to be fixed
(δj) or flexible (δj)(at the second column) [
?: change in the absolute value of the
elasticity].
Table 5.1: Properties of the Elasticities - Quantitative Differences across the Firms and
the Products
5.4 Conclusion
In a world with heterogeneous countries, this chapter examines the export product scope of
multi-product firms across destinations that substantially differ in terms of their per capita
income, which represents an issue so far largely ignored by the literature of international
trade. Capturing several robust empirical facts, in particular demand-side drivers of trade
and income, granularity of the economy, multi-product firms and their features, the analysis
is employed in a non-standard model with non-homothetic preferences on the demand
104See the Appendix F.15.19 for the proof.
105See the Appendix F.15.20 for the proof.
106See the Appendix F.15.19 for the proof.
107See the Appendix F.15.20 for the proof.
108See the Appendix F.15.19 for the proof.
109See the Appendix F.15.20 for the proof.
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and imperfect competition, i.e. Cournot competition, on the supply side. Multi-product
firms in this setting export more varieties to countries with a higher per capita income,
whereas their choice of the export scope is essentially determined by both within-firm
cannibalization and income effects. By displaying this behaviour, firms expand or shorten
their scope along their products ladder depending on the destination’s per capita income.
The price and scope adjustments of these multi-product firms in response to changes in
the income and transportation cost that are derived in the model thereby replicate several
robust empirical facts.
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Appendix F
F.1 Income Effect on the Price Elasticity of Demand
Given the aggregate demand
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
b
(a− λjpf,ij(ω)) ,
the marginal utility of income
λj =
1
LjEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω =
∆
LjEj
,
with ∆ ≡∑Ii=1∑mif=1 ∫ δf,ij0 (a− bLj xf,ij(ω))xf,ij(ω)dω, and the elasticity of demand with
respect to the price (in its absolute value)
εf,ij(ω) =
λjpf,ij(ω)
a− λjpf,ij(ω) ,
the effect of the per capita income on the price elasticity of demand can be derived:
dεf,ij(ω)
dEj
=
∂εf,ij(ω)
∂λj
dλj
dEj
.
The per capita income thereby affects the marginal utility of income as follows:
dλj
dEj
=
∂λj
∂Ej
+
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
dxf,ij(ω)
dEj
dω
and the aggregate demand of variety ω as follows:
dxf,ij(ω)
dEj
=
∂xf,ij(ω)
∂λj
dλj
dEj
= −Lj
b
pf,ij(ω)
dλj
dEj
.
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Putting this together yields
dλj
dEj
=
∂λj
∂Ej
+
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
(
−Lj
b
pf,ij(ω)
dλj
dEj
)
dω,
dλj
dEj
= −∆
Lj
1
E2j
−
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
1
LjEj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
Lj
b
pf,ij(ω)dω
dλj
dEj
,
dλj
dEj
= −∆
Lj
1
E2j
−
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
pf,ij(ω)
bEj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
dλj
dEj
,
dλj
dEj
(
1 +
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
pf,ij(ω)
bEj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
)
= −∆
Lj
1
E2j
and finally
dλj
dEj
= −∆
Lj
1
E2j
(
1 +
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
pf,ij(ω)
bEj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
)−1
< 0,
given the model assumption that Lj > 2
b
a
xf,ij(ω). Overall, one gets
dεf,ij(ω)
dEj
=
∂εf,ij(ω)
∂λj︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dλj
dEj︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0. (F.1)
F.2 First-order Condition with Respect to the Quan-
tity (FOC-Q)
Taking the derivative of the firm’s profit function (equation (5.8)) with respect to the
quantity xf,ij(ω) yields the first-order condition with respect to this variable:
∂Πf,i
∂xf,ij(ω)
=
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− cf,ij(ω) + xf,ij(ω)
− ∂λj∂xf,ij(ω)
λ2j
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− b
λjLj

+
∫ δf,ij
0\ω
xf,ij(ω)
− ∂λj∂xf,ij(ω)
λ2j
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
) dω != 0,
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
+
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
− 1
λ2j
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
))
dω
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
−xf,ij(ω) b
λjLj
= cf,ij(ω),
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− xf,ij(ω) b
λjLj
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+
∫ δf,ij
0
(
−xf,ij(ω)
λ2j
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
))
dω
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
= cf,ij(ω),
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
+
∫ δf,ij
0
(
−xf,ij(ω)
λ2j
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
))
dω
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
= cf,ij(ω)
and
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
= cf,ij(ω). (F.2)
F.3 Marginal Utility of Income
Being distinctive and unique of the chapter’s model, the marginal utility of income gets
influenced by the firm’s choice, i.e. the quantity produced, xf,ij(ω), and the number of
products produced, δf,ij:
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
=
1
EjLj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω
)
,
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
=
1
EjLj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
(F.3)
and
∂λj
∂δf,ij
=
1
EjLj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij). (F.4)
F.4 Market Dominance and FOC-Q
With the market dominance of firm f located in country i in country j given by gf,ij and
defined as a measure of the firm’s sales (revenue) share in the country’s market,
gf,ij =
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)pf,ij(ω)dω∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)pf,ij(ω)dω
=
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)λjpf,ij(ω)dω∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)λjpf,ij(ω)dω
and
gf,ij =
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
, (F.5)
and equation (F.1), as well as the expression for the marginal utility of income, given
by equation (5.5), the first-order condition with respect to the quantity xf,ij(ω) can be
rewritten to get:
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
∂λj
∂xf,ij(ω)
= cf,ij(ω),
276 APPENDIX F.
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
(
1
EjLj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
))
= cf,ij(ω),
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)[
1− 1
λjEjLj
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
]
= cf,ij(ω),
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)1− 1
EjLj
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
1
EjLj
∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
 = cf,ij(ω),
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)1− ∫ δf,ij0 xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
 = cf,ij(ω)
and
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
[1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(ω). (F.6)
F.5 First-order Condition with Respect to the Scope
(FOC-S)
Taking the derivative of the firm’s profit function (equation (5.8)) with respect to the scope
δf,ij yields the first-order condition with respect to this variable:
∂Πf,i
∂δf,ij
=
(
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
− cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
+
∫ δf,ij
0
− 1
λ2j
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω
∂λj
∂δf,ij
!
= 0,
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
∂λj
∂δf,ij
−cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij) = 0
and (
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
− cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
=
1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
xf,ij(ω)
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
dω
∂λj
∂δf,ij
(F.7)
F.6 Market Dominance and FOC-S
Using the market dominance of firm f located in country i in country j, given by gf,ij,
and equation (F.2), as well as the expression for the marginal utility of income, given by
equation (5.5), the first-order condition with respect to the scope δf,ij can be rewritten to
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get: (
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
− cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
=
1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω
∂λj
∂δf,ij
,
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω
∂λj
∂δf,ij
= cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij),
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)− 1
λ2j
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω
×
(
1
EjLj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
= cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij),
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
[
1− 1
λjEjLj
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω
]
= cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij),
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
1− 1
EjLj
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω
1
EjLj
∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω

= cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij),
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij)
1− ∫ δf,ij0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω

= cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij)
and
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
xf,ij(δf,ij) [1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(δf,ij)xf,ij(δf,ij). (F.8)
F.7 Product Scope
Proven by a contradiction, the firm expands its scope until the demand for the marginal
variety is driven down to zero: xf,ij(δf,ij) = 0.
First, it is assumed that the demand for the marginal variety is strictly positive:
xf,ij(δf,ij) > 0. Then, the modified first-order condition with respect to scope (equation
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(5.12)) can be simplified to:
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
[1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(δf,ij)
and
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
=
1
1− gf,ij cf,ij(δf,ij). (F.9)
Second, the first-order condition with respect to the quantity (equation (5.10)) should also
be fulfilled for the marginal variety:
1
λj
(
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
[1− gf,ij] = cf,ij(δf,ij),
which can be rearranged:
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(δf,ij)
)
− b
λjLj
xf,ij(δf,ij) =
1
1− gf,ij cf,ij(δf,ij). (F.10)
Given the validity of both equation (F.6) and equation (F.7), it ultimately follows:
b
λjLj
xf,ij(δf,ij) = 0
and
xf,ij(δf,ij) = 0,
which contradicts the assumption above and finishes the proof.
F.8 Output and Price Profile
The first-order condition with respect to the quantity (equation (5.10)) can be rearranged:
a− 2 b
Lj
xf,ij(ω) =
1
1− gf,ij λjcf,ij(ω),
a− 1
1− gf,ij λjcf,ij(ω) = 2
b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
and
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
2b
(
a− 1
1− gf,ij λjcf,ij(ω)
)
.
By using equation (5.13), the optimal output profile can then be written:
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
2b
(
a− 1
1− gf,ij
a
cf,ij(δf,ij)
[1− gf,ij] cf,ij(ω)
)
,
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xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
2b
(
a− a cf,ij(ω)
cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
and
xf,ij(ω) =
aLj
2b
(
1− cf,ij(ω)
cf,ij(δf,ij)
)
.
The aggregate inverse demand is given by:
pf,ij(ω) =
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
.
By plugging in the optimal output profile and using equation (5.13), one gets for the
optimal price profile:
pf,ij(ω) =
1
λj
(
a− b
Lj
aLj
2b
(
1− cf,ij(ω)
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,
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)
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a [1− gf,ij]
a
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1 +
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)
,
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1
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and
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1
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(
1 +
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cf,ij(ω)
)
cf,ij(ω).
F.9 Export Revenue
The optimal exports of the product variety ω by the firm to country j can be derived
from equation (5.10) by rearrangement and together with the cost specification (equation
(5.16)) written as:
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
2b
(
a− 1
1− gf,ij λjcf,ij(ω)
)
=
Lj
2b
(
a− 1
1− gf,ij λjτijwizf,iω
η
)
.
For the price of the variety, one therefore gets:
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)
=
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(
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Lj
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a− 1
1− gf,ij λjτijwizf,iω
η
))
and
pf,ij(ω) =
1
λj
(
a
2
+
1
2
1
1− gf,ij λjτijwizf,iω
η
)
=
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η
)
.
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The firm’s revenue from the exports of the product variety ω to country j is then given by:
pf,ij(ω)xf,ij(ω) =
1
2λj
(
a+
1
1− gf,ij λjτijwizf,iω
η
)
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η
)
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4bλj
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a2 −
(
1
1− gf,ij λjτijwizf,iω
η
)2)
.
By summing it up over the firm’s export scope and using equation (5.13) for the firm’s
optimal scope, one gets the firm’s revenue from exports to country j:
Rf,ij =
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0
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δf,ij − 1
2η + 1
δf,ij
)
=
a2Lj
2bλj
η
(2η + 1)
δf,ij
and
Rf,ij =
a2Lj
2b
η
(2η + 1)
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij
a [1− gf,ij] δf,ij =
a
2b
η
(2η + 1)
Ljτijwizf,i
[1− gf,ij] δ
η+1
f,ij . (F.11)
F.10 Export Product Scope
The firm’s optimal export scope is implicitly given by:
cf,ij(δf,ij) =
a
λj
[1− gf,ij] ,
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whereas the marginal utility of income can be written as:
λj =
1
EjLj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω)dω.
By plugging in the optimal quantity from the modified first-order condition (equation
(5.10)), the integrand gets the form:(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) =
(
a− b
Lj
Lj
2b
(
a− λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
))
Lj
2b
(
a− λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)
,
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) =
(
a− 1
2
(
a− λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
))
Lj
2b
(
a− λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)
,(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) =
(
a
2
+
λj
2 [1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)
Lj
2b
(
a− λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)
,(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) =
1
2
(
a+
λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)
Lj
2b
(
a− λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)
,
(
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
4b
(
a2 −
(
λj
[1− gf,ij]cf,ij(ω)
)2)
and (
a− b
Lj
xf,ij(ω)
)
xf,ij(ω) =
Lj
4b
(
a2 −
(
λj
[1− gf,ij]τijwizf,iω
η
)2)
,
such that
λj =
1
EjLj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
Lj
4b
(
a2 −
(
λj
[1− gf,ij]τijwizf,iω
η
)2)
dω,
λj =
1
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
∫ δf,ij
0
(
a2 −
(
λj
[1− gf,ij]τijwizf,i
)2
ω2η
)
dω,
λj =
1
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
[
a2ω − 1
2η + 1
(
λj
[1− gf,ij]τijwizf,i
)2
ω2η+1
]δf,ij
0
and
λj =
1
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
(
a2δf,ij − 1
2η + 1
(
λj
[1− gf,ij]τijwizf,i
)2
δ2η+1f,ij
)
.
With the expression for λj from equation (5.13), the marginal utility of income finally gets:
λj =
1
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
a2δf,ij − 1
2η + 1
(
1
[1− gf,ij]
a
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij
[1− gf,ij] τijwizf,i
)2
δ2η+1f,ij
 ,
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λj =
1
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
a2δf,ij − 1
2η + 1
(
a
δηf,ij
)2
δ2η+1f,ij
 ,
λj =
1
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
(
a2δf,ij − a
2
2η + 1
δf,ij
)
,
λj =
a2
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
(
δf,ij
(
1− 1
2η + 1
))
=
a2
4bEj
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
2η
2η + 1
δf,ij
and
λj =
a2
4bEj
2η
2η + 1
I∑
i=1
mi∑
f=1
δf,ij =
a2
4bEj
2η
2η + 1
δj,
where δj =
∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1 δf,ij denotes the number of varieties available in country j. For the
firm’s optimal scope, one therefore derives
cf,ij(δf,ij) =
a
λj
[1− gf,ij] ,
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij = a [1− gf,ij]
4bEj
a2
2η + 1
2η
1
δj
,
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij =
4bEj
a
[
1 +
1
2η
]
[1− gf,ij] 1
δj
,
δηf,ij =
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
[
1 +
1
2η
]
[1− gf,ij] Ej
δj
and
δf,ij =
[
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
[
1 +
1
2η
]
[1− gf,ij] Ej
δj
] 1
η
. (F.12)
F.11 Market Dominance
The market dominance of firm f located in country i in country j can be written as the
ratio of the firm’s export scope to the destination and the overall number of varieties
available in country j:
gf,ij =
Rf,ij∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1Rf,ij
=
a2Lj
2bλj
η
(2η+1)
δf,ij∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1
a2Lj
2bλj
η
(2η+1)
δf,ij
and
gf,ij =
a2Lj
2bλj
η
(2η+1)
δf,ij
a2Lj
2bλj
η
(2η+1)
∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1 δf,ij
=
δf,ij∑I
i=1
∑mi
f=1 δf,ij
=
δf,ij
δj
.
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F.12 Relationship between the Market Dominance and
the Scope
For the relationship between a firm’s market dominance and its export scope, one gets:
dδf,ij
dgf,ij
=
1
η + 1
[
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
[
1 +
1
2η
]
[1− gf,ij] gf,ijEj
] 1
η+1
−1
4b
a
1
τijwizf,i
[
1 +
1
2η
]
Ej
× (1− gf,ij − gf,ij) ≶ 0
and
dδf,ij
dgf,ij
≶ 0 ⇔ 1− 2gf,ij ≶ 0 ⇔ 0.5 ≶ gf,ij. (F.13)
F.13 Export Costs and Export Profits
By plugging in the optimal quantity from the modified first-order condition (equation
(5.10)) and by using equation (5.13) for the optimal scope, the firm’s costs from exporting
to country j are:
Cf,ij =
∫ δf,ij
0
cf,ij(ω)xf,ij(ω)dω =
∫ δf,ij
0
τijwizf,iω
ηxf,ij(ω)dω,
Cf,ij =
∫ δf,ij
0
τijwizf,iω
ηLj
2b
(
a− 1
[1− gf,ij]λjcf,ij(ω)
)
dω,
Cf,ij =
∫ δf,ij
0
τijwizf,iω
ηLj
2b
(
a− 1
[1− gf,ij]λjτijwizf,iω
η
)
dω,
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
∫ δf,ij
0
(
aτijwizf,iω
η − 1
[1− gf,ij]λj (τijwizf,i)
2 ω2η
)
dω,
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
[
1
η + 1
aτijwizf,iω
η+1 − 1
2η + 1
1
[1− gf,ij]λj (τijwizf,i)
2 ω2η+1
]δf,ij
0
,
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
(
1
η + 1
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij −
1
2η + 1
1
[1− gf,ij]λj (τijwizf,i)
2 δ2η+1f,ij
)
,
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
(
1
η + 1
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij −
1
2η + 1
1
[1− gf,ij]
(
a [1− gf,ij]
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij
)
(τijwizf,i)
2 δ2η+1f,ij
)
,
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
(
1
η + 1
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij −
1
2η + 1
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
)
,
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
(
1
η + 1
− 1
2η + 1
)
=
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
(
2η + 1− η − 1
(η + 1)(2η + 1)
)
and
Cf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,i
η
(η + 1)(2η + 1)
δη+1f,ij . (F.14)
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The export profits of the firm from serving country j are then given by:
Πf,ij = Rf,ij − Cf,ij = Lj
2b
η
(2η + 1)
aτijwizf,i
[1− gf,ij]δ
η+1
f,ij −
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,i
η
(η + 1)(2η + 1)
δη+1f,ij ,
Πf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
(
η
(2η + 1)
1
[1− gf,ij] −
η
(η + 1)(2η + 1)
)
,
Πf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
(
η(η + 1)
(η + 1)(2η + 1)(1− gf,ij) −
η(1− gf,ij)
(η + 1)(2η + 1)(1− gf,ij)
)
,
Πf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
(
η(η + 1)− η(1− gf,ij)
(η + 1)(2η + 1)(1− gf,ij)
)
and
Πf,ij =
Lj
2b
aτijwizf,iδ
η+1
f,ij
η(η + gf,ij)
(η + 1)(2η + 1)(1− gf,ij) . (F.15)
F.14 Export Ratio
The sales ratio of two varieties ω and ω′ of firm f in country j is given by:
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
=
Lj
4bλj
(
a2 −
(
1
1−gf,ijλjτijwizf,iω
η
)2)
Lj
4bλj
(
a2 −
(
1
1−gf,ijλjτijwizf,i (ω
′)η
)2) = a2 −
(
1
1−gf,ijλjτijwizf,iω
η
)2
a2 −
(
1
1−gf,ijλjτijwizf,i (ω
′)η
)2 .
By using equation (5.13) for the firm’s optimal scope, it can be rewritten:
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
=
a2 −
(
1
1−gf,ij
(
a[1−gf,ij]
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij
)
τijwizf,iω
η
)2
a2 −
(
1
1−gf,ij
(
a[1−gf,ij]
τijwizf,iδ
η
f,ij
)
τijwizf,i (ω′)
η
)2 = a2 −
(
aωη
δηf,ij
)2
a2 −
(
a(ω′)η
δηf,ij
)2
and
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
=
a2 − a2
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η
a2 − a2
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η = 1−
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η . (F.16)
For two varieties ω and ω′ with ω < ω′, the sales ratio is decreasing in the firm’s scope:
∂
(
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
)
∂δf,ij
=
2η
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η−1
ωδ−2f,ij
(
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η)
−
(
1−
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η)
2η
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η−1
(ω′) δ−2f,ij(
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η)2 ,
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∂
(
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
)
∂δf,ij
=
2ηδ−2η−1f,ij
(
ω2η
(
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η)
−
(
1−
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η)
(ω′)2η
)
(
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η)2 ,
∂
(
rf,ij(ω)
rf,ij(ω′)
)
∂δf,ij
S 0 ⇔ ω2η
(
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η)
−
(
1−
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η)
(ω′)2η S 0
⇔ ω2η
(
1−
(
ω′
δf,ij
)2η)
S
(
1−
(
ω
δf,ij
)2η)
(ω′)2η
⇔ ω2η −
(
ωω′
δf,ij
)2η
S (ω′)2η −
(
(ω′)ω
δf,ij
)2η
⇔ ω2η S (ω′)2η
⇔ ω S ω′.
F.15 Comparative Statics
F.15.1 Price Elasticity with Respect to the Transportation Cost
(PETC)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the scope
with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.17)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the market
dominance with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.18)
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Taking the logarithm of equation (5.24) yields
ln pf,ij(ω) = ln (τijwizf,i)− ln (2 (1− gf,ij)) + ln
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the price with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
.
By using equation (F.18), the last equation can be reduced to
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
(
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(F.19)
and equation (F.17) can also be reduced to
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
1 +
gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
= −1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
η (1− gf,ij)
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij = −
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij . (F.20)
Finally, plugging equation (F.20) into equation (F.19) provides the price elasticity with
respect to the transportation cost:
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(1− gf,ij)
)(
− 1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1− ηδ
η
f,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1− ηδ
η
f,ij − ηδηf,ijgf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)− ηδηf,ij + ηδηf,ijgf,ij − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηωη + ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijωη − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij − ηδηf,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)
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+
ηδηf,ijgf,ij − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηωη − ηgf,ijωη(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηωη (1− gf,ij)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
. (F.21)
F.15.2 Markup Elasticity with Respect to the Transportation
Cost (METC)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the scope
with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.22)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the market
dominance with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.23)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.25) yields
lnµf,ij(ω) = ln (1)− ln (2 (1− gf,ij)) + ln
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the markup with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln τij
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.24)
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Plugging equation (F.23) into equation (F.22) yields
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
1 +
gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
= −1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
η (1− gf,ij)
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij = −
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij . (F.25)
Plugging equation (F.23) and equation (F.25) into equation (F.24) provides the elasticity
of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
((
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
((
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)(
− 1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
)
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
ωη
ωη + δηf,ij
ηδηf,ij
ωη
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)(
− 1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
)
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(1− gf,ij)
)(
− 1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
)
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= −ηδ
η
f,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
. (F.26)
F.15.3 Properties of the PETC
The price elasticity with respect to the transportation cost is less than one:
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
< 1 ⇔ ηω
η (1− gf,ij)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
< 1
⇔ ηωη (1− gf,ij) <
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
⇔ ηωη − ηgf,ijωη < ηωη − ηgf,ijωη + gf,ijωη + ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijδηf,ij
0 < gf,ijω
η + ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijδηf,ij = gf,ijωη + ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ijδηf,ij.
The transportation cost elasticity of the price is decreasing with the firm’s market domi-
nance:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
−ηωη (ωη + δηf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)− ηωη (1− gf,ij) (ωη + δηf,ij) (−η + 1)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
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∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
−ηωη (ωη + δηf,ij) [η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij + (1− gf,ij) (1− η)]((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
−ηωη (ωη + δηf,ij) [η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij + 1− η − gf,ij + ηgf,ij]((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
= − ηω
η
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
The transportation cost elasticity of the price is decreasing with the firm’s export scope:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂δf,ij
= −ηω
η (1− gf,ij) ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂δf,ij
= −η
2ωηδη−1f,ij (1− gf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
The transportation cost elasticity of the price is increasing in each firm’s product portfolio:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
η2ωη−1 (1− gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−ηω
η (1− gf,ij) ηωη−1 (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
(1− gf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
[
η2ωη−1
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)− η2ω2η−1]((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
η2ωη−1 (1− gf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
[
ωη + δηf,ij − ωη
]((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
η2ωη−1δηf,ij (1− gf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
F.15.4 Properties of the METC
The absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
is increasing in the firm’s market dominance:
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(−ηδηf,ij + ωη + δηf,ij) (ωη + δηf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
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−
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(−η + 1)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((−ηδηf,ij + ωη + δηf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
(1− η))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((−ηδηf,ij + ωη + δηf,ij) (η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((
ηδηf,ij − ηδηf,ijgf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij
)
(1− η))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (−η2δηf,ij + η2gf,ijδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + ηωη − ηgf,ijωη + gf,ijωη)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
+
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijδηf,ij − ηδηf,ij + ηgf,ijδηf,ij − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
+
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
η2δηf,ij − η2gf,ijδηf,ij + ηgf,ijωη + ηgf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
ηωη
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
is increasing in the firm’s export scope:
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(
η2δη−1f,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ijηδη−1f,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) ηδη−1f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
η2δη−1f,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ijηδη−1f,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(
η2δηf,ijδ
η−1
f,ij (1− gf,ij) + ηδη−1f,ij gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) (1− gf,ij) η2δη−1f,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij − δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
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and
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) (1− gf,ij) η2δη−1f,ij ωη((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
is decreasing in each firm’s product portfolio:
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
=
gf,ijηω
η−1 (ωη + δηf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) ηωη−1((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
=
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(
gf,ijηω
η−1 (ωη + δηf,ij))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(
η2δηf,ijω
η−1 (1− gf,ij) + gf,ijηωη−1
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
= −(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) η
2δηf,ijω
η−1 (1− gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
F.15.5 Price Elasticity with Respect to the Per Capita Income
(PEPCI)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.24) yields
ln pf,ij(ω) = ln (τijwizf,i)− ln (2 [1− gf,ij]) + ln
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the price with respect to the per capita
income is given by
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.27)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
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and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the scope
with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.28)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the market
dominance with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.29)
By using equation (F.29), equation (F.28) can be written as
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
1 +
gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
=
1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij . (F.30)
Finally, by plugging equation (F.29) and equation (F.30) into equation (F.27), the price
elasticity with respect to the per capita income derives as
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(1− gf,ij)
)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(1− gf,ij)
)(
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
)
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
. (F.31)
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F.15.6 Markup Elasticity with Respect to the Per Capita Income
(MEPCI)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the scope
with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.32)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative while assuming a constant δj, the elasticity of the market
dominance with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.33)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.25) yields
lnµf,ij(ω) = ln (1)− ln (2 [1− gf,ij]) + ln
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the markup with respect to the per
capita income is given by
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ lnEj
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.34)
Plugging equation (F.33) into equation (F.32) yields
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
1 +
gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
)
=
1
η
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and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
η (1− gf,ij)
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij =
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij . (F.35)
Plugging equation (F.33) and equation (F.35) into equation (F.34) provides the elasticity
of the markup with respect to the per capita income
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
((
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
((
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij ,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
ωη
ωη + δηf,ij
ηδηf,ij
ωη
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
)
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij ,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(1− gf,ij)
)
1− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
. (F.36)
F.15.7 Properties of the PEPCI
The income elasticity of the price is increasing in the firm’s market dominance:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(−ηδηf,ij + ωη + δηf,ij) (ωη + δηf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(−η + 1)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (−ηδηf,ij + ωη + δηf,ij) (η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
− (ωη + δηf,ij)
(
ηδηf,ij − ηδηf,ijgf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij
)
(1− η)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)×
−η2δηf,ij + η2gf,ijδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + ηωη − ηgf,ijωη + gf,ijωη + ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijδηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
− (ωη + δηf,ij)×
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ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij − η2δηf,ij + η2gf,ijδηf,ij − ηgf,ijωη − ηgf,ijδηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ηωη((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The income elasticity of the price is increasing in the firm’s export scope:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
(
η2δη−1f,ij (1− gf,ij) + ηgf,ijδη−1f,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) ηδη−1f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
= ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
= ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
ηωη + ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijωη − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
= ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
ηωη − ηgf,ijωη((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) ηωη (1− gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The income elasticity of the price is decreasing in each firm’s product portfolio:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
ηgf,ijω
η−1 (ωη + δηf,ij) (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) ηωη−1((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
= ηωη−1 (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
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−ηωη−1 (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
ηδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
(
ηgf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
= −ηω
η−1 (η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij) ηδηf,ij (1− gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
F.15.8 Properties of the MEPCI
Since the markup elasticity MEPCI equals the price elasticity PEPCI, i.e.
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
,
their properties are identical:
∂
(
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
> 0,
∂
(
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
> 0
and
∂
(
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
< 0.
F.15.9 Scope Elasticity with Respect to the Transportation Cost
(SETC′)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the scope with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
− 1
η
d ln δj
d ln τij
. (F.37)
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Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the market dominance with respect to
the transportation cost is given by
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
. (F.38)
Taking the logarithm of the general relation
δj =
∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
yields
ln δj = ln
(∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the overall number of varieties available
in country j with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln δj
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δj
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
δf,ij
δj
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.39)
Plugging equation (F.38) and equation (F.39) into equation (F.37) provides the elasticity
of the scope with respect to the transportation cost
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
)
− 1
η
d ln δj
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d ln τ
− gf,ij d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
)
− 1
η
gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− 2gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
1 + 2
gf,ij
η
)
= −1
η
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
η + 2gf,ij
η
)
= −1
η
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and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= − 1
η + 2gf,ij
. (F.40)
F.15.10 Properties of the SETC′
The absolute value of the elasticity of the scope with respect to the transportation cost is
decreasing in the firm’s market dominance:
∂
(∣∣d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
−2
(η + 2gf,ij)
2 = −
2
(η + 2gf,ij)
2 < 0.
F.15.11 Scope Elasticity with Respect to the Per Capita Income
(SEPCI′)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the scope with respect to the per capita
income is given by
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
− 1
η
d ln δj
d lnEj
. (F.41)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the market dominance with respect to
the per capita income is given by
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
. (F.42)
Taking the logarithm of the general relation
δj =
∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
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yields
ln δj = ln
(∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the overall number of varieties available
in country j with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln δj
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δj
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
= gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.43)
Plugging equation (F.42) and equation (F.43) into equation (F.41) provides the elasticity
of the scope with respect to the per capita income
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
)
− 1
η
d ln δj
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− gf,ij d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
)
− 1
η
gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− 2gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
1 + 2
gf,ij
η
)
=
1
η
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
η + 2gf,ij
η
)
=
1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η + 2gf,ij
. (F.44)
F.15.12 Properties of the SEPCI′
The elasticity of the scope with respect to the per capita income is decreasing in the firm’s
market dominance:
∂
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
−2
(η + 2gf,ij)
2 = −
2
(η + 2gf,ij)
2 < 0.
F.15.13 Price Elasticity with Respect to the Transportation Cost
(PETC′)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.24) yields
ln pf,ij(ω) = ln (τijwizf,i)− ln (2 [1− gf,ij]) + ln
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
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and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the price with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.45)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the market dominance with respect to
the transportation cost is given by
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
. (F.46)
Taking the logarithm of the general relation
δj =
∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
yields
ln δj = ln
(∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the overall number of varieties available
in country j with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln δj
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δj
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
δf,ij
δj
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.47)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the scope with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
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and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
− 1
η
d ln δj
d ln τij
. (F.48)
Plugging equation (F.46) and equation (F.47) into equation (F.45) yields
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
(
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+ gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= 1 +
(
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
+ gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.49)
Plugging equation (F.46) and equation (F.47) into equation (F.48) yields
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
)
− 1
η
d ln δj
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− 1
η
gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− 2gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
1 + 2
gf,ij
η
)
= −1
η
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
η + 2gf,ij
η
)
= −1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= − 1
η + 2gf,ij
. (F.50)
Plugging equation (F.50) into equation (F.49) provides the elasticity of the price with
respect to the transportation cost
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1 +
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
(
− 1
η + 2gf,ij
)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= 1− ηδ
η
f,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
,
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d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)− ηδηf,ij − gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηωη + ηδηf,ij + 2gf,ijω
η + 2gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηδηf,ij − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηωη + gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
=
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
. (F.51)
F.15.14 Markup Elasticity with Respect to the Transportation
Cost (METC′)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.25) yields
lnµf,ij(ω) = ln (1)− ln (2 (1− gf,ij)) + ln
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the markup with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln τij
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
[1− gf,ij]
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.52)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the market dominance with respect to
the transportation cost is given by
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
=
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
. (F.53)
Taking the logarithm of the general relation
δj =
∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
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yields
ln δj = ln
(∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the overall number of varieties available
in country j with respect to the transportation cost is given by
d ln δj
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δj
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
δf,ij
δj
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.54)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the scope with respect to the trans-
portation cost is given by
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d ln τij
and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d ln τij
− 1
η
d ln δj
d ln τij
. (F.55)
Plugging equation (F.53) and equation (F.54) into equation (F.55) yields
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
)
− 1
η
d ln δj
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− 1
η
gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= −1
η
− 2gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
1 + 2
gf,ij
η
)
= −1
η
,
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
(
η + 2gf,ij
η
)
= −1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
= − 1
η + 2gf,ij
. (F.56)
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Plugging equation (F.53) and equation (F.54) into equation (F.52) yields
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
[1− gf,ij]
(
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
− d ln δj
d ln τij
)
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+
gf,ij
[1− gf,ij] [1− gf,ij]
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
+gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
=
(
ωη
ωη + δηf,ij
ηδηf,ij
ωη
+ gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d ln τij
. (F.57)
Plugging equation (F.56) into equation (F.57) provides the elasticity of the markup with
respect to the transportation cost
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
(
− 1
η + 2gf,ij
)
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
= −ηδ
η
f,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
. (F.58)
F.15.15 Properties of the PETC′
The price elasticity with respect to the transportation cost is less than one:
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
< 1 ⇔ ω
η (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
< 1
⇔ ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδηf,ij <
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
⇔ ηωη + gf,ijωη + gf,ijδηf,ij < ηωη + 2gf,ijωη + ηδηf,ij + 2gf,ijδηf,ij
⇔ 0 < gf,ijωη + ηδηf,ij + gf,ijδηf,ij.
For the proportion of the PETC and the PETC′, one gets
ε¯p,τ T εp,τ ⇔ ηω
η (1− gf,ij)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
T
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
⇔ ηω
η (1− gf,ij)
η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij T
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
η + 2gf,ij
⇔ ηωη (1− gf,ij) (η + 2gf,ij) T
(
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
)
(η (1− gf,ij) + gf,ij)
⇔ (ηωη − ηgf,ijωη) (η + 2gf,ij) T
(
ηωη + gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
)
(η − ηgf,ij + gf,ij)
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⇔ η2ωη+2ηgf,ijωη−η2gf,ijωη−2ηg2f,ijωη T η2ωη−η2gf,ijωη+ηgf,ijωη+ηgf,ijωη−ηg2f,ijωη
+g2f,ijω
η + ηgf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηg2f,ijδηf,ij + g2f,ijδηf,ij
⇔ −2ηg2f,ijωη T −ηg2f,ijωη + g2f,ijωη + ηgf,ijδηf,ij − ηg2f,ijδηf,ij + g2f,ijδηf,ij
⇔ ηg2f,ijδηf,ij − ηgf,ijδηf,ij − g2f,ijδηf,ij T g2f,ijωη − ηg2f,ijωη + 2ηg2f,ijωη
⇔ δηf,ij
(
ηg2f,ij − ηgf,ij − g2f,ij
)
T ηg2f,ijωη + g2f,ijωη
⇔ δηf,ij
(
ηg2f,ij − ηgf,ij − g2f,ij
)
T ωη
(
ηg2f,ij + g
2
f,ij
)
⇔ δηf,ij
(
(η − 1) g2f,ij − ηgf,ij
)
T ωη
(
(η + 1) g2f,ij
)
.
The transportation cost elasticity of the price is increasing with the firm’s market domi-
nance:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)−
(
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
)
2
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)− 2
(
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ηωη + ηδηf,ij + 2gf,ijω
η + 2gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − 2ηωη − 2gf,ijωη − 2gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (−ηωη + ηδηf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 = η
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
δηf,ij − ωη
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The transportation cost elasticity of the price is decreasing with the firm’s export scope:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)−
(
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij) ηδ
η−1
f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij (η + 2gf,ij)
(
gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)− ωη (η + gf,ij)− gf,ijδηf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij (η + 2gf,ij)
(
gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηωη − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂δf,ij
= − ηδ
η−1
f,ij (η + 2gf,ij) ηω
η((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
306 APPENDIX F.
The transportation cost elasticity of the price is increasing in each firm’s product portfolio:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η + gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ωη (η + gf,ij) + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij) ηω
η−1((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η + 2gf,ij)
(
(η + gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)− ωη (η + gf,ij)− gf,ijδηf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η + 2gf,ij)
(
ηωη + ηδηf,ij + gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηωη − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η + 2gf,ij) ηδ
η
f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
F.15.16 Properties of the METC′
The absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
is decreasing in the firm’s market dominance:
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)−
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
2
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)− 2
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ηωη + 2gf,ijω
η + ηδηf,ij + 2gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − 2ηδηf,ij − 2gf,ijωη − 2gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ηωη − ηδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 = −
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
η
(
δηf,ij − ωη
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂gf,ij
= − η
(
δ2ηf,ij − ω2η
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
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The absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
is increasing in the firm’s export scope:
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(
η2δη−1f,ij + ηgf,ijδ
η−1
f,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
η (η + 2gf,ij) δ
η−1
f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(η + 2gf,ij)
(
η2δη−1f,ij ω
η + η2δη−1f,ij δ
η
f,ij + ηgf,ijδ
η−1
f,ij ω
η + ηgf,ijδ
η−1
f,ij δ
η
f,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
−(η + 2gf,ij)
(
η2δηf,ijδ
η−1
f,ij + ηgf,ijω
ηδη−1f,ij + ηgf,ijδ
η
f,ijδ
η−1
f,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂δf,ij
=
(η + 2gf,ij) η
2δη−1f,ij ω
η((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The absolute value of the elasticity of the markup with respect to the transportation cost
is decreasing in each firm’s product portfolio:
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
=
ηgf,ijω
η−1 (ωη + δηf,ij) (η + 2gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
η (η + 2gf,ij)ω
η−1((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
=
(η + 2gf,ij)
(
ηgf,ijω
η−1 (ωη + δηf,ij)− ηωη−1 (ηδηf,ij + gf,ij (ωη + δηf,ij)))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
=
(η + 2gf,ij)
(
ηgf,ijω
η−1ωη + ηgf,ijωη−1δ
η
f,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
−(η + 2gf,ij)
(
η2ωη−1δηf,ij + ηω
η−1gf,ijωη + ηωη−1gf,ijδ
η
f,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(∣∣d lnµf,ij(ω)
d ln τij
∣∣)
∂ω
= − (η + 2gf,ij) η
2ωη−1δηf,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
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F.15.17 Price Elasticity with Respect to the Per Capita Income
(PEPCI′)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.24) yields
ln pf,ij(ω) = ln (τijwizf,i)− ln (2 [1− gf,ij]) + ln
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the price with respect to the per capita
income is given by
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln pf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.59)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the market dominance with respect to
the per capita income is given by
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
. (F.60)
Taking the logarithm of the general relation
δj =
∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
yields
ln δj = ln
(∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the overall number of varieties available
in country j with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln δj
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δj
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
δf,ij
δj
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
= gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.61)
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Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the scope with respect to the per capita
income is given by
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
− 1
η
d ln δj
d lnEj
. (F.62)
Plugging equation (F.60) and equation (F.61) into equation (F.62) yields
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
)
− 1
η
d ln δj
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− 1
η
gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− 2gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
1 + 2
gf,ij
η
)
=
1
η
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
η + 2gf,ij
η
)
=
1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η + 2gf,ij
. (F.63)
Plugging equation (F.60), equation (F.61) and equation (F.63) into equation (F.59) pro-
vides the elasticity of the price with respect to the per capita income
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
1− gf,ij
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
)
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+ gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
(
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
+ gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
1
η + 2gf,ij
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and
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
. (F.64)
F.15.18 Markup Elasticity with Respect to the Per Capita In-
come (MEPCI′)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.25) yields
lnµf,ij(ω) = ln (1)− ln (2 (1− gf,ij)) + ln
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the markup with respect to the per
capita income is given by
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ lnEj
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ lnµf,ij(ω)
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
(1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.65)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.27) yields
ln gf,ij = ln δf,ij − ln δj
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the market dominance with respect to
the per capita income is given by
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln gf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
=
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
. (F.66)
Taking the logarithm of the general relation
δj =
∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
yields
ln δj = ln
(∑
i
∑
f
δf,ij
)
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and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the overall number of varieties available
in country j with respect to the per capita income is given by
d ln δj
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δj
∂ ln δf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
δf,ij
δj
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
= gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.67)
Taking the logarithm of equation (5.26) yields
ln δf,ij =
1
η
(ln (4b)− ln (aτijwizf,i)) + 1
η
ln
(
1 +
1
2η
)
+
1
η
ln (1− gf,ij) + 1
η
(lnEj − ln δj)
and, by taking the total derivative, the elasticity of the scope with respect to the per capita
income is given by
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln gf,ij
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
+
∂ ln δf,ij
∂ ln δj
d ln δj
d lnEj
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
d ln gf,ij
d lnEj
− 1
η
d ln δj
d lnEj
. (F.68)
Plugging equation (F.66) and equation (F.67) into equation (F.68) yields
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
)
− 1
η
d ln δj
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η (1− gf,ij) (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− 1
η
gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η
− 2gf,ij
η
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
1 + 2
gf,ij
η
)
=
1
η
,
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
(
η + 2gf,ij
η
)
=
1
η
and
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
1
η + 2gf,ij
. (F.69)
Plugging equation (F.66) and equation (F.67) into equation (F.65) yields
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
(1− gf,ij)
(
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
− d ln δj
d lnEj
)
,
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+
gf,ij
(1− gf,ij) (1− gf,ij)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
,
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d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
(
1 +
δηf,ij
ωη
)−1 ηδηf,ij
ωη
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
+ gf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
=
(
ηδηf,ij
ωη + δηf,ij
+ gf,ij
)
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
d ln δf,ij
d lnEj
. (F.70)
Plugging equation (F.69) into equation (F.70) provides the elasticity of the markup with
respect to the per capita income
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
ωη + δηf,ij
1
η + 2gf,ij
and
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
. (F.71)
F.15.19 Properties of the PEPCI′
The income elasticity of the price is decreasing in the firm’s market dominance:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)−
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
2
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) ((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)− 2
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ηωη + ηδηf,ij + 2gf,ijω
η + 2gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − 2ηδηf,ij − 2gf,ijωη − 2gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ηωη − ηδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 =
(
ωη + δηf,ij
) (
ωη − δηf,ij
)
η((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
= −
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)
η
(
δηf,ij − ωη
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 = − η
(
δ2ηf,ij − ω2η
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
The income elasticity of the price is increasing in the firm’s export scope:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
(
η2δη−1f,ij + gf,ijηδ
η−1
f,ij
) (
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
−
(
ηδηf,ij + gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
))
(η + 2gf,ij) ηδ
η−1
f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
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∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij (η + 2gf,ij)
(
(η + gf,ij)
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)− ηδηf,ij − gf,ij (ωη + δηf,ij))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij (η + 2gf,ij)
(
ηωη + ηδηf,ij + gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηδηf,ij − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
ηδη−1f,ij (η + 2gf,ij) ηω
η((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 > 0.
The income elasticity of the price is decreasing in each firm’s product portfolio:
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
ηgf,ijω
η−1 (ωη + δηf,ij) (η + 2gf,ij)− (ηδηf,ij + gf,ij (ωη + δηf,ij)) (η + 2gf,ij) ηωη−1((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η + 2gf,ij)
(
gf,ij
(
ωη + δηf,ij
)− ηδηf,ij − gf,ij (ωη + δηf,ij))((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 ,
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
ηωη−1 (η + 2gf,ij)
(
gf,ijω
η + gf,ijδ
η
f,ij − ηδηf,ij − gf,ijωη − gf,ijδηf,ij
)((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2
and
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
= − ηω
η−1 (η + 2gf,ij) ηδ
η
f,ij((
ωη + δηf,ij
)
(η + 2gf,ij)
)2 < 0.
F.15.20 Properties of the MEPCI′
Since the markup elasticity MEPCI′ equals the price elasticity PEPCI′, i.e.
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
=
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
,
their properties are identical:
∂
(
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
=
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂gf,ij
< 0,
∂
(
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
=
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂δf,ij
> 0
and
∂
(
d lnµf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
=
∂
(
d ln pf,ij(ω)
d lnEj
)
∂ω
< 0.
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